[Peter Dow]

Right, I knocked this railway map up in 20 minutes so don't think I am making any pretensions to be the new Isambard Kingdom Brunel but here it is anyway - see what you think. Just a suggestion - open to amendment or your better plans if you have any.


Map of proposed new railways in Afghanistan (large 1378 x 1480 pixels)

So that is a plan for about 1500 miles or 2400 km of new railway.

To secure this railway from attack by Taliban, warlord, terrorist or insurgent attack, fortified defensive machine gun nests or pillboxes would be needed every 1000 metres on each of the two borders along the railway route, closer than 1000 m where the terrain makes it easier for the enemy to sneak up close - bridges and cuttings or other cover - where you need more defensive firing angles to spot and then to stop an advance.

I propose using a dedicated Afghan railway & road supply route protection force to man the defensive machine gun positions which force would be part of the Afghan army.

I have figures for the number of Afghan army to staff the railway & road supply route protection force for a 2400km railway.

At 2 defensive positions - fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes - per kilometre - this would be a total of 4,800 defensive positions to man.

For additional security, additional fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes can be constructed which are normally unmanned. The purpose of empty defensive positions is to confuse an attacker who then may be firing at an unmanned position.

For example, if additional defensive positions are constructed, say every 200 metres, yet only 1 in 5 positions are manned then an attacker only has a 1 in 5 chance of firing at a manned position first of all.

Then 4 out 5 first attacks would miss the defenders altogether yet alert the defenders in the nearby manned positions which negates any advantage of surprise the attacker has initially.

Such additional security measures can be implemented at locations along the route where it is considered that attacks are more likely.

Such extra defensive positions can also be occupied when mobile forces arrive to respond to a sustained attack at that location.

I am assuming a 3 man team to man a defensive machine gun position at any time and to serve as lookouts.

So 3 x 4,800 = a staff of 14,400 to man the guns. Including officers to supervise, I estimate a total of 16,000 army staff on duty manning the guns at any one time.

At 3 x 8 hour shifts that is a total force of 48,000 army to defend the railway for 24 hours, 7 days a week. The off-duty staff would form a mobile reserve to respond to any sustained attacks at any point on the route and they would be best equipped with armoured vehicles to bring more fire-power to particular points on demand.

There should be enforced an exclusion border either side of the supply route which prevents anyone getting close enough to fire a rocket propelled grenade at the defensive machine gun positions. Some claim the range of an RPG can be as far as 1000 metres in the hands of a trained person, though sources vary on this question it would be cautious design to assume the need for a wider exclusion border, say 1100m on either side of the railway.

Barbed wire can help to remind civilians where not to go unless they wish to risk being shot.

For public crossing points, to cross from one side of the supply route to the other or to use a railway station, we would need to build fortified police check-points where those wanting to cross get permission from the police which is radioed to the army in the machine-gun nests when an authorised party has permission to cross.

For the crossing points, and railway stations, the police check-points would be manned by a reliable Afghan police force.

I have not calculated the numbers of Afghan police required. That depends on how many stations and crossing points you have and how busy they are, how many people need to be screened and so on and I don't have an estimate of those numbers as yet.

Now that is a lot of work for the Afghans to get busy on but better doing that than growing poppies or serving with the Taliban or warlords, demanding pay-offs to allow our supplies through, planting IEDs or becoming suicide bombers.

This is war and in war conscription is allowed. In WW2 the British men had the choice of armed service or work down the mines. The Afghan government at our demand needs to give the Afghans, especially in poppy-growing and strong Taliban-recruiting areas, where the insurgency is strong, similar war-time choices.

All with the agreement of the Afghan president of course. So we would need a Afghan president who would agree to those kind of tough measures to fix Afghanistan and if not and he was happy with poppies, IEDs, suicide bombers, civilian and military casualties then obviously such an Afghan president is siding with the Taliban enemy is violating constitutional understandings about what NATO-ISAF are demanding from Afghanistan and such an enemy president needs arresting, impeachment, removal by NATO-ISAF and there would have to be a new election for president. Hopefully it won't come to that and agreements can be reached to end this drift and chaos of supply attempted across ground controlled by the warlords and the Taliban.

After 9 years of being in Afghanistan, the US-British-led coalition, NATO-ISAF instead of having a railway and roads and secure supply routes constructed, we have 300 British dead and 1000 American dead and not much to show for it.

I prefer a more purposeful plan such as this compared to the drift we have been getting so far from the Afghan government. It seems to me we need NATO-ISAF vision and purpose and a coherent military plan to save this Afghanistan intervention from disaster.