Nuclear Insecurity
 

Even after the horrific terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, security at two American nuclear weapons facilities has been penetrated at least three times during mock terrorist drills that the facilities knew about in advance.

This disturbing fact is disclosed in Correspondent Ed Bradley?s report on the state of security at American facilities housing nuclear weapons, and the deadly materials used to make them.

The 60 Minutes investigation reveals that in security tests conducted after Sept. 11, mock terrorists penetrated several layers of security on at least three occasions at the Y-12 nuclear complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn. - America's primary source of weapons-grade plutonium - and at Los Alamos National Laboratory near Albuquerque, N.M.

The performance in the regularly scheduled tests shows that security problems known for years still have not been adequately addressed despite the new terrorism risk.

Before the terrorist attacks in 2001, security at facilities like Los Alamos and Y-12 was known to have vulnerabilities.

"The test results that I was responsible for showed a 50 percent failure rate," says Richard Levernier of the mock terrorist assault drills he conducted for the Department of Energy at the nation's nine nuclear weapons factories and laboratories for the years leading up to 9/11.

"If you understand the consequences associated with the loss of that kind of material, it would make the World Trade Center event of Sept. 11 pale in comparison ? People should know that the Department of Energy facilities cannot withstand a full terrorist attack...a realistic attack, serious, state-sponsored."

D.O.E. improvements, like more razor wire, additional security personnel, and devices like motion detectors, still fall short.

"It's all window dressing...no substance to the security. It's what looks good from the outside," says Matthew Zipoli, a security guard at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory near San Francisco.

"We haven't been trained on the proper skills to get past an enemy...don't have the proper equipment....That degrades the effectiveness of our force."

Security requirements aren't taken seriously, either, says Zipoli. "In 1996 was the last time local law enforcement agencies participated in exercises with Livermore Laboratories," he says of the counterterrorism drills guards are required to hold with local law enforcement annually.

Another example of laxity is the fact that hundreds of electronic key cards and master keys --some of which opened classified areas -- have disappeared at these facilities. Livermore failed to immediately report its missing keys, and at Sandia National Laboratories near Albuquerque, the locks to the missing keys have just been replaced three years after they went missing.

"I find it inexplicable and unacceptable that people don't take [security concerns] seriously," says Linton Brooks, who heads the National Nuclear Security administration, "and that's why we have been working to fix that problem."

Security at the D.O.E. facilities, however, is "perfectly acceptable," maintains Brooks. "Safe and no problem is not the same thing."

Brooks adds that lapses known about since 1997 continue "because this is a complex system, there are always going to be problems and you have to continue to deal with those problems....We've got a long-term system to fix it."