All POW/MIA Senate Select Committee

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>

<TBODY>

<TR>

<TD bgColor=black>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/156.png</TD></TR>

<TR>

<TD bgColor=#999966></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Senate Select Committee - XL

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/157.pngFamilies

Missing a Loved One

Nothing can produce emotion, passion and controversy like war. How could anyone ever forget the scene of a returning POW from Vietnam kissing the ground as he first set foot on U.S. soil after years of captivity, and the thrill of watching his wife and children run across the tarmac and into his open arms? When a soldier comes home, it is a joyous reunion.

War also claims victims and produces often untold suffering. Men and women are killed, and their loved ones mourn. Taps, flags, military funerals, tears of sadness and shattered dreams are all products of war. One of the worst tragedies of all is that some simply become "missing." Their loved ones both mourn and hope. The years drag on, and the long wait for answers can become unbearable. In this regard, the Committee notes with sadness the tragic death last year of Mrs. Marion Shelton, the devoted wife of Capt. Charles Shelton, USAF, the only serviceman still officially listed by the Department of Defense as a "POW" captured in Laos during the war.

What could be worse than the emotional turmoil of "not knowing?" Two family members explained their feelings:

<TT>When a beloved son becomes missing in any war, parents like us become the living dead.</TT>

<TT>He loved the Air Force and because of that love, I chose to serve in the same branch. I feel I owe an awful lot to my big brother, Buddy. Not a day goes by that I don't wonder what happened to him and if he could still be alive.</TT>

<TT>For many Korean War POW/MIA families, this anguish has lasted for four decades; for Vietnam War POW/MIA families, many have hoped and prayed for 20 years.</TT>

<TT>National security is no longer a valid excuse for events that happened 40 years ago. . . .</TT>

<TT>I feel the American people need to understand some of the anguish that families experience when a father is taken away and there's no explanation given to the child as to why. . . .</TT>

<TT>[My daughter] writes, "I recently returned from Russia wher</TT><TT>e I spent two weeks with my mother searching for clues regarding my father's disappearance. I found no answers, just more questions. I don't know what to say, except that as I write this memories of my childhood haunt me, and I am crying. They are tears of sadness, for I never met my father.</TT>

<TT>"I grew up wondering what he was like. I was told he was dead. Then a year ago I found out he was probably taken prisoner of war at the time of the incident and might still even be alive. These days I cry, wondering about all the pain and suffering he must have endured, and I wonder if he's still alive somewhere in Russia, or maybe someone else is still alive.</TT>

<TT>"Please keep working on the exchange of information between our two countries. There are many good people on both sides willing to help."</TT>


Another Korean War veteran and POW/MIA family member also has wondered -- and persisted in his efforts to find the truth -- for more than 40 years:

<TT>I was a Korean War veteran; two tours of duty in Korea. I had four brothers on the front line at one time. My youngest brother was captured on November 4, 1950 at Anju, northeast of Anju, right up here on the map.</TT>

<TT>In 1953, when the last group of prisoners of war were released on September 3rd or 4th, and I looked at the television set after I had gotten home -- I came out all right -- and I didn't see my brother's name on that list, I told my mother and father there are three things wrong here. You have to be a prisoner of war, killed in action, or missing in action. That's three categories. And I'm sure he was one of those three, and I was hoping he would have been alive, and is still alive today.</TT>

<TT>So, I made a promise to my mother and father in 1950 that I would never stop looking for him until I brought him home, dead or alive.</TT>


Families' Views and Experiences

The Committee understands that it is impossible to make general statements about specific family members who have all suffered in their own way from the tragedy of having a "missing" loved one. Whether we speak of Vietnam or prior wars, the pain is the same.

Families are diverse in their views, in the particular circumstances surrounding the loss of their loved one, in the experiences they have had in dealing with their government, and in the feelings toward the Communist governments who hold answers.

Some believe the U.S. Government has done all it can over the years; others believe it has bungled inexcusably. Some of these families have decided to accept death and move on with their lives; others wait, convinced that living Americans remain in captivity.

No one among the Senators on this Committee is qualified to criticize the beliefs of the families. None of us has a missing loved one from a prior war. On these questions, every POW/MIA family member has fair claim to be considered an expert in the saddest, truest sense of the word.

The families have suffered the indignities of Communist governments who have refused to provide even basic humanitarian information and answers over the past half-century. They have endured the emotional roller-coaster ride of hope and failure year after year after year. They have watched governments in Southeast Asia dribble out remains and heard flat denials that records exist -- and then seen that these documents existed all along.

With the full cooperation of these governments in past years, results would have been obtained for many POW/MIA families long ago. Former President Nixon himself said in January 1992:

<TT>It has been obscene, the way they have just dribbled out information to these poor families who simply want to know what happened.</TT>


The families have been the victims of fraud and they have seen their own ranks divided by intense differences over the best way to obtain results. Through it all, they have persevered.

Through years of not knowing, both during and after the war, of bearing the brunt of bureaucracies incapable of answering questions or responding to requests, of grapplying with wrenching and sometimes conflicting information, and of dealing with the inhumane actions of former enemies, POW/MIA families have unfailingly kept their hopes alive and realistic.

The feelings and commitment of POW/MIA families may best have been summed up by the son of a serviceman shot down over Laos:

<TT>I was 16 years old when my dad was shot down. Dad was 42. He was a big man with a good sense of humor and a big appetite for life. He liked sports cars, bagpipe music, Irish whiskey; he fished, he rode broncos in the Rodeo; he loved New Mexico and the Air Force.</TT>

<TT>I remember him vividly, and miss him terribly. Nonetheless, I have long been resigned to the fact that he's almost certainly dead, and resigned to the fact that I will probably never know what happened to him. But that does not relieve me or you of the obligation to try to find out what did happen to him.</TT>

<TT>I don't expect the impossible, only the confidence that the Government that ordered my father into combat is doing all that it can to determine his fate and that my family knows all that this Government knows.</TT>


Families' Central Role in Committee's Work

The Committee owes its creation to the activism of family members, and from the beginning we sought to work closely with POW/MIA families. Family members were represented at the Committee's opening and closing hearings. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman addressed the 1992 conventions of the National League of Families and the National Alliance of Families.

To ensure that families' concerns were addressed, the Committee's Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to the primary next-of-kin of all 2,266 then unaccounted for servicemen in January 1992, seeking their advice and participation. Over the course of the Committee's year in existence, more than 100 responded, and both the League and the Alliance have actively monitored the Committee's work.

In addition, C-SPAN coverage of 18 of the Committee's 22 open hearings has kept an audience of 59 million viewers informed. "Please talk to as many families as you can -- they are the only ones holding the truth," one family member wrote. "I was glued to TV [coverage of the hearings] and watched until 5:30 a.m."

The questions before the American public are the ones that still gnaw at the families. If there are leads that can be traced to a living American serviceman, then there must be facts, places, dates, and descriptions or names. Some of the rhetorical questions of activists have been provocative, but at the same time the Government has jealously guarded its documents.

Through all of this, the families simply want answers and results. The Committee has focused on compelling leads and questions based on facts. The families deserved no less than an honest search to understand the truth. We sought information from all sources, public and private, including activists and current and former government officials.

The families of the missing deserve not merely words, but actions, answers, and -- above all -- the truth. The Committee has labored tirelessly in their behalf to provide them the truth. It is a labor of love, devotion, and gratitude.

The Search for Answers

In families' search for answers, two ingredients are essential. First, they must know the U.S. is pressing Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for all information they have. As the wife of a serviceman missing in Laos, explained:

<TT>"If these men are not alive today, it's because they were either starved, executed, mistreated, or simply died of broken hearts in the last 20 years it has taken to go looking for them. They [the Lao or Vietnamese] know where my husband is. I know this. My family will not rest until we find the fate of David."</TT>


Second, families must know that the U.S. is doing all it can on behalf of missing servicemen. As Ann Mills Griffiths, the League's Executive Director told the Committee:

<TT>The vast majority of the POW/MIA families are realistic. We don't expect miracles. We expect seriousness by our own government, Executive and Legislative branches, rather than spontaneous reaction to the squeaky wheel or the latest editorial.</TT>

<TT>Beyond that, however, what constitutes an answer about the fate of a missing loved one varies from individual to individual. To satisfy U.S. Government "accounting," policy requires "the man alive, the man's remains, or convincing evidence of why it's not possible." For families, the standard is generally different: photographs are compelling for some; for others, positively identified remains are the only acceptable proof; for still others, even remains are not convincing.</TT>


Many families know that the answers available most often are merely clues and not full answers; but few can accept inexplicably conflicting information as satisfactory, even in a partial answer:

<TT>[At the time of my brother's disappearance], the Army told us that every effort was being made to locate him, including dropping leaflets with his picture. Three months later, the story changed. They said he had been engaged in a skirmish, that he was ahead of the majority group and then shot. No other information was provided at the time and we never got his body or any of his personal effects. As far as my family is concerned, there are still many unanswered questions: What really happened? Who were the men with him? Where are his things?</TT>

<TT>I am not expecting a miracle, but I do want to know and have an explanation/accounting of what took place. Were there, for example, eyewitnesses? Is this a crash site that has previously been excavated? What is the terrain?. . . . My personal goal is to do for [him] what I couldn't do then and resolve my grief issues. . . This is the least I can do; Len and others like him made the ultimate sacrifice.</TT>

<TT>It was during a monsoon, and due to the terrain, a ground crew could not get to the plane and a helicopter could not land. After about seven days, they presumed them dead. . . . we have wondered for 23 or 24 years. Just to know for sure -- something -- would help. My mother has never remarried, thinking that someday a miracle might happen and he could come home. We all need to know. . .</TT>

<TT>He saved seven men and carried them to a safe place and then returned to his post. All of the men he saved have since died. This is just a father who is still hoping for that "someday" when we will hear more.</TT>

<TT>If my father is dead, I want him brought back and buried at Arlington with the rest of the dead heroes. Because no matter what anyone thinks of the futile and tragic war in Vietnam, the men who fought there were heroes. If my father is alive after all these years, he must think we've forgotten him. I want him to know that we haven't. There is still time to bring him home. If others are alive, we must bring them all home. My wish is simple. If my father is alive, I want to know him, not things about him. If he is dead, I want to be able to put a flower on his grave.</TT>


This search for the truth by the families was frustrated over the years by limited information from the governments of Southeast Asia, and by our own government's failure to provide satisfactory answers. In fact, according to many families, the policies and actions of the U.S. Government during and after the war not only failed to resolve the problems, but the lack of attention and focus in past years actually made things worse.

For families whose experience with the Government has shattered their faith in it, only full disclosure of everything the Government knows will reassure them.

U.S. Government Actions During the War

If there is one facet of the POW/MIA issue that is without ambiguity, without disagreement, it is that the treatment accorded families of missing Americans has deepened their anguish, not lessened it.

War-Time Secrecy

The difficulties confronting most families were rooted not only in their kin's loss, but also in the secrecy surrounding the loss. At first, families were not told -- sometimes for years -- that their husbands, sons or brothers had been captured. The impact of war- time secrecy on the lives of families can best be described in their own words. As Donnie Collins, wife of then-Captain Tom Collins (captured in October, 1965), testified:

<TT>Mrs. Collins: Tom was missing four years, two months, and two weeks, and I received a letter from him in Christmas of '69. Now, I knew before then, but not through anything the Government did. I found on my own that Tom was seen alive in Hanoi in 1966. . . . I was more fortunate than most family members. I had friends in high places.</TT>

<TT>Sen. Smith: Do you have any reason to believe that anybody in the United States Government knew he was alive and did not tell you?</TT>

<TT>Mrs. Collins: Oh, yes, I'm certain that they did.</TT>


When families were informed of their loved one's fate, they rarely were given important details. As Mrs. Collins explained:

<TT>I, as an MIA wife, was frustrated by knowing little, being left out of the loop, and it seemed at times being treated as the enemy, more feared by the administration and military intelligence than the North Vietnamese whom we should have been unified against. This was typical of the attitude of the Government in those years.</TT>


Another MIA wife, whose husband was lost in December, 1967,

<TT>. . . was notified about my husband's MIA status by telephone. When I asked if my husband's navigator, who he had trained with, was with him, Air Force would not give me an answer. . . . since [his] navigator's wife was pregnant, I did not want to call and upset her if her husband had not been on that plane. It took a sideways call to the Pentagon from one of the colonels on base to get the needed information. He told me never to tell who got me the information.</TT>


And all were cautioned to say nothing about their husbands, sons and brothers, so as not to give their captors leverage over the men.

<TT>. . . [T]hey said, "you don't need to know this. . . . if you were to let this out, this could cause his death -- now, you wouldn't want to do that, would you?" I love that old hang-that-guilt-trip-on-them.</TT>


The effect was devastating for many. As one MIA wife explained:

<TT>I needed the support of other families who knew what I was going through. I asked my Personnel Affairs officer and sergeant to deliver my hand written notes to other wives who lived within 100 miles. There were only a few, but I did not know the names and right-to-privacy laws demanded that I go through the casualty office. In my notes I offered my home as a rest or coffee stop when other women came to shop. When I received no word of reply from my notes, I accepted the fact that the other women wanted their privacy and I'd have to go it alone.</TT>

<TT>Everyday some well-meaning civilian would call or come by and say, "My dear, I don't know how you do it." I'd just be devastated! When they'd leave or hang up I'd think, "Yes -- how do I do it?" I really needed the support of the other women; the other wives of POW and MIA.</TT>

<TT>I did not learn for four years that my notes had not been delivered to the single hearings or picture viewings at the base. Why were we never allowed to get together? Why were my notes withheld?</TT>


To her, the Government lost all credibility when its directives not to publicize the POW's fate didn't change as soon as the U.S. knew its men were being tortured:

<TT>Giving the Johnson Administration and its Ambassador at Large in charge of prisoner of war affairs, Averill Harriman, the benefit of the doubt, some might assume that these guidelines really were engendered in the best interest of the wives.</TT>

<TT>That rationale became totally invalid for me, however, when the Johnson Administration learned for a fact certain that American prisoners of war were being brutally tortured, but continued to insist that we wives remain silent in order to continue our husband's so- called good treatment by the North Vietnamese.</TT>

<TT>I know the Government knew of the brutal torture for a fact certain, because I was the conduit who delivered the message to the Johnson Administration. Averill Harriman never came off his insistence that we wives must keep quiet in order to ensure the so-called good treatment of our loved ones.</TT>

<TT>It was not until more than two years after Averill Harriman knew our men were being tortured that Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense in the newly elected Nixon Administration, publicly acknowledged the gross mistreatment of our men and the violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.</TT>

<TT>On the 19th of May, 1969, when Secretary Laird first made this public announcement, Jim Stockdale had been in prison for almost four years. . . .</TT>

<TT>No one in the Johnson Administration, not McNamara, nor Rusk, nor the Bundy brothers, nor Clifford, ever seemed to realize that we wives were not so stupid as to not be able to figure out that they wanted to suppress the truth about our men's circumstances in order to keep the American public from being emotionally involved in the Vietnam War.</TT>

<TT>Just as they never called up the reserves or imposed rent controls, they didn't want the truth about our men's torture to emotionally involve the American people in their stick and carrot war.</TT>

<TT>I knew only too well they had started their war under false pretenses, because my husband had led all of the air strikes in the Tonkin Gulf incidents. President Johnson had even doubly endangered all of the lives of the men in the first air strike against the North Vietnamese mainland by announcing their arrival to the enemy on the radio an hour and a half before they arrived.</TT>


The gag order was too much for some:

<TT>Mrs. Collins: Let me just go back and point out a couple of things. That Tom was heard on the radio. He was seen coming out of the plane. He had a wing man, there were another two in the formation. He was seen on the ground. So they did know he got on the ground. They did talk to him. Yet even later on, they never allowed anyone who was with him on his wing or behind him, the two behind him, to tell me anything at all, even that bare little element to hang onto.</TT>

<TT>As I say, I can deal with dead. . . . But missing, they didn't know how to deal with missing. So they decided that the best thing to do was don't tell the families anything.</TT>

<TT>I want to remind you that Tom was security ops officer. Because of that, he had such a security clearance you would never achieve to, Senator. John will tell you that. And because of that, I was brought into the loop and I was also part of the security clearance. So Tom didn't marry a dodo who fell off the turnip truck when it went through town on Saturday. Most pilots did not.</TT>

<TT>Vice Chairman Smith: That is very obvious, by the way.</TT>

<TT>Mrs. Collins: Thank you. And because of that, why they could not sort out and tell the families the basic elements. When I later found out in early '68 that they had had this information in his jacket, I was angry but I told no one, including his parents, what was in the jacket, no one.</TT>

<TT>Now, if you read my testimony you realize that I was jumped on by big-time people. I mean State Department threatened me with you're going to shut up or else, and I never could figure out what or else was. I guess the firing squad, send Tom to Hanoi, something equally obnoxious.</TT>

<TT>As I responded to them finally, no military has control over a wife. Only the military member himself may discipline her. So if you can find Tom and get him home and he wants to kick me in the rear end, let him go at it, but don't threaten me. And finally I had to call friends in high places to get the State Department off me because I decided, in '66, to ask some questions in the public. So I was probably the first one to get swatted.</TT>


Secrecy's Effects

The secrecy had two distinct ill effects. First, it back-fired:

<TT>. . . the old military cliche that wives and families should be told nothing and should know nothing was, and I presume to some degree is still, the rule. This is an over-reaction to legitimate military security needs, and has probably resulted in more inadvertent leaks through ignorance than if the spouses and families had been brought into the network in matters that concerned them. . . . Had they brought us into the loop, telling us the things that we had a right to know from the onset, we would never find ourselves in this position today.</TT>


Second, and far more damaging to both families and subsequent Government efforts, the secrecy made families an easy mark for any con artist with information to peddle. In Collins' words:

<TT>The closed-door attitude of the Government, which started and became ingrained in the early war years, has contributed greatly to making the families vulnerable and prey for the antiwar activists on the left and the con artists and mystics on the right. If the Government was silent to their questions, then where were they to go for information and help? Some elements of both groups meant well, but their impact has been cruel to the families.</TT>


Another witness, Carol Hrdlicka, laid the blame for fraudulent schemes more forcefully at the Government's door:

<TT>I can appreciate these other scams, but I have to tell you that if our Government had done their job in the first place, I wouldn't be in the situation where I could be a victim or Carol Collins could be a victim.</TT>


In sum, another MIA wife said:

<TT>I tell you as I told the [PFOD] hearing: if a situation like this happens again I hope you all are smart enough to know you can trust the families with inside knowledge to protect them from con artists. I did not bite when asked for a donation to bring home the men. I felt I had paid enough.</TT>


Mis-Reporting

When Evidence Suggested Death

Tragically for many families, strong incentives existed for combat veterans to soften the blow that reporting a buddy killed in action would deliver to families. Admiral Stockdale felt the pressures after he witnessed a plane go down:

<TT>He was in an AD -- last called a Mayday, hit about 1,000 feet going in a steep dive, and of course, as you know, John, [there was] no ejection seat in that plane. They went out there the next morning and they found that the Vietnamese had removed the debris.</TT>

<TT>And the squadron commander said the guy is -- he's dead. And I went up to see Captain Bart Connally and I said I'm just getting started in this thing. And I sent the message, whether I should have called him KIA or MIA. . . . He said, "I did this in World War II, of course, and, he said, there's a great temptation to do the wife a favor. But in the long run I think you do her an injustice, because you're giving her the wrong message. If you think he's dead, say he's dead."</TT>

<TT>Now, I did that [reported the man killed in action]. . . . I've been told that people who were seen to spin in the traffic pattern and crash in their plane were listed as MIA for that same darned reason. We ought to think of a better way to compensate families besides lying to them.</TT>


Gen. Vessey had experienced the same situation:

<TT>Sen. McCain: You and I have discussed, and I mentioned to Admiral Stockdale yesterday, this very tragic situation that exists when a person is listed as missing or captured, especially in the case of the air war.</TT>

<TT>There were cases that we know of -- Admiral Stockdale cited one yesterday, where the plane hit the ground and exploded and no chute was cited; but with the knowledge that if that person is declared dead, all benefits cease after his death (gratuities, insurance, etc.), [his buddies listed] that person as missing. Then the pay and benefits continue for an indeterminate length of time.</TT>

<TT>Do you have any idea how we can get around this dilemma, General?</TT>

<TT>Gen. Vessey: . . . It's something that drives our making inaccurate reports. The very fact that you deprive your comrade's family of their livelihood by declaring him dead. . . so the inclination generally has been, if there's any doubt at all, move [the status report] toward the missing rather than face the facts. . . . I think the present system will drive us to the same problems that we had from the war in Vietnam.</TT>


In 1973, Lt. Cdr. George Coker cited two examples of what he had seen as a Navy pilot in an address to the National League of Families:

<TT>A guy is flying, he does see his wingman shot down. Two guys go in, and they're deader than a doornail. He's thinking to himself, "If I report that they're dead, the wife's going to be brokenhearted, she'll get death gratuities, and that's it. If I report him MIA, his pay keeps going, and it will cushion the blow for a little while."</TT>

<TT>"I just saw your son fly into the ground." Do you think I'm going to tell you that? Hell, no, because the way I think, if I tell you your son got target fixation and flew into the ground, to my way of thinking, what I would be saying to you is, "You know, what you had for a son is a real idiot."</TT>

<TT>That's not true, so what am I going to say? "Well, he flew down, and he probably lost control, he was probably hit by a 57 or something and lost control of the aircraft and went in." But I'm not going to say, "I think he had target fixation." . . .</TT>

<TT>But now I've given you a shred of hope. It's not an out- and-out false report. I told you he flew into the ground, but I just twisted 'why.' So now he has the option of ejecting.</TT>


When Evidence Pointed to Life

However, the Committee also uncovered cases where servicemen were reported as dead, in view of information suggesting survival. Moreover, the families were never provided with this information.

For example, the Committee notes the following comments from the family members of two cases in particular:

<TT>Lance Corp. Kenneth L. Plumadore was officially listed as KIA/BNR, although a 1992 case narrative from the JTF-FA indicates that PAVN forces may have captured him. IN 1992, Plumadore's sister wrote to the Pentagon:</TT>

<TT>If what I am told is correct and the government continues to withhold intellience data on my brother's capture that has been concealed from his family for 25 years, I submit to you the following questions: What reason is there for secrecy now? Why am I not entitled to know everything about my brother that you know?</TT>


Maj. Robert F. Coady, USAF, was listed as missing in Laos since 1969. His family was only provided the initial loss report, but recently discovered that there was additional information which suggested that Coady may have survived his incident. In 1969, the U.S. Embassy in Laos reported a possible correlation between Coady and a similar name reported by a POW who returned in 1969. Coady's sister wrote to the Committee in August 1992:

<TT>When my family asked if there was any information on my brother, we were told there was nothing but the initial report of his loss. I could not believe that after 17 years of believing the Air Force I found out that there was information regarding my brother not given to the family. I find this totally unacceptable.</TT>


A final example concerns a serviceman believed dead during the war, but subsequently determined to have been captured. This example was brought to the Committee's attention in November 1991 by Dr. Patricia O'Grady, the daughter of Col. John O'Grady, who was captured in 1967 in Vietnam:

<TT>O'Grady: I testify before you today on behalf of my father, Col. John O'Grady, who is finally known to have been captured alive. This information could have been obtained many years ago, but after 24 years, I can finally tell you how many cigarettes were in his pack, and I can also tell you where his actual captors live today. Yet this information was not released to me directly or readily. This information was only released to me accidentally. . . . up until 1991, August of this year, they have disputed that my father was in fact captured alive.</TT>

<TT>Sen. Smith: . . . but now they say otherwise?</TT>

<TT>O'Grady: Now they say it, based upon the fact that they have finally found his actual captors and they interviewed them in detail.</TT>


Public Relations Campaign

Late into the war and after enormous pressure from POW/MIA families, the U.S. Government began to publicize the plight of the POWs in order to keep pressure on the North Vietnamese and gain support for the war at home.

The courageous attempts by H. Ross Perot are particularly noteworty. His efforts to bring food, medicine, and Christmas packages to POWs in 1969 and 1970 and to publicize their condition improved the way they were treated, as returned POWs later described when they returned. President Nixon's description details Perot's activities and their impact:

<TT>Ross Perot supported what we were trying to do in Vietnam, unlike many other people in the business community who took a walk, and I appreciate that. He did everything he could to help the POWs while many others were doing nothing at all. At a time when many people in the American establishment were not supporting the POWs, Ross Perot was doing so.</TT>


Sen. Smith noted Perot's accomplishments when he welcomed him to testify in August:

<TT>My words of thanks for your efforts, Mr. Perot, pale in comparison to the recognition you have already received from former POWs themselves, the families, and our nation's veterans groups. As many know, Mr. Perot has a painting proudly hanging in his office which is signed by all the POWs who came home in 1973, thanking him for drawing public attention to their plight. I also note that the Department of Defense awarded Mr. Perot its highest civilian honor for his efforts -- the Defense Medal of Distinguished Public Service.</TT>


But the P-R campaign had a stark down-side as well, as families learned when it the war ended and many forgot the POWs. In 1972, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird held a press conference to pressure Vietnam by focusing on 14 men not on Hanoi's list of POWs. "All 14 men were known to be alive, on the ground in North Vietnam, or were at one time actually identified by the North Vietnamese as having been captured," he told his audience.

In 1973, when not one of those 14 came home -- including Ronald Dodge, who was shown in captivity in 1972 in a Paris Match photo -- there was no follow-up press conference. No similar U.S. effort was mounted again publicly to raise families' unanswered questions about their loved ones' fates to public attention. The families' feeling of being abandoned, with their men, still persists: As Dodge's widow explained:

<TT>Sen. Reid: What more do you think we as a committee could do that we have not done?. . .</TT>

<TT>Ms. Otis: . . . what I've been wanting is for the public to really care. And I know it's been really too long, but the Government and the media didn't press this in the beginning. They just assumed everybody was dead. And we felt so abandoned because not only did our Government or the media care, but the public didn't seem to care.</TT>


<CENTER><SPACER size="32" type="horizontal"> (http://www.aiipowmia.com/ssc/ssc41.html)

</CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=black>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/158.png</TD></TR>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Senate Select Committee - XLI

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/159.pngPost-War Government Policies

Presumed Findings of Death

For years after the war ended, few Americans wanted to re-examine its effects; families' questions were greeted with silence.

Then, beginning in 1978 and continuing through 1981, came proceedings to declare missing servicemen dead. The "presumptive findings of death" pitted families against the Government, with many trying to prove life against a presumption so strong that even post-capture photographs and other "hard evidence" failed to persuade the judges. Only one, Charles Shelton, remained listed as the symbolic POW.

For those who accepted the death of their kin, the proceedings were welcomed. They provided finality for a situation that left families dangling, letting families go on with their lives. But for those who had not gotten satisfactory answers, the rulings were traumatic. Their own words best express the experience:

These men -- many -- were declared dead not on information, but on the lack of information, that we had. . . . Your comment that 'this thing has taken on a life of its own' is so very true. It has taken over my life, and many others' unable to go through the steps of grief and dying and acceptance because of this limbo.

Commander Dodge's status change hearing was in February 1979. The next-of-kin had to prove the missing serviceman alive. The Government, with all of their resources, did not have to prove him dead.

In 1977, the Air Force Casualty Office contacted me and advised me that they were going to review David's case, and unless I had any new evidence that he was alive, they were going to declare him dead. I then stated that I had no evidence since I was not allowed access to intelligence. Why is it that the burden of proof is always on the families?

The process, and not only its conclusion, worsened the matter for many families. As the wife of a serviceman missing in Laos in December 1967, explained:

<TT>He said the hearing would be held and told me the day. I told him I'd get in touch with my children and we'd be down. He said, "Oh, you don't need to come. It is just a hearing. We will let you know about it." I said, "You are talking about killing off my husband legally. The way you've talked to me so far, I don't trust you."</TT>

<TT>. . . . He said, "Isn't there anything I can do?" I said, "You can make reservations for me at the visiting quarters. There will be my son, two daughters, my mother and myself." He said, "Oh, I can't do that. You can't stay there. You'll have to get a motel."</TT>

<TT>They closed my husband's case and declared him killed in action as of August 17, 1979. He was such an honorable, straightforward man; he would not be pleased with the situation I'd been placed in all of these years.</TT>


The League of Families chronicled the process from families' perspective:

<TT>Immediately after the signing of the Paris Accords, January 27, 1973, the Department of Defense planned to initiate presumptive finding of death rulings based on U.S. knowledge of incident circumstances and lapse of time without information to indicate the individual was still living. What was obviously not yet available was knowledge from the Vietnamese, Lao or Cambodian governments. . . the families, under the umbrella of the League, initiated a class-action suit to stop the status reviews. . . .</TT>

<TT>The court decided. . . that PNOK [primary next-of-kin] receiving compensation must be provided hearing rights. The Defense Department extended these rights to all PNOK, whether or not currently receiving government benefits. . . .</TT>

<TT>some in the League publicly offered to return their government pay if active-duty status could be retained. This was to prevent the Indochinese governments from throwing back the claim that our own government had legally determined our relatives were dead. This, too, was unsuccessful.</TT>

<TT>With the presumptive findings of death came another problem; the more presumed dead, the fewer it appeared were still prisoner, missing or unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. We, the families, knew that legal administrative rulings had nothing to do with accountability and that the numbers were actually more [than mere numbers] -- they were Americans. . . .</TT>


Changing Definitions

At the same time, the U.S. Government added to the POW/MIA list. At the end of 1978, 224 were listed as POWs; by the end of 1980, that had grown to 2,500 -- simply by changing the definition to include war-time killed-in-action.

Taken together, the action seemed to signal that the Government had made a decision was being made to move on -- that one serviceman, whose fate was uncertain, now would get the same level of attention as the next, whose death was witnessed by his comrades.

The solution was satisfactory to no one, and the stroke-of-a-pen changes, based not on facts but on some other consideration, raised even more questions about the sense and sincerity of Government efforts.

Live-Sighting Reports

For scores of families -- including some whose kin's remains had been returned -- the next information to be confronted came with the flood of Vietnamese refugees: reports that Americans were alive in Southeast Asia. The reports were tantalizing, and the heavily blacked-out sections of classified information made them more so. The slowness of live-sighting investigations, and the fruitless efforts of families to gain access to the intelligence contained in hundreds of these reports, marked a new battlefront for many families.

Questions during the mid-1980s about the sincerity of U.S. efforts heightened families' concerns. While some of the allegations of conspiracy or incompetence came with fund-raising appeals, others were leaked by insiders with no readily apparent motive besides altruism. A spate of internal DIA reviews spelled out the agency's shortcomings and, for many, confirmed fears that the "highest national priority" label assigned to POW/MIA efforts by the Reagan Administration was nothing more than words.

Repatriation of Remains

<TT>For some 379 families, the next development was the return of remains from Southeast Asia. In many cases, the remains were only fragments of bone, sometimes commingled in the casket with another servicemen who had died in the same crash. Sometimes, they were determined to be the remains of Asian people; in a few cases, they were found to be animal bones. Serious questions about the capability of the U.S. lab that identifies remains to make accurate determinations further shook families' faith in the U.S. Government (see Chapter 5).</TT>

<TT>In the half-century since World War II, technology has bettered the chance of identifying remains, but the science is far from an exact one.</TT>

<TT>There have been so many conflicting reports concerning Bill. We have always felt he was alive, and being held in Russia, even though remains (a few single teeth said to compare favorably with Bill's) was sent home in November of 1957. When we had the casket opened by court order, we found a sack with a few single teeth and a few bone fragments so that identification was impossible as far as we were concerned. We buried the body as Bill, even though we still believed that he was in Russia.</TT>

<TT>We have felt so helpless all these years, trying and trying to get positive proof of whether he is in Russia or not. My parents both died believing that the U.S. Government had not been honest with them. . . .</TT>


The combination of:

past experience with the Government on POW/MIA matters;

only partly conclusive results; and

the few number of bones available to make the determination makes it impossible for many families to accept the remains as proof of their kin's death.

<TT>Each day I wait, and look, and hope for some revelation as to how did my son die -- if he did! Oh yes, I know my Government considers [his case] a closed book because Hanoi sent back a box of bones with his name on it. But there was no identification tag, nor picture, nor anything in the way of personal effects found on his person returned to us. No fingerprints! No dental records!</TT>

<TT>I do know Hanoi had David either dead or alive -- the Pravda (1965) article told me that. He did not go down in his plane as previously thought. I want any and all information my Government has on David -- my family can handle it!. . . .</TT>


Casualty Officers

<TT>I was shocked, surprised and stunned. . . . It took some getting used to, and I can't describe the overwhelming relief I felt, knowing how, where and when he died, and that it was quick. . . . My baby, Sue, was six weeks old when the telegram was delivered to me. . . . In an instant, I [had] lost my husband, home, status as a wife, social life, my planned future -- and I was just getting over childbirth. I heard nothing from the three surviving crew members. All official business was handled by mail. I had no advisor or advocate from the military to help me sort out my life and figure out what I should do. I felt abandoned. . . . a way must be found to see that dependents of men who died serving their country are given the personal support they need.</TT>


The Defense Department has come a great distance since the days of telegrams announcing the loss of a serviceman. Today, officers serve the point of contact for families and the efforts of most are well-regarded by the families they serve.

However, few have the experience and clout needed to pry information out of the DIA, and their stints in the job are short: except in the Air Force, assignments last no more than three years. This forces families to drive the information-gathering process -- and their lack of security clearance and knowledge ill-equips them to get the answers they seek.

Simply put, the agencies of our Government responsible for the MIA issue do not provide us of their own volition and in a timely manner all information that they had about my father's fate, despite their often-repeated promise to do just that.

The inability of casualty officers to satisfy families' legitimate needs for information often worsens communication. In their eagerness to learn all they can, many families have turned to other channels -- pressing intelligence analysts or private activists for more. The different interpretations, and sometimes different facts, obtained through these channels have exposed a bureaucracy that is lumbering and often senseless in its operations. It has left many families unsure about who to believe.

<TT>Our family has never been officially told that Steven was taken prisoner, but we had received a declassified document from another POW/MIA family, that stated Steven was positively identified by photograph in November of 1968 (three months after his disappearance) as being taken prisoner. I do not know which list he now falls under, the 111 confirmed to have died in captivity or the 133 of whom no other information is available. I'm sure we will be notified in time.</TT>

<TT>I just wanted to say we are proud of Steven for his unselfishness in fighting for his country, and how proud we are of you and the committee for having the courage to look into this matter to the extent you have in order to resolve the issue.</TT>


Secretary Cheney's plan to use the POW/MIA office to trouble-shoot is commendable, but further efforts to unify POW/MIA operations are needed. Too much is lost in "translation" between the men and women in the field and POW/MIA families, because information goes first through DIA and then casualty office channels. Oftentimes, information also is passed through the Inter-Agency Group (see Chapter 5), further delaying notification of the individual's family.

While the Committee recognizes the need for some "channels," it also urges DoD to let the public, and especially family members, hear directly from those who have first-hand information about searching for unaccounted-for servicemen.

Families Turn Elsewhere for Help

The National League of Families

The League's origins can be traced to the West Coast during the late 1960s. Sybil Stockdale, wife of Admiral James Stockdale, the ranking POW in the "Hanoi Hilton," initiated the movement which evolved from a loosely organized, small group of families into the formal organization now known as the National League of Familise of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

The impetus for this action was the strong belief by these POW families that the U.S. Government's policy of keeping a low profile on POW/MIAs was unjustified and causing the families undue pain -- and perhaps even risking the lives, health and the very return of their missing loved ones (as described above in "War-Time Secrecy.")

In October 1968, the first media account of a POW story was published. As a result of that story, many families began to communicate directly with each other. What once was a small group grew to hundreds and ultimately several thousand family members.

The League's first major activity was to directly confront the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris with inquiries about the fate of their loved ones. On other occasions, family members travelled to Laos and Vietnam on their own to seek answers.

Over the past 25 years, both during and after the war, the League has pressed hard through its public awareness programs and its intense pressure on the U.S. Government to get answers. The League's goals are:

to obtain the release of all prisoners;

repatriation of all recoverable remains;

to provide the fullest possible accounting for all of the missing.


Through the U.S. Government's POW/MIA Inter-Agency Group, the League has participated over the last decade in the development of official policy in the areas of intelligence and diplomatic efforts on the POW/MIA issue. The participation of the League's Executive Director, Ann Mills Griffiths, as a member of the IAG has led to great controversy and division among family members (see Chapter 5), but even criticics recognize that Griffiths' participation on the IAG has givven the League a key role in influencing government policy on the POW/MIA issue, however. In addition, the Committee recognizes that the League has provided a continuity to changing U.S. officials' responsible for policy on this issue spanning 25 years and five Presidencies of both political parties. The National Alliance of Families

The Alliance was founded in Seattle in June 1990 under the leadership of Dolores Alfond, sister of Maj. Victor Apodaca who is missing from the Vietnam War. The Alliance has been a leader in the effort to unite family members, former POWs and other citizens who seek information on missing personnel from World War II, the Korean Conflict, Cold War incidents, and the Vietnam War.

The Alliance also has been a strong advocate for the declassification of all Government documents pertaining to the missing from these wars. Another primary purpose of the National Alliance has been to educate communities (including public and civic organizations, schools, and the general public) about POW/MIA issues. Like the League, the Alliance also has held major forums with family members and Government officials in Washington, D.C.

Fellow Combat Veterans

Another, natural alternative for families hungry for information was the men who served with their kin. Contacts were ad hoc and often secretive: officially, the Government observed servicemen's privacy rights; unofficially, individual servicemen often passed on information as personal favors, and witnesses regularly reached out to their buddies' families voluntarily. For untold numbers of families, the stories that these witnesses told made the difference.

<TT>I know my brother went down into the South China Sea. The radar technician was a very good friend of the family and he watched the plane go down into the sea. So I feel I know where my brother is. I feel he was not captured, so as far as I'm concerned, he's gone. Let him lie in peace.</TT>


For some veterans, though, the requests continued -- from family members unable to accept their necessarily incomplete stories, or from children who wanted to hear it first-hand. Often, the requests were not only for the facts of a 20-year-old incident, but for an explanation of the war itself, an answer to rumors, and more. In one letter to the son of an MIA, his co-pilot struggled to answer cosmic questions with a careful recounting of facts:

<TT>What happened to your dad and I was the real definition of rotten coincidence. . . . [We were on a mission to make] strikes into Laos and Cambodia to stop supplies from getting into South Vietnam from the North. We didn't talk much about them only as a matter of policy. There were not "secret missions" or CIA-driven. . . . As we rolled in and released the bombs, two anti-aircraft rounds struck the airplane on the starboard (right) side forward of the engine intake. The explosion caused the engine to explode also and the right wing blew off at the fold. At this point, we looked at each other and ejected from the aircraft. I went out a second or so before Mike and wound up on the west side of a small river. He was on the east. . . the material and people we were after were there.</TT>

<TT>I gathered my stuff, hid it, called our wingman and tried to talk to Mike on the radio kind of all at once. I also found that my hands and face were burned pretty well and there was some shrapnel in my arm and head. At this point, these were the least of our problems. I then tried to find Mike by wandering around in the jungle in the dark (12:30 a.m.). Not a good idea as I fell down a small cliff (8-10 feet) and had to climb out. At this time I could see down to the river and saw 4-6 troopers come across the river and head my way. I hid in a bamboo thicket and waited. . . .</TT>

<TT>There was enough evidence that Mike might be held in the general area where we were hit that a "bright light" team was interested to attempt to find and rescue him. They are mercenaries that "lived in the area." They found nothing indicating his having been there. You've been told the rest and most likely more than I. It was hard to accept, but I feel he was killed that first night. I would hope that I was wrong.</TT>

<TT>Your dad was a great guy and a good friend. He did his job better than most, but unfortunately was killed. The best part is he was doing what he loved the most.</TT>


Private Groups

<TT>. . . you become obsessed. You cannot sleep, eat, work, because you would waltz with the devil to bring one man home.</TT>


The Government's shortcomings in live-sighting investigations and elsewhere prompted some families to turn to latter-day Rambos, as well as to responsible veterans and family organizations, for additional help.

<TT>Most of us have been tempted at some point to participate in some form of POW rescue based on nothing more than questionable and circumstantial information at best, such as unverified photos, live sightings, and anonymous reports. If it sounds hokey and mystic, it probably is, and it almost always plays a very cruel hoax on the families by raising false hopes. . .</TT>

<TT>I am very pleased to know this committee will take up these issues and problems in the near future, and hope this will eliminate once and for all the con artists, and clear the way for those who are credible and knowledgeable to resolve the long standing tragedy of our MIAs.</TT>


Another POW/MIA wife was not able to ignore the information profferred by a private group:

<TT>After the [positive] analysis had come out from Los Alamos and Dr. Charney I began to doubt my own view of the picture, which was there was a slight possibility that it could be Don. I mean I just -- I did not know. But something that my son said to me sort of turned me around. He said, "Mother, that picture is obviously an American. I mean he looks like an American to me. . . . he's somebody's father, he's somebody's brother, husband, cousin. If there's a chance in a billion that it's my dad, you've got to do something."</TT>

<TT>So with that, that's when I started.</TT>


The result of many encounters are devastating, emotionally and financially.

One former Congressman was shown on a nation-wide television show telling a national audience that he knows who the prisoners are and where they are. He should be made to go on nationwide television and retract his lies.

One former Lieutenant Colonel has been exposed on television for claiming a photo he obtained was of an American prisoner still in captivity. This was nothing more than a diabolical plot to raise money; [it] caused the family involved untold grief and compelled our Government to expend untold assets to track down this 'prisoner.'

One extremely convincing former Lieutenant Colonel Bo Gritz hoodwinked me into believing his story that he knew where prisoners were being held in Laos and could get them out. In 1981, the prisoner and missing issue was getting little or no attention and I saw this as an opportunity -- not necessarily to recover my son, but to get at least one prisoner out to prove what we had been working for. Since my wife and I had been notified by the Navy Department that our son "had survived to evade" and were informed by his squadron commander that Nick had been captured and escaped, I am sure you can appreciate the vulnerable situation we were in. The "secret rescue mission" failed very quickly; it never got out of the state of Florida and cost us $30,000, with nary an apology.

<TT>. . . I am not bemoaning the loss of money since that operation is one-tenth of the amount our family has spent in our 23 years of involvement. But I do believe that this Committee has a responsibility to investigate and, where necessary, prosecute these incredible liars. . . .</TT>


The fraudulent sideshows also sidetracks U.S. investigators away from serious leads and force them to chase phantoms:

<TT>Sen. McCain: "How much of the effort that your organization is engaged in has been -- how much of your assets have had to be diverted to tracking down the bogus pictures and the hoaxers?</TT>

<TT>Mr. Sheetz: At times, Senator, I would tell you that that process has literally precluded us from doing anything else. Because the political pressure has been so intense and the high interest among the people in the Government, this committee, the American public, to know what is the truth on those cases. . . It's an opportunity-cost argument. Essentially, what you're doing is dropping the work that would probably have more payoff to chase after things that ultimately turn out to be useless exercises.</TT>


Discussion

The committee wishes to commend the families and advocacy groups for their strong leadership and perseverance over the years. They have moved the issue in a positive manner in spite of incredible obstacles. The most difficult obstacles were the intransigence of the Communist governments and the lack of focus and attention by the U.S. Government at many points during the last 40 years.

At the Committee's first round of hearings, in November 1991, all witnesses -- families, activists, and government officials -- agreed that, ." . . one of the most important things that could come out of the early days of these hearings is a new structure, and a new relationship process with the families." Assistant Secretary Carl Ford explained:

<TT>. . . we didn't lose our credibility with you, with the families, with the American people overnight and we're not going to gain that credibility back overnight. . . . The only thing that is going to persuade people is our actions and our results, and to prove over time that we are serious, that we do mean what we say, and that despite occasional setbacks, despite occasional human errors, we're going to demonstrate over the next months and weeks, years, that we can do it better than we have done it in the past. That's our only commitment, to try. And if there are problems that this committee uncovers, we'll try to fix them.</TT>


In addition to other steps noted above, two actions taken on behalf of POW/MIA families during the last year have been significant:

<TT>To answer families need for an ombudsman that both DIA and casualty officers would respond to, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney created a top-level liaison office at the Pentagon in January 1992. The job of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs is to spearhead POW/MIA policy-making and to try to get answers when casualty officers cannot.</TT>

<TT>POW/MIA documents were ordered declassified in July 1992 by President Bush, at the unanimous request of the Senate. This step was taken in conjunction with the establishment of a central "library" that families can turn to for consolidated information about their case and others, in accordance with an amendment sponsored by Sen. McCain and enacted in November, 1991. (See Chapter 5, Declassification).</TT>


The most substantive response to families' concerns, however, has been field operations that have put American troops on the ground in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to search for answers. For most of the past 20 years, U.S. investigators shuttled back and forth from Bangkok to Hanoi whenever they could get permission from Vietnam. Then, a month before the Committee was formed, a temporary U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi was permitted to open; that became permanent in November, 1992.

Increased Vietnamese cooperation, won by Presidential Emissary Gen. John Vessey (USA, Ret.), Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, and three Senate delegations to Southeast Asia, widened U.S. investigators' access, letting them go to places where Americans were reported seen alive after the war, talk to prison guards and others who may know what happened to missing Americans, and examine archives and top-secret files that hold promises of more answers.

For many POW/MIA families, however, 20 years' experience dealing with the Government makes it difficult to accept these new promises. Answers about their kin's fate are still necessary -- but they are not sufficient to explain the intervening 20 years of U.S. Government run-around and worse -- and the lack of concern by Communist governments for basic human dignity.

The Committee's review of past family experiences reflects an array of problems in dealing with our government that never should have happened. With proper organization, planning, sensitivity and openness, the Committee believes these problems can be avoided in the future.

Recommendations

The Government has wavered repeatedly in its efforts to account for missing servicemen. Their families never have.

POW/MIA families want action, not more promises. The best that the U.S. Government can do for them is to do its best for their missing kin. The Committee believes the following steps must be taken to assure families that the Government is doing its best, and not simply assigning a priority that is merely words.

Accordingly, the Committee recommends:

Those actually working on POW/MIA accounting in the field in Southeast Asia should be made available, when schedules permit, to meet with families in the United States.

Military service casualty offices should be headed by civilians who are not subject to the kind of routine duty rotations experienced by military personnel. Individuals in these sensitive positions must have experience and a base of institutional memory if they are to deal effectively and knowledgeably with family members.

The resumed publication of a regular newsletter containing POW/MIA related information would be a useful means of sharing new developments with the families.

Guidelines should be established immediately for the creation of a central computerized data base within the Executive branch with information on all unaccounted for U.S. personnel from past military conflicts, to include World War II, Korea, the Cold War and Vietnam. All relevant casualty and intelligence data, in addition to any recently obtained information potentially correlating to a specific case should be made readily available to family members and researchers through the central data base. On-line access to the central data base should be made available through an easily accessible modem system.


Procedures also should be developed to ensure that requests for information contained in the data base can be processed easily so that family members receive prompt, printed responses when necessary. Additionally, procedures should be established by the Department of Defense and the Department of State to ensure that the data base is updated regularly. The Committee further recommends that the Secretary of Defense authorize the DOD family liaison officer to work with the service casualty officers to develop a data base program which meets the needs of families and researchers who need to use the system.

Family members of Vietnam era POW/MIAs who would like to travel to Southeast Asia for direct discussions with appropriate U.S. and foreign government officials should be encouraged and helped to do so.

<CENTER><SPACER size="32" type="horizontal"> (http://www.aiipowmia.com/ssc/ssc42.html)</CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/160.png Memos of John F. McCreary
April 27, 1992

Memorandum for:
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

From:John F. McCreary

Subject:Legal Misconduct and Possible Malpractice in the Select Committee

1. As a member of the Virginia State Bar, I am obliged by Disciplinary Rule DR-1-103(a) to report knowledge of misconduct by an attorney "to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violations." Under Rule IV, Paragraph 13, of the Rules for the integration of the Virginia State Bar, this obligation follows me as a member of the Bar, regardless of the location of my employment, for as long as I remain a member of the Virginia State Bar. Therefore, I am obliged, as a matter of law and under pain of discipline by the Virginia State Bar, to report to you my knowledge of misconduct and possible prima facie malpractice by attorneys on the Select Committee in ordering the destruction of Staff documents containing Staff intelligence findings on 9 April 1992 and in statements in meetings on 15 and 16 April to justify the destruction.

2. The attached Memoranda For the Record, one by myself and another by Mr. Jon D. Holstine, describe the relevant facts, which I summarize herein:
<BLOCKQUOTE>a. On 9 April 1992, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, in response to a protest by other members of the Select Committee, told the Select Committee members that "all copies" would be destroyed. This statement was made in the presence of the undersigned and of the Staff Chief Counsel who offered no protest.

b. Later on 9 April 1992, the Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, an attorney, repeated and insured the execution of Senator Kerry's order for the destruction of the Staff intelligence briefing text. I personally delivered to Mr. Barry Valentine, the Security Manager for SRB-78, the original printed version of the intelligence briefing text. I also verified that the original was destroyed by shredding in the Office of Senate Security on 10 April 1992, along with 14 copies.

c. On 15 April 1992, the Staff Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha of Massachusetts, when advised by members if the Staff about their concerns over the possible criminal consequences of destroying documents, minimized the significance of the act of destruction; ridiculed the Staff members for expressing their concerns; and replied, in response to questions about the potential consequences, "Who's the injured party," and "How are they going to find out because its classified." Mr. Codinha repeatedly defended the destruction of the documents and gave no assurances or indications that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.

d. On 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry, stated that he gave the order to destroy "extraneous copies of the documents" and that no one objected. Moreover, he stated that the issue was "moot" because the original remained in the Office of Senate Security "all along."

e. I subsequently learned that the Staff Director had deposited a copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security at 1307 on 16 April.

3. The foregoing facts establish potentially a prima facie violation of criminal law and a pattern of violations of legal ethics by attorneys in acts of commission and omission.
<BLOCKQUOTE>a. It is hornbook law that an attorney may not direct the commission of a crime. In this incident two attorneys, one by his own admission, ordered the destruction of documents, which could be violation of criminal law.

b. Neither the Staff Chief Counsel nor any member of the Select Committee made a protest or uttered words of caution against the destruction of documents, by admission of the Chairman, Senator Kerry. The Chief Counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the Staff about the legality of its actions, and, in fact, had earlier issued the general prohibition to the Staff against document destruction.

c. The Chief Counsel's statements during the 15 April meeting to discuss the document destruction showed no regard for the legality of the action and displayed to the Staff only a concern about getting caught. By his words and actions, he presented to the Staff investigators an interpretation of the confidentiality and security rules that the rules of the Select Committee may be used to cover-up potentially unethical or illegal activity.

d. The Staff Director's action in placing an unaccounted for copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security on 16 April constitutes an act to cover-up the destruction. Throughout the 16 April meeting, all three attorneys persisted in stating that the document had been on file since 9 April. This is simply not true.

4. I believe that the foregoing facts establish a pattern of grave legal misconduct - possibly including orders to commit a crime, followed by acts to justify and then to cover-up that crime. Even absent criminal liability, the behavioral pattern of the attorneys involved plays fast and loose with the Canons of Legal Ethics and establishes that one or more of the attorneys on the Select Committee are unfit to practice law. I am obliged to recommend that this report be filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities of the State Bars in which these attorneys are members.

(Signed)
John F. McCreary, Esquire


<HR width="75%">




October 30, 1992

Memorandum for the Record

From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Obstruction of the Investigation

1. I am concerned that recent lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks of sensitive information by the Committee Staff Director to the Department of Defense. Leaks to the Department of Defense or other agencies of the Executive Branch of my Memoranda for the Record are interfering with follow-up discussions with useful witnesses. Moreover, they are endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses.

Leak of Information on Jan Sejna

2. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro, attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated that Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW related.

4. On 30 October 1992, I learned from Bill LeGro that he was directed to read a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee that discredits Sejna's information. The letter reportedly indicates that Sejna's information has been checked and not been confirmed by his former government. At the time this letter was received, the Staff had decided to take Sejna's deposition but had not yet scheduled a deposition of Sejna. In addition, my MFR was written from memory, and did not do justice to all that Sejna stated, either in detail or in context. As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.

Suspected Leak of Information on Le Quang Khai

5. The second issue of suspected misconduct concerns witness Le Quang Khai. Although Le made a public statement concerning POWs on 12 September 1992, no agency of the US government contacted him concerning his POW information. He told me on 26 October that some men who represented themselves as FBI agents contacted him to attempts to recruit him to return to Vietnam as a US intelligence agent for six months. After which his request for asylum would be favorably considered.

6. On 30 October, Mr. Robert Egan of Hackensack, New Jersey, who is a close friend of Mr. Le and the intermediary whereby the Committee Staff met Mr. Le, informed McCreary and LeGro that the FBI had again contacted Mr. Le. A person representing himself as an FBI person called on 30 October to set up a meeting with Le to discuss Le's working as an intelligence agent for the FBI's POW/MIA office.

7. So far informal checks indicate there is no such office. Secondly, this contact occurred three days after my return from taking Le's deposition in Hackensack on 26 October. I observed a copy of the MFR with apparent routing designators written in the top margin on the desk of Frances Zwenig on 28 October.

8. The contact with Le two days after preparation of my MFR, despite the passage of a month since his public declarations, is highly suspicious and more than coincidental. The circumstances of both contacts in which persons identifying themselves as FBI without showing credentials or other evidence of authenticity or authority and also making a pitch to recruit Le are also highly suspicious.

9. An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee. Based on the above sequences of events, I must conclude that Frances Zwenig continues to leak all of my papers to the Defense Department. Her flagrant disregard of the rules of the Senate and her oath of office are now jeopardizing the livelihood, if not the safety, of Senate witnesses. In addition, the Department of Defense's continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstruction of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.

(Signed)
John F. McCreary


<HR width="75%">


May 3, 1992

Memorandum for:
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

From:John F. McCreary

Subject:
Possible Violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, by the Select Committee and Possible Ethical Misconduct by Staff Attorneys.

1. Continuing analysis of relevant laws and further review of the events between 8 April and 16 April 1992 connected with the destruction of the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text strongly indicate that the order to destroy all copies of that briefing text on 9 April and the actual destruction of copies of the briefing texts plus the purging of computer files might constitute violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, which imposes criminal penalties for unlawful document destruction. Even absent a finding of criminal misconduct, statements, actions, and failures to act by the senior Staff attorneys following the 9 April briefing might constitute serious breaches of ethical standards of conduct for attorneys, in addition to violations of Senate and Select Committee rules. The potential consequences of these possible misdeeds are such that they should be brought to the attention of all members of the Select Committee, plus all Designees and Staff members who were present at the 9 April briefing.

2. The relevant section of Title 18, U.S.C., states in pertinent part: Section 2071. Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally (a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 795)

3. The facts as the undersigned and others present at the briefing recall them are presented in the attached Memorandum for the Record. A summary of those facts - and others that have been established since that Memorandum was written - follows.
<BLOCKQUOTE>a. On 8 April 1992, the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text was presented to Senior Staff members and Designees for whom copies were available prior to beginning the briefing. Objections to the text by the Designees prompted the Staff Director to order all persons present to leave their copies of the briefing text in Room SRB078. Subsequent events indicated that two copies had been removed without authorization.

b. On 9 April 1992, at the beginning of the meeting of the Select Committee and prior to the scheduled investigators' briefing, Senator McCain produced a copy of the intelligence briefing text, with whose contents he strongly disagreed. He charged that the briefing text had already been leaked to a POW/MIA activist, but was reassured by the Chairman that such was not the case. He replied that he was certain it would be leaked. Whereupon, the Chairman assured Senator McCain that there would be no leaks because all copies would be gathered and destroyed, and he gave orders to that effect. No senior staff member or attorney present cautioned against a possible violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, or of Senate or Select Committee Rules.

c. Following the briefing on 9 April, the Staff Director, Ms. Frances Zwenig, restated to the intelligence investigators the order to destroy the intelligence briefing text and took measures to ensure execution of the destruction order. (See paragraph 3 of the attachment.) During one telephone conversation with the undersigned, she stated that she was "acting under orders."

d. The undersigned also was instructed to delete all computer files, which Mr. Barry Valentine witnessed on 9 April.

e. In a meeting on 15 April 1992, the Staff's Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha, was advised by intelligence investigators of their concerns about the possibility that they had committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing text. Mr. Codinha minimized the significance of the documents and of their destruction. He admonished the investigators for "making a mountain out of a molehill."

f. When investigators repeated their concern that the order to destroy the documents might lead to criminal charges, Mr. Codinha replied "Who's the injured party." He was told, "The 2,494 families of the unaccounted for US Servicemen, among others." Mr. Codinha then said, "Who's gonna tell them. It's classified." At that point the meeting erupted. The undersigned stated that the measure of merit was the law and what's right, not avoidance of getting caught. To which Mr. Codinha made no reply. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Codinha give any indication that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.

g. Investigators, thereupon, repeatedly requested actions by the Committee to clear them of any wrongdoing, such as provision of legal counsel. Mr. codinha admitted that he was not familiar with the law and promised to look into it. He invited a memorandum from the investigators stating what they wanted. Given Mr. Codinha's statements and reactions to the possibility of criminal liability, the investigators concluded they must request appointment of an independent counsel. A memorandum making such a request and signed by all six intelligence investigators was delivered to Mr. Codinha on 16 April.

h. At 2130 on 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, convened a meeting with the intelligence investigators, who told him personally of their concern that they might have committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing texts at the order of the Staff Director. Senator Kerry stated that he gave the order to destroy the documents, not the Staff Director, and that none of the Senators present at the meeting had objected. He also stated that the issue of document destruction was "moot" because the original briefing text had been deposited with the Office of Senate Security "all along." Both the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel supported this assertion by the Chairman.

i. Senator Kerry's remarks prompted follow-up investigations (See paragraphs 4 through 9 of the attachment) and inquiries that established that a copy of the text was not deposited in the Office of Senate Security until the afternoon of 16 April. The Staff Director has admitted that on the afternoon of 16 April, after receiving a copy of a memorandum from Senator Bob Smith to Senator Kerry in which Senator Smith outlined his concerns about the destruction of documents, she obtained a copy of the intelligence briefing text from the office of Senator McCain and took it to the Office of Senate Security. Office of Senate Security personnel confirmed that the Staff Director gave them an envelope, marked "Eyes Only," to be placed in her personal file. The Staff Director has admitted that the envelope contained the copy of the intelligence briefing text that she obtained from the office of Senator McCain.

3. The facts of the destruction of the intelligence briefing text would seem to fall inside the prescriptions of the Statute, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, so as to justify their referral for investigation to a competent law enforcement authority. The applicability of that Statute was debated in United States v. Poindexter, D.D.C. 1989, 725 F. Supp. 13, in connection with the Iran Contra investigation. The District Court ruled, inter alia, that the National Security Council is a public office within the meaning of the Statute and, thus, that its records and documents fell within the protection of the Statute. In light of that ruling, the Statute would seem to apply to this Senate Select Committee and its Staff. The continued existence of a "bootleg" copy of the intelligence briefing text - i.e., a copy that is not one of those made by the investigators for the purpose of briefing the Select Committee - would seem to be irrelevant to the issues of intent to destroy and willfulness; as well as to the issue of responsibility for the order to destroy all copies of the briefing text, for the attempt to carry out that order, and for the destruction that actually was accomplished in execution of that order.

4. As for the issue of misconduct by Staff attorneys, all member of the Bar swear to uphold the law. That oath may be violated by acts of omission and commission. Even without a violation of the Federal criminal statute, the actions and failures to act by senior Staff attorneys in the sequence of events connected with the destruction of the briefing text might constitute violations of ethical standards for members of the Bar and of both Senate and Select Committee rules. The statements, actions and failures to act during and after the meeting on 15 April, when the investigators gave notice of their concern about possible criminal liability for document destruction, would seem to reflect disregard for the law and for the rules of the United States Senate.

(Signed)
John F. McCreary
<CENTER></CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/161.png KGB/GRU Information on U.S. POW-MIAs - S E N S I T I V E -

MEMORANDUM

For: Senator John F. Kerry, Chairman
Senator Bob C. Smith, Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

From: Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. (initialed here)

Date: July 20, 1992

Subject: KGB/GRU Information on U.S. POW/MIAs

Like you, I am appalled at the negligent manner in which our government has sought the return of American POW/MIAs.

helvetica,arialI am writing this memo to bring my knowledge on this subject to your attention and to express my interest in assisting you in your efforts 1) to determine the fate of American POW/MIAs and 2) to obtain their release or the return of their remains.

Based on newspaper accounts, it appears to me that you have encountered difficulties in obtaining support and information from the KGB and GRU. I have in mind recent statements by Col. - Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov that Vietnam will be a difficult case because much of the information "has not reached the archives," by Yevgeny Primakov, that the KGB has "found no new information that missing Americans from the Vietnam conflict were held in Russia," and from reports that Russian intelligence agencies are resisting efforts to uncover files on U.S. POW/MIAs.

I have been in the defense and national security business for over twenty-five years. From 1975 to 1990 I was heavily involved in the analysis of Soviet operations and strategy. Based on this work, I believe there is a considerable information in the KGB and GRU on the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs from the Korean and Vietnam' Wars and other situations. I also believe there are approaches other than "searching the archives" that may be much more effective.

To explain my beliefs and to indicate why my experience may be particularly relevant to your efforts, I would like to share with you selected portions of my notes on my debriefings of a particularly important Soviet bloc defector, Jan Sejna.
<CENTER>- S E N S I T I V E -</CENTER>Mr. Sejna is now an American citizen. When he defected in 1968, Gen. - Maj. Sejna held a variety of top-level positions Czechoslovakia that brought him into first-hand contact with Soviet intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity. Among the positions he held were chief of staff to the Minister of Defense and secretary of the Defense Council, which was the highest decision - making body in areas of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and foreign policy in the communist system.

That is, Sejna was a member of the decision-making hierarchy, in daily contact with top-level communist officials from around the world, and privy to military and intelligence plans and operations. His reports have been assessed within U.S. intelligence, operating under instructions from the Soviet Union, constructed a hospital in North Korea. Ostansibly, the hospital was built to treat casualties of the war. In reality, it was an intelligence research facility in which Czechoslovak, Soviet, and North Korean doctors would experiment on U.S. and, to a lesser extent South Korean, prisoners of war.

Czechoslovak military intelligence operations in North Korea came under the direction of Soviet military intelligence. The Czechoslovak official who was in charge of their portion of the operations in North Korea was Colonel Rudolf Bubka of the Military Intelligence Administration (Zpravdajska sprava or Zs) of the Czechoslovak General Staff. Colone Bubka was in North Korea under diplomatic cover. The hospital was under his authority. The Czechoslovak official immediately in charge of the hospital was Colone Professor Dr. Dufek, who was a heart specialist. Sejna learned about the hospital directly from Col. Bubka, from various official reports on the experiments, and from briefings to the Defense Council by experts such as Dr. Dufek and Dr. Plzak, a neurologist who was also a member of the medical team at the experimental hospital in North Korea, and from other top-level officials in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The experiments were justified by the Soviet officials as preparations for the next war. The Soviet objective was to determine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. servicemen so that the Soviets could better asses the ability of U.S. soldiers to survive and operate in the rigorous conditions of all-out global war. Special experiments were devised and run to test the psychological and physiological endurance limits of U.S. servicemen. The fate of some U.S. POWs is inextricably tied to these experiments. This is one of several reasons why the KGB and GRU are less than enthusiastic in their efforts to uncover the fate of U.S. POWs. The experiments likely would surface in the process.

Additionally, the U.S. POWs were used as guinea pigs to test a variety of chemical and biological warfare agents and drugs that were being developed for military and intelligence use. One of the series of experiments conducted on U.S. POWs was to test the effectiveness of different mind-control drugs. As it turned out, the most effective drugs were those that had been developed at the Czechoslovak Air Force Scientific Center. Many of us can still recall the radio broadcasts and filmed newsreels that were shown at the movies in the mid 1950's in which the propaganda statements of U.S. servicemen denouncing America were aired. It was the Czechoslovak mind control drugs that caused the captured U.S. servicemen to renounce America, speak of the benefits of the communist system, and subsequently refuse to return to the United States following the cease fires. I understand our defense establishment lists such people as defectors and traitors. This may be a most unjust approach to a very complex problem.

To investigate bio-chemical aspects of U.S. servicemen, which was also part of the Soviet search for vulnerabilities, autopsies were performed on dead servicemen whose bodies were taken by the North Koreans and on those POWs who did not survive the various experiments at the intelligence medical facility. To further show the coupling of seemingly disparate intelligence operations to the POW issue, it was because of these autopsies on U.S. POW/MIAs that the Soviets, Khrushchev in particular, first seized on the idea of waging war on American youth with narcotics.

The idea of using narcotics as weapons, as different from their use as intelligence tools, was a major thrust of communist China's foreign policy adopted in 1949. The Korean War was the first war in which the Chinese would push narcotics as a way to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition's military forces. This strategy would later be employed with greatly enhanced effectiveness against the French, and later the Americans, in Vietnam.
<CENTER>- S E N S I T I V E -</CENTER>During the Korean War Soviet KGB intelligence was especially interested in the Chinese narcotics operation and followed it with great care. One of their findings was the existence of a surprisingly high incidence of use of hard narcotics, such as herion, cocaine, and the synthetic hiropon, among U.S. servicemen when contrasted with similar use by South Korean servicemen, a factor of two greater.

It was a consequence of the autopsies that this information came to take on strategic importance. During the autopsies, the Soviet and Czech doctors discovered that an unusually high percentage of the young U.S. servicemen had cardiovascular damage -- "mini heart attacks" was how the Soviet doctors described the damage -- a much higher percentage than among South Koreans. While several possible contributing factors were identified, such as diet, the doctors recognized the correlation between the incidence of heart damage and use of hard drugs and concluded that the drugs were probably a major cause.

When Khrushchev learned about this finding, he immediately recognized the potential of narcotics as a strategic weapon and commissioned a study to determine the potential effectiveness of narcotics trafficking as a strategic weapon for use against the West, the United States in particular. This was the origin of what would become by 1962 one of the most important Soviet-bloc intelligence operations undertaken to undermine our society, military effectiveness, and economic stability. Their primary initial targets were our youth, which are the backbone of any nation's military strength, and our colleges, because that was where our future leaders were to be found. A thorough investigation of the fate of U.S. POWs ultimately should also lead American intelligence to the sources of the narcotics plague that has grown exponentially since roughly 1969, when the Soviet trafficking strategy went operational.

What happened to the unaccounted for American POWs in the Korean War? Most are probably dead. But, some of the roughly 8,000 still unaccounted for might be alive. Were any of the American POW guinea pigs likely to have been returned? When I put this question to Sejna, his response was emphatic. "NO WAY! " he exclaimed, adding that Czechoslovak intelligence also built a crematorium in North Korea to help dispose of the remains of U.S. servicemen following the autopsies -- the ultimate fate of a majority of the American POW guinea pigs.
<CENTER>- S E N S I T I V E -</CENTER>Obtaining information about the fate of POWs from the Vietnam War will be even more difficult than from the Korean War because many POWs are coupled to extremely sensitive programs. Before his fall from power in September 1964, Sejna explained, Khrushchev, Khrushchev put the wheels in motion to continue in North Vietnam the experiments that were begun in North Korea during the Korean War. The experiments had been considered extremely profitable and there were many new drugs, chemical and biological agents and possible counteracting vaccines developed in the intervening years that needed to be tested.

Accordingly, arrangements were negotiated with the North Vietnamese and medical experiments using American POWs as buinea pigs were continued. Doctors from East European countries besides Czechoslovakia were involved. Most of the experiments on U.S. POWs were conducted in military hospitals in North Korea. But, the most sensitive experiments were conducted in KGB and GRU facilities back in the Soviet Union. This is why the movement of U.S. POWs to Russia and their interment in prisons and psychiatric "clinics" as revealed by Mr.Yeltsin takes on added significance.

It is highly unlikely that information on these activities will ever find its way into the Russian archives. Being research operations, the activities directly relate to special capabilities that are in being today and to covert operations over the past twenty years of the highest sensitivity.

For openers, the POW experiments are coupled with efforts to develop new generations of military chemical and biological warfare agents, efforts that, according to Sejna were more sensitive and more highly classified than nuclear weapons programs. They are also coupled to the development of chemical agents and drugs for intelligence applications and their nature likely will raise serious questions about a wide variety of assassination activities, including several undertaken against a variety of the highest-level national and international leaders.

They are coupled to the development of a wide variety of ming-control drugs. One that was described by Sejna was a follow-on to the drug used to reverse the values of selected U.S. POWs during the Korean War and cause them to disown America as described earlier. The new drug tested in the mid-1960's was covertly administered through food. It was operationally used as early as 1967 to turn influential anti-Soviet individuals in various countries into neutral and even pro-Soviet supporters.

That is, the telltale trail of U.S. POWs impinges on these, and other, extremely sensitive Soviet intelligence operations and capabilities that are still highly valued today. It goes without saying that neither the KGB nor the GRU are likely to find and volunteer such information on their own initiative!

I am convinced that the above is only a fraction of the information that is close at hand respecting the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs. The above information is just bits and pieces I collected in the process to conduct careful debriefings on the POW/MIA issue -- but would welcome the opportunity to do so. There is no doubt in my mind that considerably more information could be extracted from further debriefings, and that among the items of greatest interest would be the names of other officials and participants from various former communist countries who would also have detailed memories based on first-hand knowledge. Once identified, these people could be contacted and the process repeated. The result would be a mass of detail that would be most difficult to refute and which then could be used as the basis for specific discussions with President Yeltsin to obtain his assistance in a much more direct attack on the KGB and GRU bureaucracies than merely looking for needles in the archive haystacks.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the above in detail with you and address any questions you may have. An over view of my background is attached for your information. My phone number is (XXX) XXX-XXXX.

Finally, I would like to caution your staff not to take any precipitous action based on the above without careful deliberation. That is, there are a number of important operational nuances that I did not discuss above because of their sensitivity.

[Arrow]

more to come...

[Jerry D]

As Artie Johnson said on Laugh In "Verry Interesting" thanks for the posting of this information :ae: makes a person think!

[Arrow]

Thanks for reading Jerry and taking the time to stop and think.


<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Testimony of Albro Lundy III
Submitted On Behalf of His Father Major Albro L. Lundy Jr.
November 7, 1991

This is an overview to establish a baseline for initial investigation by the committee. This is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis, as the Lundy family is still conducting investigation. As further factual evidence surfaces, the Lundy family will submit the details for the Senate to investigate.

In March of 1970 at the age of 37, Major Albro L. Lundy, Jr. said goodbye to his parents, wife and six children to answer his country's call. In the face of extreme controversy about a conflict half a world away, he unquestioningly went off to fight for freedom against an enemy known as communism. He is first and foremost, a patriot. Major Lundy is a fighter pilot but his military record shows far more. Prior to his assignment to Southeast Asia, he had taught German Luftwaffe pilots how to fly America's best planes. Upon return from his tour in Vietnam, he was to be assigned as the military attache to an Eastern European embassy (he went down just twelve days before his rotation home.) Major Lundy had also served at Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) where he had designed weapons systems and operations. This assignment came after he had completed his master's degree in Human Factors.

In addition to his family, his love was flying and he was very skilled at it. During the first eight months of his tour in Southeast Asia, Major Lundy was awarded the Silver Star, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Air Force Air Medal and six Air Force Commendation Medals, (Fourth through Ninth Oak Leaf Clusters.)

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Facts of Loss Incident

On Christmas Eve 1970, Major Lundy was flying a med-evac search and rescue mission in North Central Laos over the Ban Ban Valley. Although two other A1E fighter groups had refused this mission, Major Lundy volunteered. Three Air American helicopters, two Raven forward air controllers, and Air America C-7A and another A1E were flying on that mission. Major Lundy reported having a rough engine and that he needed to leave the airplane. Subsequent intelligence analysis indicated that his engine was hit by groundfire, as the area was heavily defended by both North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao ground troops.

Major Lundy announced that he was leaving the airplane and the observers watched an apparently normal chute deployment. One observer reported seeing someone in the chute initially, while other observers reported that no one was in the parachute as it neared the ground. Ground rescue teams were unable to reach the parachute site as the area was very hostile and casualties were taken.

Major Lundy was declared MIA, survivability rated as Category 1 (indicating out of aircraft at time of crash--Attachment 1). Two days later Major Lundy was declared KIA/BNR. There is no clear explanation given as to why he was declared KIA. Although combat forces try to make the best determinations they can in the face of uncertainty, this does not mean their judgments are infallible. For instance, Ernie Brace, who had been declared dead by the U.S. Government, returned alive in 1973 during Operation Homecoming I.

Immediately following Major Lundy's "death", and for twenty years thereafter, the Lundy family was given but a fraction of the above information. For instance, both the telegram and official condolence letter from the Commander of the 56th Special Operations Wing, Col. E.J. Walsh, specifically indicated that Major Lundy did not leave the aircraft and that "he died instantly as a result of the aircraft crash." (Attachment 2) Yet, one witness states that he saw Major Lundy in his parachute and the government to this day lists his survivability category as 1, meaning that he was out of the airplane. Additionally, the family was told that a parachute deployed from the plane, yet no adequate explanation has ever been given as to how his parachute could deploy if he went down and was incinerated in the plane. Finally, from whom, when, and where did any of this information come from? The family was not given an information to answer these questions or verify the facts.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Family Response

Major Lundy's family accepted the KIA/BNR designation despite the mysteries surrounding the crash. The Lundy family went on with their life. Johanna Lundy went to law school, became an attorney and raised six children on her own. Major Lundy's loss was so traumatic to the family that they completely avoided the POW/MIA cause even while the war was ongoing. The Lundy family accepted the death of Major Lundy so firmly that when Scott Barnes met some of the family at church in the summer of 1981 and said he had information that Major Lundy was still alive, the family said they were not interested in his information because Major Lundy was dead. Barnes approached the family because he saw Albro Lundy III's name in a visitor's book and recognized the unique name.

Scott Barnes reported on Major Lundy in his book BOHICA on page 42.<TT> THE LUNDY FAMILY FORMALLY REQUESTS THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO SUBPOENA THE CIA FILES ON MAJOR LUNDY THAT ARE REFERRED TO IN BOHICA AND TO SUBPOENA COL. PAUL MATHER, to question him about Major Lundy and all other POWs.</TT> (Attachment 3)

Major Lundy's eldest son, Albro III, had always wanted to speak to the wingman who watched his father go down and in 1985 he submitted a FOIA Request for his father's file and the names of the witnesses to his crash. The Air Force responded by sending Major Lundy's personnel and medical files but sent a letter stating that there were "no witnesses to Major Lundy's incident." Albro Lundy III accepted this letter as the truth and did no further follow-up. Despite this letter, when the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo was leaked to the media, the government immediately said that there were four witnesses to the "death" of Major Lundy. (Attachment 4)

WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT LIE TO THE FAMILY WHEN THEY KNEW THERE WERE WITNESSES AND AT LEAST ONE WITNESS STATEMENT? The government has lost all credibility in the family's eyes--they now want to see all the original documents for themselves. And so they should. There is no legitimate reason to classify these documents.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png First Live Reporting of Major Lundy

In the spring of 1991, the government sent Johanna Lundy a transcription of letter purportedly written for Major Lundy. The government classified them as "dog tag reports" of an obviously fraudulent nature although the report contained correct information not found on a dog tag. Johanna's response was to toss them in the trash and mention them to her family in passing. This is another example of how firmly the family believed that Major Lundy was dead.

Albro III ordered his own set of documents and while examining them found a mention of thumbprints buried in the bottom of the transcription. It was difficult for him to understand why this wasn't mentioned in any of the government's analysis. Certainly this could prove or disprove the correct nature of the report and whether or not Major Lundy did survive. Albro called his Air Force Liaison officer, William Frampton, about the case. His first question was, "Have you run the fingerprints yet?" Frampton replied that THEY DO NOT CHECK FINGERPRINTS UNLESS THE NEXT OF KIN REQUESTS IT. Lundy III was stunned. At this point it had been five months since the original documents were received. This is the "Highest National Priority" and the government does not even try to match fingerprints of a possible POW? The Pentagon leaves "no stone unturned" in their search for POWs and does not try to verify fingerprints? Lundy also noted that they also did not call the Next of Kin and ask if they wanted them checked or mention them in their reporting. In some cases the NOK may not even know that fingerprints exist to try matching.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Missing Fingerprints

Lundy's amazement at the cavalier attitude towards the fingerprints turned to shock when it was discovered that his father's fingerprints were missing from the file and no match could be attempted. In addition to knowing that his father had been fingerprinted as least 5 times, Lundy III possessed a letter from his father's file saying "Attached is Major Lundy's fingerprint card." (Attachment 5) His father's prints did not just fall out of the file if they were attached to this letter. Someone had to take them out on purpose.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Enter: the Famous Photograph

In late April, Judge Hamilton Gayden called Albro III and suggested he contact Gladys Fleckenstein, the mother of Lt. Comdr. Larry Stevens, because she might have a photo (http://www.aiipowmia.com/ssc/3manpik.html)of Major Lundy. Gladys had had the photograph in her possession for almost six months and had never been able to identify the third man in the photo. The names of Stevens and Robertson were on the back of the photo Shelby Robertson Quast had obtained.

Gladys had previously been aware of the Lundy family name from a letter sent to her by Chuck Trowbridge of the DIA in February 1991 stating that Major Lundy was supposedly held with Robertson and Stevens (Attachment 6). Gladys requested the Lundy family address, however, the government would not release this information. The fact that private individuals had to bring these families together is not so incredible when compared to the fact that the government possessed a three-man photograph with an unidentified third man and independent corroborating evidence that these three men were being held together and never once contacted the Lundy family to possibly identify the third man. This blatant government malfeasance directly contradicts the stated POW policy of being the "nation's highest priority."

Upon receiving a copy of the photograph from Gladys's source, an American humanitarian worker who received the photo at Site 2, Thailand, Albro immediately submitted it to a preliminary photo analysis that showed the photo had not been tampered with, except for the label applied as the sign. Albro who wanted to protect his family, especially his mother, did not mention the photo or his investigations.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Second eye-witness account

On June 27, Lundy was called by the Air Force Liaison with a second-hand live sighting of his father, still reportedly held with Robertson and Stevens, that was received in January 1991 by DIA. AS OF SEPTEMBER, 1991, THE DIA HAS NOT INVESTIGATED THIS LIVE SIGHTING. This was confirmed by Bob Sheetz, Chuck Trowbridge and Warren Grey in a meeting with Lundy and Shelby Quast September 1991. In fact, when the question was raised at this meeting specifically about these men, none of these individuals, supposedly fully briefed on the case, even recalled the existence of a second live sighting report. DIA had the report 5 MONTHS before giving it to the family and has STILL NOT FOLLOWED UP A LIVE SIGHTING NOW NINE MONTHS OLD of this highly visible case. If the families had been given the names of the sources and supposed locations, instead of having this information classified, the men might be home right now.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Photo Identification

Albro finally told his mother about the existence of the photo in early July, just prior to flying to Washington for the National League of Families conference. Johanna demanded to see the photo before hearing any corroborating evidence, and she identified the photo within minutes. "That is a picture of my husband," Johanna Lundy has said to the world. Nothing but an actual photograph of her husband would convince her that he survived. It took the weight of this picture, along with other evidence, as well as the government's dishonesty and malfeasance to cause her to question the government's initial declaration of this death. "Why would they lie if they don't need to?" she states. This photo is also unanimously identified by all Major Lundy's relatives and friends.

This photograph has also been analyzed and the identity of Major Lundy has been confirmed by photographic and computer photo analysts. These analyses will be submitted separately upon request of the committee. Particularly with Major Lundy there is an UNMISTAKABLE CORRELATION of Major Lundy's features in his young photos to his aged image in the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Pentagon Treatment of Photo

Albro Lundy III has made four trips from California to the Pentagon to see the file on his father and has been denied access each time. The first time occurred during the League of Families conference where the Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy families all met together for the first time. When all three families questioned Pentagon officials during the League of Family Conference July 11-14, they all said they had never seen the photo before. Because of the families' definite identifications of the men in the photo, Carl Ford and Ken Quinn made plans to give the photo to the Vietnamese and request repatriation of the men.

On July 15 the photo was given to the Vietnamese and surrounding governments.

On July 16th the photo was leaked to the press--not by the families.

On July 17th, the Pentagon held a press conference saying the photo could not be proved authentic and "unnamed Pentagon sources" said the photo was a hoax.

Before Ken Quinn could even get to the bargaining table on July 25th, the real OFFICIAL government policy was made quite clear to the Vietnamese: THE POWS ARE ALL DEAD.

The Pentagon undermined Ken Quinn's trip to Hanoi to discuss the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo by releasing to CBS News a seven-page analysis discrediting the letters and therefore, by association, the photo, even though the two had never before been connected, on the eve of this meeting. This analysis, containing a plethora of errors and misinformation too numerous to cite here, was handed to nation-wide news media before it was released to the three families involved. Carl Ford had promised the families prior to this that nothing would be released to the news media without it first being given to all three families involved. When questioned by Albro III about this breach of his promise, not to mention policy, Ford responded, "I guess my work is not worth much, is it?" Absolutely not, says the Lundy family.

One of the most tragic results of this breach was the fact that Johanna Lundy was told by reporters over the phone that the analysis indicated that remains of her husband and his identification card had been found. The fact that the government would even have printed this information when it knew that Major Lundy flew sanitized, (meaning that he flew without any identification on his person because he was flying in the secret war in Laos), and that the official government line to Mrs. Lundy until this moment had been that he was incinerated in his plane, is nothing less than brutal and blatant dishonesty. The government has yet to make a retraction nor provide the Lundy family with any of the evidence they purport supports this lie.

The government has had this photo in its possession since June 1990 according to DOD News Briefing on August 6, 1991. A FOIA submitted in September requesting all copies of the photo and photo analyses done on it has still not been responded to by General Soyster. The families were told by Bob Sheetz that the photo was not sent to the FBI for analysis until July 1991. WHY DID IT TAKE THE DIA ONE YEAR TO EVEN SUBMIT THIS PHOTO FOR ANALYSIS? WHY DOES DOD CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON ANY POTENTIAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE EXCEPT FOR THE IDENTITIES OF THE MEN? WHY DOES THE ONLY PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS (FROM SANDIA) RELEASED TO THE FAMILIES DWELL ON THE ERRONEOUS IDENTIFICATION OF THE PHOTO AS CIRCA WWII INSTEAD OF SPECIFICALLY FOCUSING ON THE SPECIFIC IDENTITIES OF THE THREE MEN? In fact, an identity analysis was not even requested of Sandia.

Concerning other Pentagon allegations about this photo, the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo has never been found in Soviet magazine nor has it been proven to be a "fake" or a "hoax". The Pentagon's official response to the families is that the families' identifications indicate that theses men are who we say they are and the Pentagon is seriously investigating it. Yet, in actuality, they are doing nothing to bring these men home and, in fact, are discrediting the evidence that shows they are alive.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Questions Requiring Answers

Why would our government risk their credibility with the Vietnamese by giving them a photo they had done no analysis on?

If the government truly had evidence showing questions about the photo, why did the DIA not share this information with the families when they made numerous trips to the Pentagon requesting all information on the photograph? Or did the DOD just start slandering the photo for their own purposes after it became public?

If two other families have actually identified the middle man in this photo, why haven't they come forward to shed light on this photo and to help bring their man home?

Why hasn't the DOD forwarded the Lundy family's request to these two families that they come forward or contact the Lundy family privately? Did the DOD just create this story as a way to debunk the most readily identifiable image of the three men?

How could a parachute deploy without a person in it?

Who were all the people who saw Major Lundy's incident? Where are the witness statements of the Durax pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement?

Why was Major Lundy rated survivability Category 1 and still declared KIA without further proof of his death?

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Certainty of prisoners in Laos

The United States lost 586 servicemen, missing in action, in Laos during the Vietnam War. In February of 1973, the communist Pathet Lao, through their spokesman Soth Petrosky, claimed to hold dozens of our men as prisoners of war and demanded that the U.S. negotiate for their release. Within two months, President Nixon fell from power because of Watergate and never negotiated with the Pathet Lao. The Vietnamese, as recently as July 1991, through their U.N. Ambassador, told Johanna Lundy that the Vietnamese did not negotiate with the United States regarding POW's held in Laos and that the U.S. must negotiate directly with the Path Lao. To this day, not one living American POW has returned from Laos. "You do not understand...there is a greater destiny for our foreign policy in Asia and the POWs are expendable in pursuit of that policy..." said Harriet Isom, Charge'd d' Affairs, United States Embassy, Vientiane, Laos, 1990.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Summary

In the Lundy case, the family has been deliberately lied to. Major Lundy's file tampered with, all evidence including the live-sightings and fingerprints have not been pursued and the photo has been erroneously slandered by the government. The Lundy family feels the government has shown a complete lack of good faith in trying earnestly to follow up all possible leads on the possibility of Major Lundy's captivity. They have in fact deliberately obfuscated the truth, prolonging the captivity of Major Lundy as well as all the other live POWs. It's time to stop the ludicrous charade that has been perpetrated by the Department of Defense. We pray that the Senate Select Committee can reveal the truth and finally bring our loved ones home.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/162.png Formal Information Request

The Lundy family formally requests the Senate Select Committee to obtain and provide to the Lundy family the following information which we know exists:

All classified information on Major Lundy.

CIA Radio Intercepts on prisoners captured in Laos from 1970 until today.

All photo analysis done since receipt of the photo in June 1990 which should include DIA and FBI photo analysis.

All reports of photo and sources.

Latent prints of Major Lundy known to be held at the FBI.

Any and all Henry Fingerprint Classification Cards on Maj. Lundy.

Witness statements of all Air American pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement.

All CIA files on Major Lundy, particularly the one referred to in BOHICA.

Subpoena of Col. Paul Mather to discuss post-1973 reports of major Lundy.


<HR width="50%">

<CENTER></CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>

<TBODY>

<TR>

<TD bgColor=#cccccc>DOD Response to The 3 Man Picturehttp://www.aiipowmia.com/sea/greystatic.gif</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

International
Security Affairs

DoD Response to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy Testimony

The following allegations were raised by the family members regarding DoD investigative efforts on behalf of the purported Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy (http://www.aiipowmia.com/ssc/lundy.html) photographs. DoD Responses follow.

(Ms.Fleckenstein): As of September 16th, I received the information from the Defense Department that the picture had been analyzed by Dr.Charney, who I just told you that they didn't accept that, and that they would analyze it their selves. And I waited up until now. I've called and called trying to get the annalysis to me, which I did not get, and didn't know about it until I arrived here yesterday morning and it was handed to me by Major Giddens.

The Department of Defense sent the photograph purported to depict Commander Stevens to Sandia National Laboratory on 13 September 1991. When Sandia completed its analysis the report was reviewed at DIA and then forwarded it to the Assistance Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) in order to respond to direct family requests made to Carl Ford's Military Assistant. The report was obtained on late 5 November and was provided to Mrs. Fleckenstein personally by Major Gittins rather than forwarding it through the Navy Casualty Assistance Office. This accomodation was made in order to minimize the delay to Lieutenant Commander Steven's family in light of their participation in the Committee Hearings.

(Ms.Shelby Quast): And I guess I'm asking for some help. We have said this so many times, yet I continue to hear that it [the three man photo] has been in a magazine. It's simply people don't want to hear that. And I would like to, for the record, set it straight. It has never been found to be a fake or a hoax, or ever found to be in a magazine.

The Department of Defense has never stated that the three man photo is a hoax or fake. The facts surrounding the photograph of the three individuals identified by family members as Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy are as follows:

1) The photograph first surfaced during August 1990 in Thailand along with a report which was not correlated to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy. The photograph was received along with a second photograph that was later located in an Eastern-bloc magazine in Phonom Penh and which depicted a Soviet special forces military officer. The report that accompanied the first passing of the photo was that the two photos depicted four Americans from the same prison in Vietnam and that the three were friends and the fourth was separate from the other three, so two photos were taken.

2) There are no first hand live sighting reports of the three individuals that correlate to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy. In every case, the reports are hearsay, second or third hand reports. The first report, does not have any name association to Robertson, Stevens or Lundy.

3) Flyers widely circulated in Southeast Asia by Red McDaniel's American Defense Institute provide basic biographical data on Colonel Robertson and Lieutenant Commander Stevens. Information contained within the flyer forms the basis for information associated with later iterations of the photograph. Associated reporting that goes beyond the basic biographical data is quite obviously wrong---almost humorously so.

4) The photograph has been altered. The placard that the men appear to be holding was added to the photograph after it was taken and printed, and a photo made of the alteration. The placard reflects basic data that appears on several other photographs, also reported by the sources of those photos to depict American POWs. The writing on the placard is by the same hand as the writing on a number of other alterations to photos purported to depict American POWs and later located in Soviet magazines.

5) The men in the photo appear to be holding rifles in the photograph. U.S. Government photo analysts have identified the butt of a rifle on the left side of the photo and the rifles are apparent under the placard.

6) A tape recording received with the photograph by one source and identified as the voice of Colonel Robertson by the source was rejected as a fraud by the Robertson family.

7) Captain Buchanan, Colonel Robertson's WSO stated that he did not know whether Colonel Robertson got out of the aircraft. He did not see Colonel Robertson subsequent to ejecting from the aircraft.

8) Congressman Peterson testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affiars, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, that he was interrogated by the Vietnamese about Colonel Robertson with Colonel Robertson's dogtag and idenfitication card. He also stated that the Vietnamese captors told him that Colonel Robertson had died and it was his (Peterson's) opinion that Robertson had died either in the crash or shortly thereafter.


(Ms.Quast) (Page 332): The third part I just wanted to touch upon quickly to address the access to information. I have been promised at a very high policy lever access to my father's file, but denied access by those people that have testified before this committee when I went to see the file. I'm asking what is the policy and who runs the show for POW policy.

Ms. Quast has met on several occasions with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl W. Ford, Jr. On one occasion in Mr.Ford's office on August 22 at 1:20PM, Ms.Quast requested to see the entire DIA file on her father. Mr.Ford did not promise Ms.Quast that she could see the file. He stated that he would look into the matter because the file may contain sensitive classified information.

When Ms.Quast returned to see Mr.Ford, she reiterated her request to see the entire file. She was again told that the file contained classified information and she would not be provided access to the file. Mr.Ford assured Ms. Quast that his staff would compare the DIA file with the Casualty Assistance Officer's file maintained by the Air Force to ensure that she was in possession of all of the unclassified information on her father. Lieutenant Thomas Doughty, of Mr.Ford's staff, reviewed the DIA file and the Air Force file with Mr. George Atkinson, USAF Missing Persons Office, on 5 November 1991 and determined that Ms.Quast had been provided all but one document from the DIA file. This information was communicated personally by Lieutenant Doughty and Mr.George Atkinson to Ms. Quast during one of the recesses to the hearings.

There is no anticipated change to policy to provide access to classified material to the families. The Department of Defense will continue to provide the families with all information regarding their unaccounted for loved ones. Where classified information is involved, sensitive sources and methods will be sanitized from the document prior to delivery to the families.

(Senator Smith): So I am going to put all officials in control of these [fingerprints] on notice that I intend to know why, in the case of all of the live sighting reports, and all of the individuals involved in those reports, why we do not have fingerprints in the service jackets of those individuals. And if you do not know why, you better start looking because I want to know why.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the sole USG agency with the responsibility for maintaining fingerprints of American citizens. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records on servicemen. None of the services are required by law or regulation to maintain fingerprints in the service records of their individual servicemen. The national fingerprint database within the FBI maintains all service fingerprint records as well as the fingerprints of civilians who may be fingerprited and their prints retained by the Government.

Congressman Solarz, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affiars, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, requested an explanation of why the fingerprints of Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy all are missing from the FBI database. At the Department of Defense request, FBI Director William Sessions provided the possible explanation for this state of affairs. Director Sessions' response is provided in pertinent part:

Since the FBI is the repository for fingerprints for military personnel, DoD requested the prints for these individuals, in addition to the third person linked to the photograph, Lieutenant Commander Larry J.Stevens. A search of FBI fingerprint files did not disclose a record for these three individuals. There are many reasons why we may not currently have those fingerprints and an explanation for the record may be beneficial.

The most logical reason for the absence of these prints may be the policy for purging files. In the case of military prints, if DoD reports an individual killed-in-action (KIA) or otherwise deceased, the print is placed in a special file for seven years and then destroyed unless there is additional information furnished by the military. In testimony, Mr.Ford advised that the DoD had listed Major Albro L. Lundy, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Stevens as KIA based on eye witnesses' accounts of each incident. Relevant herein is a list of 2,483 names furnished to the FBI by DoD in 1984. They were identified by DoD as being "Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia." A search of our fingerprints files identified prints for 912 individuals from that list. The prints for the three individuals linked to the photograph were NOT among those with prints in file. All existing prints from that list are being maintained and are not subject to being purged.

Another explanation is that we never received fingerprint of those in question. But, it would perhaps be more than coincidental that the prints for three individuals linked to a single photograph would have been submitted. This is particularly true given the policy of fingerprinting all military personnel. Unfortunately, due to the volume of civil prints alone, approximately 35 million individuals and 90 million cards, records of receipted are not maintained. In most instances, the only means to determine if there is a print on file is to check the index. The absence of an individual from the index only indicates the FBI does not currently have a file. This would not necessarily mean that the FBI never had a file. It could have been previously purged from the system, but, in most instances, there would be no record of the purge.

Fingerprints are frequently not capable of classification/retention due to their illegibility based on the quality of the inked prints that are submitted. When this occurs, the prints are sent back to the contributor with a request to obtain a ligible fingerprint card for resubmission. It is not unusual to not receive a follow-up set of prints. As above, there would be no record if this occured. As a point of reference, in the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 1991, the FBI Identification Division rejected over 790,000 fingerprints cards for this reason. Although historical figures are not available for the Vietnam War era, rejection rates for prints submitted by the military in the early 1980s were about 15 percent. Anecdotal information from the Vietnam War era indicates rejection rates may have been as high as 25 to 30 percent.

It should be noted that the Department of Defense requested in 1984, well before this photo surfaced, a list of POW/MIAs for whom the FBI had fingerprints on file. At that time, Robertson, Stevens and Lundy's fingerprints were not within the FBI database. We can provide no further explanation for this phenomenon beyond that provided by the Director of the FBI, however, there is no conspiracy, cover-up or otherwise mysterious circumstances surrounding the loss of these files as has been suggested by some individuals at these hearings.

The fingerprints record of Captain Donald G. Carr another individual with a high profile POW/MIA photograph case, IS on file with the FBI and available for comparison if that individual is located.

(Mr.Albro Lundy) (Page 345): I have asked one photoanalysis that we've done to be passed around to the Senators. It's a simple photo overlay. Its done on acetate, and if you take a look at it--you just lift the acetate up-one of the photos is my father as a younger man and then the other photo is the copy of the photo drawn out. You see that it matches perfectly. All the features are the same, the head analysis, something that could have been done very easily, I think by the Government immediately, but has never been done, or at least has never been provided to us.

The simple analysis described by Mr.Lundy was provided to Government photo analysis experts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI experts reaction was the the "analysis" had no basis in science, was not acceptalbe methodology in any professional association that they were aware of, and would not be accepted for admission as evidence in any court in the United States on the issue of identification by photograph. Despite its simplicity, the method decribed in the testimony is patently unreliable.

Mr.Lundy (Page 347): So I wrote a FOIA....So if you can not read it, but the part that is highlighted says specifically, this is all the information in the file, there were no witnesses to this incident.

Mr.Lundy's FOIA request in 1985 was directed to the USAF. Their records had no indication that there were any witnesses to the incident in which Major Lundy was lost. The sole witness statement was located in a file in JCRC during a records search conducted pursuant to his 1991 FOIA request to JCRC. This report was provided to Mr.Lundy immediately by the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs when its existence became known.

(Mr.Lundy) [in response to the statement "Apparently some other families claim (the individual in the three person photo) is theirs] (Page 354): And none of the families that the DIA has talked about have come forward, have called and said, let me help you here, this is my son or this is my brother. Would it not be relief to me? ... I asked Chuck Gittins, I said please Chuck, contact those people. Please write them and tell them to contact me. I need to know, I need to know. I don't know if Chuch has done it or not, but they have not contacted me.

In a September meeting in PDASD Ford's office with PDASD Ford, Shelby Quast and Major Gittins, Mr.Ford explained to Mr.Lundy the fact that two other families had come forward to claim the pictured individual as their unaccounted for loved one. He also explained that the individuals claimed by the other families also bore a striking resemblance to the individual in the three-person photo. Mr.Ford reiterated that these families did not want to be thrust in the limelight and requested that the DoD not share their identities Mr.Ford told Mr.Lundy that he intended to honor that request.

While Major Gittins was escorting Mr.Lundy out of the Pentagon after the meeting with Mr.Ford, Mr.Lundy stated in passing that he would like to speak to the two other families. Major Gittins reiterated Mr.Ford's explanation and stated that DoD would respect the request of the families. Mr.Lundy never requested "really like to talk to the other families." Major Gittins surmises that the actual question was not asked so that it would not appear that Mr. Lundy was trying to get around the decision of PDASD Ford, but rather that Major Gittins would do so on his own initiative.

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/163.png Statement by the Honorable Duane P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense

Statement by the Honorable Duane P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United States Senate October 15, 1992

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. While I am pleased to support your hearing which is examining markings on buildings and terrain in Southeast Asia that may relate to American POW/MIAs and to have this opportunity to set the record straight on a lot of incorrect information that is in circulation, I have great apprehension in discussing in an open hearing topics that relate to the capabilities and practices of our Nation's Intelligence activities. I believe that it is a poor security practice to "talk around" classified operations iniformation that was recently widely disclosed in the TV and print media. It seems that we and officials that have served before us have been indicted in the court of public opinion for ignoring signs that Americans were left behind based on an inaccurate bill of particulars that was drawn up using incomplete, selectively leaked intelligence.

I understand the frustration with classification expressed by many in the general public and in particular by the families and Veteran's organizations that are so concerned with the POW/MIA issue. They appear to believe that we are unnecessarily keeping this intelligence material behind a veil of secrecy - that as it relates to events from decades ago it therefore no longer required classified protection. This is not the case. Much of what we have discussed in closed meetings is based on current intelligence sources and methods. This is not, as some have charged, an attempt to hide a perceived government failure to liberate our POWs. Rather, it is the fulfillment of our obligation to protect those intelligence means and methods vital to our global responsibilities in the defense of the Nation.

Notwithstanding his reservations about public discussion of intelligence matters, Secretary Cheney has authorized me to present an unclassified statement describing certain of our intelligence activities and other related activities that were understaken in response to certain symbols that have been purported to indicate the possible presence of American prisoners of war in Vietnam and Laos. These symbols have been referred to in the press as the USA and K, the 1973 or 1573 TH, the Morse Code K, the 52 or B52, the "arrow and P, and what were believed to be a series of escape and evasion identity numbers that were seen by Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency, or JSSA, personnel on some photographs of Laos.

To the extent that I can in an open session, and to the best of my knowledge based on what I have pulled from the reports of actions that were undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency and by the JSSA, I will review our current understanding of these symbols. Following my statement Mr. William Gadoury of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting will present his statement concerning certain activities related to the search for Americans and the USA symbol. Colonel Bob Bonn, Commander of the JSSA, Mr. Bob Dussault, Colonel Bonn's deputy, and Mr. Al Erickson, a SERE instructor and evasion and escape expert, and Mr. Sheetz, Mr. Santora, and Mr. Knapper from the Defense Intelligence Agency are present. These individuals are prepared to independently confirm the accuracy of what I relate.

However, I must caution that in open session we will be unable to present the full range of information available to us on these matters -- information that we have previously presented to the Select Committee in closed meetings. Any questions that require getting into classified information in order to provide a complete answer will have to be answered in a closed hearing. Please do not take this as an indication that we are not willing to answer your questions fully. We have willingly made all of our documents available to the Select Committee and we will willingly answer all of your questions. We just have to do so in a responsible manner when dealing with sensitive intelligence or escape and evasion matters. If we divulge the tradecraft used in either area it may cost American lives in future conflicts.

Before I review the specific symbols of interest I would like to make a few comments concerning imagery. I believe that a short general description of this topic will help you understand the complexity of the issue and the technical photographs we probably think of the snapshots we get back from the drug store or the one hour film processor or the portraits we have taken on special occasions. When we talk of imagery we are talking about quite a different thing. Although some of our imagery is produced by light directly falling on a wide strip of film, most is produced by very high technology processes involving devices which transform the varying light signals into digital signals. These digital signals can be read out on very high resolution workstations -- a kind of film negative. Such imagery can be made up of a single view of the area or it can be made up of two images taken slightly apart in time or from two slightly different angles. This allows us to view the image as if it were in three dimensions.

We examine such film on a light table under very powerful optics. In effect we put it under a microscope. Interpreting the information contained in a film positive or negative is not a skill you can pick up quickly. I was an imagery analyst in my earlier years in the Air Force. It took me six months of basic schooling and another six months of on-the-job training before I was considered qualified to sign my name to an imagery interpretation report. Today, we send our analysts to an additional three months of advanced schooling after they have had this basic qualification training. When viewing an image it is often easy to "see" things in nature that appear to be man-made but which on closer examination are shadows and foliage.

When an intelligence analyst has a question about an area or a specific point target he submits an imagery request. This request is given an appropriate priority and will be imaged. This image does not go directly to the intelligence analyst that requested that it be taken. Rather, a skilled imagery interpreter examines the image and prepares an imagery interpretation report. This written report, and occasionally a print or photograph of the target, is forwarded to the analyst. Some times when an imagery interpreter examines an image he or she will see something that was not mentioned in the original analyst's request. An example is the USA seen by a CIA imagery interpreter who was examining imagery of Laos for another purpose. In such a case the imagery interpretation report is forwarded to the analytic section responsible for the unexpected sighting.

I also should address why we are showing line drawings of the symbols we are here today to discuss. A fair question is "You are very open about what these symbols are or appear to be so why not show photographs of them?" The reason is straightforward. If a camera scientist can get his hands on an image he canb determine many characteries of the camera that took the picture. Its location, its focal length, the camera's stability, its sensitivity to the varying intensity of light, and a host of other technical parameters. We do not want the scientists of other countries to obtain such knowledge of our technical capabilities. Such knowledge would help them hide things from us that we need to see to support our military forces and for national security.

Now I will turn to the symbols that have been the subject of so much discussion. I will review each of the images of interest in turn. I believe this will support our conclusion that of all the millions of square kilometers of territory in Southeast Asia that we have examined over the years we really only have two unexplained sets of symbols which were clearly intended to communicate something to an observer from above.

The first symbol of interest is a 1973 TH. This symbol was imaged on May 20, 1973 and again on July 10, 1973 on the Plain of Jars in Laos. The Plain of Jars was a hotly contested area during the war in Indochina. Lao General Vang Pao and his Hmong soldiers fought valiantly for control of this vital area which contains within its borders the key lines of communication for central Laos. Control of the Plain of Jars shifted back and forth between Royal Lao Army and Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces during the war.

The imagery, now unclassified, which contains this set of symbols was obtained using an unmanned airborne reconnaissance system. It has been interpreted as either a 1573 or 1973 and either TA or TH. None of the four possible combinations of these symbols correlate to a classic distress symbol or to the escape and evasion symbols that our crews were trained to use. Another explanation is that the four numbers resemble a personal authenticator number but we have been unable to correlate them with any individual. Although it is not what we would expect to be used by an unaccounted for U.S. military person, the symbols remains of interest to the Defense Department because they have not been explained.

Possible explanations for the appearance of these symbols are many, though none seem particularly convincing. For instance, the U.S. Government provided aid to General Vang Pao through CIA-operated Air America assets. Some Air America crews were downed in action. One such U.S. Aviator, Emmet Kay, went down on May 7, 1973 approximately 8 kilometers from the area where this symbol was either tramped, cut, cleared or etched into the elephant grass. (Emmet Kay returned to the U.S. in September 1974.) Some have surmised the Emmet Kay's Hmong crew might have made the symbol during the few hours they were free before capture. The leader of the Hmong was a Major Thao. We can speculate that he may have been trying to signal their location by abbreviating his name. We may never know the answer to this as Major Thao died in captivity.

Others have surmised that the symbol could have been placed on the ground by a group of Thai personnel that were also captured during this period by the Pathet Lao. TH, of course, is the two character U.S. country code for Thailand. We know that these three Thai individuals were held in captivity with Emmet Kay and his Hmong crew members. Many attempts have been made over the years to follow this lead. Only recently, a new lead has surfaced indicating that one of the Hmong may now be available for interview in Thailand. If we are successful in our attempt to interview this individual we may learn more. But at this point, we have no way of knowing if the symbol was or was not made by either the Thai individuals or the Hmong.

Another, and less likely, theory for the symbol relates to the downing of an AC-130 gunship in December 1972, some 300 miles away in southern Laos just across the Lao/Thai border. While only two crew members were known to have survived, one of the crew members that stayed with the plane down to its impact on the jungle floor was Captain Thomas Hart. Captain Hart is the only downed aviator whose initials and loss circumstances could possible correlate with the initials TH. While Captain Hart's remains were recovered in 1985 by the JCRC, even if Captain Hart had survived, it is unlikely that he would have chosen to evade for over 300 miles through some of the roughest territory in Laos. He would more likely have gone a relatively short distance due West toward Thailand and freedom.

All we know for sure at this point in time in 1992 is that the symbol remains unexplained despite having been analyzed in depth on at least four separate occasions: by the Pacific Command in 1973: by the JCRC and DIA in 1976: by DIA in 1986/87: and by the DIA, CIA and JSSA in 1992. Neither the DIA, JSSA, or the JTF-FA have been able to make a correlation to any individual. While positive results may have been hoped for in 1973-75, it is not likely that 19 years later we will be able to pick up the trail in Laos. In short, the origin and meaning of this symbol is unexplained and probably will remain so.

I will now turn to the USA &amp; possible K symbols. This symbol was imaged on January 22, 1988 in a narrow rice paddy Valley in Northeast Laos near Sam Neua, Laos. This imagery was taken for a project unrelated to POW/MIAs and was not looked at by an imagery analyst until early December 1988. While the actual imagery remains classified, the line drawing we have with us today is unclassified. As you can see, the letters USA are clearly distinguishable, and each letter is estimated to be more than twice the height of a normal sized man. On the imagery, below the USA letters some additional markings can be seen. Some have speculated that these markins are in the pattern of the number 34 or even the letter K, or perhaps even a so-called walking K distress symbol. This symbol was only imaged once. By the time it was discovered in December 1988 by the Central Intelligence Agency and immediately brought to DIA's attention, it was no longer observable on the ground.

Once this symbol was made known to DIA, investigative steps were promptly taken. The full range of follow-up steps taken by the U.S. Government have been briefed to the Committee in a closed meeting. What I can say here in open session is that all appropriate means of information collection, including the full range of intelligence assets avialable to the U.S. Government have been brought to bear to no avail. Like the prior symbol discussed that appeared on the Plain of Jars in 1973, this USA symbol remains unexplained.

There is still disagreement as to whether or not the markings and shadings seen below the USA letters are in actuality some type of evader symbol. It is clear to DIA and CIA imagery analysts that the USA letters were constructed by scraping away the rice stubble from a harvested rice paddy in dry season. One likely explanation for what appears to some as a 34 or possible K is the dumping of extractred rice stubble in several piles at random. Clearly, the supposed K is not in any fashion comparable to the USA letters -- not in size, not in means of construction, not in spatial orientation, and certainly not in clarity. When this image was further examined through the application of sophisticated computer-enhanced analysis, including the use of so-called false color analysis to differentiate between grey scales, this alleged K symbol appears even more likely to be the mounding of rice stubble and thus even less convincing as a possible K.

So what do we have here? No one, not DIA, not CIA and not JSSA, can correlate the USA and possible K symbols with an unaccounted for individual. While the Lao government has admitted that prior to 1973 prisoners were kept in Pathet Lao headquarters caves located in the Sam Neua area, prisoners were not known to be held there after the war ended. These caves have been visited many times in recent years by Americans and other Westerners, and it was clear by the late 1980's that the caves are no longer in use. Other facilities that would likely be used for hiding American POWs are not known to exist anywhere else in Sam Neua.

I acknowledge that there have been isolated reports of POWs being held in some areas of Laos, including Sam Neua. But after giving these reports, most of which come from refugee sources, a full and complete evaluation, the Department has been unable to develop convincing evidence that U.S. POWs are being held in Sam Neua today, nor do we have any evidence they were being held there in 1988.

Mr. Bill Gadoury, an investigator who covers Laos for the Joint Task Force - Full Accounting, has an interesting story to tell that may relate to the USA symbol. As I indicated earlier, Bill will tell this story at the conclusion of my statement.

Where we are now with regard to the USA symbol can be summarized as follows: 1). The USA and possible K remains unexplained, despite having tasked every means of information collection available through the intelligence Community. Many collection capabilities have been exercised multiple times to no avail. 2). No correlation to a known unaccounted-for individual can be made by DIA, JSSA, or the JTF-FA. And 3). Until an unexpected lead develops, there is little more that can be done other than continuing to monitor the situation. We have discussed in our closed meeting how we are accomplishing this monitoring.

I will now address the possible K symbol in Morse Code on the roof of a building. This possible symbol was seen on July 30, 1975 when DIA and CIA imagery analysts noticed several light spots on the roof of one building within a known prison compound in Vietnam Northeast of Haiphong. The photography remains classified, so DIA has prepared line drawings for our discussions in open session.

Noticing a distinct color difference -- some roof sections were much brighter than the remainder of the roof on one barracks type building -- CIA imagery analysts attempted to discern a possible pattern. They made a tenuous call that the pattern could be a dash - dot - dash in Morse code, which could be the letter K or the letters N and T. Although this was an admittedly tenuous imagery analytic call, an intenst all-source analysis was mounted by DIA.

What they learned can be summarized at the unclassified level as follows. First, the prison compound was formerly a French detention facility, used later during the Vietnam war years as a provincial jail. We know that it was used to house captured South Vietnamese commando infiltrators, several of whom were ultimately interviewed after emigrating from Vietnam after the war. These former inmates stated that no U.S. prisoners were even known to be incarcerated there during wartime.

Other sources provided postwar information. This prison, known to us now as the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp, was used from late 1975 to late 1978 by the North to house former Army of Vietnam (ARVN) officers and other South Vietnamese officials who underwent "reeducation" to prepare them for "proper functioning" in the new socialist/communist unified Vietnam. Thus, from late 1975 Dong Vai became part of a much larger reeducation camp system in Vietnam that has been described to us in great detail by many of the thousands of South Vietnamese refugees that have been interviewed by DIA's investigative personnel. Taken as a whole, the body of reporting from Dong Vai paints a consistent picture -- this camp was used for reeducation and not for housing U.S. prisoners.

A closer look at the photography of July 30, 1975 reveals some very interesting details. The front gate is wide open and no special security measures are apparent. The roofs of a number of buildings inside and just outside the compound are off, indicating probably rehabilitation of the jail facility, no doubt preparing it for its subsequent use as a reeducation camp.

Fusing all this information, we see a very consistent picture. First, after the fall of Saigon, Dong Vai was renovated and subsequently used as part of the reeducation camp system. Second, the replacement of roof tiles accounts for the color difference seen on July 30, 1975. In fact, the photography shows that one section of the roof of the building in question is open, indicating that tile replacement was still in progress. Further, photography of the compound taken in January 1975 before this reconstruction process started failed to show any roof tile color variations. And photography of December 1975 after the roof reconstruction was complete, shows weathering of the sections replaced in July; no color variations are observable.

The Dong Vai reeducation camp had a rather short lifetime. By late 1978, most of the reeducates had either been released or were moved to other re-education camps further south. For Vietnam and China, the late 1970's were punctuated by recurring security threats and border crises. We can speculate that because this facility was so far north, the Vietnamese decided to close it for security reasons, or perhaps it was no longer needed as part of the reeducation camp system. What is known through recent photography is that the camp is no longer in use, many of the buildings have been torn down and much of the former prison/camp area has reverted to agriculture.

In short, the fused, all-source analytic view of DIA and CIA is that Dong Vai was not a facility that housed American prisoners; that roof reconstruction accounted for the roof tile color differences seen only on July 30, 1975; and, that it highly unlikely that symbols were consciously placed on the roof structure as a signal. JSSA fully agrees with this assessment. We consider this possible symbol closed and are no longer pursuing it.

I will now address the 52 or B52 symbol. Based upon source reporting in 1979 and 1980 that American prisoners might be held in a detention facility in southern Laos, imagery analysts began to review the area for the presence of a detention facility. In doing so, the numbers 52, believed to be a possible symbol were observed five times between December 1980 and March 1981 in a facility located in the area southeast of the city of Nhommarath, Laos. The photography, which remains classified, shows a possible 52 in an agricultural area within the camp. The possible symbol was first observed on December 4, 1980, with subsequent observations on December 30, 1980, January 2, 1981, February 6, 1981 and March 8, 1981. Slight changes in the structure of the symbol were noted from sighting to sighting and as late as March 8, 1981, the symbol was still in place, however, the top portion of the 5 could no longer be seen.

The symbol was located within a row crop area between the walls of an inner compound and the perimeter fence. Although imagery analysts have arrived at different conclusions as to whether there was actually a 52 symbol or not. Because of the variations in the size and structure of the possible numbers from observation to observation there was strong suspicion that what the imagery analysts were reporting as possible 52, might be nothing more than shadowing within the row crop area. During continued analysis of the possible numbers, some imagery analysts reported that there might even be a "B" associated with the symbol, however, the possible B appeared to be another instance of shadowing within the area under observation.

The source reporting which was the basis for requesting the imagery analysis came to DIA from the CIA which stated that the reporting should be read with caution since there was some question as to the reliability of the sources involved. As noted earlier, the facility in question was located near the Lao city of Nhommarath, which is situated in Khammouane Province; the city of Nhommarath is within 50 kilometers of the Mekong River and the border of Thailand. The proximity of this facility to Thailand raised doubts that the Lao Communists would actually hold American prisoners in an area so close to Thailand.

In 1980 and 1981 there was not a large number of sources as yet available who had visited the area or been within the facility near Nhommarath. Nevertheless, photographs of the interior of the facility in question were turned over to U.S. Government representatives. The photographs, taken in early 1981, indicated that Western prisoners were not present within the facility. The exact measures undertaken by the U.S. Government to inspect the facility and to determine whether American prisoners were being held or not remains classified. In addition, the body of reporting from human sources who had detailed knowledge of the interior and purpose of the facility does not support the notion that American prisoners had ever been held within the facility.

There was not then and there has never been proof that American prisoners were held in the facility near Nhommarath. As a matter of fact, continued analysis since 1980, photographs of this facility and human sources support our best judegement that Americans were not held in the facility. The facility is now known to have been a reeducation camp used by the Communist government that took power in 1975 to educate former Royal Lao Army officers and certain officials from the Royal Lao government. This camp has been described to us in detail by former inmates that have been interviewed outside of Laos. There is even more reason to believe now that what was interpreted as a possible 52 symbol was nothing more than the irregular furrows of many individual garden plots.

I will now turn to the symbols referred to as an arrow and a "p." In mid-1992, during a routine review and analysts of central Laos, analysts discovered a possible symbols which included a large arrow and the possible letter "p." These symbols were on the ground in December 1987. Further review of these possible symbols revealed that although one symbol has the overall shape of an arrow, the stem does not join the arrow head. The stem of the arrow may be up to 100' in length. The possible "p" symbol appears to be nothing more than a scarred area on the ground with vegetation, perhaps a bush or two, growing in the center.

There is no evidence that this possible symbol has any association with Americans, whether living freely or in captivity. Explanations for the possible arrow include natural limestone outcroppings or logs. An imagery search was conducted in both directions of the axis of the possible arrow with negative results. When imaged this area was undergoing the slash and burn process associated with clearing jungle for agricultural use. When next imaged this area was under cultivation. While we are attempting to identify refugees in Thailand who came from the area where the symbol was observed, we have little hope of gaining further information on these five year old possible symbols.

This gets us to the bottom line of the various symbols which we believe were intended by their makers to be detected from above. To date, we have two unexplained sets of symbols. One was imaged in 1973 and one was imaged in 1988. A full range of follow up actions were undertaken. None of these symbols can be tied to a U.S. POW but neither can we absolutely disprove that "possibility."

I would now like to turn to some apparent evader symbols that have been cited as recent evidence of POWs in Laos. These supposed symbols were seen by members of the JSSA on a poor quality positive print of an image. For context, the JSSA is a 65 person organizatino located in three states and headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. As commander, Colonel Bonn reports to the Air Force Director of Operations. The Air Force and JSSA are executive agents for the Department of Defense for two major areas: Joint operational evasion and escape matters, and Code of Conduct and SERE training. They have a third, more recent charter as an executive agent for the purpose of drafting, in coordination with the Services and other DoD agencies, a Department of Defense Directive on POW/MIA matters. The latter project is in progress.

Under the JSSA E? charter, they are responsible for working E? operational matters with command planners and operators to ensure tactics, procedures, equipment, and training are adequate and consistent with JCS policy. The JSSA also acts as executive agent for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel with respect to Code of Conduct and SERE training. To accomplish this they have a special training unit with 19 people responsible for providing advanced instruction and exercises for selected high risk-of-capture personnel from all the military services. This unit trains these personnel in Code of Conduct, SERE, and hostage survival courses, both in residence and using mobile training teams.

The JSSA has also been charged by DoD to conduct periodic inspections of five SERE certified training schools operated by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; to research and analyze prisoner of war and actual SERE experiences for lessons learned to improve training; and to maintain a Code of Conduct-related research library.

That then, in a nutshell, is the JSSA. The JSSA does not have an never has had MIA accountability as a functional responsibility. They are not cognizant of all-source intelligence related to MIAs and have never been tasked by anyone to conduct a comprehensive review of reports of downed, missing, or captured personnel in Southeast Asia. However, in 1978 the JSSA did do a survey of Operation Homecoming POW debriefs and compiled a data base of all references to sightings of non-returnees. The only POW analytical role the JSSA now performs is to review POW and peacetime hostage debriefs for lessons we can apply to the training programs we oversee.

The JSSA has never been asked to review DIA's MIA efforts. The JSSA is not an inspector general and has no one qualified in intelligence analysis or photographic interpretation to perform such a function.

Aside from the project to draft a DoD Directive, the JSSA's current involement in POW/MIA matters was solely due to requests by the Select Committee that they review poor quality, poor resolution copies of photography for evaluation with respect to evasion and escape techniques of ground signal communication. This they did with some degree of discomfort at being asked to be photographic interpreters, a technical skill they do not possess and which was called to the Committee's attention by the DoD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office -- this is the organization that I established to declassify POW/MIA documents and to support the Select Committee.

On June 22, the Chief Counsel of the Select Committee requested that the JSSA evaluate the photograph containing the USA symbol discussed earlier. The letter of request asked the JSSA to provide an independent evaluation of the symbol's probably origins, meaning, and if they are consistent with accepted SERE training and procedures. The JSSA was also asked to evaluate a photograph of a second larger area some distance to the southwest.

In forwarding the JSSA's response on July 10, the Director of the DoD Central Documentation Office cautioned Mr.Codhina, Chief Counsel of the Select Committee, that the JSSA does not maintain a capability to perform imagery analysis and that imagery was only one source used in the intelligence process and that to fully comprehend the significance of a photo, information from multiple sources must be considered and examined by analysts from an appropriate intelligence organization.

I regret that I was not personally aware of the Committee's request to the JSSA and our response in July. I believe we could have avoided the resulting misunderstandings if we had been aware that the JSSA was attempting in good faith to perform a function that was well outside their area of expertise. Basically, the JSSA personnel viewed a very poor quality print with a magnifying glass and saw a lot of numbers and letters. They then matched these symbols against their authenticator lists of missing airmen. Where these matches occurred they indicated that these might be possible "evader" symbols. I do not want to get more specific on these symbols as much of the escape and evasion tradescraft is classified and may well be used again. I am concerned that all of the media attention to these symbols has probably compromised any attempts by any possible surviving American POWs to use the symbols that were taught to them in Southeast Asia.

Viewing a poor quality print with a magnifying glass is just now how imagery exploitation should be done. This ignores the basic principles of imagery interpretation which considers the pattern, shape, size, shadow, surroundings, tone and texture of each artifact. When the JSSA personnel viewed the original quality imagery of the printed photograph on a light table using high resolution optics the nature of all the supposed evader symbols became clear. They were simply vegetation, shadows or artifacts of the photographic production process. Some possible symbols were even in the tops of 200 foot tall trees, an unlikely place for an evading POW to leave a signal. When shown photographs of other locations including Africa and Utah, the JSSA personnel also "saw" the same kinds of symbols -- symbols which again disappeared on the light table. Each and every apparent evader symbol was reviewed by JSSA on the light table and none were found to be real. Now I don't want to give the impression they were imagining things. Often when you look at a photographic print you can see numbers and letters in the shadows. That is why we do not normally interpret such prints for intelligence purposes and that is why it takes a long time to train imagery interpreters; it is easy to be misled. In this case it is unfortunate that untrained personnel were used to support an unwarranted conclusiong concerning evader symbols in Laos.

Mr. Chairman that concludes my statement. I respectfully request that Mr. Gadoury of the Joint Task Force Full-Accounting present his statement before we entertain questions. I make this request as I believe his statement is relevant to the questions that may remain concerning the USA and possible K symbols.
<CENTER></CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/164.png Testimony of Monika Jenson-Stevenson
November 7, 1991

It's a great honor to appear before this distinguished group of Senators. I know that many of the Senators on this Committee have worked long and hard to finally bring to justice, an issue that has so strongly affected our country and has for so long been neglected.

I came here at my own expense today because I and my husband have spent the last six years of our lives researching and writing a book about the subject you will address. The conclusions we drew were ones that I would have thought inconceivable 10 years ago. I am here because the response to the book has made it overwhelmingly clear that the many people that concern themselves with this issue need desperately to have, just one segment of the U.S. Government champion their right to know the truth about what happened to American soldiers who were taken prisoner in a war that everyone wanted to forget about as soon as it was over.

This issue, as we see it, is about trust between citizens and their government on the most important contract, when soldiers risk their lives for a country and the country promises certain protections in return. Sadly, in my view, that trust has been badly abused by the government agencies who have controlled the Prisoners of War issue.

When I began this story for a Sixty Minutes program, I was an experienced reporter. I was not naive. I felt that almost nothing would shock me. But I was shocked to find that my government, which I believed had a common objective with the families of the missing and veterans, was deliberately lying and putting an incomprehensible resistance to the people they were most obligated by moral, legal and Constitutional mandates to protect. We found, my husband and I, in the writing of the book, that the Interagency Group which controls this issue, not only lied with impunity, they did so with full conviction that they had a moral right to do so. We wanted to find out why but the best answer we ever got was that it was necessary for reasons of National Security. Whatever that meant in this context, it did not include the American soldiers who were caught by a vicious enemy and War situations that embarrass this country.

The soldiers lost in Laos, for example, were protected by no National Security umbrella. They were simply designated nonexistent. The official government position has always been that there is no credible evidence of prisoners left behind in Laos or anywhere else in Southeast Asia with the best will, that can only be described as a blatant lie, yet it is policy. We came across large amounts of credible evidence, evidence collected by the most expensive and the best technology in the world, as well as that reported by competent and loyal human agents, many of whom were our former allies and risked their lives, their limbs and also lost prisoners in that conflict. Evidence that was described on my "60 Minutes" segment by General Tighe, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as a miracle. Now if the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in all those critical years knew that is was a miracle, we believe that the Interagency Group controlling the Prisoners of War also knew it. Yet almost all of the evidence, a lot of it has been inexcusably retired, left to disintegrate and be destroyed. That is a fact that will make this Committee's job very, very difficult.

Another devastating lie is that if men are still alive, they are there by choice. My husband knows something about that. He saw French prisoners long after the French Indo-China War was over and filed a report with the Canadian Government. The Vietnamese displayed these prisoners to my husband as converted Communists, but it was clear that they were prisoners and that they were under extreme duress, like Bobby Garwood in Vietnam, abandoned by their country. They had no way of telling the truth about their real position without forfeiting their lives. We believe the Prisoners of War Control Group knows that about Bobby Garwood and the other American prisoners that they have reports on.

Another lie is that the Vietnamese have never offered to return prisoners. We too have talked to the Vietnamese, my husband more extensively than I, and we have talked with people who were direct witnesses to meetings where the Vietnamese made a direct offer of prisoners for money. One was made to the Woodcock Commission in the late 70's.

The truth is that lies have become U.S. Government policy on prisoners. That's a policy more generally known a plausible deniability. I'd like to give you just one very graphic example of what happens to credible intelligence and what happens to our institutions.

One of our sources is a retired CIA man of high rank who personally saw prisoners in Laos in the early 80's. He reported this to the appropriate agencies and he knew which ones they were. The negative response spurred him to look into the policy. What he found was a deliberate organized attempt by some Intelligence officials to disinform and harass the families of the missing who were most vocal in their disaffection of government policies. He brought very specific charges to the Justice Department. When we tried to find out what happened to those charges, they had disappeared. All that the Investigator could find was self-serving documents that cleared the DIA of all wrong doing. The Investigator then asked the Justice Department for the full file. The official said he would have to take this up with another government department and later, the official withheld the complete file because of a third agency's objection. Is this what American Justice has sunk to, that a third agency, without identifying itself, can interfere with critical matters effecting the lives of Prisoners of War that are brought before the Department of Justice?

I know that many of the readers of our book find this unacceptable. We hope, and they hope that you will not only address this problem but you won't allow this investigation to become made ineffective by the same kinds of abuse, abuse of secrecy and that you will rectify this kind of activity.

I've been asked to bring up one more matter by the people who have been working quietly and diligently on the issue of live prisoners. They are concerned that perhaps this Committee will address itself too much to the issue of remains and not live prisoners. They recognize that you have a full years investigation ahead before you can issue any definite statements about prisoners but, they are urging that you issue now, a public statement which says:

"If there are American alive in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia who were taken prisoner during the Vietnam War or because of activities growing out of that War, the Select Committee will welcome them home."
<CENTER>
<HR width="50%">


</CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/165.png Prepared Testimony of Dr. Jeffery Donahue

Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee:

As the resume submitted to you shows, I have spent an enormous amount of my time, energy, heart and money trying to account for my brother, Major Morgan Jefferson Donahue, Missing-in-Action in Laos since December 13, 1968. There is only one reason why I have done this: because he and many others in Laos WERE ABANDONED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT -- by the government which they willingly and honorable served in the belief they were doing the right thing for their country.

Very simply, the POWs in Laos were abandoned through the mundane and mendacious conduct of international diplomacy. Laos was the ultimate secret war, funded and operated by the CIA and its Thai mercenary army. The Indochina War tore this country apart. In the rush to disengage from it, Messrs Kissinger and Nixon swept the POWs off the board as if they never existed. They did exist, and they exist today. Until they are brought home, this country will not be whole.

I have submitted statements and documents to this Select Committee from the Defense Department, the State Department, the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese regarding American Prisoners-of-War in Laos during the Vietnam War. All affirmed that Americans were alive and in the hands of the Pathet Lao. Indeed, several of the documents from our own government not only gave the precise locations of POW camps holding Americans in Laos but also the number of Americans in those camps. The proof of the existence of U.S. POWs in Laos during the War and after the signing of the Paris Peace Accord is immutable.

Thus, can you imagine my feelings and those of my mother and father and the families of so many servicemen lost in Laos while we were watching Operation Homecoming on T.V. and no prisoners came home who had been imprisoned in Laos? Can you imagine the intensity of my hopes and prayers, saying to myself, "O.K. God, the next one is going to be from Laos -- maybe it will be Morgan and we'll celebrate as powerfully as those other families who are running to the aircraft to hug and kiss their fathers, sons and brothers who had come back from the two Vietnams.

No POWs held captive in Laos came back despite all the proof. With that commenced a new dimension in human suffering for their families and loved ones. And, there also commenced a new erosion in the integrity of our government.

Some of us have kept our lives moving even with our suffering; others have not. Oh, how I weep for them and for their loved ones left behind to face mean, cruel fates in the POW camps and jungles of Indochina.

Just as sadly, that suffering inevitably warped itself into a tragic twist which I believe ONLY YOU by your actions can untie: LOSS OF FAITH IN OUR COUNTRY and a firm perception that it cannot and will not do the right thing, which is to bring home the live POWs from Laos even at this late date. Indeed, loss of faith in our country over and above our government is truly heartbreaking because we all were among the most intense lovers of our country. We were as patriotic as could be.

And beyond OUR suffering and loss of faith is the greater and growing awareness by so many OTHER Americans -- based on the facts -- that servicemen were abandoned in captivity by their government. This goes beyond the polls, Ladies and Gentlemen, because when we as a country begin to lose faith in government then all is lost. I think this country does recover from a lot of its trials and tribulations and moves to a higher plane of political and economic awareness, but that is not the case when our government leaves behind live POWs. There is only a downside for our future.

That downside, in addition, is not going to be transmuted into upside by the present process of normalization of relations with Indochina, and I would like to say a few brief words about this. I need to first note, though, that IF THIS COMMITTEE DOES NOT INTERVENE TO BRING HOME THE LIVE POWS THEN YOU WILL HAVE SANCTIONED LEAVING THEM BEHIND IN THE FIRST PLACE. If, as we know, they were alive during and after the War, then some and hopefully many of them are alive today. Nothing could be greater cowardice than for someone to say (as the representatives of the State and Defense Departments so often do), "Well, we don't have any proof they're alive today." Such statements are worthy of nothing but scorn, opprobrium and contempt and are nothing more than another way to obfuscate the truth of the POW-MIA issue.

I fundamentally believe that the process of normalization and, ostensibly, accounting for the POWs-MIAs as laid out by the State and Defense Departments -- the so-called "Roadmap" -- itself fully embodies the lie that the Executive Branch of government has perpetuated for so many years: no Americans were left behind alive nor are alive today. The Defense and State Departments continue to perpetuate this lie so deliberately and so rigorously that it is incorporated into the Roadmap such that no live POWs will be brought home. Two questions affirm this to me, and I feel strongly that you should investigate them as thoroughly as you can:

(1) Why are we not making normalization CONTINGENT UPON a return of the live POWs throughout Indochina, i.e., why are we giving up the great leverage we have to negotiate a return of the live POWs in exchange for normalization? The Vietnamese are desperate for our investment, trade and diplomatic recognition -- are we not desperate for our POWs? Is this not the substance of negotiated deals rather than give-aways? To give the Vietnamese and Laotians everything they want in exchange for some undefined "progress" on the POW-MIA issue, as presently is the course laid out in the Roadmap, IS TO FOREVER ABANDON THE LIVE POWS. Is that what this Committee and, indeed, the entire United States Senate wishes to endorse?

(2) Why is the Roadmap classified and what exactly are the judgmental elements of progress? The fact that they are judgmental was stated to me and others in meetings with Messrs Kenneth Quinn and Carl Ford this September. When asked what constituted progress, they simply said, "Progress is a judgement call". Ladies and Gentlemen, that is not the way the fate of the POWs who were left behind should be negotiated. I beg you to seek the declassification of the Roadmap so we the people may have input and, if necessary, change its direction. Again, the Roadmap is not going to heal the great wound this country feels as the result of the abandonment of those who served it.

You see, here the problem is but one thing: secrecy. The war in Laos was a secret war; the POWs in Laos were a secret; the POW intelligence is a secret; and, the Roadmap is a secret. To me, everything is a secret only because some people are hiding the truth. And, to them the truth is TOO POWERFUL for this country, TOO DESTRUCTIVE for the morale of our Armed forces, and TOO DEBILITATING to our national honor for it to be told. Thus, in the eyes of the individuals who have lied about the subject for so many years, the country is better off by the secret NOT being told and by the POWs forever "serving their country" rotting away in Indochina. Therefore, to these incredibly morally bankrupt individuals the secret -- and the lie -- must prevail and the truth must never be told.

Until the truth is told, Ladies and Gentlemen, and until the live POWs are brought home, there is no honor, there is no dignity, and there is no morality in the armed forces and foreign policy of this country. The Roadmap embodies the secrecy and the lie and it is up to you to change that. Please, we cannot have an honest POW-MIA policy until we have honesty about the issue. The fact that live Americans were abandoned makes the blood boil of everyone I know -- EXCEPT those warped policy-makers involved in the secrecy and the lie.

I must therefore ask this Committee to request the White House to defer normalization of relations with Indochina until you have finished your research and investigations and have issued your conclusions and recommendations. With the Roadmap, the White House is running away from you and will persevere with the lie and abandon the live POWs. I think this Committee is too distinguished for that. The POWs are, their families are, and so is this country.

I'm tired, Ladies and Gentlemen. My parents are tired and my mother has a broken heart. We have spent over 22 years trying to bring my brother back from Laos. We have no faith in our government and we are on the verge of losing it in our country. I guess in this latter regard we would join my brother. Does anyone in this room think that it is his faith in his country which has kept him alive? I dare say not; rather, it probably is his faith in his creator and his family, knowing that WE would not abandon him as his country has. Please, please help us regain our faith in our country. Please do the right thing and intervene in the POW-MIA process and bring the live POWs home now.

I would like to add that to me solving the Indochina POW-MIA issue and bringing home the live POWs is incredibly straightforward process: THE PRESIDENT puts the Secretary of State on an airplane and sends him to Hanoi and Vientiane with a mandate: using our levers of investment, trade and diplomatic recognition negotiate with the Vietnamese and Laotians to bring home the live POWs; to do so you must also give them a face-saving way of giving the men back.

It is that simple. I think he needs your encouragement to do it.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue

Brother of Major Morgan Jefferson Donahue, USAF, Missing-in-Action in Laos since December 13, 1968




<HR width="50%">

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue
Summary of Involvement in the Indochina POW-MIA Issue

Director - National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (also served as a Director in the mid-1970's);

Director - International Institute for Prisoners of War;

Member - National Alliance of Families of America's Missing Servicemen - World War II/Korea/Cold War/Vietnam War;

Member - POW-MIA Connecticut Forget-Me-Nots, Inc.

Author of THE INDOCHINA POW TIMELINE and MANIFESTOS ON THE INDOCHINA POW-MIA ISSUE;

Director and President - Friends for Humanitarian Aid to Laos, Inc.

Among the first Americans invited to Hanoi after the fall of South Vietnam (invited by Phan Hien, then Deputy Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in October 1976 to discuss the provision of reconstruction and development aid to the SRV in return for an accounting of American POW-MIAs);

Travelled to Laos, 1974, 1975, 1988. 1990 (twice) and 1991 and to Thailand several dozen times in 1984-88;

I have been employed by Union Carbide Corporation for the past thirteen and one-half years. I presently hold the position of Manager of Project Finance and Treasurer of Latin America and Africa.


<HR width="50%">


<CENTER>ADDENDUM TO THE REMARKS BY DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

THE MANDATE FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW-MIAS</CENTER>Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

This Committee was formed to put the POW-MIA issue to rest and with it the suffering, acrimony, confrontation, distortion and deceit which has characterized it from all sides. The turmoil and tragedy surrounding the issue has done nothing but pit the public against their Government. A recent national poll shows 70% of Americans believe POWs were left behind. Yet, the Government maintains it did not happen.

Thus, your charter is a profound one. Your efforts will require serious research on the POW-MIA issue including going through the classified intelligence data in the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, the very fact that this data is classified is one of the principal problems obfuscating the issue. In addition, your efforts will have to go beyond the Vietnam War to the Korean War and World War II as many feel the Vietnam POW-MIA issue had a strong precedent in those wars.

Moreover, you will need to hear the testimony of the experts outside Government and the POW-MIA organizations such as Stephen Arkin, William Paul and James Sanders. Individuals such as these have conducted many years of research of the subject. Beyond them you should hear the testimony of both the Government and individuals outside Government involved in the issue. Indeed, I am honored to have the opportunity to appear before you.

Very basically, the elements of your mandate are straightforward. Fulfilling them is the only way to put the issue to rest and help this country heal. The elements are:

To conclude whether American servicemen were left behind in captivity in Indochina and, if so, why. (Fulfilling this mandate will make a very important contribution toward precluding future POW-MIA debacles such as we have experienced in Indochina.)

To recommend alternatives for securing as full as possible an accounting for the POW-MIAs. This should include a plan to bring home the live POWs. You will have to address whether an accounting should be a PRECONDITION to normalization of relations -- THIS IS AN IMMEDIATE CONCERN FOR THE COMMITTEE.

To conclude whether American servicemen were left behind in captivity in Korea and, if so, why. Also to recommend alternatives for securing as full as possible an accounting for them.

To conclude whether American servicemen were left behind in captivity in World War II and, if so, why. Also, to recommend alternatives for securing as full as possible an accounting for them.

To opine as to the efficacy of both the Government's efforts to obtain an accounting and its POW-MIA intelligence operations. However, I strongly recommend you adopt a "no fault" policy in doing so.

To investigate the Glomar Java Sea incident, as it is closely linked to the POW-MIA issue.

To set standards which will delineate what is "as full as possible an accounting for the POW-MIAs." Participants outside Government should work with you in this regard such that the public accepts a final accounting. This is because so very few people trust the Government regarding an accounting. Indeed, the polls indicate the American public is deeply suspicious of the Government's policy and actions on POW-MIAs.

I firmly hope that you will approach this complex subject with open minds and clear slates. It deserves your most complete attention.

Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue
Brother of Major Morgan J. Donahue, MIA in Laos since 12/13/68
October 29, 1991


<HR width="50%">


<CENTER>ADDENDUM TO THE REMARKS BY JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

A POW-MIA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP? IT'S IN THE POLICY!</CENTER>Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

The loud and in many cases credible voices charging a conspiracy and cover-up on the POW-MIA issue will not go away until you address the two things most responsible for the charges:

1. The large and growing body of evidence clearly showing that servicemen were abandoned alive and in captivity at the end of the Vietnam War and the growing body of evidence indicating that POWs are still alive in Vietnam and Laos;

2. The fact that POW-MIA intelligence data still is classified despite the War having been over for 18 years. Indeed, POW-MIA intelligence still is classified for the Korean War and World War II. As long as the Government classifies such data, charges of a conspiracy and cover-up will stick; it is just not possible to understand why such data is classified unless the Government is trying to hide the truth about live POWs. "National security" is an excuse which simply does not hold water after so many years.

Beyond this, though, is the conspiracy and cover-up embodied in the Government's POW-MIA policy itself; the policy, too, is in vital need of your investigation. Very simply, THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONCOCTED AND RIGOROUSLY PURSUES A POW-MIA POLICY WHICH ACTUALLY PRECLUDES THE RETURN OF LIVE POWS! To understand this deliberate paradox, you should consider the elements of the policy:

A. "The POW-MIA issue is humanitarian, not economic." To the Vietnamese the issue never was, is not now and never will be humanitarian. To realize this, all one has to do is read the testimony of Congressmen and other officials who visited Vietnam after the War verifying that to the Vietnamese the issues of POWs and economic reconstruction of Vietnam were ABSOLUTELY LINKED. The Vietnamese consistently raised the two subjects together. And, of course, the Laotians merely mirrored their sentiments.

To me, the Vietnamese still are telling us the issues are linked. They consistently say to us, "We do not have the money or the manpower to search our remote provinces for missing Americans." What they really are saying is, "Look, give us some aid and trade -- and look who we found in the jungle." In other words, THE VIETNAMESE WANT SOMETHING FOR THE POWS AND NEED A FACE-SAVING WAY OF GIVING THEM BACK! They are telling us they have our POWs and want to give them to us, but they need (1) something for them, and (2) a face-saving way to let them go.

Very importantly, this affirms the need to make a return of the live POWs and an accounting for the missing a precondition to normalization of relations with Vietnam and Laos. I firmly believe that unilaterally normalizing relations with Vietnam and Laos will lead them to kill the live POWs because the bargaining power they represent will have been obviated (by us, to compound the paradox).

B. "The answers to the POW-MIA issue are in Hanoi, not Washington." This element of the policy is the ultimate cowardice, and the policy makers who formulated it should be excoriated for their complete avoidance of responsibility. It was OUR Government which sent the servicemen to Indochina, it was OUR Government which abandoned them, and it is OUR Government which is responsible for bringing them home. The answers are in Washington, not Hanoi. The policy makers do not have enough integrity to either tell the truth about the issue nor formulate a policy which will bring the live POWs home. Indeed, to avoid that responsibility they have subordinated the POW-MIA issue to other foreign policy objectives (normalization) such that the POWs are in danger of being forever wiped off the slate. This is something this Committee dearly needs to rectify. When government avoids responsibility for ITS actions as has been happening so long with the POW-MIA issue, we as Americans have lost.

C. "When somebody brings us proof of a live POW, we will move heaven and earth to bring him home." This is fraudulent on three fronts: (1) it shifts responsibility for proof of live POWs away from Government to individuals such as myself; (2) the Government itself is sitting on mountains of classified evidence of live POWs which no one else can see; and (3) even when presented with proof, as in the case of Donald Carr, the Government proves itself impotent.

D. "We have more intelligence resources than ever before dedicated to the POW-MIA issue." This is the classic Government approach to any problem -- throw more money at it (and it still will not be resolved). It does not take 500 intelligence analysts and a POW-MIA office in Hanoi to "resolve" the POW-MIA issue. Indeed, such a smoke-and-mirrors approach is certain to fail because the deceitful policy itself says there are no live POWs! All it takes is the Secretary of State getting on an airplane to Hanoi and Vientiane with a mandate from the President to negotiate the necessary deal to bring home the live POWs. And, we have all the bargaining chips we need in the form of normal commercial and diplomatic relations to strike such a deal. It is that simple.

E. "We have looked into our files and we can't find any proof of live POWs." Here, the Government is trying to have its cake and eat it, too. THIS COMMITTEE needs to do the looking. The evidence is overwhelming that POWs were left behind alive and in captivity, the evidence is overwhelming that they still are alive today, and the Committee needs to take the initiative and do the right thing: tell the truth and bring the men home.

Much of the problem regarding the POW-MIAs boils down to no one in our Government, including five Presidents, having the courage to serve them as they served their country, and no one in our Government having the integrity to be accountable for them (which is the real issue of accountability). Won't this Committee please change that? The time is due; the POWs deserve it, their families deserve it, and the country deserves it. Time and results clearly demonstrate that the Defense and State Departments are not going to honorably and decently resolve the Indochina POW-MIA issue; rather, they are trying to make it go away through their ruthless deceit and cowardice.

Dr. Jeffrey Donahue
Brother of Maj. Morgan J. Donahue, MIA in Laos since 12.12.68
October 29, 1991


<HR width="50%">

<CENTER>ADDENDUM TO THE REMARKS BY DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE

The Role and Activities of the National League of Families
of American Prisoners and Missing in SOUTHEAST ASIA</CENTER>Ladies and Gentlemen of the Committee:

(Please also refer to the attached document, "The National League of Families: Undemocratic, Unfair and Unswervingly Dedicated to Defending the U.S. Government's Lies, and Deceit on the Indochina POW-MIA Issue")

I have been a member of the League since 1971. I served two terms on the Board of Directors in the mid-1970's and was elected to the current board this past summer with the second-highest vote count.

You may be aware that the Executive Director of the League and the past Board opposed the formation of the Select Committee. Indeed, the Executive Director and leadership of the League oppose almost every initiative which is not "policy correct", i.e., which is not supportive of the Government's POW-MIA policy. And now, the Executive Director of the League and her entrenched minions on the Board continue to hold this Committee in high contempt, as evidenced by their statements to the membership in the League Newsletter. For example, the Executive Director states in the October 21, 1991 Newsletter, "Hopefully, the (Select) Committee will not attempt to determine whether POWs are held or the extent to which accountability can be achieved. . ." To the family members, as opposed to the totally pro-Government Executive Director, these certainly should be two of the Committee's principal mandates.

The Executive Director and the entrenched members of the Board serve but one purpose which, sadly, is not the POW-MIA families. Rather, it is serving and only serving the Government's POW-MIA policy, a policy itself which has been formulated and is being pursued to make sure that no living POWs return from Indochina to the embarrassment of the Government. The League is little more than a mouthpiece for the Government and the Executive Director is for all practical purposes a spokesperson for the Government. The statistics for family participation in the League activities affirm the families' dismay and frustration regarding League activities: only 22% of eligible family members even bothered to vote in the last election of Directors, and 25% quorum consistently cannot be raised at the League Annual Meetings. It would appear that the families have given up hope on the League. Furthermore, the League's financial support primarily is through NON-FAMILY contributions including United Way.

I ran for the Board of Directors hoping to transform the League into an entity serving the families instead of the Government. I now realize that this is impossible. Even though I am a Director of the League, I cannot have access to the League mailing list. Nor can I have any comments inserted into the Newsletter. Other barriers against family members seeing anything but official Government policy go far beyond this; indeed, no voices contrary to the Government's policy are ever invited to address the League or have their comments in the Newsletter. This includes well-known experts on the POW-MIA issue. The League is entirely a one-sided player, and the current League leadership is firmly dedicated to keeping it that way.

The Government's POW-MIA policy would not have what little credibility it does were it not for its very successful co-option of the League in the early 1980's. By bringing the Executive Director under its wings President Reagan could say, as does President Bush today, that he had the support of the family members in his "highest national priority" POW-MIA policy. Such a statement was and is part of the conspiracy which has deliberately kept the POWs from coming home. With so few families participating in the League and with those who do only being fed the pro-Government line, neither the League nor the Government can claim that the families support Government policy. Indeed, the League cannot validly claim to represent the families.

I believe the standard for evaluating the effectiveness of the League, and for that matter the effectiveness of the Government's POW-MIA policy, is accounting for the POW-MIAs and bringing home the live POWs. I cannot imagine any other standard which is relevant. The League and the Government have utterly and unequivocally failed. They have failed the live POWs, they have failed their families and they have failed their country. For the Select Committee to not prevail where the League and the Government have failed would be to lose the greatest opportunity ever to set the record straight on America's POW-MIAs and to deny this country the chance to finally close the books on the Vietnam War and get on with its future.

I would like to note that I do not believe the Executive Director of the League and certain Board members do not want the live POWs to come home. Rather, in blindly accepting the Government's POW-MIA policy they are unwittingly endorsing abandoning the live POWs because the policy has exactly that purpose and consequence.

Dr. Jeffrey Donahue
Brother of Maj. Morgan J. Donahue, MIA in Laos since 12.12.68
October 29, 1991


<HR width="50%">

<CENTER>THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES: UNDEMOCRATIC, UNFAIR AND
UNSWERVINGLY DEDICATED TO DEFENDING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S LIES AND
DECEIT ON THE INDOCHINA POW-MIA ISSUE

BY: DR. JEFFREY C. DONAHUE, MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE SINCE 1971 AND BROTHER OF
MAJ. MORGAN J. DONAHUE, USAF - MIA IN LAOS 12/13/68</CENTER>The U. S. Government's POW-MIA policy has been debilitated by a series of coverup allegations over the years from individuals within Government and individuals and entities outside Government. Each time, the Defense Department or the State Department "investigate" the allegations and say, "Trust us; we've taken a look and affirmed there is no coverup." One thing the American public can count on is the inevitability of more allegations because anytime the Government says, "Trust us," you can bet it is lyin g. The Indochina POW-MIA issue is no different in this regard than Watergate or the Iran-Contra deal. Thank God that the American public knows better.


<HR width="50%">


One way the Government perpetuates its lies on the issue is through the National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing in Southeast Asia. The League is merely a mouthpiece for the Government's policy, and this brief statement explains how the League does it.

Fundamentally, dissenting opinion has no forum within the League. Members are forbidden access to the membership roster or the League mailing list. Questions at the Annual Meeting are severely limited and no press is allowed during the General Session at the Annual Meeting.

Once upon a time, dissenting opinion could be put before the membership in the form of resolutions passed at Regional Meetings. Those resolutions were distributed to the membership for voting prior to the Annual Meeting in mailings accompanied by the voting for Board members. However, the Board also exhorted members to vote against resolutions which were considered contrary to League "direction." Thus, members would read only the resolutions and the recommendations to vote against them. No defense or ex planations of the resolutions were allowed. And, the recommendations to vote against the resolutions usually were paragraphs or a page long when the resolutions themselves were only a few sentences. Members never had a chance to hear the other side and never had a chance to even ask questions. This year, the Regional Meetings were dropped, so not even the resolutions can be put before the membership.

At the other extreme, the Executive Director of the League has a totally unencumbered forum from which to espouse the Government's POW-MIA policy. She also distributes her personal views at will in periodic mailings (for example, her 6/14/91 letter) at League expense and in the Newsletter. Opposing opinions are never printed in any League document; rather, opinions and events contrary to her opinion are attacked without the membership ever having the chance to make up their own minds by being given both s ides of the story.

The Executive Director and the Board say that the League speaks for the POW_MIA families on the issue, and State/DoD often cite the League as the "voice" of the families. This, true to League form, is just another deception. In the first instance, many families have joined the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America's Missing Servicemen - World War II/Korean War/Cold War/Vietnam War. In the second, there is a universe of POW-MIA families and nobody knows how many belong to the League such that it represents the "voice." Finally, it is not certain as to what comprises a "family." In all probability the League would have folded years ago if membership had not been extended to aunts, uncles and grandparents.

Dissenting opinions are vehemently suppressed at the Annual Meeting and dissenters who either state or distribute opposing opinions are threatened with the hotel Security Department and arrest, as I was at last year's Meeting for merely passing out some literature. Questions are not allowed of Government officials at the Meeting except to innocuous junior-level personnel such as those representing CILHI and JCRC.

Experts on the POW-MIA issue from outside Government whose knowledge or opinions differ from the Government/League position never are invited to appear at the Annual Meeting, nor are their positions ever printed in League documents. Some of these individuals are widely acclaimed for their knowledge and research on the POW_MIA issue; examples include Bill Paul, Tom Ashworth, Jim Sanders, Eugene Tighe, Sen. Robert Smith, former Cong. John Rowland, former Cong. Billy Hendon and members of the POW-MIA research team of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican staff. The only opinions presented to the League membership are those in support of Government policy. Does anyone think, concomitantly, the Col. Millard Peck, who recently resigned as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Special POW-MIA Office, will be invited to appear at the Annual Meeting to present a different view of the Government's policy? Of course not. Indeed, the League has become a party to the Government's coverup.

Of course, who will be invited to appear before the Annual Meeting? Only representatives of the U. S. Government -- the very same people who formulated and now perpetuate the Government's lies on the issue.

Sadly, the whole POW-MIA issue has come to the point where to know the truth one has to go outside the League and the Government. The truth is that American servicemen were knowingly abandoned alive and in captivity in Indochina and remain there today. The League and the Government are so dedicated to suppressing that truth and instead lying about the issue that they have concocted a policy which precludes the live POWs from coming home.

If the Government and the League wanted the live POWs home, they would be home. It is that simple.
<CENTER>
<HR width="50%">


</CENTER>

[Arrow]

www.manchu.org/sounds/briefing.ram (http://www.manchu.org/sounds/briefing.ram)

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png Testimony as Prepared for Delivery By
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
November 5, 1991

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee today to reaffirm the commitment of the United States government - and especially the Department of Defense - to account as fully as possible for American prisoners of war and for Americans missing in action and otherwise unaccounted for.

Mr. Chairman, this committee meets at a time of increased public attention to the fate of our POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia. I welcome and encourage this spotlight on a matter of the utmost national importance.

I can think of no subject that stirs more emotion, or generates more frustration and controversy than the subject of POWs and MIAs, especially those lost during our operations in Southeast Asia. The fact that there were thousands unaccounted for in previous wars does not make it any easier to accept the fact that 18 years after active U.S. participation in the Vietnam War ended, we still do not have a full accounting of all those lost in combat.

Eight months ago, when we defeated Iraqi forces in the Gulf, we were able to account for all of our people, even those lost behind enemy lines. That achievement is one of the legacies of our concern for other missing in Indochina. In turn, our success in the Gulf generated a renewed national attention and commitment to achieve the fullest possible accounting for those lost in Southeast Asia.

We welcome any contributions that this committee may make in shedding additional light on this important issue. I assure you of my full support for this Committee's efforts. The Department of Defense will make any of its experts in this field available to the committee to address specific questions you may have.

Accounting for other missing in Indochina remains a deeply personal commitment for me and for President Bush. I am the first Defense Secretary to come before Congress to testify exclusively on the subject of POW-MIA affairs. This is an indication of the importance that I and the Administration attach to this critical issue.

Under the President's leadership, we have pressed harder than ever before to find answers to the difficult questions this search entails. Today, I can tell you that although many questions remain unanswered, the Administration has made significant breakthroughs in a number of important areas.

First, as a result of General John Vessey's outstanding effort as Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW-MIA Affairs, we have opened an office in Hanoi and are conducting in-country joint field operations. This has enabled us to carry out investigations on the scene, enhancing our ability to get the answers to our questions that we need.

Second, as shifts within the communist world have opened new avenues for our search, we have carried out the first joint investigations ever held within Cambodia and worked for increased cooperation with officials in Laos.

Third, to take advantage of the new information now available to us, I have ordered that 88 additional personnel be assigned to augment our field staff. I have also authorized the creation of a new position within the senior Pentagon ranks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW-MIA Affairs. With the new staff for this office, our POW-MIA efforts will be augmented by an additional 102 persons.

The effort to account as fully as possible for our POWs and MIAs is not an easy one. Our most urgent requirement is to determine whether any Americans remain captive in Southeast Asia and if so, to return them to the United States. The issue of live prisoners has been at the forefront of our intelligence effort and in our negotiations with the governments of Indochina.

The governments of Indochina have consistently denied holding any Americans. We do not, and never will, accept their denials as the last word. We intend to keep the pressure on. President Bush has pledged decisive action to return any American, should such evidance be obtained. I make you that pledge again today.

In recent months, questions have been raised regarding the Department's efforts to resolve the POW-MIA issue. As this?? Committee can well appreciate no American official would spare any effort that might Iead to the discovery of a single American prisoner of war. It is unthinkable that any American servicemen or women would fail to come to the aid of a lost comrade. Anyone who knowingly withholds or conceals information that could lead to the recovery of a captured American serviceman would deserve the most severe punishment possible. But I must say I have difficulty imagining why anyone would do such a thing. Everyone I know would be thrilled to learn that one of our comrades is still alive and we have a chance to get him back.

In fact, countless men and women in uniform and in civilian life have devoted long hours, great skill, and high hopes in the search to account for Americans who did not return from Southeast Asia. As professionals, as members of the armed forces, many of whom served during the Vietnam conflict, and as Americans, they have not needed to be told how important their mission is. They've had clear marching orders from the members of this Administration: The POW-MIA effort has our fullest support.

I regret the burden that families have borne through these long years of uncertainty and loss. And I condemn the cruelty of fast operators who have preyed on their hopes and made them suffer.

All Americans can be assured that the issue of prisoners of war and missing in action has the efforts of the members of my Department as well as our hearts. As you can well imagine, it is a subject that continues to haunt the men and women in uniform who served in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We have a special obligation to those who gave of themselves in the service of the nation; to their families, and to those who will be asked to serve in future conflicts, to do everything in our power to obtain the fullest possible accounting.

Mr. Chairman, later today and in the weeks ahead, you will hear from a number of officials who are far more knowledgeable than I am about the details of our procedures and about individual cases. I want to take this opportunity this morning to give you my perspective as Secretary of Defense on the overall progress of the issue of POW-MIAs, and what we are doing to achieve the fullest possible accounting.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/167.pngTHE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS

I would like to spend a few minutes, first, to explain how we approach the important issue of whether Americans remain captive in Indochina. To date, we have no conclusive evidence proving that Americans are being held against their will in Indochina.

Nonetheless, the importance of this issue makes investigating live-sighting reports our first priority.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has the primary responsibility for investigating and analyzing live sighting reports received by our teams in Southeast Asia. Reports come from many sources, but our investigators solicit potential sources of information from among the thousands of refugees leaving Vietnam, legal travelers who have recently visited the region and others who may have been in a position to observe. In many cases individuals with information seek out our representatives in Bangkok. Regardless of how the information is received, the procedure for investigating remains the same.

Upon receipt, live sighting reports are examined to determine if the geographic location of the sighting the time and circumstance of the sighting, and the details provided correlate to a known missing American. Related data is retrieved from DIA's extensive casualty, source and camp files, and the information is compared to what is available in the report. All files of losses or known incidents of capture or imprisonment in proximity to the location reported are reviewed for possible correlation, as are all files of all missing individuals whose time or location of loss generally relate to the given report.

Based on these findings, a preliminary determination is made regarding whether descriptive details provided by the source missionaries, or civilians jailed at various times for violations of Vietnamese codes. In fact, almost 300 of these resolved reports have been correlated to Private Robert Garwood who returned from Vietnam in 1979. Of the remaining reports, 373 have been determined to be fabrications, leaving 109 reports under active investigation. These reports are the focus of other analytical and collection efforts.

We have a live-sighting investigator on the staff of our Hanoi Office and we will insist that he will be granted free access by the Vietnamese to carry out his duties. To date, we have not reached complete agreement with the Vietnamese on the modalities of investigating live-sightings in Vietnam. We again raised this issue in a meeting in Hanoi last week and it appears that there is still more work to be done before the Vietnamese grant permission for our investigator to travel freely. It is our intent to press the issue continually until granted full and free access.

As I noted earlier, investigating live-sighting reports will continue to be our first priority. We will dedicate all resources necessary to support this vital requirement just as we have with the photographs that have appeared prominently in the media this past summer. We will not be satisfied until we are absolutely certain that every last case that can be resolved is resolved.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png COMMAND and CONTROL

The organization of our POW-MIA effort is one of the most important ways we sharpen our focus on the issue. Later during these hearings, Major General Christmas, the Pacific Command Director for Operations, will outline what we have done to focus and expand our field investigations through a new Joint Task Force in our Pacific Command. But today, let me briefly describe the concept for this plan.

We will apply the military assets and personnel available within the US Pacific Command to address the POW/MIA issue in much the same way as we applied the assets of Central Command in Desert Storm to defeat the Iraqis. Proceeding from a two tiered approach, we will investigate discrepancy cases and last known alive cases on a full-time basis with an expanded Hanoi Office staff. We will continue to bring in teams of investigators from Hawaii to support the activities of the Hanoi Office and to investigate systematically the cases within particular geographic regions. The Joint Task Force approach promises to bring a new intensity to our on scene operations. We now have the staff and experts available to move forward as quickly as the Indochinese governments will allow.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/168.pngSOUTHEAST ASIA

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and economic difficulties in China have been significant factors in changing attitudes and opening new avenues for progress in POW-MIA affairs in Southeast Asia. These developments removed support from Southeast Asian Communist regimes, forcing them to seek cooperation from other sources of economic assistance. They are turning to the West and especially the United States. This has opened new opportunities in three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/169.pngVIETNAM

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/170.pngGeneral Vessey's Activities

Over the past year, the Vietnamese have demonstrated increasing levels of cooperation in resolving the fates of Americans missing in Indochina. General John Vessey, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW-MIA Affairs, has been especially persistent in pushing for greater access.

In April, he led an interagency delegation to meet with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister. At that meeting General Vessey and the Foreign Minister agreed to establish a POW/MIA Office in Hanoi that would: conduct in-country investigations of reported first hand live-sightings; research historical records; conduct forensic review of jointly or unilaterally recovered remains; and conduct advance planing and execute joint field operations. On July 8, the U.S. POW/MIA Office opened in Hanoi with an initial staff of five.

Initially, we indicated that the Office was temporary in order to provide time to assess its value. It is our judgment that so far, the Office is a success, providing a ready point of contact with the Vietnamese, and increasing communication between their officials and American POW/MIA specialists. We have indicated to the Vietnamese that we want to change its status to permanent. This will permit us to increase the staff and expand its operational role.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/171.png"Last Known Alive" Discrepancy Case Investigations

Since 1987, our efforts in Vietnam have focused on the investigation of 119 illustrative "discrepancy cases" which General Vessey presented to the Vietnamese in 1987 and 1988. These are cases in which we believe the individual survived his incident of loss and for whom the Vietnamese should be able to provide information. In some cases, these individuals were listed as Prisoners of War but did not return at Operation Homecoming in 1973, when US Prisoners of War were repatriated by the Vietnamese. In other cases, these individuals were "last known alive" on the ground, or were in communication with friendly forces and in eminent danger of capture. We believe the Vietnamese should be able to provide additional information on the fate of these individuals or otherwise account for them.

These "discrepancy cases" represent individuals that, in our judgment, based upon the incident of loss, are among the most likely to still be alive. That is not to say that other individuals in other cases could not be alive, but rather in prioritizing our efforts we selected the cases of individuals we believed most likely were alive when they fell into the hands of the Vietnamese. Therefore, if we can resolve the discrepancy cases and cases of individuals "Last known alive" we will be able to shed important light on the question of whether or not Americans remain in captivity in Indochina. Sadly, to date, we have not been able to locate any live Americans, however, we have been able to reach the judgement that 57 of the individuals who comprise the "discrepancy cases" provided to the Vietamese are dead.

In September we completed the l4th Joint U.S. Vietnam Field Investigation of last known alive "discrepancy cases. " This joint investigation was our most ambitious effort to date, and Vietnam's preparations and cooperation were improvements over past field investigations. Of significance, the Vietnamese allowed our resident researcher access to contemporaneous wartime documents that addressed the specific incidents of several previously unaccounted for Americans. As a result of these efforts, we believe that we may be able to confirm the death of several additional individuals. We are hopeful that the Vietamese will provide access to similar records for other wartime military regions.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png Field Operations

If I may, I would like to explain briefly how these investigations work. In all cases, our investigators begin with the assumption that a missing serviceman or civilian is alive. First, we identify the case we would like to investigate jointly with the Vietnamese. The DIA and Joint Casualty Resolution Center then prepare case files of information for presentation to Vietnam's specialists. The records are detailed explanations of the incident of loss, biographic data, search and rescue efforts, and other information that will assist the Vietnamese and US investigators in focusing on a particular case.

We then ask the Vietnamese to independently check their records to locate any information they may have in their records and archives, locate eyewitnesses if any, and military personnel or veterans who may have participated in the action so that our teams may interview them. After the Vietnamese carry out these preliminary investigative activities, we send in our teams, consisting of records researchers, interviewers and linguists to question witnesses and examine documents. lf we can locate the crash site, we may survey it.

All of this information is compiled and a report is prepared and submitted to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis of the data received. The information is then correlated to the information within our files and analytic judgment reached. In some cases, we make a determination that further investigation is required. That may involve further records research and witness interview, or it may involve crash site survey and excavation. So far, there have been 14 such investigations since 1988. Another is scheduled to begin later this month. We go wherever the evidence leads and conduct as exhaustive an investigation as possible to attempt to determine the fate of the individual involved.

Vietnamese cooperation on these joint investigations has improved. But despite these improvements, we are still not satisfied with Vietnam's performance. Vietnamese officials could do much more to assist our efforts. Too often our official finds that public pronouncements of increased cooperation by Hanoi do not produce satisfactory arrangements on the ground. Promises to cooperate on live-sightings, improved helicopter transportation, and complete access to historical records remain only partially fulfilled. Vietnam's foot dragging on the unilateral repatriation of remains is especially frustrating. Certainly, if we ever hope to achieve the fullest possible accounting in a reasonable period of time, Vietnamese unilateral efforts as well as their participation in joint activities will have to dramatically improve. As I will discuss later in more detail, we intend to have the capability in hand to move as rapidly as cooperation by the governments of Vietnam Laos and Cambodia will permit.

To date we have accounted for only 7 of the 119 discrepancy cases presented to the Vietamese and jointly investigated. While we believe that we can confirm the death of an additional 57 unaccounted for Americans since we started this process, we have not been able to account for them by return of their remains. Obviously, results are slow in coming.

I support the statement by my colleague, Jim Baker, that the pace and scope of normalizing relations with Vietnam will depend?? upon the extent of cooperation by the Vietnamese on POW-MIA matters. The Department of Defense firmly supports the road map that describes the steps Vietnam must take and measures we will take in response before we will be ready to have normalization of relations. I can assure you that we will be rigorous in our judgment about whether Vietnam is adequately complying. We will not be deterred from our goal of achieving the fullest possible accounting for our servicemen and civilians missing in action in Vietnam.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png LAOS

Some of the most vexing questions remaining from the Vietnam war relate to the unaccounted for in Laos. Of the 528 Americans who remain unaccounted for in Laos, 3% are in the category POW or MIA. At Operation Homecoming only 9 Americans captured in Laos returned as POWs. It is important to realize that approximately three quarters of the Americans unaccounted for in Laos were lost in areas controlled by the People's Army of Vietnam (FAVN). Despite that fact, we continue to press the Lao for answers regarding the fates of Americans who were captured by the Pathet Lao. Only one American held by the Pathet Lao, Emmitt Kay, was released by them and returned from captivity. A second Pathet Lao prisoner, Dieter Dengler, escaped successfully.

Earlier this year, we conducted the first joint investigations of discrepancy cases involving Americans last known to be in Pathet Lao hands. Shortly thereafter, in May of this year, the U.S. and Lao agreed to an expanded plan for increased joint cooperation on POW/MIA and other humanitarian issues for the rest of 1991. Activities agreed upon include further joint investigations of discrepancy cases, small scale joint surveys and recoveries and joint crash site excavations.

So far, we have conducted the first three activities under the expanded program. In response to Lao humanitarian concerns, the Department of Defense and the US Pacific Command have provided Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance to the Lao. The Department of Defense has furnished to the Lao nearly I00 tons of excess medical supplies in three separate shipments over the past year. Additionally, the US Army Corps of Engineers completed construction of a small 5 room schoolhouse earlier this year in Savannakhet Province.

Finally, during September we conducted a Medical Civic Action Program Exercise with the Lao, sending US doctors, nurses, and medical technicians to assist the Lao in training their medical specialists in a remote northern village in which we would like to conduct POW/MIA investigations later this year or early next year. These humanitarian assistance projects will, hopefully, assist our investigators in obtaining Lao cooperation at the province and village level.

While we have undertaken a year-round plan with the Lao, actual cooperation on the ground has not yet fully succeeded in implementing the promised schedule. For example, we have had to delay a field activity scheduled to start late this week until the Lao repair the helicopter that they had planned to dedicate to the mission. The lack of helicopters continues to be the most pressing operational problem in Laos. The Soviet helicopters in the Lao inventory are dangerous and operationally degraded. Nonetheless, we have continued to use them on joint operations in that country. In the past, the Lao have rejected our proposals to fly U.S. military helicopters for casualty resolution efforts in their country. We have made alternative proposals, to include the lease back of US-made helicopters operated by commercial concerns in Laos. To date the Lao have made no commitment on these overtures, but we are continuing to work with the Lao to solve this problem.

We believe that the Lao shortcomings are more a fraction of limited resources and capabilities than a lack of commitment. In fact, they have been very cooperative on urgent investigations such as the purported Borah photograph. We have two major field operations planned before the end of this year, and I am hopeful that implementation will continue to improve rapidly and enable both countries to get back on track.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png Lao-Vietnam Border Cases

As I said, approximately three quarters of the losses in Laos occurred in areas under the control of Vietnamese forces during the war. Accounting for Americans lost in such areas must be a trilateral effort between the Lao, Vietnamese, and U.S. While field operations inside Laos will necessarily be bilateral U.S.-Lao activities, the success of such efforts will largely depend upon U.S.-Vietnam cooperation. The historic records and documents required must come from the Vietnamese. Field cooperation on the border cases requires the assistance of both the Lao and the Vietnamese. We have proposed bilateral talks in December with the Lao and Vietnamese to develop a methodology for addressing these cases.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png CAMBODIA

Phnom Penh has recently begun to cooperate with us in accounting for Americans missing in Cambodia. Since July, three investigation teams have traveled to Cambodia to follow-up on the photographs alleged to be of live American POWs. Their cooperation assisted other specialists in tracking down a number of what proved to be fraudulent photographs. Since July, we have also conducted two technical meetings with the Cambodians, the first such activity since Phnom Penh fell in 1975. Phnom Penh officials have also bilaterally returned remains that we hope will prove to be an American unaccounted for from the 1975 Mayaguez incident. We are hopeful that their cooperation will continue to improve.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png RECENT PHOTOGRAPHS

As the Committee is aware, there have been a number of photographs that have surfaced in the media, and which have been identified by family members as MIAs from the Vietnam war. We take each identification seriously, and will use our full resources to answer the questions raised by these photos. I would like to briefly give you a status report.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png Colonel John L. Robertson USAF, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, USN and Major Albro Lundy, USAF.

Our photographic experts have concluded that the picture sai to depict Colonel John Robertson, US Air Force, Lieutenant Commander Larry Stevens, US Navy, and Major Albro Lundy, Jr., US Air Force, has been altered. The handwriting on the altered photograph and the method of alteration are both similar to changes made to five other photos said to be prisoners of war. We found the originals in Eastern-bloc magazines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. These other photographs do not show American prisoners of war, they depict a Soviet baker, military advisor, and workers. One of the sources of this photograph has also passed to our investigators faked POW photos in the past.

To complicate the investigation, no one has claimed to have seen any of the individuals pictured. Further, a second picture, allegedly depicting Lieutenant Commander Stevens was provided by the same source that originally obtained the faked "Borah" photograph. Subsequent reporting from Sandia National Laboratories fails to verify that this is Lieutenant Commander Stevens.

The associated reporting accompanying the three person photo, except for limited biographic data widely circulated by POW/MIA activists in Southeast Asia, has also proven false. The identifications by the families are the only positive information we possess. We are continuing our investigation, however, the information available to us strongly suggests that two of the individuals allegedly pictured perished at the time of their loss incident. In the absence of additional reporting we may not be able to resolve this case.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png Lieutenant Daniel V. Borah USN

A photograph taken in Laos surfaced earlier this year that was identified by family members as Lieutenant Daniel V. Borah, US Navy. In addition, a non-government forensic anthropologist positively identified the person in the photo as LT Borah. With the help of Laotian officials other investigators were able to locate the individual who turned out to be 77 year old Lao highland tribesman. The man was interviewed, photographed, and fingerprinted. He identified himself in the photo, as did a second individual who also appeared in the picture. Family members who want to see the tribesman for themselves will leave in a few days for Southeast Asia. They will] be accompanied by another investigator who first interviewed and photographed the man in Laos.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png Captain Donald G. Carr, U.S Army

The case of Captain Donald G. Carr, US Army is quite compelling because of the remarkable likeness between the 1989-1990 photograph we obtained from retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jack Bailey and CPT. Carr's wedding picture. In order to pursue this case, we need more current and more precise information, particularly concerning the location of the individual in the photograph. I met with Colonel Bailey on 8 October at the request of several members of Congress. During the meeting Colonel Bailey promised that he would give our investigators access to his subsources and introduce us to the individual who took the photograph.

Accordingly, I dispatched a Department of Defense team to accompany Colonel Bailey to Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, after a week in Bangkok Colonel Bailey was unable to provide the access or information he had promised. After the team arrived in Bangkok he also disclosed that the photograph-instead of having been taken in Laos as he previously indicated-may actually have been taken in Burma or Thailand. Despite this setback, we continue to apply all our available resources to locating the individual pictured in the photograph.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png POW/MIA FRAUD

I have already alluded to some of the recent experiences we have had with outright fraudulent claims. Lel me elaborate to make it clear what we are up against. I know I join all of you in condemning the cruel actions by some fast operators who play on the hopes of families and friends of POWs and MIAs. They doctor old pictures or forge documents solely to make a quick buck the worst of these individuals traffic in reports obtained from unnamed sources in Southeast Asia, invite publicity to their claims of live Americans, promise great results, and often seek to raise money to keep their efforts going. It is also common practice for them to claim that their information is proof positive of government-ineptitude and cover- up. In the process, they raise the expectations of the families desperate for any sign that a loved one is still alive. Unfortunately, when we investigate their claims we find no Americans, only unsubstantiated hearsay accounts, and too often signs of deceit and fabrication.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png SENATE STAFF MISSION

In August, at the request of a member of Congress, I agreed to provide an aircraft to take a Senate staff member and an individual purporting to have "hot" information on live Americans to Southeast Asia to follow-up his information. I also provided several experts to go along on the trip. This individual subsequently provided the Senate staffer with a source who failed a polygraph test. This same person was also involved to some extent in the fake "Borah" photographs. We must naturally pursue every lead that comes our way. But, each time we rush to answer these false alarms, our resources are diverted from solid leads and productive lines of inquiry. Individuals who repeatedly provide false information, well intentioned or not, should be called to account for their actions.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png KOREA AND THE COLD WAR

In addition to our efforts in Indochina, we recognize that there are 8,177 Americans unaccounted for from the Korean War, and others missing as a result of Cold War incident. Accounting for these men is also of concern. We will continue to press the appropriate governments for the fullest possible accounting.

The North Koreans hold the answers to these 8,177 Americans, including 389 initially classified by their services as prisoners of war. Negotiations with the North Koreans on this subject have been conducted by the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in defense of freedom in Korea. The North Koreans have proved unwilling to cooperate fully with the UNCMAC, preferring instead to have occasional discussions with our embassy officials in Beijing and to use Congressional delegations to return a small number of American remains to U.S. control. With the help of Senator Smith, who has met with officials of the North Korean Government both at the United Nations and Panmunjon, we are pursuing an alternative approach that holds promise for future cooperation.

In the past year, we have made several approaches to the Soviets to investigate whether they possess information on Americans lost in Cold War aircraft incidents. In some of these cases, our information suggests that crewmembers survived their incidents of loss. The Soviets, however, have repeatedly denied any knowledge of the fates of these individuals. In April, the Department of State sent a demarche to the Soviets regarding this issue. More recently, Secretary of State Baker raised the issue with his Soviet counterparts during the Moscow Summit. The Soviets pledged at that time to make relevant KGB records available to our specialists. We have sent a "second demarche requesting access to the promised records. We have also raised the issue of Cold War losses with a delegation of Soviet and Russian veterans' groups when it visited my office last month. With their help, we hope to raise the consciousness of other veterans, and convince them that this issue is one of signal importance to the American people.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMITMENT

As this committee knows, the work is not easy. Hundreds of people in the Defense Department - who want nothing more than to resolve this issue - have devoted their careers to searching for answers to these questions. Congress has made its own contribution, with investigations, special committees, and hundreds of hearings by the committees with responsibility for oversight of the POW/MIA issue. Some of the most knowledgeable Americans on the subject are right here in Congress, and their assistance continues to be invaluable.

However, there is probably always room to improve the job we do in pursuing leads. I am told that there were many gaps in the efforts in the late 1970's and early 1980's which lead to the decision in 1985 and 1986 to increase the resources devoted to pursuing live sighting reports. The personnel increased that I ordered this summer were to make sure that new gaps do not appear as the level of overall effort increases.

Over the summer, to take full advantage of the new information available to us and increasing access being provided by the Governments in Indochina, I ordered that 88 additional personnel be assigned to augment our efforts in the field to gather and process information. They will add manpower in four places - the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, the Army's Central Identification Laboratory, the DIA's Special Office for POWs and MIA's, and DIA's Stony Beach operation.

I authorized those increases this past July. Since then, contact with Vietnam has further improved, as has the cooperation by the authorities in Phnom Penh. Cooperation with the Government of Laos has consistently expanded over the past years. To take advantage of the heightened activity, we have authorized the creation of a new position in the Pentagon -- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW-MIA Affairs.

This position will be set up under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and assigned a staff of 14, including three positions already in that office. The new deputy will serve as the principal assistant on all POW/MIA matters, reporting to Paul Wolfowitz, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

These two steps represent the assignment of 102 new positions in the Department for the important and difficult work of gathering new information, sorting out the facts, and working with the families. This brings total staff devoted exclusively to this issue to almost 240. lf more people and resources are required, we will not hesitate to add them.

http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/166.png CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you as we continue our progress in this important area. As you and the members of your committee travel to Southeast Asia, I urge you to impress upon the governments of Vietnam and Laos, and officials in Phnom Penh, the need to do all they can to resolve this issue. The answers to the questions about Americans unaccounted for do not lie in the files of the Defense Department. The answers must come from the governments of Indochina.

The families of POW's and MIA's have been, and will continue to be, our most important constituents. This nation is committed to keeping the faith with every soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, and civilian until the fullest possible accounting is achieved. We owe them, and their families, nothing less. We will not rest until the job is done.


<HR width="50%">

<CENTER></CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/iipcache/172.png Testimony of James 'Bo' Gritz
November 23, 1992

JAMES BO GRITZ POW INVOLVEMENT

THIS STATEMENT WAS PREPARED BY BO GRITZ FOR PRESENTATION ON 23 NOVEMBER 1992 BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS DEPOSITION STAFF AND IS TO BE OFFERED INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT IS THE TRUTH, SO HELP ME GOD, AS I KNOW IT TO BE: ATTESTED TO BY MY SIGNATURE ON THE 22D PAGE THIS 23rd DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992 IN THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, VA.

OVERVIEW

I have outlined my involvement in POW/MIA matters in the 22 pages that follow using operation (OPN) titles to separate events and times. It is my studied opinion over the past 12 years that responsible officials within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government (USG) knowingly abandoned U.S. Prisoners of War (POW) held by Communist powers as a result of World War I, World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia. I believe that presidents up through and including George Bush have known that Americans were left alive and in violation of law, these high officials and certain of their appointed subordinates have continued and perpetrated a cover up of this reality. I believe certain members of the U.S. Congress have aided in the oppression and diversion of critical information that could have revealed a fullness of truth long ago. I am convinced their exists a mindset in most USG offices that everything possible must be done to discredit the living POW movement and those that support it.

It may not be economically or politically expedient for the USG to deal with the POW issue in real terms, but I am certain it is right. It may provide excellent photo opportunities, but it is my view that for U.S. officials to look interested posing with Communist officials before stacks of old uniforms and equipment is an insult to the heros who once were apart of it. The fact is that the Communist in Laos for whatever and all the reasons did not return our POWs! The fact is that the Vietnamese held Americans after 1973. The fact is that Americans were sent to Russia that have not been returned. "Accounting" is a term used in reference to things, like boots, helmets, pistols, et al. Our POW/MIA should be returned! STOP THE BUSHLIP AND GET TO THE HEART OF THE MATTER -- HERE AND THERE!

OPN LIBERATOR

I was asked in October 1978 by the Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. Gen. Harold R. Aaron, to go in search of U.S. prisoners of war thought to still be held against their will by Communists in Southeast Asia. At the time, I was assigned to the U.S. Army Element, Office of the Secretary of Defense as a Chief of Congressional Relations (DSAA). I retired from active duty in February 1979 for the specific purpose of resolving this political dispute.

General Eugene Tighe, Director, DIA, requested H. Ross Perot sponsor a private effort to determine whether or not any U.S. POWs were left alive. Perot called me to his EDS, Dallas office in April 1979. He instructed me accordingly: "I want you to go over there and see everyone you have to see, do all the things you need to do. You come back and tell me there aren't any American prisoners left alive. I don't believe it and I'm not interested in bones." COL Arthur D. "Bull" Simons was there. In contrast to Perot, he told me: "I'm going to plan the operation and you're going to execute it." I left for Asia immediately. Bull Simons died while I was away.

I went overseas hoping to prove that all our POWs were home. I came back convinced that they were still alive. Everywhere I went in Asia, people I knew who were actively engaged in intelligence operations were certain we had failed to bring them out. COL Frank Collins was one of the most convincing. He was the senior Defense Attache. Frank said that he consolidated reports from the entire East Asia region. He was positive American POWs had been abandoned. He offered Nguyen Giang as one example. Giang was in a refugee camp having escaped from Vietnam. He said he was with 49 American POWs only months before. Two of the POWs had died. Giang buried them. The others were still alive at the time of his escape. The Americans were being held as Tan Lop, a camp near the Red River, north of Hanoi.

I reported the results to Perot and recommended that we make Giang available for interrogation by electronic and chemical means for verification of his claim. Perot telephoned GEN Tighe and requested that Tighe bring Giang to the USA. Tighe wrote a memo to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown making the request. Brown forwarded the recommendation to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. A month later, Vance wrote a note to Brown turning down the appeal. These documents have since been denied by the Executive Branch, but they were written and I have copies. I returned to SEA for more convincing evidence. Patrols were launched into Laos to suspected POW holding areas using forces loyal to GEN Vang Pao (CIA mercenary chief Military Region II -- Laos during the war). One of the units returned with a positive sighting of 30 U.S. POWs at Nhommarath, Laos. Satellite photography confirmed "30 non-Asians by measurable shadow" and a figure 52 made in the ground to be visible by air. The Nhommarath report became Top Secret -- Special Intelligence! Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle told me that he briefed President-elect Reagan on the finding in the West wing of the White House in January 1981. The information was so sensitive I was told by Tuttle "never to even say the word Nhommarath!"

OPN VELVET HAMMER

I formed a pilot team in Florida to begin initial planning for a possible private sector rescue effort. I had maintained liaison with Ann Mills Griffith who was director of the League of Families since my first trip to Southeast Asia when it appeared POWs were still there. Ann made two trips to our base. I had been told by Admiral Tuttle in his Pentagon office to stand down. He stated, "President Reagan is excited and intends to make the rescue using Delta Force." I questioned the acceptable risk of the new president invading Laos in the wake of the Iran raid and criticism of Russia in Afghanistan. I used the planes being turned around during the Bay of Pigs as an example. Tuttle assured me, "The planes will not be turned around in this case!" Still I was concerned that politics would get between us and our POWs.

Ann brought George Brooks with her to the Overstreet Ranch where we has assembled those asked to be part of Velvet Hammer. Brooks offered to write a check for $20,000 to help keep the effort together. Gordon Wilson, my executive officer, handled all funding. I didn't feel right about accepting money from a "Family" member, but George was insistent. As I recall he arranged through Gordon to made the check payable to the Special Forces Association. The time soon came at the termination OPN GRAND EAGLE when Ann, with George always faithful, would become adverse to those who support the "living POW movement." This was because things didn't go Ann's way. They have been acutely critical of my operations and George has even said that I asked him for $250,000 to bring his son home. That is a total lie and absolute fabrication. George knew perfectly well from information given to him by Ann that Velvet Hammer was oriented only towards Nhommarath and we had no idea who might be there. COL Earl Hopper, former director of the League, can verify the truth. Both Hopper and I questioned Brooks at the Crystal City Stouffer Hotel concerning the money Brooks donated. Brooks clearly said he had no problem with Gordon's accountability. I state for the record that I have never sought funds from any POW family, nor led them to believe in any way that we were going on a mission to rescue their specific missing loved one.

We held the team together for as long as possible and then sent all except the most critical personnel home. Gordon told me that Brooks even helped with the transportation. I went to Ft Bragg and learned that Delta was indeed gearing up for the rescue. Still I was concerned the Reagan staff would not be willing to take the risk of sending an official military force into Laos. The Thais wouldn't actively support such an overt launch so the heliborne force would have to infiltrate a high risk corridor across Vietnam. I wrote a Top Secret memo to President Reagan outlining a private sector alternative. The message was delivered to National Security Advisor Richard Allen on 30 March 1981, the day President Reagan was shot! I was told that Haig was outraged that such an option existed. I was warned by Tuttle to watch out for a witch hunt and protect my sources. Tuttle said he was recommending to Lt. Gen. Phillip Gast, JCS Operations chief, that I be brought back on active duty for the operation.

I sent what remained of Velvet Hammer personnel home. Admiral Tuttle called me at my Los Angeles home on May 20th and said that the next day's Washington Post would carry a front page story stating that CIA mercenaries were sent into Laos looking for POWs, but found none. The planes had been turned around!

OPN GRAND EAGLE

Next, I was contacted by Jerry King, officer in charge of the Intelligence Support Activity. Even the initials "ISA" were classified because Congress knew nothing of the organization which was headquartered in Arlington Hall under the code letters "TCA." King wanted to continue Velvet Hammer under the new designation, Grand Eagle. I was to establish a network throughout Asia to gather information. Part of the operation was to focus on photographing POWs in captivity using ground units. I met with GEN Vang Pao in LA and arranged to use COL Soubane's troops. A four man training team was assembled in October to prepare the ground recon units for launch in December. Former Special Forces Master Sergeant J.D. Bath was the training team leader. Scott Barnes was an unfortunate add on!

Barnes identified himself as a close personal friend of GEN Vang Pao. Barnes sad he had worked in the Army Security Agency during the Vietnam war and had met Vang Pao at a special forces camp. Barnes was present but aside during the Vang Pao meeting. I had no reason to doubt Barnes. He had no operational talent, but said that Vang Pao wanted him to go along to monitor our relations with Soubane. The general's letter to Soubane instructed him to provide men for operational cost only, but Soubane was prone toward profit taking. It made sense that Vang Pao might want someone he trusted to oversee the operation. ISA said "NO." Their records check found him to be a flake who was dropped from military service as "unsuitable." I protested since Barnes would have no operational responsibilities. They relented -- I'm sorry to say.

Bill Macris (MI specialist) punched Barnes in the nose one week into the field mission. Barnes was returned immediately to the States. He did not go into Laos. He did not photograph POWs. None of these claims came up until long after the mission was over. What Barnes did tell Rob Ostrow of the L.A. Times was that I had sent him with Ed Wilson to Thailand to train for an assassination of President Reagan!

I was slated to go into laos to photograph American POWs in December 1981. Instead, Jerry King put the mission on hold and called me to D.C. Admiral Alan Paulson had replaced Jerry Tuttle. A bureaucratic tug-o-war developed. King told me that Paulson was tring to pull in ISA's POW authority. Paulson was complaining that I had "too much visibility" to be a principal field agent. King said that Paulson suggested that I function within the agency as a staff assistant. House Foreign Affairs, POW subcommittee Chairman Robert Dornan had called a hearing to question both Paulson and CIA deputy, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman about inner-agency problems in POW field operations. I was asked to meet with Admiral Inman. There was conflict over who has final POW operational control. King said that DIA was only a coordinating agency -- not an approving authority. Inman said he would contact me before Christmas with a decision. King called on 4 January to say that "Grand Eagle was to be put on the shelf as if it never existed. Too many bureaucrats in Washington didn't want to see live Americans returned!" King said he was empowered to have me returned to active military status as his deputy.

Ann Griffith called. She said Admiral Paulson wanted to continue Grand Eagle under his auspices and that he would soon be contacting me. Ann was very excited. Jerry King telephoned warning me about Paulson. King stated that Paulson only intended to completely dismantle the net so that no future operations would be possible. King indicated further covert support. Paulson was angry when I turned down his proposal. He contacted J.D. Bath and told him I had gone crazy and wouldn't cooperate with on-going efforts. He convinced J.D. to meet with DIA rep Pat Hirt and divulge what he knew of our operation. Ann Mills was furious. I didn't feel it appropriate to share with her all that happened between Paulson, King, Inman and myself. From that moment forward, Ann became critical of all I did. Let there be no doubt -- Ann Mills has full access to DIA POW data.

OPN LAZARUS

Using the assets and resources already in place, I prepared to launch Operation Lazarus. Fred O'Green, CEO Litton Industries was supporting the mission with night vision and nuclear fire control communication devices. He informed me that continuation of the mission was meeting resistance in the Pentagon. I acknowledged problems with Paulson. O'Green confirmed that Paulson was the choke point. I asked, "Is the mission on or off?" O'Green said he would confirm things on his end and let me know. The next day I received word that we had a green light.

We spent from August 1982 until November overseas setting up the operation within Thailand. I had 10 potential targets from ISA/CIA to check for POW presence. It was important to define which of three Lao resistance groups has the highest potential for mission success. We worked with Phoumi Nosavan, Vang Pao and Kong Le organizations. Gordon Wilson briefed President Reagan on the operation in the Santa Barbara White House. Gordon coordinated through the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

We made two precursory patrols into Laos in November and December 1982. A decision was made to conduct our main operation using Kong Le's people. A guerrilla organization was trained in the use of HF radios, codes, cameras, and special reconnaissance techniques. The commander, General Kham Bou Phimasen, agreed to survey the target sites and communicate any positive findings. Gary Goldman and I spent more than a month in Laos.

Scott Weekly had been operating a radio relay station through Esso at Khon Khan, Thailand. A CIA liaison informed him that we would not be allowed to reenter Laos even if POWs were found. He said higher authorities had feared our capture and compromise. That prediction turned out to be true.

On 10 January 1983, we received confirmation that one of the targets contained live U.S. POWs. I was told by O'Green that operational funds had been cut off and no return was authorized. When I proposed to sell one of the "boxes" we were cleared to return. Scott Weekly, Gary Goldman and I re-entered Laos 30 January 1983 with the purpose of rescuing U.S. POWs. We spent the next 30 days toward that end. We received messages from the CIA to return immediately. One message said that if we did not "stop and return -- all support is off!" Our mission was compromised within the United States and international attention made it extremely difficult to return safely to Thailand. I was charged by the Thai authorities with opening a high powered radio and fined. A State Department rep named Mulkey came to us saying he was there to help, but wasn't cleared for any POW conversation. The team returned to the U.S. in March 1983. ASA personnel reported they were instructed that it was life and death that they find us and maintain a fix on our location. I believe Jerry King may have been right.

Upon return to LAX, we were met at the plane by FBI agent Fred "Rusty" Capps. Who was there to give us swift and direct transportation home. He was concerned about sensitive equipment, until assured that everything would arrive in the U.S. secure and separate. Persons from the Munitions Control Board wanted an interview, but Capps explained that we would have nothing to say. Capps would later testify that he had communication with the CIA and, while I had not revealed to him my contacts, he had determined they came from a "unit that didn't exist" at Arlington Hall from a non-existent Jerry King. Later I saw Capps in the Los Angeles USG Wilshire building with a man he said was taking their files on our operation to Washington. Capps said the IG was making an inspection and wasn't to have access to the information. The sensitive devices were all received and restored to proper channels.

During the mission, Walter Jones, a team member was given a package containing bone fragments by a Lao. The source said they were from a crash site. He presented photographs showing himself in company with others digging around obvious aircraft debris. The pictures were of personal USAF equipment and human remains. There was enough evidence to convince me that the package should go to DIA for examination by the ID lab in Hawaii. A short time later the Pentagon made a press release that I had brought back "chicken bones" claiming them to be U.S. MIA remains. I have nine graduate level semester hours from the University of Kansas in Anthropology and undergrad work in bioscience and toxicology. I am certainly not qualified to make serious judgement calls on identification, but I can distinguish between bird and human bones. DOD's demeaning treatment of our good-faith effort was to become standard fare from a bureaucracy determined to keep its skeletons hidden! For some reason it was "kill the messenger" instead of "seek the truth."

The "Nhommarath 30" has been put off like everything else that the USG would rather not deal with, as "old information that has been thoroughly investigated and been found without substance." I don't believe Nhommarath has ever been properly looked into. Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle told me he personally briefed the president! It was A-1 Top Secret Special Intelligence! He was a key DIA-POW official. To my knowledge, Tuttle has never been called to testify before the Kerry, or Murkowski, or Solarz, or any other so called POW concerned Congressional hearing. Subpoena and question Tuttle -- under oath -- in detail about Nhommarath.

I was asked to testify before a Solarz sub-committee hearing upon our return to the U.S. in March 1983. When questioned whether or not I had any official sponsorship in my POW pursuit, I responded in the affirmative, but would not identify the agency in open session. That afternoon Admiral Paulson disclosed the existence of ISA during executive session. True to confidential Capitol Hill tradition, the information was immediately leaked and the Washington Post ran an article, "Reagan told to reign in rouge intelligence operation." In accordance with intelligence tradition, ISA went further underground to resurfaced with a new face.

OPN BROKENWING

Gary Goldman and I then went to Paris to meet with General King Le who had just made his way out of exile in Red China. Kong Le agreed to help resurrect Operation Lazarus. One of his former officers had a son that reportedly was in charge of three U.S. POWs at a camp near Xieng Khouang, Laos. I contacted the father along the Thai border northeast of Vientiane. A communication net was developed to allow indirect contact with son. Positive relations were established to the point where to demonstrate access to physical U.S. POW intelligence, the source acquired Lance Peter Sijan's U.S. Air Force Academy ring for a reward of $1,000 and a photo-signature of Major Walter H. Moon who was missing in action. The ring was genuine containing the proper Balfour markings, class date '65, wear marks, and inside scripted name of "Lance Peter Sijan." The photo showed a full-face close up of a bearded caucasian in prison garb with a bandaged head. The picture had been taken by someone considerably shorter than the subject. A scrap of aged paper had written in pen the following inscription in three lines: "1. Name WALTER HUGH MOON 2. Date of birth 31 MARCH 1923 3. Place of birth Rudy, Arkansas, USA." Under that in an Asian cursive hand was" "Name and Signature of prisoner." Beneath was a clear and bold "Walter H. Moon."

I immediately sent the ring back by courier with instructions for John Mangham to personally contact the Sijans and arrange for it to be returned with honor to the father and mother in Wisconsin. Peter Sijan had received the Medal of Honor for his valiant acts as a POW. One of the USAF Academy dorms is named after him. I knew the family would treasure the ring. When Mangham called, Mr. Sijan contacted DOD for guidance. I later learned that Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage advised them not to accept the ring since it was a fake!

Upon returning from overseas, I was puzzled at the refusal and angry that a high government official like Armitage would be so quick to powerfully discredit something without so much as an examination or inquiry. Armitage's knee-jerk reaction was standard Pentagon response to any private sector offering. I telephoned the Sijans. They expressed doubt as to the rings authenticity. An Air Force colonel and military lawyer from Nellis AFB came to view the article and wanted to know if I would give it to them so they could send it to Armitage. I refused and personally went to Milwaukee to offer the ring to Mr. and Mrs. Sijan. They instantly recognized it as genuine and having belonged to their son who died in captivity. They showed me a duplicate that Balfour had made for them.

I dutifully turned over the photo, negative and "signature of prisoner" to chairman Solarz of the House POW sub-committee. He gave it to DIA who denounced (They said Moon had been executed shortly after capture) even though the wife, Mrs. Ruth Moon verified both the picture and handwriting as clearly those of her husband. Actual samples of MAJ Moon's signature and file photos matched those given to me in Laos by the Kong Le contact. Armitage testified before Congress that I was unscrupulously withholding personal articles from POW families and that I was turning over manufactured intelligence. The Fate of MAJ Moon still remains unresolved largely due to a constipated Executive Branch not willing to view its own mess for fear someone may be found responsible! Why wasn't the Moon document ever presented to the Lao authorities for explanation and possible resolution?

You can possibly begin to see why it becomes non-habit forming to furnish Congress such findings. They end up on the DIA scrap heap while you are defamed and lied about in undated and unsigned National Security Council memos that are released to the media, sent as responses to public inquiry, and publicized by Ann Mills in her League reports.

One of the three POWs was described as having the use of only one leg. An effort was coordinated to have the three American delivered by the son on the Thai side of the Mekong River near Si Chiang Mai west of Vientiane, Laos during the Christmas-New Year period 1984-85. A Lao police colonel was to drive brokenwing in his truck from the camp to meet with the others at the river. The son and six defecting Pathet Lao guards were to escort the other two Americans on foot to the rendezvous.

Agents reported their safe arrival -- except for brokenwing and the son. They said the police colonel had lost his nerve and returned brokenwing to the camp after the others had departed. It was also reported that the son had been killed in an altercation during the cross-country move! At the appointed time and place a reconnaissance/boat team was sent across the river to pick up those who has arrived. Contact was made and the party started back in two dug-out boats. Mid-stream the lead boat was taken under fire by a patrol boat hidden along side an island. The boat then ran down what was left. The second pirogue was seen to turn back and successfully make land. Agents reported the two Americans safe. Two dead and two wounded members of our team were recovered by the Thais and treated. We tried throughout the week to arrange another pick-up without SUCCESS.

The final effort came when our reconnaissance team reported contact with the POWs and their guards by radio near midnight at a pre-arranged crossing site. As we prepared to launch a rubber boat for the pick-up, I noticed through night vision goggles a strange "glitter" along the far bank adjacent to and about 100 meters from the pick-up point. One of the recon team was directed to move along the shore in that direction. I monitored his progress through the PVS-5 goggles. As he approached, the suspect area erupted in gunfire. Rounds were fired not only at the recon but across the river into Thailand! Thai military liaison said that I was to report to the Province chief the next day. The Thai-English newspapers printed a story saying U.S. Embassy officials were officially inquiring as to Bo Gritz presence along the border. I was informed the mission was over.

Aside from OPN BROKENWING, Special Forces Major Mark Smith had been assigned from his duty as SFOD-KOREA commander to monitor my POW operation in Thailand. Mark knew that U.S. POWs were scheduled to be brought across the Mekong, but he was not informed of the intercept and subsequent abort. Major Smith was left to believe that Americans had been abandoned with no one to receive them. I was to meet Major Smith face-to-face in 1986.

OPN SOUTHSIDE

The following dry season (September thru March). I was still working on trying to verify the facts concerning BROKENWING and three MIA POWs. I was introduced to a source who said he represented a Pathet Lao general officer willing to turn over five U.S. POWs in exchange for safe passage to the U.S. for his family and support in fighting Soviet sponsored Vietnamese occupying his south-central region from Saravane to Sepone (Tchepone). Huge caches of munitions had been removed from Vietnam during the 1973-75 period by Erich von Marbod and Richard Armitage. These were located in Thailand and the Philippines to continue resisting Communist forces. I figured that some of this would be made available if Americans were returned from captivity.

The source said the general would personally escort the senior U.S. prisoner as a show of good faith to a point near the border where we would meet. Once identification was verified, I would receive the POW who was reported to be Richard A. Walsh. Walsh was shot down flying an A-1J Skyraider on 15 February 1969. I questioned the wisdom of a general officer driving a U.S. POW along Route 23 and 9 through roadblocks we had determined were occupied by Vietnamese. I was told the general had authority and passes to allow such a trip and that I should only be concerned with safely negotiating the border to arrive at a point just north of Savannakhet. Once Walsh was safe, I was to arrange acceptance of family belonging to the general and several of his key officers. Four more Americans were to accompany them across the border into Thailand.

Christmas-New Year 1985-86 was the target date. Liaison reported both the general and his passenger had been intercepted and were being detained by the Vietnamese. The only evidence that gave this report credibility was a joint public release by the Lao and Vietnamese in the press on or about mid-January stating they had "apprehended and were holding a U.S. citizen."

As part of the coordination, I had furnished the liaison with a U.S. Passport to be used as ID by Walsh as required once we crossed into Thailand and before he was returned to U.S. control. The Thais supported our efforts throughout, but if caught without proper credential, a foreigner would immediately be arrested. It was possible to lose a POW in the Thai bureaucracy unless surface effort was made to satisfy all their requirements. It was feasible that Walsh or another AMerican was carrying that passport when stopped by the communists. Not knowing the true identity and poor communications could have misled them into thinking they had someone else.

A second comment added to that theory. Not long after returning, I was in the U.S. State Department. A friend, Colonel Nestor Pino, noticed me and made the comment, "Good to see you alive. We thought maybe you had been captured -- your passport turned up in a strange place." The question remains: Why didn't U.S. officials follow up on the communist report of an American in custody?

Tom Harvey had worked as a military assistant to Senator Warner, but was currently assigned to the National Security Council. Harvey was following the Murkowski POW hearings. He was especially interested in what Mark Smith had to say about POW video tapes. A person having the tape was to make it available through Mark, but was to remain anonymous. Somehow his identity was revealed through government leaks and the person had gone underground -- with the tape. All that was left was Smith's testimony.

Harvey had been in touch with DeConcini from Arizona. Senator Dennis DeConcini asked that I personally question Mark Smith to determine whether or not his report of a video showing U.S. POWs was genuine. I talked to Mark and brought him to speak directly with Senator DeConcini. Mark was to be recalled and further questioned along the lines developed in his conversation with DeConcini. Additionally, at the Senators interest and insistence, I gave to Mary, the Senator's Chief of Staff, in the presence of Tom Harvey several POW cases in original document form that I thought if properly investigated would conclude that our brothers were certainly still in captivity. Mary assured me that they would be safe and presented before the committee. They were locked in the safe and I was to receive the originals back after the hearings concluded. Murkowski canceled the hearings. Mary sadly could never locate the "secured files," Mark Smith was labeled a charlatan and Medal of Honor recipient, Howard a drunk. I was glad the committee did not call me to testify.

Later, in the third-quarter of 1986 I included Mark as part of an Afghan training team. I wanted to have adequate time to determine if his story about seeing the POW video tape in Lebanon was fact or fiction. After spending days with him in after-hour conversation concerning every detail of his experience with the video, I'm convinced he saw exactly as he testified. I was to involve Mark in a 1987 exercise code named RED BULL.

OPN EMERALD CITY

Harvey called me the last of October 1986 from the White House (NSC). Vice president Bush had received information that a most infamous drug lord in Burma has U.S. POWs! The DIA, CIA, and DEA had no means to verify the report, but it came from very high placed and reliable sources. Harvey wanted to know if it was possible for us to confirm the information. He said that President Reagan was prepared to do whatever was required to get the men back if General Khun Sa had and would release them! Scott Weekly and I flew to DC and met Harvey outside the White House. He gave us letterhead and language that identified us to Khun Sa as having only a humanitarian interest in POWs. We left in November for Burma.

I had previously established several ethnic agent networks. I had never activated a Malaysian-Chinese group. Since Khun Sa spoke Mandarin, I felt our best bet was through the Chinese mafia. It worked and within a short time Scott and I were inside Khun Sa's headquarters. We established good rapport and determined that the reports of his having American POWs were false. I used both video and a CIA provided portable polygraph to produce proof that Khun Sa had no knowledge of U.S. POWs. The VP report said that Khun Sa has five POWs and sightings on 70 more. It said that Khun Sa had lost four POWs drowned along with some of his own men trying to cross a rain swollen Mekong River to safety.

Khun Sa said while he had no information on POWs, he would send agents to scrub Laos along a north-south line running from Vientiane -- west to the Burma border. He promised to either secure any Americans found or give me 2,500 of his best troops to recover them. I was told to return in March for the results. I asked Khun Sa about trafficking in Heroin. He told me to take an offer back to President Reagan. Khun Sa was willing to eliminate all the Golden Triangle opiates and disclose the U.S. government officials who were his best customers for more than 20 years! In return Khun Sa wanted a trade agreement which would allow free world exploitation of the Shan State natural resources. VP Bush was leading the war on drugs and it sounded like an offer we couldn't refuse.

I turned over three video tapes to Harvy just before Christmas 1986. Two tapes showed polygraph interviews of source information to the vice president wherein deception was obvious. The third tape included Khun Sa's drug eradication offer and verification that the things attributed to him that were reported to VP Bush were false.

Harvey telephoned with congratulations on successfully resolving the POW report, Khun Sa's sweep of western Laos and offer to help in any rescue operation. When I inquired about the drug offer, Harvey said there was no interest. Such a negative response was surprising, but staff assistants in DC tend to develop tunnel-vision and see no importance outside of their own narrow focus. I returned to Burma and found reason why there was "no interest!"

OPN RED BULL

I left again for Thailand in January 1987 to follow-up on POW leads from BROKENWING, SOUTHSIDE and Khun Sa's sweep of western Laos. Upon arriving in Bangkok, I was given residence in the Prime Minister's quadrangle. Som Suk, an asset who normally works as a representative for the Thai Bull union, reported that he could not help. He would be traveling to Vientiane with the minister of commerce to speak with Kaysone Phomvihan about a up-coming rice dead. The Red Bull was similar to Jimmy Hoffa's Teamsters. No rice was marketed that did not include their participation. In return the government used the Red Bull to quell such disturbances as student up-risings at the university. Posing as "plain people" the union members quickly and mercilessly broke up demonstrations.

A short time later, Som Suk burst in to say that he had spoke with Keysone in social conversation about the possibility of buying out U.S. POWs. He said that the Prime Minister asked "how much do you think we could get?" When Som SUk replied, "10 million Baht for each," Keyson's reply was, "Good, that's 8 million for me and 2 million for you."

Som Suk was excited to know if he had acted correctly in making the offer of 10 million Baht -- he was quick to add that we did not have to pay him the 2 million. I assured him that his action was proper. Kaysone had told him that there were two Americans near death being held in Vientiane and two more not far away. If the operation could be kept secret, Americans could be officially listed as having died in captivity when they were actually being covertly transferred to U.S. control.

A meeting was held to work out the details with lawyers and persons representing Keystone. A Thai Special Forces general would provide security fro Udorn to Bangkok. The police chief at Nong Khai would clear the route from the border. We would present a bank voucher showing sufficient funds in an "overseas account" for the transaction. Once the money was in-country, the Lao would produce positive ID of four U.S. POWs. Satisfied with the currency of ID, the first deposit of 10 million Baht would be made into the "in-country account." Satisfactory proof of deposit would produce the first live American. After positive ID, we would transfer the money as directed. Subsequent transfers would proceed as mutual confidence evolved.

Scott Weekly assured me that our planning messages were passed to Tom Harvey and that "the money is on the way," but it never showed in the account. I have no way to know all or exactly what happened, but after a short time of not being able to demonstrate a deposit, the Lao went home, as did an angry Som Suk. It is conceivable that Harvey relayed the information to Assistant Secretary of Defense RIchard Armitage who was responsible for POW/MIA recovery and "other arrangements" were made that cut me out of the net.

OPN HEROIN HIGHWAY

I delayed going back into Burma until April because of newspaper reports that "Khun Sa's mountain stronghold had been seized". Banner headlines proclaimed; "U.S. Declares No Mercy in Drug War Against Khun Sa." It looked like air strikes along with joint Thai and Burmese ground operations involving 26,000 soldiers had finished the Shan State and Khun Sa. Still his messages arrived wondering why I hadn't returned as invited. I decided to brave the battle and try to get through the lines to Khun Sa. I was surprised to find the border wide open. Not only that, but a major road building operation was underway that allowed one day service by pick-up truck from Mae Hong Son, Thailand to Khun Sa's headquarters! I took team members Lance Trimmer and Barry Flynn as observers. On our November 1986 visit, Weekly and I had used horses over a three day journey along narrow winding opium trails.

Khun Sa was in rare form. He had a new crew-cab Toyota, hospital and temple. He laughed and wondered. "What took you so long?" He was delighted when I answered that I had waited for the war to die down. "That was a newspaper war," he boomed! "After you left with my Reagan message in December, I thought maybe I'd see B-52 bombers overhead. Instead both the Thai and Burmese came to me and said they had to make it look like they were doing something or they could lose millions of U.S. drug suppression dollars. I told them to do anything they wanted as long as it included a road from Mae Hong Son Air Port." Ten-ton trucks had replaced the horses and mules as the drug tonnage quickly indicated. A news article showing the U.S. Ambassador presenting the Thais with a $1.8 million check for all their hard work cooled political concerns.

Khun Sa said he understood the problem. He sadly reported that after an exhaustive search his agents had turned up no evidence of U.S. prisoners alive in Western Laos, but he was willing to reveal some of the U.S. officials he had dealt with since winning the Burma-Laos Opium War in 1967! My ears pricked up when Richard Armitage was named as the person who handled the money with the banks in Australia! I was familiar with the Michael Hand's Nugan-Hand Bank chain that laundered CIA drug money worldwide. The Chiang Mai branch telephone was answered by the DEA secretary. Mike Hand had been a Special Forces operative. Nugan was found shot to death after the bank examiners revealed their nefarious dealings. Hand disappeared. If Armitage was the bagman, then he wouldn't want live POWs coming home. Follow-on investigations would involve him as the responsible bureaucrat. Armitage and Harvey were close associates who lifted weights together at the Pentagon Officers Athletic Club. If Armitage was involved and saw Khun Sa's offer to name names, it could have sparked the "newspaper drug war" -- something certainly did!

Immediately upon arrival at the Bangkok safehouse on 19 May 1987, I was called by Joseph Felter who informed me that U.S. Government authorities, had come to him so that I might be advised to erase and forget everything I had just learned from Khun Sa and return IMMEDIATELY with all documentation to be turned over to Harvey upon arrival. My failure to properly respond would "hurt the U.S. Government!" Felter lives in the DC area and knew of my association with Harvey.

Felter called again on 29 May after my arrival in LA at the request of William Davis, a State Department official to warn me about any disclosure of Khun Sa information. I was told that if I did not cooperate, aggravated charges and hostile witnesses would be brought against me -- that I would serve 15 years as a felon! My oath was not to lie, shred, or cover up. I chose instead to present the information and was called to testify before Larry Smith's House Sub-Committee on Narcotics Oversight. It was a mistake. Smith did not allow the members to view the Khun Sa video record and questioned the "heroin highway" as being a road to attack Khun Sa. He said the charges against Armitage were old, investigated, and unfounded.

The DEA finally admitted to a new road from Mae Hong Son to Khun Sa's HQ, but they said it was a "graduation road." Khun Sa wanted Thai officials to attend a special ceremony and didn't want them riding mules for miles so he had a highway built that they could drive along. Official heroin statistics record that in 1986 Khun Sa shipped 600 tons of opiates out of his Golden Triangle. The amount went up to 900 in 1987 (per highway), then 1,200 tons in 1988 and 3,050 tons in 1989! The road became so visible that Khun Sa had to alter the direction of flow and means of transportation, but not the volume. As Khun Sa said to me, "How do you think I can move so much opium product out of the jungle if it is not with badges?" Attorney General Richard Thornburgh indicted Khun Sa calling him the world's blackest criminal. Khun Sa had offered President George Bush one metric ton of #4 pure Asian Heroin that sell for over $1 million per pound on the metropolitan streets of America. It was to be a show of good faith that he would eliminate every once while divulging his best customers. There was no interest!

Charges were brought against me in Oklahoma City for training Afghan. No true bill was ever obtained. In Los Angeles, it was for violation of the neutrality act. The FBI came to my rescue and the charges were dropped. I was indicted in Las Vegas for using a false passport. After two years and more government phone calls trying to get me to stop talking about government drug operations and POWs, I was taken before a sealed Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) hearing. White House, NSC, State Department, and Justice Department officials testified. Judge Phillip Pro ruled that all I could say before the jury was that I had been asked by a high level U.S. intelligence agency official to go in pursuit of U.S. POWs and that I had been doing so. I was acquitted, but had been prevented from travel for two years. On May 9th, 1989, State Department Special Agent Scott Farquar made an official statement: "Let me start by telling you that Gritz has been confirmed to have been an agent of the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) of the United States Army. His mission and the mission of the ISA are deemed to be classified."

OPN DUCES WILD

As of late 1990, OPN Lazarus member, Marine Gunnery Sergeant Jack Thompson, assigned to the Philippines, had been working on U.S. POW photo/dossier reports out of northeast Thailand. He had developed source information to a point where more experienced operatives were needed to handle and evaluate the agents and their offerings. The source was offering for sale a photo showing three men holding a sign. The non-Asians in the picture were said to be POWs Lundy, Robertson, and Stevens. I had rejected the buy based on Jack's description of what he saw. Robert B. Keplinger from Reno, Nevada was asked to go with Jack and determine whether or not additional Lazarus ground personnel and resources should be dedicated to follow up the agent reports Jack thought might be valid.

Bob Keplinger left with Jack for Thailand in April 1991. The source said he had contact with U.S. POWs. He again offered as proof a black &amp; white photograph showing three Caucasians with a sign. The photo was rejected as a fake because of obvious alternations. The handwriting on the sign was Asian. The sign appeared to be in the corner of a paper (manila) folder written on and placed on the photo of three men and retaken to look like a poster. Markings on the sign indicated a "Lao Date" of 25 May 1990 and location of Nanon Thakhet (NNTK). Our records indicated John Robertson was shot down over North Vietnam while the other two were missing from Laos. It didn't jive.

I supplied Bob with "Key Question Dossiers" containing 55 queries that only the POW could answer correctly. Four times the source said he gave the dossiers to the POWs, but while there were hand and finger prints, not one of the written answers were correct or even written in an American hand. We concluded that the source was phony and only trying to scam money out of those interested in POW info.

OPERATION EMERALD SEEKER/INSIDE STRAIGHT

Robert B. Keplinger had reported contact with a source in the summer of 1991 who said they had connections out of Hong Kong with U.S. POWs in Vietnam. Bob said the source claimed relationship with a French-Vietnamese narcotics operation wherein a freighter was loaded with drugs out of Vietnam in return for $1 million (U.S.)&gt; The Vietnamese intelligence officials involved had asked if any of the French side knew of Americans with an interest in recovering live U.S. POWs.

Bob went to Hong Kong to check out the connection and was convinced that the source apparently had access to VN officials with information on American POWs in SOutheast Asia. Communications developed into third and fourth 1991 visits to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) and Laos under the cover of resource mining business interest by Bob Keplinger and Chuck Johnson. In compliance with the Logan Act, the Lazarus Team had been asked in writing by families of U.S. servicemen missing in action to represent their interest in both Laos and Vietnam.

The Lazarus Team (R.B.K.) was sponsored beginning in August 1991 by an "International Company," Guernsey Limited, Channel Island calling itself C.O.D.E. with Nguyen Hao Tam and several French nationals. On one occasion I was asked to send a fax to the United Nations Laos delegation chief verifying that Bob Keplinger was representing me (Bo Gritz) and the Lazarus POW Recovery Team. Two other verifications were to be included from Eugene McDaniel and Ross Perot assuring the receivers that Bob was not a USG official. I prepared the fax and sent it to Red. Capt McDaniel said he would get Perot's chop and send the consolidated message on to the UN.

Bob took Gary Lane with him to Hanoi. Gary was part of a Red McDaniels POW/MIA documentary team. Bob opened doors through our VN defense contacts that allowed Gary to preview hugh amounts of VN war footage showing shoot downs, injured Americans and U.S. personnel captured as a result of ground action. Gary selected what he wanted and Bob arranged for the film to leave Vietnam. The team was sharing the same hotel in Hanoi with GEN Vessey and his group.

After a trip into Laos with Tam, Chuck Johnson and several French nationals, Bob Keplinger called to say that a Laotian official was stopping by Reno, Nevada to see him. The visitor turned out to be the son of the ruling prince in Laos, Souphanouvong. He was accompanied by a U.S. State Department escort officer. The Lao instructed Bob to "be patient -- we will be doing business." During a subsequent visit to Vietnam, Bob and Chuck Johnson were shown an area in Saigon and told that Americans were being held there under the authority of the Interior Minister. Further developments prepared Bob to go to Vietnam for a physical inspection of U.S. POWs.

January 1992, Bob Keplinger left Reno, NV for Saigon via Paris accompanied by Nguyen Hao Tam with assurances that he would be taken to a VN resistance chief and allowed to interview 10 U.S. POWs. The POWs were part of a 50-man American group being held in the Ban Me Thout highlands area (IICTZ) of Vietnam west of Nha Trang.

On the previous trip, Keplinger and Chuck Johnson had been asked to list 10 U.S. POWs they wanted to see. Since inspection tours and talks had taken place over the past six months in both Vietnam and Laos and not knowing whether the sample should be taken from either one or both areas, Lance Trimmer and I supplied a list of 10 from each country who we felt were still in captivity.

Keplinger was to be allowed 10 minutes with each of the 10 POWs (whether it was to included any of those we listed wasn't known) to thoroughly document their identity by video-audio tape, photography, fingerprinting, and key question dossier. Once there was no doubt as to confirmed POW identities, at a near term date to be determined, two of the Americans were to be released and given safe VN escort to a neutral zone (that would be determined mutually between the VN and our joint U.S.- French team). The others were to be freed in phases. H. Ross Perot had agreed to pay for the transfers. Eugene "Red" McDaniels was "in the loop."

By Mid-February '92 Keplinger and Tam were in Saigon. Keplinger sent a fax stating that he departed Saigon at 0530 on 17 Feb '92 north to Nha Trang and west to the RV near Ban Me Thout. Keplinger reported that he and Tam were taken by VN guide overland in a van type vehicle of Nha Trang. He met with armed guerrilla on the beach near Cam Ranh Bay who guided them westward through a restricted travel zone to a rendezvous in two vehicles. Keplinger reported hearing explosions to the rear during a night drive and was later told that the second vehicle was ambushed and destroyed. Keplinger said the atmosphere with the so-called FULRO reps was less than cordial and threatening if not almost hostile.

The FULRO chief did not produce the 10 American POWs as agreed. Instead, Keplinger said the VN took offense at the inspection requirement and offered the two POWs for instant turn-over without compensation. When Keplinger said he wasn't prepared to accept two U.S. POW at that moment, he said the FULRO chief told him to make arrangements and be ready within the next 30 days.

Keplinger returned the last of February from the failed inspection trip to Ban Me Thout with FULRO amid press reports from a Frenchman, Michele Honorin, who said he had been part of our team in Laos and had recorded U.S. POW locations on film. The Kerry Committee wanted to hear from Bob in March. I advised Keplinger that this was not a good time to discuss the forthcoming rescue plans with anyone outside our team. He agreed and said that he would keep comments about what had happened involving the Frenchman vague. Keplinger would use the "emerald" business cover to conceal active POW dealings. Keplinger said that he would not admit to, or discuss live POWs with the committee.

For the record, Bob Keplinger told me, Jerry Gillespie and other team members that he had personally viewed two U.S. POW. He said they were identified as A-6 pilots and that the G-chief was willing to turn them over immediately. Keplinger told me that he refused custody of the two Americans because he had no infrastructure at that time to insure security and safe passage home. Keplinger reported that he was working necessary arrangements through Tam for the contemplated turn-over.

Chuck Johnson had other ideas. He was in Paris wanting to go to Saigon to help, but had been vehemently rejected by Bob. Chuck was of the opinion that Bob had been less than sincere. Chuck suspected he was more oriented on personal business than our POWs and had made [Joyce's note: This word was crossed out in the text -&gt;] major a major error in not accepting the two POWs he said were offered. Gary Lane had said that Keplinger had identified himself using another name five years ago in Washington D.C. when Lane was doing a POW TV segment. Lane further complicated the issue by stating Bob referred to himself as "working for the company." Chuck was in close personal contact with Tam and reported that little or nothing was being done to prepare for the turn-over. Chuck began an approach through Tam that would involve Lance Trimmer, Tam and himself, but exclude Bob.

Travel to Saigon was set for the last week in March. Lance joined Chuck in Paris at Tam's headquarters. According to Chuck, Tam received a fax from VN saying that all was ready. All that was needed was for them to "bring two suits of clothing and two passports." The POWs would be turned over per the FULRO agreement. Travel documents and tickets were secured, but the day before departing, Tam said the VN were putting the meeting on hold since it was announced that Senator Kerry was coming to Vietnam. Chuck and Lance were told that the VN did not want to risk any initiatives that might be reached through the chairman's official visit. Chuck and Lance waited in Paris until it was announced that a 56-man DOD "search team" was being dispatched to Vietnam.

Our private sector effort closed out in May 1992. We had secured film records from the VN allowing Red McDaniels and GAry Lane to produce their POW documentary video. We had visited areas of Laos and Vietnam. Government officials from Laos and Vietnam had demonstrated considerable interest in our live-POW effort. We had successfully assessed and exercised a French-connection into Communist Asia. Keplinger was last in Vietnam with Tam the last of October 1992. SInce April 1992, I have received no further communication concerning VN willingness to access U.S. POWs.

Many of the contacts and comrades made over these past 12 years are dead. Almost everyone who dedicated themselves to this righteous cause is worse off. I must conclude that while we have labored long and hard, the enormity of government opposition has taken its toll. I salute all the those who have kept the faith with our missing in action. Our reward may not be now, but someday it will be noble. I pray for those who may remain in captivity that their hope might forever burn bright knowing that they will never be forgotten as long as Old Glory flies and even one true American lives -- that we will forever be in search of them until we all come home!

THIS CONCLUDES MY OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS. MY COMMENTS RECALL EVENTS AND EXPERIENCES SPANNING MORE THAN 12 YEARS. I HAVE FAITHFULLY RECONSTRUCTED EACH COMMENT WITH CARE AS TO ACCURACY IN AS MUCH AS MEMORY AND RECORDS ALLOW. I CERTIFY THIS A TRUE STATEMENT AND AFFIX MY SIGNATURE THIS 23TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992 IN THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, VA.

James G. "Bo" Gritz
<CENTER>
<HR width="50%">


</CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPOSITION OF SCOTT TRACY BARNES
COMMITTEE CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, March 6, 1992
Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
1111 14TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650
(202) 289-2260

DEPOSITION OF SCOTT TRACY BARNES

Friday, March 6, 1992

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on POW/MIA
Affairs
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of SCOTT TRACY BARNES, the witness

herein, called for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, pursuant to notice, in Room S-407, The Capitol, commencing at 10:23 a.m., the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, and the proceedings being taken down by Stenomask by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction.

On behalf of the Select Committee on POW/MIA

Affairs:
DINO CARLUCCIO
Deputy Staff Director
NEAL KRAVITZ, ESQ.
ROBERT TAYLOR
STEVE GEKOSKI

box: DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 10501
By PMoore NARA, Date 8-3-93
<CENTER>C O N T E N T S</CENTER>WITNESSES:Scott Tracy Barnes
EXAMINATION:By Mr. Kravitz
<CENTER>P R O C E E D I N G S</CENTER>Whereupon,

SCOTT TRACY BARNES,

the witness herein, called for examination by counsel for the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and having been duly sworn by the Notary Public, were examined and testified as follows:
<CENTER>EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE</CENTER>BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Mr. Barnes, why don't we just start by having you tell us your full name for the record.

A. Scott Tracy Barnes, B-a-r-n-e-s.

Q. And Tracy is spelled how?

A. T-r-a-c-y.

Q. The first thing we're going to do is just have some exhibits that have been previously marked admitted into the record. The first is Exhibit No. 1, which is a copy of the notice of Senate deposition that was served on you, I understand.

A. Yes, by the United States Marshals.

Q. Does Exhibit No. 1 look like an accurate copy of the notice that you received?

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Exhibit No. 2 is a copy of the subpoena that was serve on you for today?'s deposition. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

Q. Does that look like an accurate copy?

A. Yes, it does.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. And Exhibit No. 3 is just a copy of the authority and rules of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

THE WITNESS: And I received a copy of this; yes.

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Have you reviewed the copy of the rules?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Let me ask you this first. Have you ever been in a deposition before?

A. Yes.

Q. So you understand how it works?

A. Yes.

Q. Just so it's clear on the record, as you know, you've been sworn, and all your testimony fill be under oath, subject to perjury.

A. Correct.

Q. The way the deposition is going to proceed is I'm going to ask questions, and you're going to give answers. It's very important that you understand the question before you answer it. If you have any doubt about whether you understand the question, just let me know. No one is served by your answering a question if you don't fully understand it. Our interest, as I said before we went on the record, is to get as much accurate information as we can. And if you don't understand my question, I think our interest is going to be foiled. You obviously don't want to be giving answers under oath to questions if you don't understand them. So please, I won't be insulted. Just tell me that my question is bad, it's unclear. And we can rephrase it. A lot of the subjects that we're going to be talking about, you know a whole lot more about than I do. And that's why you're here. So I may not be asking the best questions.

A. Okay.

Q. Some of the questions that I ask you, you may have information that you know not only from your own observations, but from observations that other people have related to you.

A. Okay, yes.

Q. Commonly known as hearsay information. I'm interested in knowing both what you know from your own observations, and what you know from what other people have told you about their observations. But it's very important for you to tell us what you know from what you saw yourself, what you smelled yourself, what you heard yourself.

A. Firsthand.

Q. And what other people are telling you,

A. Okay.

Q. So if something you're telling me is based on hearsay, just let us know.

A. No problem,

Q. If you don't tell us something is based on hearsay, we're going to assume that it's based on firsthand knowledge.

A. Okay.

Q. Try to be as complete as possible in your answers. If you start rambling on and getting irrelevant, we'll interrupt you.

A. That it's irrelevant.

Q. But again, our purpose here is to get as much information as possible. So try to give it to us in as much detail as possible. There may be occasions where we ask for your opinion about why somebody said something or about why somebody did something. In those cases, obviously you're free to speculate and give your opinion. Because that's what the question is asking for.

Otherwise, if we're just asking you factual questions, and you don't know the answer without speculating, it's better to tell us. And I'm going to instruct you to tell us that you don't know the answer without speculated. We're perfectly interested in what your speculat?ion would be, but it's important for us to know that it is speculation. Do you understand that?

A. Right.

Q. I had a telephone conversation, I believe on Tuesday of this week -- which is March 3 -- with Neil Goldstein. Is it correct to say that Neil Goldstein who has advised you regarding your rights in this deposition?

A. That is correct.

Q. Have you had a sufficient amount of time to discuss your rights with Mr. Goldstein?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you have any questions for him that you feel you need to ask him before the deposition begins?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. I have Mr. Goldstein's telephone number here. Just for the record, it's area code (213) 828?-1000. And I just want to make it clear on the record that if at any time you feel you need to consult with Mr. Goldstein before answering a question, you're free to ask for a recess and try to reach him by telephone.

A. Okay.

Q. I haven't discussed with the people outside the room what arrangements could be made. But I'm confident that arrangements could be made. If worse comes to worst, we can go back to our office and make a telephone available to you. My interest is in making the arrangements, as much as possible, to be as if he were here.

A. No problem, I appreciate that.

Q. I know that Mr. Goldstein requested the Committee to pay for his expenses to fly out here. And the answer was that we couldn't do that. So just so that you're at as little disadvantage as possible, we wanted to make it so that he's here at least in voice, if not in person.

A. Okay.

Q. On that same issue, regarding access to Mr. Goldstein, we discussed off the record the Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate yourself.

A. Right.

Q. Just to go over again what we said, I will do everything I can not to ask you a question, the answer to which would tend to incriminate you of a crime. Sometimes it might happen by mistake, if I don't know what your answer would be, and in order to answer a question truthfully you did have to say something that would incriminate you or tend to incriminate you. If you think your answer might tend to incriminate you, you should just tell me. And we can either recess for you to call Mr. Goldstein, or if there's no question that your answer would incriminate you or intend to incriminate you, you can just take the Fifth.

A. Or it might be something you could clear up yourself, on the spot, to my satisfaction, also.

Q. Okay.

A. Great.

Q. Let me ask you this -- do you have a flight that you're supposed to be on?

A. I believe -- unless it's been changed -- they talked about leaving late today because of some economical things with the Senate. Unless that's changed, it's still tomorrow. I can stay as long as you need. That isn't a problem -- as long as you give me a place to lie my head. So I'm here at your disposal. So you do what you need to do. And I'll work it out logistically.

Q. It's 10:30 now. I think what I'd like to do is go for about an hour and 15 minutes -- maybe until quarter of 12, and then break until 12:00. And then maybe go from 12:00 until 1:00; break for lunch; and then come back and have a similar-type schedule this afternoon, until we finish.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Apparently there's some papers you need to sign at 12:00 regarding your reimbursement for your expenses?. So why don't we break at 12:00 for lunch, because the papers are going to be over in the Hart Building. And then come back at 1:00. And I understand that at 3:00 you need to go back over to the Hart Building, with our clerk, who is Nancy Cuddy, with those papers, to get your reimbursement. So why don't we try to schedule our breaks around those events. Okay.

A. I know this is going to be rude and inconsiderate of me to ask this. But is there a possibility at all of any coffee? Or, are we stuck with water?

Q. I don't know the answer to that.

A. Just thought I'd ask.

Q. We already got your full name. What's your father's full name?

A. Charles Ray -- R-a-y -- Barnes -- B-a-r-n-e-s.

Q. What was your mother's maiden name?

A. Poole, P-o-o-l-e.

Q. What's her first name?

A. Stephanie.

Q. What's your date of birth?

A. 6/19/1954.

Q. So you are

A. I'll be 38 in 2, 3 months.

Q. Where were you born?

A. Burbank, California, St. Joseph's Hospital.

Q. What's your social security number?

A. 550-76-8371.

Q. Where are you living now?

A. Prescott, Arizona.

Q. What's your address?

A. Mailing or physical? Mailing is P.O. Box XXXX Prescott, Arizona, XXXXX.

Q. What's your physical address?

A. XXX XXX XXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX. And I think the community is called Dewey. It's just outside the city limits of Prescott, Arizona.

Q. Dewey is?

A. D-e-w-e-y.

Q. How long have you lived there?

A. 5 weeks.

Q. Where were you living before that?

A. XXX XXXXXXXXXX, Pine Top, Arizona.

Q. How long were you living there?

A. 7 weeks.

Q. Are these near each other?

A. Heavens no.

Q. How far apart?

A. Oh, that's probably 170, 180 miles or more.

Q. Why did you move?

A. Well, after a visit from the FBI, I lost a job at the Apache Nation and went to Prescott.

Q. Are you working in Prescott?

A. No, I'm trying to get a business started with the SBA.

Q. What kind of a business?

A. A clothing store for children.

Q. What stage are you at in your attempts to get the business started?

A. Well, everything is done. All I have to do is get the money.

Q. What happened with the FBI 5 weeks ago?

A. Well, I had gotten a visit from an FBI agent by the name of Roger Toronto -- a nice fellow. And we went to lunch. Later on he had called and said, out of the blue, I think you and I need to share some intelligence back and forth, being as the position you have on the Apache Nation. At first I thought that a little bit odd. He was an excellent agent. He was an embassy agent that came up from Uruguay recently. And I said, okay. I called Ross Perot, and I told Ross what was going on. And he said kind of feel the guy out to see where he was coming from. The agent introduced me to his organized crime counterpart out of the Phoenix Bureau, Doug Hopkins. And Roger had called and said look. I need to get some information from you so I can run an international security check on you so you can have a security clearance.

So I gave him the everything that he wanted. And he called back about 10 days later when Bo Gritz was in town running for president -- which was rather puzzling. And he said I lost the information, can he get it again. So I gave it to him again -- and I don't know how much detail you want to go into this.

Q. Let me ask you this: what's the Apache Nation?

A. It's the native American tribe, the Apache Nation, White River, Arizona.

Q. What were you doing for them?

A. I was the supervisor in charge of all child abuse investigations -- anybody under 18 that died on the reservation, it was my duty to investigate it, any serious child abuse, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

Q. How big a population is that?

A. The Nation is about 12,000 registered tribal members.

Q. You had that job for how long?

A. About 7 or 8 weeks.

Q. How did you get that job?

A. That's what I'd like to know. I had gotten a call when I was living in Flagstaff, saying we're interested in having you come down here to work for us. You'll technically be a tribal employee. You'll be the first white man to ever have a position, so treat it with extreme caution. Shannon Pike and myself went down there. And I was given the job right on the spot. And instead of starting off at normal pay, they increased it to top pay -- which was rather surprising.

Q. What was your pay?

A. It was supposed to be like $26 000. And they said oh, we're going to give you $30,000 plus, plus -- which was very unusual.

Q. Did you have any background in investigating child abuse?

A. Um-hum. I was a social worker in the State of Washington and did child abuse there.

Q. So you were there for 7 weeks?

A. Approximately 7 weeks.

Q. Where were you working before that?

A. Well, before that I wasn't. I was living in Flagstaff with Shannon Pike, who's dad's an MIA. And before that I was in the State of Washington as a social worker.

Q. How much time passed between when you were working as a social worker in Washington State and when you left Flagstaff to go to Apache Nation?

A. 7 months.

Q. And you just got called out of the blue by the Apache Nation?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Did you know anyone there?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever figure out how they found you?

A. I assume -- and this is only an assumption -- that it was one of these innocuous, you know, send a resume to these P.O. Boxes and they market it out. I had sent several of those in response to several -- various ads. And I didn't know, and still don't to this day.

Q. What happened after your 7 weeks at the Apache Nation, were you fired?

A. What had happened, there was a couple homicides of some 2-year-old kids. And I solved one with George Poplin, the CI. And they didn't want to look into any further. And then there was another girl who died under strange circumstances. And they didn't want that looked into. They wanted her body immediately disposed of.

Q. Who is they?

A. The tribe.

Q. What do you mean?

A. The Chairman, who lives here in town, Ronny Lupe. So my superior says, look, you've got to understand one thing. We're a Nation within a Nation. And we don't like outside people telling us how and what to do. So the 27th of January my immediate superior came in and said we're tired of getting phone calls from Washington. I need your resignation right now, and I need all your identifications and all your files. And I said I'm not going to play politics here. Here it is, goodbye. And that was it.

Q. Were there any allegations of wrongdoing?

A. Oh, no.

Q. You didn't fight it at all?

A. No, I don't fight anything anymore. I don't care.

Q. How are you supporting yourself now?

A. I'm not. I went into great debt in borrowing a substantial sum of money to do business. Unfortunately, unless SBA kicks in, I'm sunk. Prior to that, I was living with Shannon, like I said. But we're no longer together. I have rent that's due today. I have no income, no unemployment -- nothing.

Q. You mentioned that the people at the Apache Nation told you they were tired of people calling from D.C.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Did you ever find out what they meant by that? Who was supposedly calling?

A. Well, in one instance -- let me try to explain that. Because one of the investigators, George Poplin, a white gentleman from the tribe, he said Scotty, he said something is going on -- major phone calls are going on. Everybody is looking into -- everybody thinks you work for the Government, and you are a plant. Because they need to ask you -- the Chief of Police of the Apache Nation asked me to come here. Do you work for the United States Government in any way, shape, or form? And I said no. I do not. I did when I worked for the Nation. But other than that, no. He goes, well there's a lot of suspicion. Supposedly right after you left all these murder documents disappeared.

And I said, oh, I see the game you're going to try to play. You're going to try to say I stole all the homicide documents when I was the one who was working murders with you. He said, I know, Scott, it's all bunk. But just so you're aware of that, when I asked Ms. Red Steer -- and there's some documents in there with her signature on it -- she said we just can't handle this anymore. I don't know who you work for. I don't know why you're here. We don't know why you even got hired.

Q. I know I asked you previously not to speculate, but this is a question that calls for speculation. Who do you think was calling from Washington, D.C.?

A. I have absolutely no idea. I know that there was a concern that Assistant Secretary -- Dr. Eddie Brown, over here, had made some calls. And I went to see him this morning. And, of course, he refused to see me. So I don't know. I'd like to see their phone logs. But she would never even tell me. And when I saw Ronny Lupe with Steve the other day, that just really surprised me. Because even he -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- when Steve and I were getting ready to go in the elevator, it was well, what are you doing here? I says well, I fluffed it off. But he also bought Attaha. And Attaha is one of the people we were looking into with one of the homicides, who is Vice Chairman of the Apache Nation. To me it was too coincidental... But I don't know who called from Washington. They won't tell me. By all means, call George Poplin, the Apache Police Department. He's an honorable guy.

Q. Do you believe that those calls had anything to do with your involvement in the POW issue?

A. No, no, I do not. If they do, and you find out, let me know.

Q. How long were you doing child abuse investigation work in the State of Washington?

A. 5 months.

Q. How long were you living in the State of Washington before you moved to Arizona?

A. Just that 5-month period. I left California to go accept this position in Washington.

Q. Where in Washington was that?

A. I was working out of the Colville -- out of Spokane, north of Spokane office.

Q. How do you spell it?

A. C-o-l-v-i-l-l-e.

Q. What was your position there?

A. I was a Social Worker II -- Roman numeral 2 --Child Abuse Investigations.

Q. Why did you leave that after 5 months?

A. I had a visit from two agents of the OSI who said that they were getting faxes from Washington, D.C. Basically one was an intelligence memo that I was out to assassinate Saddam Hussein. Another one was pages of kiss the boys good-bye. Another fax was that I was a member of the Arian Nation. You'd have to ask the agents. The faxes went from this end of the table to the next. There was hundreds of them, literally. So one of the agents says that it's probably in your best interest that you immediately resign and move out of Washington.

Q. Who was that agent?

A. You'd have to ask Olympia, Washington. I don't remember.

Q. Was it an FBI agent?

A. No, OSI -- Office of Special Investigations for the State of Washington. At least their credentials were State of Washington.

Q. A State official?

A. Uh-huh -- the man to ask would be Roy Harrington, if you can track him down. Because he tried to fight the system. He said I may be -- and I may be mistaken in this because it was a conversation that didn't interest me too much -- he said the Governor's office is getting these faxes, these faxes that are anonymously going to -- you name it -- to churches, to police departments, to anybody that has a fax machine. That's where they're going. So finally the Sheriff of the county issued me a gun permit, advised me to carry a firearm. Because one of the people they suspected of doing this is now one of the FBI's 10 Most Wanted.

Q. Don't most faxes have, on the top, the number that they're faxed from?

A. And it was a Washington, D.C. number. And all they know is -- I think it was a K Street foreign business. However, the only problem with this is -- and they still have the faxes as evidence up there because they brought in the FBI -- is you can put in any phone number that you want. And that was who they suspect this FBI guy did. Because he just started randomly punching in other people's fax numbers, trying to get all the investigators looking in a different direction. I think one fax number may have been Honolulu. I mean it was bizarre. But yet to answer your question, it also had a phone just like this one on it. But Sergent Lavonne Webb of the Stevens County Sheriff's Department is the main man that was involved in the investigation with OSI; and Jim Davis was the FBI agent out of Spokane.

Q. Who is this guy Harrington?

A. Roy Harrington -- he should now be in Olympia. He's a head honcho with the Department of Social and Health Services, State of Washington. And he's the one that said I don't want you to resign. He goes, there has been such political power to get rid of you, Scott. And he says I put my neck on the block to keep you. He goes you're an excellent social worker. Somebody very powerful is obviously trying to undermine you. And I said, you know, I'm not going to fight it anymore.

Q. Do you have any idea who was sending those faxes?

A. Well, yeah. This FBI's 10 Most Wanted character that wiped-out all the Immer family, and also assassinated his girlfriend, Robert Allen Suggs -- a/k/a Robert Michael Allen -- who supposedly was hired to do it; ex-Air Force security; former cop.

Q. So this is your belief?

? A. The FBI said they pretty much tied him in with other people. But obviously not telling me -- so I don't know. For all I know it could have been any number of people.

Q. Do you believe that those faxes had anything to do with your involvement in the POW issue?

A. Oh, heavens, yes. A lot of it surrounded the POW issue, at great length.

Q. The subject in the faxes?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Was the POW issue?

A. Not all of them, but a lot of them, yeah.

Q. Did you ever see what actually had arrived?

A. I saw probably 30 or 40 of the faxes. One was a bogus intelligence fax; another one was a Saddam Hussein hit fax; another one was -- I was an international drug smuggler fax; I was a member of the KKK fax. I mean you'd have to ask the authorities because they have them up there as evidence.

Q. Have you ever had any connection with the KKK?

A. Never.

Q. Let's not get too far afield, here. Let me ask you some questions just about your education. Did you graduate from high school?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. Redondo Union High School, Redondo Beach, California, June 1972.

Q. Did you ever go to college?

A. Yes, in the Army I went to -- I think it's now called Pierce College. On the post it was called Fort Steilacom Community College; St. Mary's College, up in Washington State; El Camino College, in Torrence, where I got my A.A. Degree in the Administration of Justice; then Saddleback College for the ?DEA school in Orange County; Marimar College for the San Diego Sheriff's College in San Diego; Empire State College, State University of New York, External Degree, Bachelors, in Human Services; California State University, Domingus, Masters in Humanities; and a host of other schools.

Q. So how many advanced degrees do you have?

A. Advanced?

Q. Or post-high school?

A. Oh, gosh -- three degrees, and 12 or 15 certificates of which I brought with me.

Q. The A.A. degree was from --

A. Administration of Justice from El Camino College, Torrence, California.

Q. And what are the other degree?

A. Bachelors is in Community and Human Services; Masters in Humanities and History.

Q. And those are from which.

A. B.S. is from Empire State College, State University of New York; Masters is California State University, Domingus Hills, Carson, California.

Q. Do you know the years, offhand, roughly?

A. You can look on them, they have them.

Q. Are these copies?

A. Those are yours, yes.

Q. Why don't we mark these as exhibits. I'm marking Exhibit No. 4 -- why don't you tell us what that is?

A. This is a transcript of my bachelors -- I'm sorry, California State University, Domingus Hills, granting me a masters of arts in humanities, August 31, 1987. And I was on academic probation for one semester.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. We don't need to go into that. Why don't we mark this number 5. Why don't you tell us what Exhibit No. 5 is?

A. Exhibit No. 5 is from El Camino College, California. It's a transcript of my associates of arts degree granted1975, and the degree was actually sent to me in 1976. But I graduated in 1975.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. We have one here marked St. Martin's College, number six. What's number six?

A. It's a copy of the transcript of the course I took at St. Martin's College in Olympia, Washington, while I was assigned to the 14th Military Police Company, 1974.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. And I'm showing what's been marked as Exhibit No. 7.

A. It's a transcript copy of Sandy Hill Community College District, of my coursework, spring of 1976 when I attended the San Diego Sheriff's Academy.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. And one more. Exhibit No. 8?

A. 8 is Ft. Steilacom Community College, transcript of coursework I took while serving in the United States Army at Ft. Lewis, Washington.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

THE WITNESS: There are a few more in there somewhere.

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. I'm showing you now Exhibit Now 9.

A. Exhibit No, 9 is a copy of my degree from State University of New York, Empire State College, Bachelor of Science, issued March 1986,

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No, 9 for identification,)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. And I've got one more in front of me. And then let's move on, But this one looks like another degree that we should put in the record,

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 10 for identification.)

THE WITNESS: Exhibit No, 10 is A copy of my masters degree from California State University, Domingus Hills, conferred August 1987,

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. I lied when I said just one more. Because here's your A.A. degree from El Camino College, Why don't we mark that as number 11

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No, 11 for identification.)

THE WITNESS: Number 11 is really two. It's a double copy. It's the associate of arts degree from El Camino college, issued June 1976. Below it is a copy of additional training from San Diego Community College, San Diego Sheriff's Department.

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. So you graduated from high school in 1972?

A. Yes.

Q. And you entered the Army in what year?

A. I signed up -- my entry date, I believe; was July 16th. I came back to the United States July 16, 1973.

Q. You graduated from high school --

A. In June of 1972.

Q. Did you travel out of the United States in the year between the time you graduated from high school and the time you enlisted in the Army?

A. Yes, extensively.

Q. Where did you go?

A. Mexico, Tahiti, American Samoa, Western Samoa, Fiji, Tonga, New Caladonia, New Zealand, Australia, Bali, Cuala Lamphoor, Hong Kong, Red China, the Philippines, Vietnam.

Q. The record should reflect that Mr, Barnes is consulting his passport.

(Pause,)

A. I'm pretty sure that's most of the countries during that time.

Q. Was there any purpose other than just vacation that you were going to these countries?

A. All except two, pretty much the rest -- Australia and Vietnam -- were other than that.

Q. When did you go to Vietnam?

A. I arrived in Thon Son Nhut in March 1973.

Q. For the record, is that North Vietnam or South Vietnam?

A. South Vietnam.

Q. What was your purpose in going to South Vietnam in March of 1973?

A. Being as it's an area that isn't relevant to the POW/MIA issue, that I would rather not discuss...

Q. Unless you think that there's a Fifth Amendment issue, we are going to direct you to answer that question, Because it is, in our view, relevant to the POW issue.

A. Maybe you could tell me why you think that's relevant?

Q. Well, trips to Vietnam --

A. I'll invoke the 5th on the trip to Vietnam.

Q. Is it your position that there was something illegal about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Let's talk about your trip to Australia. When were you in Australia?

A. It was 1973, I believe, I'm looking for the stamp -- oh, okay -- February 1973.

Q. How long were you in Australia?

A. I think it was about 2 -- maybe 3 weeks -- maybe a little longer.

Q. What was the purpose of that trip?

A. Predominantly tourist.

Q. But you said previously that Vietnam and Australia were the two countries that you went to for reasons other than being a tourist.

A. Yeah, but I mean predominantly it was tourism.

Q. What was the purpose other than tourism?

A. I don't think that's area, I was sent up to a place called Pine Gap, in the Womerea Rocket Range in Central Australia.

Q. Who sent you there?

A. A man by the name of Dr. Joseph Bissett, B-i-s-s-e-t-t.

Q. Who is he?

A. That's what I'd like to know, I don't know who he was.

Q. How did it come about that he sent you to this area that I won't even pretend to try to pronounce?

A. We had met in New Caladonia. We're talking a long time ago, now. He had instructed me to go to the Vietnamese officials in Canberra, Australia, and to meet him later on in Vietnam. And then in the meantime, for some extra economic assistance, if I would head on up to the Woemera Rocket Range I would meet somebody there who might be of some assistance there.

Q. Who might be of some assistance?

A. Right.

?Q. In what?

A. Whatever is going on at that time in Pine Gap.

Q. What was going on in Pine Gap?

A. I have no idea.

Q. What happened when you got to Pine Gap?

A. The Australian officials with the United States Air Force officials had some discussions about me being on the installation.
<CENTER>C O N T I N U E D</CENTER>Q. What is Pine Gap?

A. Part of Pine Gap and the Woemera Rocket Test Range -- and I don't know this to be a fact -- was a testing center or joint military operation of our Government and their government. And that's basically all I know about it.

Q. Did you have any affiliation with the United States Government during your trip to Australia in 1973?

A. Not that I'm aware of.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. If I did, I was not aware of it.

Q. How could you have had an affiliation with the United States Government without knowing about it?

A. Well, if I worked for somebody in the private sector and they worked for the Government, and I was an extension of them, and they didn't tell me, then I wouldn't be aware of it.

Q. Okay, Well, what did you do when you got to Pine Gap?

A. I believe I stayed there about 3 or 4 days, maybe.

Q. What did you do in those 3 or 4 days?

A. Like I say it's been a long time -- met with some American Air Force personnel. Other than that --

Q. What did you meet with the Air Force personnel about?

A. They were discussing rocket testing. That's a long time ago, And I don't think it's relevant to the direction that we're heading. So I'd like to move on.

Q. Did you have any training in rocket testing?

A. Oh. heavens no.

Q. Did you have any idea why you were sent up to Pine Gap to discuss rocket testing?

A. Well, no, none whatsoever.

Q. Did you ever question anybody about what you were doing there?

A. No, it was fun and it was adventurous. I was 18.

Q. I'd like to go back to your trip to Vietnam. This is 19 years ago, and I guess I'm not convinced that there is anything you could tell us for which there is even the slightest shred of possibility that you could ever be prosecuted for it.

A. Well, I think it's an area that is irrelevant.

Q. Okay, but that's not for you to decide. I mean we've already decided that it's relevant to our investigation.

A. See, I don't see how.

Q. You can't take the Fifth just because you think something's irrelevant. You can take the Fifth if you think that what you're going to say -- if you have a good faith reason to believe that what you're going to say is going to incriminate you in a crime that there's a reasonable possibility you might be prosecuted for. And it's for us to decide whether something's relevant.

A. I'll just invoke the Fifth and I will refuse to answer that question.

Q. Even understanding that this is, 19 years ago?

A. I wouldn't care if it was 100 years ago. It doesn't matter. Time is moot.

Q. Well, it does matter. Because as we were discussing before, you understand that there are statutes of limitation, and as we were talking before -- I remember we were talking about a burglary that may have happened.

A. Hypothetical.

Q. Hypothetically that may have happened more years ago than the statute of limitations would permit your prosecution. And you told me that you understood that that would mean that you could be required to answer questions about the burglary, hypothetically.

A. Correct.

Q. So it does make a difference whether something's 19 years ago or 3 years ago or 100 years ago. Do you understand that?

A. Yes, but I think hypothetically it's like our Government -- Kennedy was assassinated in 1963 and they still keep stuff and they don't discuss it.

Q. What does that have to do with this?

A. If there's nothing that needs to be brought out, why not reveal it, is what I'm saying. You're not following.

Q. You've lost me.

A. To me it doesn't matter how long ago it was. There are certain things you just don't discuss. And that is a thing that I will not discuss, and I will invoke the Fifth and refuse to answer.

Q. Just so we know, under oath, you're invoking the Fifth because --

A. Self-incrimination.

Q. Because it's your position that your answer to my question about what you were doing in South Vietnam in 1973 would tend to incriminate you in a crime?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Are you aware of any criminal activity that anyone else was involved in in South Vietnam during your time there?

A. Can you rephrase the question?

Q. Can you tell us what anyone else you observed in South Vietnam was doing?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I just don't see the relevancy to whatever happened 19 years ago has on this prisoner of war investigative body.

Q. We're telling you that it's relevant to our investigation. That's not your decision to make.

A. I'm not aware of any other activities in South Vietnam in 1973, no.

Q. You mentioned a whole list of other countries that you visited during the year between high school and your enlistment in the military. And you told us that you went to all these countries as a tourist.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Is it true that you went to all these eight or so other countries exclusively as a tourist?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go by yourself or with other people?

A. No, I was always by myself.

Q. How were you travelling, what mode of transportation?

A. I would say 99 percent of it was aircraft; 1 percent was hovercraft or boat.

Q. And how were you supporting yourself at that time?

A. Through the initial stage, I had sold some stock that my father, at the time, had recommended -- a penny stock, as they called it back then -- to invest in. And for whatever reason it did quite well.

Q. You say initially that was how you supported yourself. How did you support yourself after that money ran out?

A. Okay, after meeting this individual in New Caladonia, there was money made available in Australia in South Vietnam. At Chase Manhattan Bank in Saigon, I had a think where I could go in there and withdraw funds. And they would stamp, as it is in here, the Citibank of Saigon.

Q. Your passport would get stamped every time you took money out of the Chase Manhattan Bank?

A. That's what they had requested, sir, every time I went in to withdraw. Under my name and passport number they would stamp it. Why, is beyond me.

Q. How much money do you think you spent during the year you were travelling that year?

A. I would say probably 30 -- maybe $20 to $30 thousand dollars in American money -- not counting foreign currency.

Q. And how much of that money came from the stocks -- if you remember?

A. Less than -- oh, $9,000 maybe, approximately.

Q. So in other words, between $11 and $21,000 came from your activities in Australia and Vietnam?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Now based on what you described as your activities in Australia -- correct me if I'm wrong -- but it doesn't seem as if you would have been paid very much money for going to the Rocket Place for 4 days.

A. No, transportation, housing, spending, cash was in Australian money. That wasn't very much. But on my arrival, as I recall, in Singapore, I had a good sum. And then in Saigon, a substantial sum.

Q. So it's fair to say that most of this money that you were earning was in South Vietnam in whatever activity it was that you have taken the Fifth on?

A. Yes, that's true.

Q. Between $10,000 and $20,000?

A. I would say $16-ish, yes.

Q. About $16,000?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell us the name of the source, this person who sent you up to was it Pine Bluffs?

A. Pine Gap yes, Dr. Joseph Bissett.

Q. Is he also the person who sent you to South Vietnam?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any idea where he is?

A. No.

Q. Where was he when he sent you to Australia and South Vietnam?

A. New Caladonia.

Q. Which is where?

A. It's in the deep South Pacific, a little community called Lucafolia, New Caladonia -- a French colony.

Q. How did you meet him?

A. I was on the beach, and he had approached me. It was ironic, because it was like he was expecting somebody. But yet we struck up a conversation. He had asked a few questions -- are you travelling alone, et cetera, et cetera. I said yeah. And for the next maybe 2 days we had some discussions.

Q. You've told us that you were exclusively a tourist in the other countries that you listed.

A. Yes.

Q. Is there something else?

A. Yes, I was going to say in one country, but -- can we go off the record?

Q. If you have a question. I'd rather stay on the record.

A. I do have a question.

Q. Why don't we go off the record for a second. (Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Back on the record. While we were off the record Mr. Barnes told us that he, at one point, went into Red China from Hong Kong to see how far he could go. I think he said how far we could go.

A. Right.

Q. Who were you with at that time?

A. There were several groups of Europeans that I had met in Hong Kong and we had wanted to see how far we could get into Red China before we got stopped. Not knowing -- a bunch of kids, what were they going to do?

Q. Why do you view that as being different from the other places you went to simply as a tourist?

A. Because that was an illegal entry into a foreign country that, at that time, the United States was not friendly to.

Q. What were you doing as a tourist in the other countries?

A. All of them -- just seeing the sights; travelling around.

Q. How far did you get into Red China before somebody found you?

A. Well, the British stopped us. We snuck past them. We got in about probably 1/2 mile before the Chinese guards stopped us.

Q. What happened?

A. They took our pictures, and turned us over to the Brits.

Q. Was anyone arrested?

A. No -- I guess you could call it a detainee, because we had to take a boat across, and up to a little hill where there was a British guard place. And they turned us over to them.

Q. What was your main interest or purpose in going on this around-the-world trip? What made you decide to do it?

A. I'd been wanting to see Australia for some time, and just picked up one day and got a ticket and went.

Q. When you left, did you know that you were going to be gone for a whole year?

A. Well, I wasn't gone a whole year. I took a one-way ticket when I left the United States. So I had no idea how long I was going to be gone. That part's correct -- whether it be a week, a month, 8 months -- I had no idea how long I'd be gone. I didn't have any time schedule.

Q. Was there anything about your trip that year that you think formed the approach that you took to the next several years of your life in terms of what you did?

A. No, because I knew upon my immediate return I was going to join the United States Army.

Q. You knew that before you left?

A. Oh, yeah, I had already gone in and seen one recruiter. And I figured before I joined the Service I'd take a trip.

Q. Did you come back to the United States at any time while you were on your around-the-world trip?

A. No.

Q. You just went from one country to the next?

A. Exactly, yes.

Q. What, again, was the date you ended up joining the military?

A. I believe I actually took the swearing-in the 16th of July 1973. And it was delayed, maybe 5 weeks, something like that.

Q. In August of 1973?

A. Yes.

Q. And this was an enlistment rather than the draft?

A. Um-hum?

Q. You enlisted for a period of 3 years?

A. Whatever it was back then -- the standard enlistment -- 3 and 3, or 4 and 2 -- I'm not sure.

Q. Our information is that you enlisted for 3 years,

A. I know it was a 6 year total, counting reserve and whatever, non-active reserve, which was waived.

Q. So in other words, you enlisted for some period of years -- probably 3 -- as an active duty?

A. And 3 years inactive, yes.

Q. And it was the United States Army?

A. Yes, Army.

Q. Now let me ask you this -- I assume you had some training after you enlisted in the Army. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. What areas of training did you get?

A. The basic, at Fort Ord, Fort Gordon, then Fort Bragg, then on up to Fort Lewis.

Q. That was in the State of Washington?

A. Yes.

Q. So basic training was where?

A. Fort Ord, then on down to Fort Gordon, and then Fort Gordon to Fort Bragg and then back to Fort Gordon.

Q. Were those all basic training?

A. No, no -- not basic -- I believe one was AIT and one was Special S.

Q. What's AIT?

A. Advanced Individual Training, the next step after Basic -- whatever your MOS category is going to be.

Q. What kind of training did you get at Fort Bragg?

A. Fort-Bragg was counterinsurgency, recognitions of certain booby traps, guerilla warfare-type, you know, training, analyzing data, lot of body language stuff.

Q. Why were you -- I assume that was not training that everyone who enlists in the Army was receiving, is that right?

A. There was a lot of people in this group, But I have no idea.

Q. Do you know why you were chosen for that training?

A. You'd have to ask 525 MI Group.

Q. Do you know what the specific name of the course you took at Fort Bragg was?

A. It had something to do with the late president -- no, other than it had Kennedy's name in it.

Q. Was it at the JFK Special Warfare Center?

A. I don't know if it was at the center, but I know his name had been brought up as a course guideline -- there was a guy that had discussed, you know, the founding -- the history of this organization was because the late president had a vision to have special operations.

Q. What was the name of the instructor?

A. Captain Sinclair -- I think it was Bob Sinclair.

Q. Bob Sinclair?

A. I'm pretty sure that was it. The other captain -- my captain -- ended up shooting himself. And that was Captain Cherry. He was the one that was kind of coordinating who is going to what post. You'll see, if you get my record, you would see I had signed up to go to Neurenburg, Germany. At the last minute that whole thing got twisted and they wouldn't let me leave the States.

Q. How long a course was it at Fort Bragg?

A. I was up there, first time, 6 -- 6 1/2 weeks, and then brought back to Fort Gordon.

Q. Did you ever have any special military intelligence training during your stint in the Army?

A. No, I wouldn't say so, no.

Q. You seem to be --

A. Well, I would say, you know, it was military. I mean the 525 MI was constantly down there talking with me.

Q. What does that mean, 525 MI?

A. The military intelligence group 525.

Q. Well, did you ever have any, then, informal intelligence training while you were in the Army?

A. What you call -- I don't know what you would call informal, I mean, identification of things -- I mean you would have to define what you regard as intelligence, you know?

Q. How about drug training?

A. We had a lot of drug training, yeah, in interdiction, host nations, stuff like that.

Q. When?

A. I mean I don't see the relevancy of those to this committees investigation into --

Q. Where did you receive the training in drug interdiction?

A. That was down in Fort Gordon. We had people come out of a place called Glencoe, Georgia. And they were coming down -- and I think maybe one or two times we took a trip to Glencoe.

Q. Were you ever involved in military police intelligence?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. Fort Lewis, Washington.

Q. And tell us what your involvement in military police intelligence was.

A. Basically, there is a drug problem in a couple of areas, one which involved Army CID which I worked with for a while with them.

Q. Where did you work with Army CID?

A. Fort Lewis, Washington.

Q. Do you know a guy named Special Agent Albert Rowe?

A. Doesn't ring a bell.

Q. He's -- I should just tell you -- he's someone whom members of our committee have interviewed. He is special agent in CID at Fort Lewis. And it says that there is absolutely no record of your having anything to do with CID at that base.

A. Well, then you should take the document that they have here and the names, who I worked with at CID. You have it.

Q. Do you want to show us which one that is?

A. Do they even have any record of me being at Fort Lewis? (Pause.) Okay, CIA Special Agent Delbert Richardson is the guy I worked with.

Q. Delbert.

A. Richardson.

Q. And he was CID special agent at Fort Lewis?

A. Absolutely.

MR. GEKOSKI: He was the Assistant Chief of the Drug Team. We talked to him also.

THE WITNESS: Did he remember me?

MR. GEKOSKI: No.

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. For the record, what Mr, Barnes was referring to was this document number 22 in the appendix to his book, the name of which is Bohica -- B-o-h-i-c-a, And document number 22 purports to be a letter, M.D. Wilson, Assistant Chief of Police, Investigations Bureau, City of Seattle, Department of Police.

A. Were you able to talk to Seattle people about that?

A. Do they remember, or are they suddenly having false memories?

Q. Okay, what's -- let me ask you this, Mr. Barnes.

A. This doesn't cease to amaze me.

Q. Did you work on any drug operations when you were at Fort Lewis?

A. Absolutely -- lots of them.

Q. Tell us about that.

A. I worked on one in particular well, that one was a major one.

Q. Which one?

A. The one with the CID in Seattle. Narcotics Task Force, from LSD to mescaline, military people, casket retrieval, you name it. And --

Q. How many drug operations would you say you worked on out of the Fort Lewis Army base?

A. Fort Lewis ?-- 30, 40 major drug operations.

Q. And it's your testimony that this was as a member of the Fort Lewis drug team?

A. No, I was attached to the 296 MP Company, 89th MP Group, 14th MP Detachment.

Q. And just for the record, MP is --

A. Military police.

Q. Were you aware of the existence of the drug team?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And did you have anything to do with the drug team?

A. Constantly.

Q. And is it conceivable that you could have been, involved in 40 major drug operations and have the commander of, the drug team not know who you were?

A. Not at all. Not at all.

Q. All right, our committee has been told by Special Agent Albert Rowe, who was the Commander of the Drug Team, that you never worked with them. Can you give us any reason for that discrepancy?

A. Well, I would go to Seattle P.D. Narcotics, and Richardson and ask why -- or General McFadden. Ask General McFadden.

Q. Do you know anything about Special Agent Rowe that would lead you to believe why he might lie about you?

A. Maybe he didn't know me. I have no idea because I don't know him.

Q. But if he was the commander of the drug team, you already told us that it would be inconceivable that --

A. I don't know if he was a commander, I mean I'm just going by what you say he was. I have no idea. I worked strictly with one agent handler out of CID, and two guys out of Seattle PD Narcotics Intelligence.

Q. But it remains your testimony that there is no way that the true commander of the drug team at Fort Lewis would not have known who you were?

A. I don't know, I mean if they didn't tell him, I certainly didn't know him. So I don't have any idea. But if it was --

Q. Did you know anyone else who identified himself or herself As the commander of the drug team at Fort Lewis ?-- anyone other than Albert Rowe?

A. No, because I strictly worked with one CID man. He was my contact. That's the only head guy I would ever deal with.

Q. Who is that?

A. Richardson, the one that's in the letter. I mean there's -- it was a court case. The guy was convicted.

MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we go off the record for a second?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. KRAVITZ: Back on the record.

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Were you involved in a fire base undercover missions?

A. Yes, Yakima Fire Test Center in eastern Washington, at the ASA Center, 1974.

Q. Can you tell us what that was?

A. There was a drug serious drug problem allegation at the intelligence base, underground satellite communications network, I was flown there by helicopter by -- if I'm not mistaken, he's a general now -- Colonel Kanamine, he's a Japanese fellow. And yeah, there was a drug -- well, I shouldn't say was -- there -- yeah, there was a drug problem and it involved officers. And we eradicated it.

Q. Colonel Kanamine is someone whom you mention in your book. Can you tell us what your relationship with Colonel Kanamine was? And just for the record -- tell me if I'm wrong? -- but I think that's spelled K-a-n-a-m-i-n-e.

A. I think that's probably correct, He was a provost marshal that I would directly answer to.

Q. And what was the nature of your relationship with Colonel Kanamine?

A. I would give him briefings on what cases we were working, where they stood.

Q. What kinds of cases?

A. Smuggling cases.

Q. Drug smuggling cases?

A. Drug smuggling cases.

Q. And how often during your year -- how long were you at Fort Lewis?

A. Okay, about 12 months -- about 1 year, right on the nose.

Q. During your year at Fort Lewis; how often would you meet with Colonel Kanamine?

A. As I recall, back then I probably didn't meet with him but maybe ten times -- at the most.

Q. Okay.

A. CID did not want a whole lot going through to the old man. I mean it was just like -- it was not necessary that the PM knew everything. Because we were investigating, you know, some high-ranking people, higher than, obviously, Colonel Kanamine.

Q. Who were you investigating?

A. Well, we had looked into some activities with the 9th Infantry Division, CG; we looked at some activities with the CG of the 75th Ranger Battalion; there was a lot of things that we looked into.

Q. Did you receive any intelligence training or drug training at Fort Lewis?

A. Yeah, I would say it wasn't in specific, we went on a lot of things with CID surveillance activities -- mostly OJT, I mean working directly with them.

Q. Would you disagree with the statement that there is no formal intelligence and drug training at Fort Lewis at that time?

A. Would I disagree there was no -- I have no idea.

Q. Okay. You're not saying, then, that you had formal intelligence training, or formal drug training during your year at Fort Lewis?

A. No, I mean if we did I don't remember. I mean we went to a lot of different classes for brief subjects; I was going to college there. Mostly instructors were law enforcement people.

Q. Were you involved there with the military police intelligence unit?

A. Um-hum? MPI.

Q. Where were you involved with the MPI?

A. Fort Lewis and the Yakima Fire Test Center.

Q. What was your involvement with the Military Police Intelligence Unit?

A. That we were trying to get information on narcotics trafficking, coming from off-post/on-post; that some of the people -- it was alleged -- the ASA Center was deeply involved in narcotics; trying to find out who was dealing in what, other than this one subject that was convicted -- what the connection was.

Q. Are you actually sure that the military police intelligence unit exists?

A. Absolutely.

Q. As a specific division within Fort Lewis?

A. Well, I don't know the command of it, I mean the guys that I -- and one girl -- that we had worked with, you know, we had our own office, we had our own equipment, we could send and receive stuff; some of them wore civilian clothes, long hair -- some of them had long hair and beards, I mean there was -- and they were constantly coming off post.

Q. So this was an organization that had its own office?

A. Yes.

Q. It had its own stationery, for example?

A. No, none at all.

Q. Why not?

A. Well -- you're not going to put MPI on stationery. I mean the stationery we used was typical, you know whatever the PM's office had, and in notes, I mean we didn't need any stationery for anything.

Q. How many people were in the military police intelligence unit when you were dealing with them in 1973 - 1974?

A. I would say the guys and one girl I dealt with, there was about seven.

Q. Did you have any training in the area of corrections?

A. Um-huh -- Fort Gordon, Georgia -- 1 week's worth.

Q. Just 1 week's worth?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you ever work in the area of corrections?

A. I worked in the stockade at Fort Lewis for about 10 - 12 days.

Q. Doing what?

A. There was a homicide up there, the William Kaplan -- K-a-p-l-a-n -- case that I assisted in the investigation. And he was in custody, you know, as the trial was going on. And so my job was to, you know, keep an eye on him during my shift.

Q. Keep an eye -- you mean guard him?

A. Well, yeah, I guess it would be guard him. I was one of his main escorts to and from the court martial.

Q. Were you involved in investigations in the correctional facility?

A. There was one investigation, but I don't even remember -- it was on the periphery edge of something but that was it.

Q. And it's your testimony that you worked in the correctional area of Fort Lewis for only-about 10 days?

A. At the most, and that's pushing it -- at the most.

Q. You never spent any other time in addition to those10 days working as a correctional officer?

A. No, I was always out doing dope cases.

Q. When did you leave the Army?

A. December 19, 1974.

Q. What was the reason or reasons that you left the Army?

A. Well, there was a lot of recruiting going on for other agencies that I had been interested in.

Q. Which other agencies?

A. Well, DEA had been through; CIA had been through; MI had been through, And Captain Colbert had said, you know, there's a lot to offer, you know, with the war coming to a conclusion and a lot of troops coming back. We were getting these commendations. He says you can get an EDP if you so desire.

Q. What's an EDP?

A. Early drop program.

Q. And who is Captain Colbert?

A. He was my immediate CO.

Q. Do you know what his first name was?

A. Uh-huh. But he was the company CO.

Q. Okay, so you had been interested in these other agencies. Why did you end up leaving?

A. Well, the deal was that I would get out, go to school, and then eventually can go to work for one of these other agencies upon graduation from college.

Q. Okay, how did you arrange to get out early?

A. I didn't, they did.

Q. Who is they?

A. Whoever the CG was at the time.

Q. What's a CG?

A. The Commanding General.

Q. And how did --

A. All I had to do was sign one form and that was it.

Q. Well, how did it come about that -- that you were even approached about leaving -- leaving the Army?

A. Well, I had requested that -- you know -- one of the recruiters, I had told him yeah, I would be interested. And he says well you're going to have to get more callers than what you already have. And he says, you know, with a clean record and what you've done already -- he says, you know, you're quite good at this. We can arrange things, if so be it. And I said okay. And then I bet -- that was November -- I would say probably the very early part of December, the CO came down. And he says just sign right here, and you've got an EDP. And I signed right there. And the 19th had a plane ticket, and I was out.

Q. Which agency was this recruiter from who implied or --

A. Central Intelligence -- he represented himself as Central Intelligence.

Q. So in other words, in November of 1974, you met with --

A. I don't -- I previously met with several people.

Q. Okay, but in November of 1974, someone who claimed to be a representative for the CIA told you that he would arrange to have you released early from your Army requirements.

A. Right, he would take care of the paperwork.

Q. And the understanding was that you would go-to school for a certain period of time, and then become an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.

A. No, the deal was that I would have to continue on in college using my VA benefits to pay for it; and that after completion of college, any number of one of agencies in the intelligence community -- whether it be DEA or the civilian sector -- you know, I would be in touch with them.

Q. Now did Colonel Kanamine have anything to do with your early release from the Army?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Doesn't your book refer to a meeting with him when he suggested that you should leave early? (Pause.) I'm just going to read from page 6 of the book Bohica. And just for the record, that is a book that you are the author of, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm now quoting from page 6 -- periodically, agency recruiters would come through and want to talk with 30 to 40 people at a time, probably hand-picked by commanding officers, about available positions within the agency. Just as an aside, when you're talking about the agency, you're talking about the Central Intelligence Agency?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Back to the text -- I told one recruiter named Hall on his second -- on the second stop in about 4 months, quote, if I ever get the opportunity I would be willing to be recruited for operations, end quote. He said he'd see what he could do. In 1974 I was sent to Yakima Fire Base, Army Security Agency Center in the eastern part of the State of Washington. For 2 months I worked on undercover assignments, then received orders to report back to Fort Lewis, immediately, to meet with Colonel Kanamine, commander of the military police intelligence unit.

I was transported to Fort Lewis by helicopter. Besides the pilot and the co-pilot, I was the only one aboard. At Fort Lewis, the Colonel informed me, quote, we have an offer for you, Scott. Get out of the military service now instead of waiting. Quote, but I still have a few months left on my hitch, end quote, I told him, curious about what he had in mind, Quote, when am I going to be doing, end quote. Quote, the war is over now, so we don't need so many troops. We have many wounded, and a lot more coming back to the States. So we'll be able to process you out early, end quote. At first I believed his explanation. 3 weeks later I was told, quote, here are your papers. You want to take this opportunity. My senior officers were very encouraging. That is a direct quote from your book?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. So is it true, then, that Colonel Kanamine was involved in your decision to leave the Army early?

A. I wouldn't say he was involved with my decision. I think that it was encouraging. He -- I wish I could remember the Major's name -- there was a major. But I think Captain Colbert was probably the most encouraging.

Q. Would you agree that your book states, or at least implies, that Colonel Kanamine encouraged you to leave the Army early?

A. I would say encouraged, but not the main one, no.

Q. Colonel Kanamine has been interviewed by this committee, and says, first of all, he doesn't remember you; and second of all, that he never told anyone or encouraged anyone to get out of the Army under the same circumstances or similar circumstances described in this book. Do you have any explanation for why he would say that?

A. Does he work for the Government? Is he a general?

Q. I don't know what he's doing now.

A. He's a general now.

Q. Is he a general now? Is that what your testimony is?

A. Um - Hum.

Q. Does that give you an explanation for why he would contradict you?

A. I think you said he doesn't remember.

Q. He said he doesn't remember you. He doesn't remember ever having anything to do with you.

A. So you'd have to ask between 1974 and 1991, 1992, how many people he's spoken to, who have spoken to him.

Q. I'm not asking you for how we can interrogate him.

A. I'd like to.

Q. I'm asking whether you have any explanation for why he would contradict you on these points.

A. I don't think he's contradicting. I think like you just said, he says he doesn't recall me.

Q. He says he doesn't remember you personally, even though you say you've talked to him ten times. And in your book you recount an episode where he encouraged you to leave the Army early to take a position in the agency. And he says he never told anybody to leave the Army early to take a position in the agency.

A. Well, I guess he's entitled to his opinion.

Q. Is it your testimony that he would be lying to us?

A. If he said that, he's lying, yes.

Q. When did you actually leave the military?

A. December 19, 1974.

Q. And it's your testimony that the reason for leaving, specifically, was what?

A. To go out and go to school, which I did.

(Brief recess)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Were you ever described as a correctional specialist when you were in the Army?

A. Um-hum.

Q. What was your interpretation of what that meant?

A. That was one of my trainings, 95 Charlie MOS.

Q. What's an MOS?

A. Military Operating Specialty.

Q. So when did you get the title correctional specialist?

A. I assume as soon as I graduated from Fort Gordon.

Q. Did you ever have any other titles?

A. Not MOS, 95 Charlie, 95 Bravo, my back-up MOS.

Q. Were you ever a guard chief?

A. I think that's the MOS actual title, That's what they call it -- okay, civilian-related occupation, guard chief.

Q. What is it that you're reading off?

A. My DD-214.

Q. What's a DD-214?

A. It's the printed record of your military time and discharge, etcetera; name, address, rank -- all that kind of stuff.

MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we get marked for identification. (The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 12 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 12, which is a xerox copy of document number 23 out of your book, Bohica. Do you recognize that?

A. Yup.

Q. What is that?

A. It's a xeroxed copy out of my DD-214 that the publisher has in my book.

Q. You had another document you were looking at just before I showed you Exhibit No. 12. What is the document that you were looking at?

A. A copy of my DD-214 without the deletions the publisher whited-out to put in the book.

MR. KRAVITZ: Let me have marked as Exhibit No. 13 this exhibit. (The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 13 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ;

Q. I'm going to show you what is marked as Exhibit No.13, which I can tell you is a facsimile copy of what we've been told is your actual form DD-214 discharge papers. Have you ever seen -- if you ignore the green ink that I put on there, have you ever seen that document before?

A. This document? No. This document is a fraud. Not a bad one, but it's a fraud.

Q. Let me ask it let's put this one away for a second. We'll talk about that in a minute. Let me ask you just to compare Exhibit No. 12, which is the xerox copy -- a xerox copy of the DD-214 from your book, and number 13, which we've been told is a facsimile copy of your true DD-214.

A. Well, first of all, let me state for the record under oath, that I have the one and only original copy of my DD-214.

Q. Where is that?

A. It's at home in a safe deposit box. And you're more than welcome to view it at any time.

Q. Is there any way you could submit that to the committee?

A. I'd rather have it done in person. Because it is the one and only hard-inked copy, signed by Lieutenant Stokkes and myself. This is amazing.

Q. Just so it's clear for the record, I have marked several items in green ink that appear to be different from the version in Exhibit No. 12 -- that is, there are items marked in green on Exhibit No. 13 that are different from Exhibit No. 12. Just starting with box no. 16, according to your book, your title is Spec 73-12-13.

A. That's correct.

Q. On Exhibit No. 13, it's correctional specialist as opposed to just specialist. Is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. And, in fact -- well, let's mark another one.

MR. KRAVITZ: Let's mark this one number 14. (The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 14 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. What is number 14?

A. This is a copy I made the day before yesterday from my original copy of my DD-214.

Q. So your testimony is that Exhibit No, 14 is an accurate copy of the true, DD-214?

A. Absolutely. Q. You would agree that even on Exhibit No. 14 your title reads different than --

A. The Government's.

Q. Well, it reads different than the title that appeared in your book, Bohica.

A. So you'll know this for the record, whoever the people are at Daren Publishing Group, Dennis had whited-out certain things like my address, social security number. And when they called they said I could white out anything where anybody could cause me any hurt or damage. So whatever they've whited-out back there, before they put it in the book, was entirely up to them.

Q. So your testimony is that you had nothing to do with the decision to white out the correctional specialist on the DD-214?

A. None -- I sent them the DD-214, And whoever the girls were that did the putting of the stuff in the book was sort of worried about your social security number. I said you white out anything that somebody that could cause me harm would come back.

Q. Well, it's your book, isn't it?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you certainly, I assume, didn't want to be misleading the public about your military background in your writing your book.

A. Absolutely.

Q. Would you agree that when your title is listed as a correctional specialist it certainly makes you appear as if your military experience was more that of a guard than as an intelligence officer?

A. I wasn't an intelligence officer. So I answer your question no.

Q. Or involved in drug-running, all those kinds of investigations?

A. Not at all.

Q. You don't think there's any difference between being titled a correctional officer or being titled an investigator into drugs and guns and all that kind of stuff?

A. No, I mean here in Exhibit No. 14 is the actual copy -- whatever they whited-out was up to them. You'd have to talk to them.

Q. Well, did you ever question them as to why they took out the correctional -- the word correctional from your title?

A. No, you'd have to talk to them.

Q. You don't believe that the word correctional would endanger your safety, would it?

A. No, nothing wrong with that.

Q. But you just told us a couple of moments ago that you instructed them to take out anything that would endanger you.

A. Anything that they thought could cause me any problems.

Q. Did you review this document, as whited out before you okayed it for your book?

A. No.

Q. So it was out of your hands?

A. Yes, I trust them.

Q. If you had been the person editing this document, would you have left in the word correctional in block number 16?

A. I would have left in everything except my social security, my date of birth, and my home of record, I would have left everything as is.

Q. Going down to box number 27, remarks, even on your copy, Exhibit No, 14, it reads correctional specialist course. You'll agree that on Exhibit No. 12, the copy from your book, the remarks section is blank?

A. Right.

Q. Any explanation as to why that was deleted?

A. You'd have to ask them back in Ohio.

Q. You had nothing to do with that?

A. No.

Q. If it were up to you, would you have deleted the words correctional specialist course?

A. Not at all. That was part of my training.

Q. Would it have had anything to do with information that we received that that was the only training you got while you were in the military?

A. No.

Q. And that that information would be inconsistent with your portrayal of your background?

A. Not at all. Can I ask you a question on the record?

Q. Let me finish asking questions. I'm going to show you Exhibit No. 13 again. And on the bottom of the remarks section, you would agree that it reads failure to meet acceptable standards for continued military service.

A. This is what the Government's document 13?

Q. Yes. Have you ever seen it before?

A. Never. As a matter of fact, if you look at the type on all of this, this is obviously added on, after the fact, with a new typewriter at another date.

Q. The type will obviously speak for itself, And I think we all can agree for the record that the type on some of these items is different. I will grant you that. And I don't have any explanation for it. We received this, as you can tell, as a fax on February 28 of this year.

A. From?

Q. Where did this come from? From the Army Archives in St. Louis.

A. Well, if they're submitting this as an official document, they're doing this -- obviously fraud. What are you going to do about it, on the record?

Q. What are we going to do?

A. What's this committee going to do about this.

Q. We can talk about that off the record. In the deposition, we ask the questions. But I can tell you that one of the subjects that this committee is investigating is fraud of all types related to this issue. And --

A. Well, here you have an official document, Exhibit No. 13, that has been submitted by our Government, which is fraud. And I want to know what you're going to do about it.

Q. We can talk about that. I don't answer questions on the record in a deposition. But I would be happy to talk to you about that.

A. That's right, you work for the Government. I forgot.

Q. I already said that the type is different, for the record. In several of the areas that I have circled in green -- specifically box number 9(c), box number 10, and box number 27 -- the type face that appears on Exhibit No. 13 is different than the rest of the type face in the document.

A. The Government's is different.

Q. That's the Government's document, Some of the stuff, however, you will agree -- some of the information that is included on Exhibit No. 13, which is missing from Exhibit No. 12, is not missing from your own copy.

A. That's right. This is the copy, the original I took out of the safe deposit box -- not just 3 days ago.

Q. I think what would make sense for us to do would be --

A. Which, if you want to ask, you can call him Ken Hall at the Vietnam Veterans Center in Prescott, Arizona, took the original and made these copies for me -- the actual original.

Q. Who is he again?

A. He's in charge of the Vietnam Veterans Center in Prescott.

Q. Okay, and he made this copy from the original?

A. From the original.

Q. In your safe deposit box?

A. That is correct.

Q. What is your understanding as to what they should have in St. Louis? Would they have another --

A. Unequivocally, this is obviously a cover-up, continuing cover-up. And the Government is portraying fraud. They're trying to say things, obviously, that aren't true, to attempt to damage my credibility -- which is comical, at best.

Q. I think we're about to break for lunch, Let me just -- before we go off the record -- tell you -- because I really don't want you to get the wrong impression --

A. I've already gotten the wrong impression. I'm not going to trust this committee any further.

Q. Well, let me just tell you --

A. You've shown your colors.
<CENTER>C O N T I N U E D</CENTER>
<CENTER>

</CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Q. Let me just tell you -- what we need to do is to get as much information as we can, and to test it to see how credible it is.

A. Mr. Kravitz, it does not take a very intelligent person to see the fraud that's been perpetrated here.

Q. I haven't denied that this looks the way it looks.

A. The Government you work for.

Q. I don't think we need to say anymore. And we will, after lunch, be going into more substantive issues. But I think it's necessary for us to ask you for your reaction to these documents. They exist. And I should say -- I should tell you that one of the things that the committee is looking at is whether there's cover-up of all information regarding the POW issue. And one of the things that's helpful for you to do is to point out stuff like that. And it's now on the record. And I think it's something that should be investigated.

A. Should be, but knowing what I know now, I don't see this ever, being investigated. The Government is bigger than you and me put together.

Q. Why don't you take a couple of minutes to look at it?

A. I guess it should -- it blows my mind. I guess it shouldn't blow my mind. Why don't you ask them to produce the signed original?

Q. Well, I think we should.

A. I think you should, too. And I think if any of you want to come out to Arizona, I will show you the original, along with the original CID letter that's in the book -- the original, -- inked, signed -- this is a trip.

MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we go off the record. (Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. We've been discussing the issue of the DD-214 off the record for approximately 5 minutes. And Mr. Barnes has informed us the United States Army was directed by the Federal District Court in San Francisco, back in January of 1981 to produce -- during the Hells Angels Trial -- a complete copy of Mr.Barnes' military record.

We are going to -- as part of our investigation for the committee -- we are going to contact the Federal District Court in California to attempt to get the DD-214 that was submitted, pursuant to that subpoena and that order. We're also going to go back to the Army records in St. Louis and find out where the copy that was faxed to us, and now appears as Exhibit No. 13 came from. I think we should try to make the best attempt we can to see what this -- what this was copied from. Because I agree that there is a serious question as to what's going on with all these documents. I don't know if you want to add anything to that.

A. Well, I would like to know -- obviously this committee is powerless to do anything about fraud. But here our Government is perpetrating fraud. It's now as an Exhibit and, in my opinion, an investigation of a cover-up. And here, our own Government's continuing to perpetrate that. What is going to be done?

Q. Well, I just said what was going to be done in the first instance. I don't want you to have the impression that the committee is powerless to investigate fraud. That is one of the subjects that we are charged with investigating. And it will be investigated.

A. So if you see that this is wrong, and I show you the original, what are you going to do?

Q. That's not going to be up to me. But I guarantee you that it will be brought to the attention of people who are very interested in investigating fraud both within and outside the Government.

MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we break for lunch.

THE WITNESS: I'd like to ask a question of Steve off the record.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the taking of the instant deposition recessed, to reconvene this same day.)
<CENTER>AFTERNOON SESSION</CENTER>(1:15 p.m.)

Whereupon,

SCOTT TRACY BARNES,

the witness on the stand at the time of recess, having been previously duly sworn, was further examined and testified as follows:
<CENTER>EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF

THE SELECT COMMITTEE - Resumed</CENTER>BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Let me just say before we start this afternoon session, Mr, Barnes, is there any answer that you gave us before lunch that now, having had an hour to think about it, that you'd want to change in any way?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. Let's move forward in time to 1981. It's my understanding that at some point that year you were in Hawaii. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. When did you go to Hawaii?

A. Probably February-ish.

Q. Of 1981?

A. Correct.

Q. Where in Hawaii were you?

A. I was on several of the islands, but Oahu.

Q. What were you doing there?

A. In 1981 I went over there to help with a friend that was doing a church.

Q. What was the name of the church?

A. No. that was 1983. 1981 was Maui -- Hope Chapel.

Q. So you went -- this is still February of 1981, and you were in Maui working with Hope Chapel?

A. The City is Kehi, Maui.

Q. How do you spell that?

A. I believe it's K-e-h-i.

Q. What was Hope Chapel -- or what was it at that time?

A.It's a non-denominational, Christian, Orthodox church.

Q. Were you there helping a friend who was running the church?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Who was that?

A. Craig Englert.

Q. How do you spell that?

A. E-n-g-l-e-r-t.

Q. What exactly were you doing?

A. Basically, they had started a new church and I was just going to help them, you know, get it off the ground.

Q. So what kind of work?

A. Talking to people about the bible, helping them get a permanent building, setting up chairs when they would have their Sunday service in whatever building they were, because they didn't have a permanent building then.

Q. Were you involved in any kind of intelligence work at that time?

A. No, not there in Maui.

Q. Before the time that you got a call from a representative of Hughes Aircraft, what was the most recent time that you had been involved in any intelligence, counter-intelligence?

A. Before that?

Q. Right.

A. The Angels trial, which was January of 1981. So I would say the previous month. So fairly recently. Go ahead, I'm sorry. I don't like to be wrong.

Q. Did there come a time that you -- you were contacted by someone from the Hughes Corporation?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that?

A. I would say mid to late-April was the first, as I recall, telephonic contact.

Q. And this is 1981?

A. That is correct.

Q. Tell us exactly what the nature of that contact was.

A. As I recall, the very first, initial one, was from a female that worked for Hughes Aircraft, El Segundo, California.

Q. Do you know what her name was?

A. No. and I'm not sure if it's in the book or not.

Q. Where did you receive the phone call?

A. At the Hope Chapel office, in Kehi, Maui -- so you'd be able to get the long distance telephone record from Hughes, Then the next call was from a man wanting to know --

Q. Let's talk about them one at a time. What happened in the first telephone call.

A. First she wanted to know if I had ever heard of a James Gordon Gritz. She wanted to know if I was still in acquaintance with Vang Pao. I said yes. That was essentially it, until a day or two later.

Q. Did she identify herself by name?

A. Yes, but like I say, I don't know if it's in Bohica or not. It might be in the excerpts of the little blue book that's been printed in there. Her name might be in there if you want me to look.

(Pause.)

Well, I'm looking, if you want to keep asking questions.

Q. First, what was the conversation about?

A. First if I knew Edward Gordon Gritz, which I said I didn't, and then if I knew Vang Pao, and that I'd get a forthcoming call.

Q. Did she tell you what the call was going to be about?

A. I don't know if she did, but the next call did, yeah.

Q. Okay, What was the next call that you got?

A. It was a man that called, and gave me a call back number, I'm at Hughes Aircraft, and said that, you know, Gritz had wanted to get a hold of me.

Q.Oh, okay.

A. It was area code (213) -- at that time -- 670-1515, Extension 6563, APD Office, Advanced Program Development, Hughes Aircraft, El Segundo, California. That was the call-back number. And I checked it, and it was.

Q. Okay.

A. But her name's not down here.

Q. Do you know who it was who called you the second time?

A. The man? No. The third time, yeah.

Q. Okay, now what was the conversation the second -- when the second call with the man?

A. What was my relationship, currently, with Vang Pao; would I be interested in helping this guy, Gritz, gather information on American prisoners of war. I said I don't believe there's any -- I left it at that, I said yeah, I'll talk to him if he calls.

Q. You said you don't believe there's any what?

A. There's any left behind, no.

Q. Did you mean that when you said that, or --

A. Oh, of course. I had no reason to doubt they all came home in 1973.

Q. Okay, so your belief in April of 1981 was that there were no live Americans.

A. That is correct, absolutely.

Q. What was that based on?

A. Well, belief in my Government, belief -- when the President of the United States said all living prisoners of war had now been returned home, I had no reason to refute that, I never doubted my Government then.

Q. What was the nature of your relationship, in April of 1981, with Vang Pao?

A. Very good, very good.

Q. Can you tell us? How did you first meet him?

A. In person, I was going to go to Thailand for him in -- I believe it was in -- early 1980 -- in July 1980 I was going to go to Thailand for him. And I had subsequently had several meetings with him. At one time, Dr. Jane Hamilton Merritt, who is a pretty well-known -- I think she's a college professor up at an all-women's college somewhere in New England now -- she was having a meeting regarding the gas warfare problem down there. So she would be one that you could confirm my existence at that time with General Vang Pao. And she was disturbed that we were in the same room together because she didn't like me. I did not go on the 1980 request, I made it as far as Hawaii. And then that was it.

Q. What was supposed to be the purpose of the 1980 trip to Thailand?

A. That his men, some of his, you know, Hmong people were in need of certain supplies. And I was going to go help them get these supplies.

Q. Was it your understanding in 1980 that Vang Pao was working for the CIA?

A. Um-hum. There had been an on going -- according to him, and Lieutenant Colonel Vang Yee -- an on-going, or maybe a lack of dialogue that a promise was made. And we went over the whole thing -- not that it meant a whole lot to me at the time -- and he was very upset at, you know, our Government, for not coming through with the promise. And we discussed it.

Q. How did you first come in contact with Vang Pao?

A. Well, I know some people say it was in Vietnam in 1973. My first contact was via Hope Chapel, helping some of his refugee people -- not him -- he's not an American Christian by any means -- but some of his Hmong people.

Q. So what was -- his connection with the Hope Chapel was through --

A. His -- none -- just basically some of his Hmong people had gone to get -- you know, our church, at the time, was heavily involved in helping any and all refugees, clothing, food, things of that nature.

Q. Did he have anything to do with the chapel through the refugees?

A. No, none that I'm aware of.

Q. Do you know where he was living back in 1980, 1981?

A. Yeah, he had a little ranch down in Victor, Montana. And he maintained a very substantial office in Garden Grove, California.

Q. And when did you first meet him in person?

A. It would be early 1980's, with Dr. Jane Hamilton Merritt.

Q. Where?

A. In his Orange County office.

Q. Between that first meeting in 1980, and the time that you received these telephone calls in Hawaii in April of 1981, how many times did you meet with Vang Pao?

A. Maybe four.

Q. All in the California office?

A. Yeah.

Q. What were those meetings related to, after the 1980 trip was cancelled?

A. I don't know how to word this -- let me understand the question. You're asking the meetings that I had with General Vang Pao before leaving for Hawaii in 1981, what we discussed?

Q. Right.

A. I don't think I can answer that.

Q. Because?

A. That -- I just would rather invoke the Fifth Amendment on that one, in its entirety. The meetings had essentially nothing to do with American prisoners of war.

Q. Essentially had nothing to do with?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay -- well, let me ask you this -- were you working for the CIA at that point?

A. To my knowledge, I've never worked for the CIA.

Q. Okay, so to your knowledge, you were not working for the CIA in 1981 when you were meeting with Vang Pao?

A. To my knowledge directly to the CIA, no.

Q. Okay. But you're not sure whether you were working indirectly for the CIA as a contractor for someone who might have been working for the CIA.

A. That is correct, yes -- that is true, yes?.

Q. Okay. How widely-known do you think it was, say in the spring of 1981, that you knew Vang Pao?

A. Not at all -- widely, meaning common civilians, none -- not at all.

Q. How do you think it was known by the people -- by Bo Gritz, for example?

A. That, you'd have to ask Bo Gritz.

Q. You never found out how he found out that you knew Vang Pao?

A. Not that I recall, no.

Q. Have you ever heard of a Hmong tribesman by the name of Phimmerchek, an acquaintance of Vang Pao?

A. Doesn't ring a bell, not that name -- I would remember that, I think.

Q. Okay, so you got the second call from a man at Hughes Aircraft.

A. Yes.

Q. And you were told to expect a call from Bo Gritz?

A. Well, Bo came in later, I mean the name Bo -- I mean it was always James Gordon Gritz, you know, and then eventually, yes, that dropped. And yes, I was to expect a call from Bo Gritz.

Q. And did you call Colonel Gritz, or did he call you?

A. We call -- he would call, and I wasn't there. And we kept playing phone tag, I bet several days.

Q. Before the time that you actually spoke with Colonel Gritz, did you know what the purpose of his contacting you was?

A. Yes, that he was going to want to discuss American prisoners of war having been left behind in Indochina -- no specific country at that time.

Q. Did you know that he was going to discuss that issue in the context of mounting a secret rescue mission?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you do anything to check into Colonel Gritz's background before the time that you actually spoke with him?

A. I may have, but I'm not sure. I may have called a few people, but I -- in all honesty, I don't recall.

Q. Okay. When was it that you first actually spoke with Colonel Gritz?

A. I bet it was end of April, close to the end of April.

Q. And this was on the telephone?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Do you remember who succeeded in reaching whom?

A. I believe I finally had connected with him -- but he may have been connected with me. I'm not sure.

Q. And this was at the Hughes.

A. From Hughes Aircraft because I remember on the phone bill, unfortunately, the church had gotten -- I paid for it, though -- Bo did -- that there was numerous calls back and forth.

Q. Okay, well what was the conversation that you had with Colonel Gritz?

A. Finally, when we got on, he had -- first he wanted to know for sure it was Vang Pao, did we have a good relationship? And I said yes. Was I aware that he was still running certain operations, you know, out of his host country; and what I knew; did I believe there was American prisoners that were left behind; probably at that time I sarcastically laughed, and of course, no, no, there was no Americans.

And he said, would you help me on an operation? You know, you're in Hawaii right now. Would you go to the United States Embassy, you know, and coordinate with some people down there that are very interested in knowing, you know, what Vang Pao's people know.

Q. Well, let me ask you this -- you -- there was no question in your mind that any type of rescue mission would be dangerous?

A. Oh, of course.

Q. And you've told us that your belief back in the spring of 1981 was that your Government was telling you the truth.

A. Absolutely.

Q. - that there were no live POWs.

A. Correct.

Q. Why would you agree to go on what was certainly to be a dangerous mission, if you believed that it was going to be fruitless because everybody was dead?

A. Well, they didn't agree, the mission going to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok wasn't dangerous.

Q. Oh, okay, so in other words -- what you signed on for initially was just to go to Bangkok.

A. Yeah, let me explain how that worked, There were some and this is -- I found out after the fact you know, and I don't want to mess up your deposition here that certain elements in the embassy needed Vang Pao's guerrillas' cooperation down there. They were not cooperating with the known people within the embassy. I was to convince Vang Pao's guerrillas, you know, that I'm a representative of Vang Pao; these people are not in any way affiliated with the United States Government. Please help them. They're private. That's all that it was. It was supposed to be an introduction -- as they called it, a greasing of the slids to smooth things over. All these individuals, on paper, are supposed to be retired from any American organizations at all. And that's all that it was. And I said yeah, I'll run down there for you to do that.

Q. So in other words, the expectation was that if any of the -- if the guerrillas thought that this had anything to do with he American Government, they would squash it?

A. Exactly. And that, I learned after the fact.

Q. You learned after the fact that that was why you were asked to be involved?

A. Right, exactly.

Q. So what -- what, exactly, was the agreement that you reached with Colonel Gritz over the telephone that first time?

A. That first of all I wanted to check into some people that I had known, and would he give me names and numbers of those people that I can verify some things -- which he did. He said do you know a courier --

Q. Let me interrupt you for a second. In your book, you tell -- you write that what you wanted to check out was to make sure that it was an official, Government operation.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Isn't that inconsistent with what was going to be presented to the guerrillas?

A. Oh, absolutely. But I wanted to make sure that it was, in fact, backed by the Government, that this ploy was to convince these guerrillas and General Souvan that these guys don't work for the Government. I'm not going to go do something private. I'm not going to get involved in some fantasy escapade, you know, or my life could be endangered or caught and, you know, looked on. I don't mind helping if there's something that is -- that they feel is serious and they want to look into. That's up to them, I don't care.

Q. Okay.

A. And I would help them do that.

Q. But at the time that you signed on, you had absolutely no expectation that you would be involved in a recognizance mission?

A. None whatsoever, none.

Q. Who did you call to verify that this was, in fact, a Government-sponsored mission?

A. I called two people within Defense Intelligence.

Q. Do you remember what their names were?

A. Pat Hurt and Mike Burns, I spoke to Colonel Kennedy. I spoke to Colonel Robinson.

Q. Let's just slow down -- who is Pat Hurt?

A. Pat Hurt and Mike Burns work for Defense Intelligence Prisoner of War information for the DIA -- or did. I don't know where they are today. I haven't kept in contact with them.

Q. What did Pat Hurt tell you when you called him?

A. How did I get his name and number; told him; he said yeah, you can check with all kinds of people, you know? It's a sanctioned/unsanctioned; official/unofficial. I said okay, I got the drift. Colonel Robinson --

Q. Did you know these people before you called them?

A. I may have known them via Vang Pao. I mean there was a lot of American people that were brought up during several meetings on some things. But I can't say for certain that --

Q. You mean you may have met Pat Hurt?

A. Oh, I don't feel I ever have met either of them. But, I mean, their names may have been brought up at some of Vang Pao's meetings.

Q. And that's how you would have known to call them?

A. That, and Bo had given me, you know, a whole list of names and numbers -- both within the Pentagon and without -- to confirm or deny.

Q. Okay, what did Burns tell you?

A. That it was a -- as I recall -- it was a back-door operation -- and it might not have been, because I mean there was so many people during this period of time that I had spoken to -- so I can't be certain of what actual one individual had said. But the general consensus out of everybody in the confirmation was that it was a back-door operation; that Dick Allen and the Vice-President at the time, George Bush, and William Casey, in protecting certain people, needed to have an intelligence operation go to look to see if this information was valid or not. It's not that they didn't trust it, believe, you know, the Hmong, or the Montenyards, or the LPs, but it's that they, you know, Allen, Casey, and Bush, wanted an American on-ground team to see are there Americans there? It involved a lot of other people that, you know, I had spoken to that confirmed the exact same thing.

Q. What's your best approximation of the date that you, called Pat Hurt on?

A. I would say within the late to the first week of May, late April to the first week of May.

Q. Okay, so sometime between say, April 20, and May 10.

A. And May 8 or 9.

Q. And same --

A. And then subsequent, thereafter, several conversations.

Q. Within how long a period of time?

A. By the end of the year.

Q. Okay, so in other words you continued to talk with Pat Hurt --

A. And Burns.

Q. -- through the end of 1981.

A. Absolutely.

Q. Until a time period after the recognizance mission?

A. I don't recall. The Secret Service and the FBI talked to me Christmas Eve 1981, I'm not sure if I talked to Burns and Hurt after that day or not because that was a key day to cut communications with a lot of people.

Q. Back to late April, early May, after your first telephone conversation with Colonel Gritz, did you call anyone other than those two people at the DIA?

A. I talked to Robinson, I talked to Kennedy.

Q. Okay, where was Robinson?

A. At that time he was in the Pentagon.

Q. Defense Department in what capacity?

A. I think he, at that time, was working chemical/biological research in conjunction with Yellow Rain in Indochina.

Q. Was he someone you knew previously?

A. Knew -- no, I couldn't say that I knew him. But we had had previous conversations.

Q. What information did you get from Robinson?

A. That it was an official mission; the activity was behind it; Dale Duncan was involved; Wayne Longhoffer -- names that I had already heard of and had known previously; and there were some other names. But I don't remember who they were.

Q. What is the -- what is the activity?

A. The activity as described was -- and if you want me to draw it --

Q. Just go ahead and --

A. And I'll do exactly what was done. Apparently what had happened, Admiral Turner, in 1977, 1978, had dismissed a lot of people from Central Intelligence after some of the Church hearings in 1975. And what had occurred is the White House, via the NSC, via Bill Casey, in communications, wanted a special operations group that would not be answerable to Congress, the Senate, that could be circumvented so there would be no connection to the next one up.

Bill Casey, in turn, spoke to certain individuals, informed -- what we just called it the activity period. Substantial amounts of money were needed. Obviously, the agency, in its funding, could not fund an entirely separate arm on its own, without somebody asking questions. I don't want to say the word permission, but it was okay to dabble in the illicit transportation of narcotics and traffic, and certain things, to raise large funds of cash. And there was no account of same. My understanding is you may have already looked into this. Colonel Dale Duncan was later arrested, convicted, for some minor fraud stuff, because they couldn't get him on the big stuff. So they buried him on the small stuff.

Q. We're going to come back to all this stuff about the activity later, actually. Because we're actually very interested in what you know about the activity's involvement with drugs and certain other --

A. But that is not a POW. That's not in your guidelines.

Q. We can talk about that later, I think. I think it probably is. Let's go back to your dealings with Colonel Gritz. Let me just interrupt for one second and introduce you. This is Dino Carluccio, our Deputy Staff Director. Who did you speak with other than Hurt, Burns, and Robinson? Anyone from the CIA?

A. Several people. John Stein, McMahon -- the others are named in the book, I don't remember all their names. But --

Q. And was the information that you received from the CIA people you spoke with essentially the same -- that is, that this was an official --

A. It was a black operation. The activity's hand was in it. You know, if you could assist, you know -- Daniel Arnold was one of the main people.

Q. Do you know what -- is it Stein or Stein?

A. Stein -- S-t-e-i-n, John.

Q. John Stein?

A. John Stein,

Q. Okay.

A. He was at CDO when I talked to him, I don't know where he is today.

Q. What did you do after you spoke with all these people and learned that this was a Government-sponsored mission?

A. I think -- and you could probably ask the pastor out there -- I think I spoke to him on a Christian level, I mean, you know, looking for advice, you know? I mean I did not believe, obviously, then, that we left men behind.

Q. What was the pastor's name?

A. Craig Englert -- E-n-g-l-e-r-t.

Q. Okay.

A. And he should still be there. And Jason, the gentleman that was dying of cancer at the time, the other pastor. And he's still alive. He made it. I discussed it with them because I had some concerns.

I knew it was Government. There was no doubt, you know, in my mind. Bo then said do you know of a courier that you, personally know -- you know, he goes, I could send one to you. But you may not know him, and it may, you know, cause a little problem. But you know him -- that I could send over a package. And I said yes. There's somebody I know that lives, you know, 2 or 3 miles from here. He could pick up a package on one condition. And this is where my personal -- at that time -- greed comes in. And that's as long as you pay for him to have a week's vacation in Hawaii. He says oh, we can do that. And so he did, And this individual came over.

Q. By this time had you done any investigation into Colonel Gritz's background?

A. Not other than the people that I had spoken to, you know -- I found out that he was asked in 1979, out of Panama, to start looking into the possibility Americans were left behind. Other than that, there wasn't much for him to look into.

Q. What was the name of the courier?

A. In order to protect him; his name is -- his first name is in the book, I don't really want to divulge his last name.

Q. Well, were you --

A. The FBI's already given him a bad time.

Q. We're going to ask you to give us his name. I mean it's --

A. I just really can't, I mean I need to protect him.

Q. What do you think is going to happen to him if you give us his name? Well, knowing that this mission -- his name was given --

A. Well, his name was given out before and the FBI came to him.

Q. You understand, that as we said before, this deposition is committee confidential, which means it's not going to go to the -- the FBI is not going to see this transcript.

A. You want to bet? You give this to McCain and the whole world is going to have it.

Q. Are you refusing to answer that question?

A. Yes, I will have to refuse to answer it.

Q. What's his first name?

A. Steve.

Q. Where did you know Steve from?

A. We've known each other since we were just kids. We grew up together.

Q. What kind of arrangements did you make with Steve?

A. I called him up and I said do you want a week's paid vacation in Hawaii? Maybe I'm quoting him inaccurately -- he says, what is this, another Government da-da-da? I said no, don't worry about it. Just pick up a package. Bring it to me, and we'll go scuba diving every day for the next week. And then I have to go to Thailand. And then boom. He was there.

Q. Was it ever explained to you what Hughes Aircraft connection was in all this?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Who explained that to you?

A. Bo.

Q. What did he tell you?

A. That he was placed in Hughes Aircraft as a cover, to run operations for the activity in different parts of the world. He, at that time, for the activity, was focusing in on the POW stuff.

Q. Do you know who in the Government was providing intelligence information to Bo Gritz on the POW issue at that time?

A. Who in the Government, other than Longhoffer, King, Colonel Duncan, and whoever his immediate agent handler was. He had hardcore -- and I've seen it -- hardcore intelligence. I mean it wasn't xeroxed copies from the Government that had been through who knows what.

Q. Who was Bo Gritz's agent handler?

A. By real name, I do not know, It was all done via TRW. And he used all their communications.

Q. What was the name you knew the handler by?

A. I don't know the name. Really, I don't. It wasn't important to me who his immediate man was.

Q. Was money discussed during the telephone conversation between you and Gritz, the initial telephone conversation?

A. What do you mean by money?

Q. Well, did you-discuss with him whether you were going to be paid for this?

A. Of course. What's the statute of limitation on tax, 7 years?

Q. I think it's certainly a lot longer than 11 years, But I have to say I don't know the answer to that -- I'm sorry, a lot shorter than 11 years.

A. Okay, yeah, we discussed money. Money was no problem.

Q. What was the money-discussion?

A. That I would be paid X amount in cash; I would have a contact company, too, really -- one in Hawaii and one in Bangkok, if I needed liquid assets other than what he was sending.

Q. Again, this deal was simply for you to go to --

A. The U.S. Embassy, Bangkok,

Q. It had nothing to do with a recognizance mission?

A. None.

Q. How much money did he promise to pay you to go to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok?

A. What's the relevancy of that? I mean I'm laughing because it was a lot, for what I thought was a waste of your taxpayers' dollars.

Q. It's relevant because it's a fact about this decision.

A. It was a lot of money. I can't say, but it was in the thousands.

Q. What was it?

A. I bet I probably got 9 or 10 grand in cash.

Q. $9 or $10 thousand in cash?

A. Yes.

Q. Up front?

A. Up front.

Q. And that was paid to you in Hawaii?

A. It was paid to me directly in Hawaii, delivered to 45 No Khai Street, Kehi, Maui.

Q. That was before you ever went to Thailand for Gritz?

A. Right, and then Steve had come over. And, of course, he had his plane fare paid, and a whole week's pay to scuba diving.

Q. You mentioned a guy named Longhoffer.

A. Wayne.

Q. Was he --

A. He was an activity operative.

Q. Do you know someone whose name is simply Wayne Long?

A. It rings a bell, but I'm not sure.

Q. Do you think there might be someone different than Wayne Longhoffer?

A. Well, there was a Wayne Longhoffer. But that rings a bell, I can't place it.

Q. When you were talking on the telephone with Gritz, he was in California?

A. Yes, he was at that one number.

Q. You were in Hawaii?

A. Yeah, now when he called me, I don't know what number he was at.

Q. Were you talking on secure or unsecure telephones?

A. Well, when I called him, I called from the church phone.

Q. Obviously an unsecure telephone.

A. Yeah, him calling me. He said there's no problem But I didn't really care. I didn't think there was anything of any secrecy or hush-hushness about it. He said everything will be spelled-out in the package that yiour friend is bringing.

Q. When did the package arrive?

A. I bet maybe they got things coordinated by late-May, early June.

Q. And it arrived with your friend, Steve?

A. Yes, he brought it over, yes.

Q. What did you do when you got the package?

A. Looked it over.

Q. Were you supposed to open it?

A. Oh, yes, oh, of course.

Q. You weren't simply supposed to deliver it in Thailand?

A. Oh, no, no, there was a sealed package within the package that I was to deliver. That, I never did open. But the main package, yes, I did open.

Q. What was in the package?

A. A letter from General Aaron to Bo, a bio on Bo, some people that I was supposed to contact at the Embassy -- a few names and numbers. Other than that, that was about it.

Q. What was the nature of the letter from General Aaron to Bo?

A. Something to the effect some people within the Government, our Government, believe that we may have left men behind. But another branch of our Government is circumventing to stop that. Would you kindly, with your intelligence apparatus, be a certain contacts, join in and help us do this? And then there was another letter asking him -- and I think it's in Bohica -- to step out of the service on paper, and that upon completion of operation, he would be promoted to Full Bird Colonel, and he'd be put back on active duty with Fifth Maksog.

Q. Did you know who General Aaron was at that time?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Who was he?

A. A deputy DIA commander.

Q. Was the letter to Bo Gritz from General Aaron on DIA stationery?

A. Yes, as I recall -- one of them is in there. But yes. That's one of them.

Q. Go ahead.

A. It was not a copied letter. It was original stationery, with an original ink signature.

Q. Let me go back to your initial conversation with Bo Gritz over the telephone. Again, what's your best estimate as to the date?

A. We had lots of conversations from when the first calls came in, all the way through June when I left.

Q. But you first talked to him probably some time in April?

A. I want to say April.

Q. Did he say anything about a drug connection between CIA Agent Daniel Arnold and General Vang Pao during that first conversation?

A. Did he say anything?

Q. Right.

A. I don't recall if he said anything.

Q. Do you recall if you did?

A. There were some discussions.

Q. Can you tell us about that?

A. What does that have to do with it?

Q. It's related to this whole mission.

A. What was the question again?

A. Was there any discussion between you and Bo Gritz when you first spoke with him in April of 1981 regarding drug dealings, or any drug connection between CIA Agent Daniel Arnold and General Vang Pao?

A. I don't recall if they discussed it.

Q. If they discussed it -- I'm talking about your conversation with Bo Gritz.

A. There was some discussion. Bit I don't remember real heavily the time frame, or what it involved. But there was some discussion about things of that nature.

Q. What was the general nature of the discussion?

A. We're getting into in area here that I think doesn't really need to be gotten into. I mean I can't --

Q. Why don't you just tell us what the general drift of the conversation was regarding the drug connection?

A. I'd rather not.

Q. Well, I'm asking you the question.

A. Then I'm going to refuse to answer.

Q. On the basis of what?

A. Well, I Just don't want to discuss that. I don't really feel -- I mean I'll just take the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination.

Q. Is that an honest answer?

A. That's a very honest answer, I mean there were some discussions. But somebody could twist it around, like obviously things I've seen here today, and make me look like a bad guy, and rather than dig into someone else's world, I'm going to leave it alone.

Q. Well, let me ask you just generally then, whether there was any discussion between you and Colonel Gritz regarding any gun-running connection between Daniel Arnold and General Vang Pao?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it your intention to take the Fifth as to any details?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you come in contact with a person named Robert Moberg?

A. Yes.

Q. Who is he?

A. Who is he in reality, or who was he as he introduced himself to me?

Q. Why don't you answer both?

A. He said he was a retired special forces individual that he was currently, quote, on paper working for the DEA in the Golden Triangle; that he was one of the recognizance helicopter pilots -- the main one, as a matter of fact.

Q. For Bo Gritz mission?

A. For the activity -- let me clarify something for the record. Whenever we spoke -- obviously not everything is in Bohica, or all these other books -- when we'd say the activity, we knew what we were talking about.

Q. Who is we, you and Bo?

A. Everybody involved. We always didn't say ISA, or the dark room, or slogan names. We always knew the activity to be exactly -- as I a little while ago -- explained it to be.

Q. So what did Moberg --

A. Moberg confirmed he was, in fact, the main helicopter pilot; that they had been having some problem with the guerrillas; that Khun Sa had been cooperating in one element; and there had been a problem for when Khun Sa's open field stopped and some other individuals started; and those were areas that apparently this intelligence operation was to take place, in a very hostile area between two drug war lords.

Q. When did you first meet Moberg?

A. Maybe the 16th of June, 1981.

Q. That was when you were in Thailand already?

A. What he could do -- I didn't mean to interrupt you. Every time went to the United States Embassy, I had to sign in in two places, one at the front gate, and one with the U.S. Marine Guards on the inside -- every time. And each time I was there, this passport was given them to hold until I left. So it was a constant -- so there's a record of every single time I went there, along with everybody else that goes through the gates -- unless they took the big white out.

Q. When we first asked you about Moberg, you said something like he had a -- he was someone in reality, and someone different.

A. Exactly, I knew he was a member of the activity, period. But he was, quote, there as a DEA Golden Triangle Eradication person, which was all bullshit.

Q. So in other words, that was his official --

A. That was his official pay chit. Because as he termed it, I guess it would be okay, he could get information from his employer of what was going on in that world, and give it to the activity so they know, certain things -- if you get what I'm saying. Do you know what I mean without saying it?

Q. Certain things about drugs?

A. Yes, okay, DEA is going to Monitor from this date to this date; okay this channel is wide open for the next 14 hours; we can do fly-overs. There will be no electronic set-up. So the inteliigence he would get from DEA, he could filter to the activity, and whatever they did with it, they did with it.

Q. When did you first go to Bangkok for Bo Gritz?

A. For Bo, June 1981.

Q. Was it June 15?

A. I believe so. Let me look. Arrived Bangkok, admitted 15 June, 1981. That is correct.

Q. How did you get there?

A. I believe it was Pan American Airways.

Q. From Hawaii?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you go by yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you bring with you?

A. I brought the package, in its entirety, that Bo had sent over with Steve; my money; of course, passport; and one small satchel.

Q. Who had made the arrangements, travel arrangements?

A. I believe it was through Secret Service Travel Agency. That was the name of it -- no affiliation to the Secret Service that we know.

Q. Had you made your own arrangements, or had Bo?

A. I think he had made them. And I just went -- and I went just to go pick up the tickets, because I went on a one-way. I went in on a one-way.

Q. What was the reason for going in on a one-way?

A. Because I wasn't sure how long I was going to stay there. He wanted me to get a visa for 6 months. And I think I did get a 6-month visa. I got a visa -- 4-month visa - good for one journey.

Q. What was his explanation for why you might need a 6-month visa, if the only thing you were expected to do -- as you understood it - was to go talk to some people at the American Embassy?

A. That, you'd have to ask him. It might have been because they were only issuing either 1 or 2-day travel visas, or extended, non-immigrant visas. I don't know what the laws are.

Q. Do you remember questioning Gritz about that?

A. No.

Q. It sounds like based on What you understood you could have accomplished it in 1 or 2 days.

A. Well, who would know, though? I certainly wouldn't have. They might have wanted a lot of other things done.

Q. Did your visa allow more than one entry?

A. No, it did not. It's stamped here good for one journey only.

Q. And it's stamped on what date?

A. June 17, 1981 --- stamped there good for one journey. And I'm to leave September 5, 1981. So it was good for one journey.

Q. So this says the visa must be utilized before September 5, 1981?

A. That's what I did.

Q. I thought you said you went -- oh, I'm sorry. I got the months mixed up. What did you do when you got to Bangkok?

A. Proceeded, as instructed, to the NaNa Hotel; met the individuals I was instructed to meet -- Chanida and others.

Q. Who exactly did you meet there?

A. Chanida -- I couldn't even begin to pronounce the other names -- the one that called us Miss Sari; eventually Dominique Zaponne; what was that guy's name -- Alan Dawson; Paul Vogel; the soldier of fortune boys,

Q. Okay, why don't we go back and just go through these one by one, and you tell us who these people were and what their roles were.

A. Chanida was reported to me to be essentially a contracted individual for the activity. She -- I don't know if she was a manager, or an assistant manager of the NaNa, N-a-N-a. Sukim Vit, she had worked on previous assignments, and knew that I was coming. She had received some sort of telex, or something because she knew who I was right away. And she had the appropriate identification, as was instructed in the package.

Q. Who is next?

A. I think it was Ms. Sari. But I'm not sure. Because the meeting took place -- they wanted the meeting to take place in an extremely neutral, non-listening area. So we went to the middle, some little like a zoo, and got a little paddle boat and rode out in the middle of nowhere to talk -- a little extravagant, but I could see why. It was important. Then there was some problems with these soldier of fortune characters. So I had to re-contact Bo.

Q. Now what was that all about?

A. Jim Coyne and Frank Brown somehow knew that I was there. They sought me out. I let Bo know what was going on. He devised, you know, a-little ruse -- which worked -- obviously, they wrote about it. And ended up getting $750 on his American Express card. And then there was another character named Alan Dawson, who was really strange.

Q. You met him at the hotel?

A. I think it was in a bar that he eventually sought me out, or maybe I sought him out. I'm not sure. I mean there was a problem that Chanida had said with certain individuals that they had known in the confines, they had been coming in, checking, you know, what Americans had checked in and who was there. And then found Dominique Zaponne -- as a matter of fact, Alan Dawson -- no, Bobby Schwab was the other one, Robert Schwab.

Q. Okay, now who is Robert Schwab and Dominique Zaponne? Zaponne was a -- and I can only tell you what I was told -- a non-combatant, ex-Green Beret that Bo had recruited out of Van Nuys, California, to help do some cross-the-border intelligence gathering. Schwab, I'm sure you must know who he is, he was captured numerous times by the communist. And I think Richard Childers got him out 8, 9, years ago, 6 years ago. And Dawson was a freelance reporter for the Bangkok Post, if I'm not mistaken.

Q. Were you told that all these people were involved in this mission?

A. No. no, no -- they were problems. They were trying to snoop around and stir up stuff. And they -- you know, lack of killing them, they needed to be pushed out of the picture.

Q. Okay, and who told you that?

A. Bo --I mean he knew a list of -- you know, he said the only one I want you to deal with is Zaponne. All these others are thorns, you know? And we'll deal with them as they pop up.

Q. What was Zaponne's involvement supposed to be?

A. Cross-border with Bo.

Q. Okay.

A. Big guy.

Q. Were you told that Bobby Schwab was running bones across the southern border?

A. I, myself, personally talked to Schwab about that. He said yes, that Ann mills-Griffith, with the National League of Families had been paying him a couple-of-hundred bucks to get bones and return them -- irregardless of whether they were Americans, dogs, chickens, or cats. And that she needed, to maintain credibility with her people, to keep her in power. And at that time I didn't even know who the hell she was.

Q. So Schwab told you that he was involved in some major fraud with Griffith.

A. Exactly, with Griffith, Ann Mills-Griffith.

Q. Did he tell you the magnitude of --

A. As I recall -- and I'm only doing this by memory -- I think he was getting $200 per delivery of X amount of bones; not full-set skeletal remains, some stuff he had broughten back were dog tags, and airplane parts, serial numbers off some airplanes -- that were legitimate aircrafts shot down.

Q. Did you call a guy named George Brooks?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Who is he?

A. George Brooks, from what Bo explained, was a man that had given Bo -- and I don't want to be held accountable to the amount, because I'm not sure -- it was either $20 or $40,000 -- I'm not sure which one. Bo wanted me to call him, in the United States. And I believe I made the call. And he was in New England somewhere, long-distance from Bangkok, on an open line, which kind of was a little bit strange. And I talked to Mr, Brooks. And you can ask him about the conversation.

Q. Well, what do you remember about the conversation?

A. Not much.

Q. I mean, what --

A. Just that he had given a substantial amount of money to Bo --

Q. For what?

A. To help recover Mr. Brooks' son --

Q. Who was a POW?

A. MIA/POW -- I don't recall right now which one -- and that Bo had been doing some things for the National League, with Ann Mills-Griffith, and that there was some sort of falling out. But Bo wanted to -- if something would happen, Bo wanted to be able to say publicly, well George Brooks helped finance it. Therefore, it's private.

Q. And you learned this information about the payment from --

A. From Mr. Brooks, himself. And Bo admitted that he did receive a substantial amount of money, whether it was $20 or $40, I'm not sure -- or $28.

Q. Okay, when did you first go to the U.S. Embassy in --

A. In Thailand?

Q. Right.

A. June, was my very first time.

Q. Was it June 15, the first day you arrived, or was it a couple of days later?

A. I think it was the following morning. But you'd have to check their records.

Q. I think your book indicates that it was the 17th.

A. It might have been.

Q. Does that sound right to you?

A. Somewhere in there.

Q. What was your express purpose in going to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok?

A. It was specifically instructed to see Moberg, and from there it would go to wherever Moberg felt it needed to go.

Q. So Moberg was the person you were supposed to contact when you arrived?

A. Yes, and I did.

Q. Had you met him during the couple of days before you went to the Embassy, or was that the first time?

A. I'm thinking -- I don't think he came to the hotel that day, but he might have, I'm not sure.

Q. Okay, what happened when you met with Moberg at at the Embassy on the 17th of June?

A. Whenever that meeting was, he had come downstairs, real, nice, jovial guy, shook my hand, said let's walk down to the cafeteria and grab a quick cup first, before we go up. Walked down a long hallway; turned left; went in the cafeteria; sat down and started to have some coffee; and we're talking about the operation that was to come, you know.

Q. Did Moberg work at the United States Embassy?

A. Oh, yeah, he had an office on the third floor.

Q. Do you know what his official title was?

A. Drug Enforcement Eradication Pilot, or something like that.

Q. Okay.

A. DEA.

Q. So through his position --

A. He had DEA credentials.

Q. So through his position for the DEA, he had an office at the Embassy.

A. Yes.

Q. I'm sorry, go ahead.

A. So we started to have some coffee; discussing that there was a guy in there that he was concerned about. And he said something like bow your head, I don't want this guy to know that you're here. I don't even want to talk to this guy. So I kind of, you know, had my cup similar to this --

(indicating.)

THE WITNESS: -- and was sipping. And the guy had made eye contact. And he looked puzzled. And he came over. And he had asked Bob, and he goes, well aren't you going to introduce your friend? And it was like God, we know each other from somewhere. And he kept searching in his mind where we knew each other from, you know? And as I recall, I didn't even say my last name. I just said oh, I'm Scott, or something.

BY MR, KRAVITZ:

Q. Did you recognize this person?

A. Yeah, kind of. Then all of a sudden he goes now I know. June 1975, DEA school, El Turo, California -- something to that effect. I said no, it was Ervine. But yeah, you're right. Because we were in the same class together. Of course, I -- you know, 40, 50 agents from all over the world, and I don't know who everybody was.

Q. So who was this guy?

A. He was a real DEA guy apparently -- unbeknownst to me. There was some discussion about the DEA agent's wife up in Chaing Mai. And they talked a little bit about some stuff that had been going on. And, apparently, there was a -- I believe she was a Thai woman, also murdered up there, messing around in Khun Sa's territory. And Bob said, well, we've got to go. And we went upstairs.

Q. Do you know who this DEA agent was?

A. No.

Q. Okay, what happened when you went upstairs?

A. A Marine guard escorted us up. There was a part on the stair where he said this is as far as I can go. You have to go from here. I was searched. I take that back. They did do a physical search and electronic search. We went to a door. Bob pushed a bunch of buttons to get in the office and we went in a windowless, little, tiny office that he had and he started talking on the phone to somebody, not in English, bits and pieces in English. After a little while there he says I've got to take you down to Paul Mather, that's who you've got to see and I'll talk to you later. We went down to Colonel Mather's office.

Q. So you didn't have any further discussions with Moberg?

A. 20, 30 minutes, tops.

Q. Was the mission discussed?

A. Of course.

Q. What was discussed about it?

A. That he was going to be one of the helicopter pilots. There was some discussion about the members of the Blue Light, and the Delta team, that they were going to try to do a joint naval operation in the Gulf of Siam.

Q. Let me ask you this. At this point you still believed that your only involvement was delivering this stuff to the embassy?

A. Yes, and that's all at that time that it was,

Q. Why was he telling you all about the mission?

A. Bits and pieces of it were in the package and I had made some mention that I don't believe we left any Americans behind and if we did they want to be there anyway, leave them.

Q. So he was telling you about this secret mission?

A. I wouldn't say it was secret. It was something that was apparently in the planning, way in the future. It wasn't right now then, in June of '81, nothing was happening.

Q. So he was discussing this with you, and then you went down to see?

A. Well, we had discussed Vang Pao and some other things.

Q. And the issue of your involvement in the mission still had not come up?

A. Yeah, just to make sure that Vang Pao's people there, up along the border, were going to assist, that they were under the impression that it was, in fact, a private operation and that what Vang Pao's people had requested was going to be honored, medicine, more munitions, more radios, et cetera, et cetera.

Q. Based on what Moberg was telling you, what was your understanding of what the mission was?

A. There was a dual purpose. The POW part of it was to be an area, whether or not there was Americans in this region, and that's what his involvement was there.

Q. You mean reconnaissance to find out whether they were there?

A. Right. They needed some Americans when the monsoons were over to go in with Vang Pao's people to see and they had to make sure it was not, in any way, connected with the embassy, with the agency, with the activity -- anybody. They needed it cut and dried, everyone quote was a civilian. This was strictly on your own.

Q. And what was the other purpose?

A. It had nothing to do with POWs.

Q. Drugs? Why don't you just tell us if it had to do with drugs or not?

A. Yeah, it had to do with narcotics trafficking.

Q. When you were talking to Moberg that first time at the embassy, did he tell you which area the reconnaissance mission was going to go to?

A. If you have a map I can show you. Several areas were discussed.

Q. Were they all in Laos?

A. Yes.

Q. Why don't we get this marked.

(The document referred to was marked Barnes Exhibit No. 15 for identification.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Just for the record, Exhibit 15 is a map of Laos with Vietnam and Thailand, or at least parts of it on there too.

A. Okay, the areas that were discussed, not all of them are printed on here, is, of course, Nape, this, here's Mu Gia Pass, Nhommarath, Mahaxay, and there was an area up in here that was discussed.

Q. Why don't you go through that one more time and state every place?

A. The map that he had was a thousand times more detailed, Nhommarath, N-h-o-m-m-a-r-a-t-h, Nape, N-a-p-e, Mahaxay, M-a-h-a-x-a-y, Mu Gia Pass, M-u G-i-a, but there are several others that aren't named here.

Q. Areas farther to the north and west?

A. More up in the area here.

Q. Were you shown any specific POW camps by Moberg?

A. They weren't called camps, reeducation centers that were pinpointed throughout this area right in here, and what was discussed is the Vietnamese, in all honesty, at certain times could say that no they are not holding any Americans against their will, in their country, but they would move them across the Mu Gia Pass, which would obviously put them in Laotian territory, and then he would say well, they're being honest; they don't hold any Americans. They are over here. So I understood and I said, well, I don't believe there's any Americans. If they're there they want to be there, leave them, and he kind of chuckled.

Q. What did you do when Moberg took you downstairs totalk to who?

A. Right down the hall.

Q. So he took you down the hall?

A. Paul Mather, Bill Wharton, Jim Tully, and I think there was one other gentleman, but I don't recall his name.

Q. Who were these guys?

A. Paul Mather, he introduced me as the Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force and the Joint Casualty Resolution Center boss. He was responsible for all intelligence coming out of the north on Americans and MIA'S, and Bill Wharton was supposedly a retired Marine Corps master sergeant, I think it was, who was a linguistic specialist. Jim Tully, as I recall, worked for defense intelligence and was an intelligence analyst on POW/MIA affairs out of IndoChina, and there was another guy, but I don't remember who he was. And there was another guy, but I don't remember who he was, he came and left, and then Moberg left.

Q. So were you speaking to these four other people all at the same time?

A. Let me think. They were sitting in front and there was Paul's desk, Bill was here, Jim was here, Moberg left -- I know three, we were like this, talking back and forth all the time.

Q. Were these guys supposedly part of the activity's mission?

A. That's what I'm not clear on.

Q. Was it explained to you why you were taken to see them?

A. Only that they were responsible for the primary job of confirming or denying Americans left behind, but more importantly they were in direct negotiations with Hanoi on remains, and it seemed like the importance was more on the remains -- something to the effect also, you are one of Bo's boys. They were cordial.

Q. So these people clearly knew about Bo Gritz's proposed mission?

A. Oh, absolutely. Matter of fact, Bill had mentioned there was a real -- I don't want to say this word, it's a nasty word, but anyway he said Florida was a real blah, blah, blah, so he knew Velvet Hammer was a screw-up and I knew nothing about Velvet Hammer.

Q. This was Bill who?

A. Wharton, W-h-a-r-t-o-n.

Q. What was discussed -- I mean how long a meeting did you have with these three people?

A. At that time? It was pretty long, I bet at least an hour or more, at least.

Q. What were you discussing for an hour?

A. We discussed four files of which I had never heard of any of them.

Q. Four POW files?

A. They didn't call them that, casualty files,

Q. Who were they?

A. At the time, Captain Charles, but he's promoted Colonel; Albert Lundy, Senior; Ron Dodge; and a guy named Bobby Garwood. So it was Shelton, Dodge, Garwood, and Lundy.

Q. What was the context in which those four people were discussed?

A. That Ron -- Commander Dodge's body would be coming back forthwith, that he was in fact captured alive, that he was killed, and that they were waiting for the deterioration of the remains before they returned them. Lundy they had reports on, they weren't sure if he was dead or alive. He was shot down, I think, up in the Plaine des Jarres; Bobby Garwood, like Bill was saying, you know, he opened his big mouth, he talked, he was a test case, you know, that he released to see what the reaction would be - is America ready to pay us some bucks or what happens, obviously they turned him in, I think they said, and he was being brought up on charges or something to that effect. And Shelton, was a living American prisoner of war the Pathet Lao had had, and that he was at one time rescued and then returned to his captors.

Q. Did you give Mather a letter from General Aaron at that time?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was that the letter in the packet?

A. Yes, it was. One of several, several letters, the bio, there was something in there that could be construed as some sort of cryptic code -- I myself couldn't understand it.

Q. Did Mather say anything about the letter from General Aaron?

A. I don't recall. He opened a sealed envelope and whatever was in there I do not know, even to this very day, but it was something of very significance.

Q. Did you give him a map and code book?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. To Mather?

A. Yes.

Q. Those were from the packet of materials?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that all about?

A. The code book was just to deliver it in person.

Q. Had you read the code book?

A. I couldn't, I didn't even understand it. It was a code I'd never seen. The map was a topographical map that had certain squared areas with permanent markings on them, target sites is what they were called, such-and-such dates, SR-71 here, KH-13 or something here.

Q. Did those target sites correspond to the areas you were showing us on the map?

A. Exactly, and more.

Q. Can you describe what the code was like, was it a series of numbers and letters?

A. Yeah. It was on treated paper and it was both sides, I'm not sure which side was what you would call side 1 or side 2. There was a foreign writing in one corner, whether it was Arabic, Hebrew, Chinese, I have no idea. On the left- hand side, as you go down, there was lines, and then they had boxes, and each box would have something in this foreign language, then it would have an American letter, and then it would have a dash and a number, and it went through the whole thing, then when you turned it over on the opposite side there was no writing and it was all boxed.

And as you go down here, it's almost, as I would read, right to left, but the way they were looking at it, at least from what I saw on the other side of the desk, they were reading from one corner to corner to corner, something like that because he had written down some things about it which I have no idea -- I couldn't decipher it, if I wanted to.

(Recess,)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. At some point during your meeting with Mather in the embassy that first time, did you agree to go to Cambodia for him?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. How did that come about?

A. There was a discussion, how do I word this? United States State Department was making certain allegations against the Soviet Union in the use of chemical weapons, i.e. yellow rain in particular. He had asked if I would go deliver a shoe-box type size package to the Khmer Rouge, I made a comment, I thought the Khmer and Pol Pot were against them, and he kind of chuckled and he said you know, if you do this - and I said, okay. That's where it left.

Q. Did you know what was in the package?

A. No, I never opened the package, I never looked inside it. There was something in it, it weighed, I think, 2 or 3 pounds maybe, and I did deliver it. I am not going to deny it. Well --

Q. You've written about it in your book?

A. Well, yeah, I'm just thinking of the Neutrality Act. Is the Neutrality Act statute of limitations over?

Q. That I absolutely have no idea.

A. Yes, I went into Cambodia and delivered the package as requested to the Khmer Rouge, yes.

Q. When did you do that?

A. It was about the 18th, just before my birthday.

Q. Did you go by yourself?

A. No, I went with Prasit.

Q. How do you spell that?

A. P-r-a-s-i-t and Tek was the driver.

Q. When did you meet those guys?

A. Tek showed up the following morning to pick me up. The package was put in the trunk of his vehicle and for the next several hours we drove to Prasit's place over in Arana patat.

Q. Could you show us again on the map?

A. It doesn't go low enough. It would be down in here on the Cambodian/Thai border. If you leave Bangkok and come over here on the border, it's a town called Arana patat and there's a little place called Poiet, P-o-i-e-t, in the same area.

Q. Just so the record is clear you are pointing in the direction southeast of Bangkok?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember where it was that you crossed the border?

A. Mm, The Sunghoi River, and I know everybody in the world says there's no river there, but I beg to differ with you. If I can find the document, the grid coordinates. Steve, do you know what page it's on?

MR. GEKOSKI: We won't have the right map to match the grid coordinates anyway.

THE WITNESS: No, no, the grid coordinates are in here. The actual numerical. The picture of the little river I fell into is here too.

(Pause.)

THE WITNESS: Okay, it's Sunghoi-Si River, Thai/Cambodian border, Southeast Asia map series ND48-9 1/250,oooth,

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. So that is where you crossed the border?

A. That is the area that we crossed, yes.

Q. How long were you in Cambodia?

A. I think we stayed in the Khmer camp a few hours, max.

Q. What kind of arrangements had been made for you to go there?

A. That Prasit was an agent working on behalf of the United States Government to run people with other people, you know, into Cambodia via the JUSMAG and Task Force 80 people.

Q. How long were you there?

A. I got there early in the morning, so I think we came back probably mid afternoon, 4:00, maybe.

Q. Did you see anything of note when you were in Cambodia?

A. Well, what's of note?

Q. Did you just simply go there, drop off this box?

A. Dropped off, the interpreter talked for a while, saw a bunch of American weapons, that kind of surprised me. They were obviously in relatively new condition, weren't weather beaten, didn't look like they were traveled over jungles, rivers, and mountains. There was some discussion the United States had, in fact, been assisting the Khmer in fighting off the Vietnamese invasion, and I made a comment, isn't it true, since they didn't know English, I could say it, that these guys were the ones that were killing their own people, I mean they are involved in genocide. He says that point really doesn't matter. They are our only asset right now for a guerilla force, to keep the Vietnamese off key and so therefore a lot of the stuff removed from Bein Hoa and elsewhere we're just giving it to them.

Q. Did you learn what was in the package when you were in Cambodia?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever learned what was in that package?

A. Officially no. No, Later on, it did come about that it may have been samples of yellow rain that were to be put in strategic areas so when Al Haig made his visit, or whoever made their visit, they would find samples of yellow rain. They in turn, would make a firm accusation against the Soviets that they were, in fact, using yellow rain.

Q. Where did you hear that?

A. It had come up in some discussions with Prasit.

Q. As far as you could tell, did your trip to Cambodia have anything to do with the POW reconnaissance mission?

A. The later mission?

Q. Or any of it?

A. Yes, in one aspect. There was some discussions with the translator regarding certain areas in Cambodia where Cambodia and Laos meet, but I was not aware of -- but there was some discussion. There was some brief discussions with Prasit and the translator -- other than that.

Q. When did you get back? Where did you go after Cambodia?

A. As I recall, I went back to the ?Na ?Na, from there then I went back to the United States Embassy and reported back to Mather, Then he asked me to go down to the Vietnamese Embassy.

Q. I am sorry, then you went --

A. Then I went down to the Vietnamese Embassy.

Q. What was the purpose of going to the Vietnamese Embassy?

A. From what I understand it was that they needed someone to go down that was a civilian and that it was all prearranged, and that we were going to discuss, there was a certain individual that was at that time from Hanoi, supposedly a very powerful ministerial-type figure that wanted to discuss the prisoner of war issue, but Mather and his people were obviously well known to V.C. intelligence, that they couldn't go down, Moberg couldn't go down, so I went down.

Q. Who did you meet with at the Vietnamese Embassy?

A. I couldn't even begin to pronounce their names, I mean seriously. I'm not trying to be coy, I couldn't. After they opened the gate, there was two fully dressed in their uniforms with some dogs. We went through a metal gate, went through another gate, went down a long corridor. Then some Vietnamese in business suits came in, we went into this room right on the right. A nice gorgeous room. The guards stayed on the doors.

There was one uniformed guy on the inside. Then there was a door right here, and two people obviously of some importance came in because everybody except me stood up, and they started talking. And then the one guy was fairly good English, then two of them started talking in French. I don't know French, but I know bits and pieces, and I said, well, that's not Vietnamese, and they had some discussions and they said well, you'll understand in a minute, and we stayed there -- they had some tea. I wouldn't drink it -- less than 2 hours.

Q. Could you understand any of the conversation that was going on?

A. When we spoke in English, oh sure.

Q. What was being discussed?

A. They knew that I was sent there. They wanted to discuss war crimes and it's just like, who do you think I am? They pulled out some pictures that were very interesting and sad. We did discuss our country's belief that they believed that there was Americans still living, but they were more inclined to have an admission of some sort of war crimes stuff and he showed pictures.

Q. What were the pictures of?

A. They were pictures of Americans holding up decapitated heads of obviously Vietnamese people. There was pictures that were somewhat similar to the My Lai incident. A lot of young, naked individuals that were obviously deceased and deteriorating, decomposing -- some argument, for lack of a better word, over that. Then you go back and you report to your people that there will be some sort of discussion on this issue. I left, went back, reported to Mather.

Q. Were you shown any maps at the Vietnamese Embassy?

A. Well, there was maps that were there, not in English, but there were some maps, yes.

Q. Were they the subject of any discussion?

A. Ironically we discussed, briefly Khun Sa. There was a controlling factor, but other than that there was nothing in any great detail.

Q. What was ultimately your understanding as to the purpose of your trip to the embassy, the Vietnamese Embassy?

A. I think they wanted to see what they would say, and how they would treat me.

Q. Who wanted to see?

A. Mather's people. His little group, knowing that apparently, and I don't know if you might know what the political situation back in June '81 between our country and their countries were, I don't recall. But I think they wanted to see -- are they softening up, are they willing to talk, can we approach them from a non-governmental -- I said, I don't work for the government, I have no government credentials at all.

Q. You mean are they willing to talk about prisoners?

A. That was one of the highlight of discussions. I think they were -- maybe I shouldn't say more interested, they wanted to see if I would say yes, U.S. soldiers committed war crimes. How am I supposed to know, you know? I think they wanted to see my reaction and some names were brought up. But they were not American names and I have no idea who they are.

Q. Were prisoner of war issues discussed at all?

A. Not in any great detail. There was one photo in particular with an American with a bandage across his face and it was brought up that they were going to release him, deceased, and I had said well that's the one Mather had previously had discussed, Commander Dodge, and apparently later on he did come back, full skeletal remains.

Q. What happened when you went back to the American Embassy?

A. I told Mather what had transpired and I went back to my place and went to Burma.

Q. So you left Thailand at that point?

A. Just for the day, I went to Burma and came back.

Q. We are still a little bit unclear as to why you were sent to the Vietnamese Embassy?

A. That you would have to ask them. It could have been a set-up too, because like I think I told you the FBI now has all these pictures of me entering the embassy with something in my hand and then exiting supposedly with nothing in my hand.

Q. Did you bring anything there?.

A. I think I had a little satchel of stuff, but other than that I don't recall.

Q. So just correct me if I'm wrong, I'm trying to paraphrase, but just tell me if I'm wrong. Is it your understanding then that the reason you were sent by Mather to the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok was simply to see how the Vietnamese were going to react to an American?

A. To somebody that quote wasn't affiliated with the government and wanting to discuss the prisoner of war issue. I want to say -- I'm trying to figure out a name, Duk So, was a name that was mentioned quite a bit, a Vietnamese individual. There was one who spoke excellent English. He said he was even educated in the United States. But I think more their focus was on, am I going to say there was war crimes. It's like, how am I supposed to know if there was or not? I have no idea. I think, it was like a game and, of course, the whole thing could have been set up by Mather so the FBI has these pictures, I don't know.

Q. Did anyone at the meeting in the Vietnamese Embassy, any Vietnamese say anything about having live American POW'S?

A. There may have been some discussion that they are not in their country, but there may be some in a neighboring country. You have got to remember I wasn't too interestedthen because I didn't believe there was any, so to me it was irrelevant. It just wasn't that big a deal to me -- sorry to say, knowing what I know now.

Q. How much longer did you stay in Thailand at that time?

A. I think I stayed about 9 or 10 days, I think I left the 24th or 25th of June.

Q. Did you do anything else?

A. Went to Burma.

Q. Did you do anything else related to Bo Gritz or Mather or any of those people?

A. Got rid of the soldier of fortune and Dawson character. Schwab went back to Southern Laos to get bones, Zapone went north. Oh, no I take that back. Yeah, I did. I went to the Bank of America to set up the money wire transfer and we did a test on it, that's correct. There was an American, either he was the president, or vice president of the main B of A branch in Bangkok and I was supposed to set up an account to have money wired to a company.

Q. This was your payment from Bo Gritz?

A. No, no, this was for them for the future, and I did go to B of A and I did receive a wire so it was active and working.

Q. How did you get involved in that?

A. That was part of the package discussions, that I wasto go, you know -- Chanida had a whole list of orders, too, that needed to be set up, that she knew from Bo, that she had already had, and I did go to B of A and I did set that up and I did receive a wire, just to make sure it was working.

Q. Money came through?

A. Yes. It was $500 I remember that, Because it had to be handled by one individual guy in the bank, a white guy, so if you could find whoever he was then, and get the information.

Q. So that happened between say the 19th of June and the 25th of June?

A. Yeah, it was more towards the latter part.

Q. At this time, was it still your understanding that your involvement was going to end with this trip to Thailand?

A. Well, yes and no. I was supposed to go back, I'd never met Bo, I was supposed to go back, tell him what had transpired, everything was go, and that would be shake hands, get another wad of cash, and that would be the extent of my involvement, yes.

Q. Before we talk about your trip back to the United States, you mentioned a joint Delta-Blue Light exercise in the Gulf of Siam?

A. Right. It was discussed that there was going to be, our government was going to have a naval operation going on down there which -- how do I word this, I wasn't Navy so I don't know what they call them -- a training exercise, so it wouldn't be out of the ordinary that all these ships are there. And that there was going to be members of Blue Light and Delta. It was a two-fold operational plan in that one was going to be a hit and the other was going to provide the exit. Other than that I never knew if there was a big military operation in the Gulf.

Q. This was something you discussed in your meeting at the U.S. Embassy?

A. That is correct.

Q. With Mather?

A. With Moberg.

Q. Did you go back to the U.S. to meet with Gritz?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Where did you meet with him?

A. I met with him in Hermosa Beach, California, for the first time in person.

Q. What was the purpose of that meeting?

A. He wanted to know what happened. I did turn over some pictures to him of the Khmer, and he briefly discussed, it was an ongoing situation. He wanted to know if I could introduce him personally to General Vang Pao. I hemmed and I hawed and I arranged that and I did bring them together. Then we got, unfortunately, a little bit deeper into the situation. He said, I saw you on ABC's television show. He says it was good you were out of the country when that aired.

Q. Where did your meeting with Gritz take place?

A. It's a little like a taco place near the Hermosa Beach pier in California.

Q. Did you go to his house?

A. Later on, yes,

Q. When later on?

A. I don't know if it was that day or maybe a day or two later.

Q. Did you see any equipment at his house when you went there?

A. At the house on Holy Cross, here is the home and you go down the driveway and back here was an office. In here there was some. But there was blue house next door that he was using to store stuff. Later on, yes, a tremendous amount there.
<CENTER>C O N T I N U E D</CENTER>
<HR width="50%">

<CENTER>Barnes - Part III (http://www.aiipowmia.com/ssc/barnes3.html)


<HR width="50%">


</CENTER>

[Arrow]

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD bgColor=#999966>Senate Select Committee Testimony &amp; Depositions</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Q. What type of equipment did you see?

A. Equipment I'd never -- I shouldn't say never, but a lot of radio equipment, recording equipment, there was a device that a helium balloon could automatically inflate and take something up fast for aerial retrieval, cameras, recorders, parabolic apparatus. There was a device -- it was the damnest thing I've ever seen, I would say it would be about probably about this size, plastic. It looked like a giant calculator, and he would hook it up to the telephone and push in buttons, for some scrambling apparatus on numbers. That he personally carried with him and we used that frequently.

Q. Did Colonel Gritz tell you where he got all this equipment?

A. Yes, some of it was on behalf of Litton, some of it was on behalf of Hughes. There was some stuff that charter members, they had little metal tags, that were obvious, that were removed, and they were activity materials that could not be traced back, hopefully could not be traced back to the government.

Q. Did you ask Gritz what all the equipment was for?

A. Well, later on I did, yeah, we went over most of it.

Q. Later on, you mean, before you --

A. Went in October, yes.

Q. Was all of that equipment activity equipment, or just some of it?

A. I don't know what you mean by all of it. Did he say all of this came from the activity or just some of it, isthat --

Q. Right.

A. No. He would say this is from Litton, this is from Hughes, this is from Bragg, but I would say 90 percent was activity-donated, for lack of a better word, equipment.

Q. When were you first told what this equipment was for?

A. I think it was after I first introduced him to V.P.

Q. When was the introduction to Vang Pao?

A. As I recall, it was either in Bob Dornan's office, or at V.P.'s Lao Community Center, I'm not sure because one was the one day and the other was the next day.

Q. So Vang Pao's community center was in California?

A. Yes, he has a Lao community center down in Euclid. He has two really, both in Orange County, one in Garden Grove, and one in, I believe it is Santa Anna,

Q. So you didn't take Gritz to Montana?

A. Oh no, no, we never had to leave California to connect with V.P. at all.

Q. Could you describe for us what happened when they met?

A. Yeah, they saluted each other, it was bullshit. It was funny. They respected each other as officers, which I thought was a joke, because they were in civilian clothes, but it was very serious, even though I laughed. It was funny. Vang Pao would not talk to Bo without me there, which kind of surprised me. I said you guys have met. I have introduced you. Matter of fact, Bo even pulled out a military I.D. card showing he's retired, lieutenant colonel rank. Bo offered him money. He was not at all concerned about money. Cash was not a problem to him. It was at the Laos office was the first introduction because I remember as we walked in General Souvan had introduced himself so it was the Laos center, the first introduction.

Q. Were there any maps looked at?

A. There was one at Vang Pao's, but the main map was in Congressman Robert K. Dornan's office near LAX.

Q. Why don't you tell us about the discussion with the map?

A. Bo said that basically on a humanitarian side he and a group of people had gotten some information before they retired and they wanted to go see if there were Americans there. Vang Pao had said, you know, I have been telling, you know, Daniel, and the rest of them for years that every now and then we would run across areas that there are Americans there, and not just white men, there's black men there. They are not Cubans, they are not Soviets, they are American and I'm telling you that.

I've told you before -- not Bo, but you, the government -- that they are there. They discussed, way up in Sam Nuea province, I mean, way up, where he says that it would taken anywhere from 6 to 8 months for him to get the information, that's how hard it would be from Sam Nuea to get the information back into Thailand, Thailand back to V.P. But he says your government wants nothing to do with it. They chitted-chatted about military stuff for a while. V.P. was very concerned that there was absolutely no CIA involvement at all. He was really upset at the agency, and he made it very well known, in no small manner.

Q. So was he told that the agency had absolutely nothing to do with this?

A. Bo told him, yeah. I told him too. I said, trust me G. There's nothing going on. You know me. I wouldn't get involved if it had anything to do with the government, and he was convinced. I think he was especially convinced when he was offered a substantial amount of money because he knew the agency wouldn't do that.

Q. Did Vang Pao tell you or tell Gritz what it was that had made him distrust the CIA?

A. Yeah, we all had a discussion. I had kind of previously known from some '80 conversations. During the conclusion of the war, Dan Arnold had promised Vang Pao that he would go ahead and continue the pipeline, that he would get not only his immediate family, but all the high-ranking individuals that worked the Lima sights out. Whatever happened, that didn't happen. He said that Turner ended up screwing everything up 2 years after the fall of Saigon, a lot of the guys ended up being out of work. And that all kinds of Vang Pao's -- and I think there were some loyalty there -- a lot of his men were murdered, killed, and he was very upset at that.

And he comes back and the government gives him a community center and puts 20,000 of his people on welfare and it's like, wait a minute, you promised this, this, this. They bought him a nice wheat and barley ranch, in the freezing cold Montana, when he's used to Indo-China weather. I mean he was very pissed, and I can now understand why. I would have been pissed. So he wanted to make sure there was no company involvement. It's almost like he was ready to go to war with the agency, if he had to.

Q. Did he know what the activity was?

A. Mm. Bo had mentioned it to him,

Q. Was he comfortable that the activity was?

A. Civilian.

Q. So he was comfortable with that?

A. Yes.

Q. He didn't know the connection between the activity and the agency?

A. Not at all.

Q. What exactly as far as you could tell -- what was Gritz trying to get from Vang Pao?

A. His cooperation with not only him here, but mainly his men there that were in and out of the country doing cross- border operations constantly. There was a list, and it's not in my handwriting, of some things that they had wanted. He said, you know, the hardest thing that we are having to get and we need is penicillin. We need atrophine, and we need all kinds of medical stuff. And he was told, yeah, we could get everything for him. He didn't want much in the way of munitions, he wanted a few, but weapons was not a problem.

(Pause.)

Just so you get into the area of the meeting in Robert Dornan's office. That was a significant meeting.

Q. Why don't we talk about that meeting and then take a break so we can go down to the disbursement office. Let's move on to that meeting. When did the meeting in Congressman Dornan's office take place?

A. I would say it was about August 26th, 28th, somewhere around there.

Q. Who was present at that meeting?

A. Let's see, General Vang Pao came, Colonel Gritz, myself, Colonel Gee, Colonel Van Yee, some Chinaman, Stan Mullin, Congressman Dornan's aide. I think that was it.

Q.Dornan was not there?

A. No. It was funny because it was set specifically to make sure he wasn't there, but then that following Sunday Bo met personally with Bob, so it was, in my opinion, because you asked for opinions earlier, a ruse to convince Vang Pao that it was not involved with the agency. Bob Dornan at that time, as I recall, was chairman of the POW/MIA task force, had an interest, and so it was very convincing for Vang Pao to meet there.

We had an hour meeting, maybe a few minutes more. Stan Mullin, as I recall, and you could find him, I think was present for almost all of it. We discussed in detail -- I shouldn't say we, they discussed in detail, camps, and the last reported live sightings that had occurred, and which camps were closest to the Mekong River on the Thai border/Laos border area that could be easily verifiable rather than going deep in country and risking more casualties. They flip-flopped military jargon back and forth.

Q. They being Vang Pao?

A. And Bo.

Q. What was your involvement with Gritz at that point?

A. Just to bring them together in Dornan's office. I called and arranged the meeting.

Q. You were still not signed up to go on any missions?

A. I had no intentions of going anywhere.

Q. Was anything agreed upon between Vang Pao and Gritz at that meeting?

A. Yes, Vang Pao at that meeting agreed he would cooperate 100 percent for a further incursion, that he would go ahead and send intelligence to his people down there, andit was agreed, yes.

Q. What exactly was the incursion that was agreed on?

A. They had agreed that some time, as soon as the weather cleared up, October, November, that an American team would go down with his people and go take Pictures of POW's in a camp.

Q. And the purpose for taking the pictures was explained to you how?

A. That it was a reconnaissance team, that they wanted to go in and identify are there Americans there, that they had been hearing it via intelligence and I think the KH-135 and SR-71 had taken photos. That wasn't good enough. They had information, but they wanted Americans to actually come back and say, hey, were they there?

Q. Then what was going to happen?

A. Then Blue Light and Delta were going to go ahead and do a massive rescue, and that's all they needed was to show they're there. You had this whole naval task force in the Gulf of Siam to back it up. You had a joint Ubon/Udorn air operation, so you had some power there. If it was going to happen you had a lot of power.

Q. Was there one specific camp that was being discussed?

A. Yes, we discussed, not one, but there were several that they were discussing. Let's go back to the map here. They were discussing mostly Mahaxay and the Nhommarath, thosetwo areas right here. One of the hottest places was here, Mahaxay, but the problem they'd been having by the time intelligence would get here, back to Vang Pao's people, it could be literally a month, so what they had done is previously there was an operation that had given them radios so they could communicate quicker, letting them know. So there was a lot of spotted camps up along here, that were mobile camps, and that they might have them there for 10 to 15 days at a time working and then they would move them.

Q. When you say them, you mean the prisoners?

A. American prisoners, right.

Q. Just so that the transcript is correct, you are talking about mobile camps?

A. Along here on the other side of highway 1.

Q. Northwest of Nhommarath?

A. If you go in NKP, here's NKP which is a border town, which is on the Laos side, north of here, Vientiane was up here. This is where we launched somewhere in here, it's not written here, but it's somewhere along in here. If we had a more detailed map it would show you. And on the other side of Highway 1, I think you're missing Highway 2, it's one real close to the river on the other side, and there had been mobile camps along here. I have no idea what is in here, whether it's gems, jewels, opium, rice, or what, but they had been working a lot of Americans along this side of the ridge.

Q. Why don't you take this purple pen and just draw a circle around where the mobile camps were?

(The witness complied.)

THE WITNESS: I would say probably in here. You want to call it A?

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Sure. That's the area Vang Pao was talking about?

A. He was talking about when there's mobile people here, it would be better to go ahead and cross here and try and verify intelligence than it would be to launch deep in country. Granted all along here they were being moved back and forth in the Mu Gia Pass, but if you just needed a rapid confirmation, get your pictures, and then you'd have your confirmation, but like you said it's not going to do any good.

Q. So the decision was not to go into Nhommarath or Mahaxay?

A. Yes. See we were told, we went to this area, our maps, of course, weren't anything like this. We had an area that said like the Mahaxay area. When we launched from Vientiane -- we could have gone -- the way we went, we could have gone here, but I have no idea, you know -- that we had discussed these camps because these were apparently permanent highway camps and people would come in from Mu Gia on a frequent bad is and they would move them back over into Vietnam. But, you know, these were of extreme importance to Vang Pao.

Q. What was the arrangement ultimately when that meeting ended in Dornan's office that day?

A. That he was going to contact his people,

Q. He being Vang Pao?

A. Yes. He would go ahead and approve to his guerillas down there to get the most current and recent intelligence that you have on Americans, the movements, send it to him.

Q. Send it to?

A. Vang Pao, and that he would go ahead and recontact us, which he did.

MR. KRAVITZ: Why don't we take a break.

(Recess.)

BY MR. KRAVITZ:

Q. Before we broke we were talking about the meeting in Congressman Dornan's office primarily between Vang Pao and Bo Gritz at which the decision was made to go ahead with the mission. Was there a time later that year, in 1981, that you were specifically told that the mission was on for a specific time?

A. Yes. There were several meetings from that late August through September, there was a call to where Bo had called me in another location in California and said the?? mission was a go, there is a Presidential Charter, would I come down and assist in some other elements of it. I came down, saw a very large suitcase of money.

Q. Where did you come down to?

A. 8029 Holy Cross Drive in Westchester, California, Bo Gritz's home. I was given some money, he had asked if I would go to Bangkok with his team because his team didn't know Vang Pao, et cetera, et cetera. I said, well, let me think about it. The financial offer was substantial so I accepted.

Q. Was this the first time that you'd been asked to go along on any part of this mission?

A. I believe so, before it was always just -- I think what had happened is Bo realized that Vang Pao, being Bo was the new man on the block, Vang Pao might not explicitly trust him. There were comments made by Vang Pao, well, you know is Scott going to go down and meet with these people? So, I think it was decided that I would go, but that's as far as I would go, was Bangkok.

Q. So when you met with Bo Gritz that time, when was this, in October?

A. September. We had several meetings.

Q. But when he first gave you money it was to go simply to Bangkok as opposed to going into Laos?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. How much money did he give you at that time?

A. I think it was about $7,200.

Q. In cash?

A. Yes. Hundred dollar bills.

Q. How much money did you see at Bo Gritz's house?

A. He said it was $426,000. There was no doubt in my mind it could have been. I don't know because I didn't count it, but there was a large briefcase full of cash.

Q. He had one briefcase?

A. One briefcase, opened it up and said, look at all this money.

Q. $100 bills?

A. All $100 bills.

Q. That's what he paid you in?

A. Yeah, he gave me a roll, a very large roll of $100 bills. I gave some to the church, took Randy Sanford out, and, you know, basically gave $100 bills away.

Q. Did you ask Bo where the money came from?

A. I didn't have to. Well, after taking the money and after having gone back, we had some further discussions that might be in the area, that might not be a good area to discuss because I did take some of the money. Your question is did I ask Bo where the money came from? The answer no.

Q. Did Bo indicate to you whether the money came from the activity?

A. A portion thereof, yes.

Q. What did Bo say about that?

A. That he was in direct contact with Jerry King and others and that's pretty much where I left it.

Q. Where else did Bo say the money came from?

A. Ask Bo, that would be hearsay,

Q. It's not hearsay it he told it to you. Where did he say the money came from?

A. It came from profits, from other sources, other situations.

Q. Drug money,

A. I'm not going to say that it was.

Q. You are not going to say that it wasn't?

A. Well, it's self incriminating to say did you take drug money, Scott, and I say, yes, then I've incriminated myself.

Q. We don't need to go into that.

A. To me that's not important where the money came from. I know you might think it is.

Q. Did Bo say anything about the money coming from any POW fund raising organizations?

A. Never, never.

Q. Did you ever suspect?

A. No, I knew that it wasn't.

Q. What was the plan that you and Bo agreed to specifically when he gave you the $7,200?

A. That I would go ahead, meet with these other people that were coming in from different parts of the country.

Q. Meet in California?

A. Yes, we all met in California, but I was pretty much not to ever tell them anything about Vang Pao's meetings in any sort of detail that Bo -- in other words, he wanted to keep each of us only knowing bits and pieces. He didn't want us to share information amongst each other.

Q. Why is that?

A. I don't know. Probably to protect some things that he didn't want these people to know about and I left it at that. It didn't really matter to me, back then.

Q. Did you then meet with these other people who were going to be involved in the trip?

A. Yeah, there were some other people from Hughes that I had met with before these gentlemen came into the picture, but yes, I did meet each of them individually.

Q. You met them individually?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Who were they?

A. There was William Macris, if I pronounce the name right, Ben Donatowski, J.D. Bath, Butch Jones, and the other man that didn't go on the mission, but we had cursory contact, one was Vic and I don't recall his last name. There was a couple of girls, no they weren't involved in the mission. Other guys would come and go, they were brief contacts, but I was never formally introduced, we shook hands, had a beer, went to dinner a few times.

Q. What was the purpose of the meetings with all of these people in California?

A. They were going to have their intricate parts, for an intelligence, reconnaissance operation, to confirm or deny the existence of live Americans. Bill or William Macris was to be the contact with Colonel Mike Eiland in cryptography, Ben Donatowski and J.D. themselves were former Delta members and J.D., I think was voted to be the tie-breaker, if there was some sort of problem.

Q. And your role was simply to go over there and deal with Vang Pao's people?

A. To get these gentlemen introduced to Vang Pao's people, get them happy, I come home, they do whatever they're going to do.

Q. When did you actually go over to Thailand?

A. I think we left about the 19th of October, 1981. I was admitted into Thailand 21 October, 1981 so counting the date line and loss of a day, we left on PAN AM flight number 1, so we probably left afternoon of the 19th, given the date line, and a whole day flying there.

Q. How specifically planned out was the mission before you left California?

A. Quite a bit. There was all kinds of meetings -- there was all kinds of communiques. There was stuff going on TRW M-4, a few things at Hughes, there was a lot of things going on. When I had officially said I would go, at no time was I to be separated from any member of the Delta force. There always had to be at least one member of Delta with me, and any other member with any of the other guys.

The only one that was ever gone by himself, and we followed him a couple of times was Bo, and he did in fact go to TRW M-4, we saw him walk right in the building, so there was no problem with that. Lance Trimmer, he was contacted in Montana to pick up a letter from Vang Pao's ranch.

Q. Who was the letter for?

A. It was General Vang Pao's identification and introduction to Lieutenant Colonel Souboun, S-o-u-b-o-u-n, I believe it is spelled.

Q. A guerilla?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was to be brought by you, by the team?

A. Whoever was going to meet with Souboun was to deliver the letter and it was in a sealed envelope, not just a regular lick'em, stick'em shut. It had a Laos seal on it.

Q. Can you tell us the names of all the people, Vang Pao's people in Thailand that you knew?

A. Gosh, if I could look at the book. There was Colonel Souboun, there was another strange name, okay, there was Sung torn -- I'll spell the last name, C-h-i-r-a-y-o-s. We called him Southern Chicago. There was a Colonel Soubom, S-o-u-b-o-m, in the pictures we worked with some of the guerillas, some of them are in here. I couldn't even begin to pronounce their names.

Q. These were all contacts that Vang Pao gave to you?

A. Right. He had already prearranged two people. There was a photograph of myself and a photograph of Bo Gritz that were given to General Vang Pao that he was going to have couriered to his people and it was either one or both of us were supposed to show up. Of course, everybody assumed it would be Bo, being the big Green Beret would be the man to go. It wasn't until the last moment that he was asked to stay behind, which really didn't cause suspicion. It concerned some of the Delta members more than it did me. I thought well, wait a minute. This guy's supposed to be going, at the airport. Matter of fact the day we were to leave, he got orders to stay behind and to help plan the actual rescue, which still bothers me.

Q. When was the actual rescue supposed to take place?

A. If there was a confirmation, the rescue was supposed to take place within 72 hours of the satellite burst confirming the existence of Americans in a particular camp. That's a 3-day launch period, if they could get in, confirm it within 72 hours, there was supposed to be a rescue.

Q. How long before the team was leaving California did Bo announce that he wasn't going?

A. The day.

Q. It was just that day?

A. As I recall, it was like I've been told I've got to stay behind and help finish the actual rescue team itself which made sense in that he was a Green Beret commander.

Q. Were there any practices or rehearsals of the reconnaissance mission, any stagings of it?

A. They had some, yeah, but I was never aware of them. I certainly didn't partake.

Q. You weren't involved?

A. No. not at all.

Q. The Delta members that you were describing, were these active Delta members or former Delta members?

A. Good question. As I recall, Jim said he retired. I think Ben still was active.

Q. Who's Jim?

A. Bath, J.D. Bath -- he uses Jim and Jeff so -- Mac, I think already was retired from service. However, they all did have green military cards. I think, well, there was a lot of them that could be phony. There was a lot of bogus from passports to military I.D,'s, to business cards, to you-name-it, so who knows what was real.

Q. What kind of equipment did you all take over there?

A. Who said we took any?

Q. Did you take any equipment?

A. Some equipment was brought over there -- high tech electronic, eavesdropping equipment, recording equipment, several compact and backpack type radios, a small, I wish I could describe it, almost like a TWX machine.

Q. I don't know what that is,

A. Like a teletype, similar to a teletype, only its pinpoint is like if you are reading braille. It was bumpy. You are not familiar?

Q. When you say it was brought over, who brought that stuff over?

A. It just showed up. It was part of the cargo to be brought.

Q. It just showed up in Bangkok?

A. It got there.

Q. Who actually left California to go to Bangkok?

A. There were four of us and there was supposed to be a six-man detail on that flight also who we never, throughout the entire flight, had contact to my knowledge with.

Q. Did you know who they were?

A. No, we had no idea. We knew that there was going to be six people on that plane that were involved for several reasons, one to make sure we weren't compromised, two to provide added intelligence and security support, and three to make sure that we got to where we were supposed to be going.

Q. Who were the four people in addition to you, who would?

A. Counting me it would be myself, Ben Donatowski, Bill Macris, and J.D. Bath, we were the only four from that flight.

Q. So Butch Johns didn't go?

A. Nor did Bo.

Q. And Vic?

A. Vic was just a business man.

Q. When you arrived in Thailand, did you go through customs?

A. Right. First, we went to Hong Kong, had about an hour or so layover. There was some contact made here.

Q. What was that like?

A. Hong Kong.

Q. Was there anything unusual about the contact?

A. Just that there was a discussion that merchandise that was on its way down that we couldn't carry with us was okay, was going to get there on time, and was going to be no problem.

Q. This was a discussion with customs?

A. No, no, in Hong Kong was a discussion with somebody that I was not privy to meet. As I recall his name was Silas Hong, an ICA representative. But, yes, we went through a kind of a customs when we arrived in Bangkok. There was some fear at first because part of this cargo that was handcarried tothe aircraft was electronic equipment and obviously if it was discovered, it would have been a violation of the Thai law.

Q. Was this a regular commercial airplane that you went on?

A. Yeah. PAN AM flight 1, yes.

Q. What happened, then you flew from Hong Kong to Bangkok?

A. To Bangkok.

Q. What happened when you got there?

A. First, there was a little concern. We split up. It's almost like we went through -- there wasn't that many. It's not like United States where everything's all high tech like. There was almost, when they took our passports and ran the numbers, no problem. They didn't even look at anything. Immediately got in separate vehicles and I think it was myself and J.D. went to the Rajah.

Q. Is that a hotel?

A. Yes. And then Ben and Mac went to the NaNa where I had previously stayed in June of '81.

Q. What was your understanding as to why you got through customs so easily?

A. That we had been expected, that it was obviously a government operation, and that our two countries were assisting the stuff needed in, and it needed to be brought in with the people that were going to use it.

Q. What was the first thing you did after arriving in Bangkok relative to the mission?

A. Well, we went to the Rajah and went to bed, got up the next day to have a meeting with Colonel Mike Eiland, and met with an American named Ken Vest at Gym World, and --

Q. What were those meetings about?

A. To confirm that certain weapons had arrived.

Q. Weapons that arrived with you?

A. No, no, no. They had the previous meeting in Hong Kong about.

Q. These were weapons that Bo had arranged to arrive in Bangkok from elsewhere?

A. I didn't say Bo, but the operation, yes.

Q. Someone connected to the operation?

A. Yes.

Q. Had arranged to have additional weapons?

A. Right.

Q. What kind of weapons did you have?

A. Armor light 180's.

Q. What are those?

A. Basic 223 caliber automatic, semi automatic weapon.

Q. And these were to carry on the mission?

A. Well, I don't know. They were weapons that someone was to use.

Q. Did you have meetings with any of Vang Pao's people?

A. Not in Bangkok, no.

Q. When did that happen?

A. We've jumped way ahead.

Q. Let's not jump way ahead then. What else happened in Bangkok before you left to go closer to the Laotian border?

A. Well, Mike Eiland came from the embassy, there was some discussions with Mac and I think it was Ben met with him and I think the next day J.D. and I left, went down and had our passports stamped that we were leaving the country and we flew up to Udorn.

Q. How did it come about you were going to go on the mission all of a sudden, on the reconnaissance mission?

A. Well, it didn't. I was still going to go and introduce them to Vang Pao's people up in the NKP, Nakhon Phanom and Nung Kai, right up on the border. So somewhere along the lines I was going to have to go up there and introduce them, which was not a problem, you know, just catch a flight back.

Q. But Vang Pao's people were still inside Thailand?

A. You have to understand, here you have the Mekong River. Here's Laos, and here's Thai, and here's people zig-zagged all up and down across the river, so they have refugee camps all along on the free side, so they do cross border, so I had obviously known all up to Nung Kai here that he had people staged all along here.

Q. So you got your passport stamped in the event you had to cross the river?

A. No, no, I got it stamped that I left Thailand.

Q. Why did you do that?

A. Because it was brought to our attention like from this day on you guys are out of Thailand, the whole world, if anything ever happens, you are not here. I didn't have a problem with that. What we needed to do, we needed to do so they stamped it, that we left on I think it was the 24th October, 1981.

Q. So in other words the purpose of that was to keep the secrecy of this?

A. Right and there's stamp that we left Thailand 24th October, 1981.

Q. Who arranged to have your passport stamped like that?

A. I have no idea who arranged it.

Q. Where did it get stamped?

A. It got stamped right there in an office at the airport as we were boarding the plane.

Q. To Udorn?

A. To Udorn, air base.

Q. And that's still in Thailand?

A. Northern Thailand.

Q. So you and J.D. went up there?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened when you got to Udorn?

A. In short we were met there. At first, I thought we got compromised. He apparently knew more than I did. He said no they