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Operation Apache Snow
At 0700 Hrs the first 400 men of the 1/506th and 3/187th of the 3rd Brigade 101st Airborne Division mounted sixty-four Hueys and combat assaulted into the A Shau Valley.
It was the largest airmobile assault of the Vietnam War and that was only the beginning. Also CA-ing were the 2/501st 101st Abn., the 9th Marine Regiment, units of the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 1st ARVN Inf. Div. and also involved was the 3/5th Cavalry and attached units. The lifts flew south across the A Shau and then north along the Laotian border using the walls of the A Shau as a screen to the LZ's. It was a plan that paid off for we didn't lose any choppers, unlike the 1st Air Cavalry did during Operation Delaware. Lessons were well learned from the 1st Cav's operation in April 1968. While the 3/187th and A, B and C companies of 1/506th air assaulted into their LZ's, my company was already on the ground. We had CA'ed the day before and landed right smack in the middle of the valley near the location of the old Special Forces camp at Ta Bat on the Rao Lao River and secured the LZ for the artillery batteries which would support the rest of the 3rd Brigade's troopers and the 326th Combat Engineers of the 101st Abn. to build FSB Currahee. Everyone knew that the A Shau Valley was one of those places in Vietnam that was owned by the enemy and that became evident from the first day. All the units RIF-ing the valley were finding bunkers and having sporadic contact with the 3/187th in contact in the vicinity of Dong Ap Bia. |
11 May 1969
Once again signs of the enemy were being found by all the units with the discovery of bunkers, hooches and food stores. C/1/506 came under an hour long mortar attack that wounded 22 men. The 3/187th making their way up Hill 937 encountered stiff resistance and from documents taken from an NVA officer it was estimated that the 29th NVA Regiment was on the Dong Ap Bia mountains with a strength of between twelve and eighteen hundred troops. |
The 101st
Did a helluva job in one of the worst parts of that whole friggin' awful place. Here's to the men of the 101st that spent so much time in that friggin' A Shau....Bill, James, and Dan, you guys did a great job under horrible circumstances. Frisco also...just not sure he was in the A Shau.
Airborne! Pack |
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12 May 1969
With the exception of B/1/506 engaging three NVA and killing one of them the day was uneventful for the 1/506. The 3/187th was another story. After pounding Hill 937 all day with air strikes and artillery fire, B and D companies 3/187th tried to advance and experienced heavy enemy contact. The NVA was entrenched in fortified bunkers and when the companies of the 3/187th moved into NDP’s, all of the NDP’s were probed and at midnight were hit with very accurate mortar fire. |
Quote:
Bill, a sharp AIRBORNE hand salute to you and my other brother Screaming Eagles that entered the fight. You were missed, and mentioned often, at the Campout. Hope to see you there next year. |
13 May 1969
The units of the 1/506th kept finding bunkers, hootches and stores of food with A/1/506 engaging and killing a trail watcher. On Dong Ap Bia the companys of the 3/187th were in heavy contact. B & C companys moving up a ridge towards the enemy's positions were engaged by snipers, small arms and RPG's. C companys CP area was attacked resulting in two Rakkasans KIA and five wounded. D company had a medevac shot down while extracting wounded killing two men on the ground when it crashed. The 3rd Brigade commander, Col. Conmy ordered the 1/506th to reinforce the 3/187th. |
Bill, Sir!
Thank You, for sharing this! Am reading, and this time, I am also saving what you share, in my computer. Still to early to really "explain" things to my daughter. She will turn 7 years old this early July. But I have begun "lightly" to tell her some things, about Vic. She now knows that Vic and many other young men roughly in his age, once in your youth "went to another country, far away, where there is a lot of jungle". She does not know what "military" do other than a few funny anecdotes from my own service I have told her, such as for example that during survivaltraining, "daddy eat ants, and made tea from pine-needles" and so on. But she now knows that when Vic, and many young men his age during your early 20s of age, did go to that country with a lot of jumgle far away, you did so also "working while wearing green clothes" as I put it when explaining being in service. Am sorry for what above must seem as being "ramble", but my point is, I am saving what You share in Your posts about for example "Operation Apache Snow", also for my daughter to read one day. Not now though, as she is too young yet. But in some years in to the future from now, she will read your posts which I am currently saving to my C-drive. It is also my whish of that, when she becomes older, she may begin to talk with for example You Personally Sir, directly by e-mail and/or forums. Seeing and hearing how many people roughly my own age "are" over here were I live, makes me realise how much I do not want my own daughter to be "as they are". That is why I am so set on the importance of my daughter one day talking directly with for example You Sir! And that is also why it was so important for me to have her meet Vic, and for her also personally to keep in touch with him, allthough yet only by singing "Happy Birthday" over the telephone on his birthday, when not being over and visiting him in person. (Twice so far for my daughter, and 4 times for myself. But Vic is also comming over to visit us over here the summer of 2009). But as not yet even being 7 years old, this is a bit in to the future though. So what I am saying is that, what you are doing when you share your posts as above, is important also to me personally, in more ways than you may perhaps have reflected on as of yet. My daughter calls Vic "Uncle Vic". Perhaps soon in the future, she may also have an "Uncle Bill" to talk to. My daughter is however not the only one I am at times "explaining things" to. Am now having a new "stationing" at work. At this new stationing, there are a lot of "youngsters". Their view of what happened in former RVN and DRV between 1959-1975 (and still happens today for that matter, in RVN), is quite "odd" to say the least. Just the fact that I am telling them "1959" and not "1965", is "news" to them, as far as "when" the 2nd Indochina War actually begun! A few of them have now begun to realise that I am "informed" more in depth and detail, and have begun to listen when I tell them some things. They are now, more contiously (spelling = ?), beginning to realise how little certain "Hollywood-productions" regarding the war in SEA, have with reality. Again, Thank You! You are, and what you do is, Important! T G C! Sincerely A.B |
14 May 1969
The 1/506th was still discovering bunkers and started to encounter resistance while on the way to support the 3/187th. At 0645 the FAC in the 3/187th CP directed thirteen air strikes using napalm and 1000 lb. bombs on Dong Ap Bia. Arty from the nearby firebases also pounded the mountains. The companys moved out and C company encountered a bunker line and the NVA employed Claymores setup in trees, heavy mortar, RPG and small arms fire. B company was in a ferocious firefight with the NVA who were rolling grenades down the hill from their bunkers. One platoon of A company was hit with friendy fire from Cobras when they went to cover the withdrawal of B & C companys. The companys occupied NDPs and Spooky throughout the night raked the area between the 3/187th positions, west to the Laotian border. |
15 May 1969
The 1/506’s progress moving to help the 3/187th was being impeded by increasing contact with enemy units offering stiff resistance. Once again the Rakkasans of the 3/187th assault on Hill 937 was turned back although B company was able to overrun the first line of bunkers. When they tried to advance they were met with sniper and heavy machine-gun fire so SFC Louis Garza, who was acting platoon leader, marked the enemy positions with smoke and called for ARA. The gunships fired into the CP killing one and wounding 15. The 3/187th CO called off the attack. The CO of 1/506th reported that they were within 1200 meters of the 3/187th initial LZ. My company, D/1/506, had been running platoon sized RIF’s out of FSB Currahee daily and were also discovering bunkers. We were given a warning order and put on alert to possibly make a CA from Currahee to also support the 3/187th |
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