Medivac flying into hot LZs

On Thu, 31 Jul 2003 1353 GMT, "jwags"
wrote:

> Here ya go..my statement of "fact"
>
> Page 107, we were soldiers once, and young
>
>" Hauling the wounded off the battlefield was a medical evacuation
>helicopter mission. But this was early in the war and the medivac commanders
>had decreed that thier birds would not land in hot landing zones- or in
>other words, that they would not go were they were needed."

I was there early and in February of 66 we had a mass casualty
situation but whoever was on watch at Battalion that night would not
risk his choppers for a night medivac. Our Sixer finally got up the
chain of command and that officer was replaced instantly and sent
home. It was called Operation Mallard.
> Now exactly how would you interpret that statement?
>
> This is why I asked if this was an isolated incident or something that
>changed throughout the war.
> I was not assuming that they would not risk themselves, but asking what
>really happened based on the statement made in the book.
>
> Now what exactly is wrong with that?
>
> I have nothing but respect for all you guys that served over there. I am
>but a few that are taking the time to find out the real story, from the
>people that were there. I may ask a few stupid questions. But I am not
>meaning any disrespect by it. If I didn't give a shit I wouldn't be here. It
>sounds like I could learn alot from you. And I would like to. If given the
>chance.
>
> Jeff
>
>
>
>"John?] "
> wrote in message
>news:310720030005019144%jmerk06@earthlink.net...
>>
>> Go back an read what you wrote; it's just below.
>>
>> You made a statement of *fact* that you read in Moore and Galloways
>> book that "The medivac(sic) guys would not fly into a hot LZ", but when
>> called upon to back it up, you make vague references to vague
>> statements in the book and other vague references to other unnamed
>> books and stories. When you attribute a statement like that to an
>> author, you should be prepared to back it up with an exact quote. It
>> has nothing to do with jumping in anyones shit, it has to do with
>> telling the truth, which you seem to have a problem with. You made a
>> statement that is simply untrue and now you are attempting to waffle
>> your way out of it.
>>
>> When an aircraft goes into a hot LZ to drop off food or water or ammo
>> or any of a hundred things, it's dumb for it to leave empty and then to
>> risk another ship to haul wounded. You bring the cargo in and haul the
>> wounded out; it's simply efficient utilization of assets. If there are
>> no unit aircraft in the vicinity, call Dustoff. I've never heard of
>> them refusing a mission. If there are wounded who need help, you just
>> go and ask questions later. I've been hailed on the emergency channel
>> to pick up wounded just because someone saw us fly over and took a
>> chance that we were monitoring it. If we had the fuel to divert to the
>> nearest evac hospital, we never turned down a request. Any helicopter
>> crew, DUSTOFF or not, would do likewise.
>>
>> If you have legitimate questions ask them, but don't make statements
>> you can't back up.
>>
>> ...and if I were any more relaxed, I'd be asleep.
>>
>> John Mercadante
>> B-7/1 Air Cav, 1970-71
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In article <6x0Wa.15726$cF.7395@rwcrnsc53>, jwags
>> wrote:
>>
>> > This is exactly why I asked.
>> > Because I don't know.
>> > And there was SEVERAL referances in that book saying that they did not
>> > depend on medivac but instead relied on their own huey crews to evac
>> > wounded. Several, as in more than two.
>> > I have been around usenet long enough to know there is always a few
>people
>> > in every group that feel the need to jump someones shit over anything
>they
>> > feel they can justify.
>> > If you notice I asked if this was an isloated incident. Implying that I
>did
>> > not believe this was true all of the time. But thought perhaps varied
>with
>> > who where and when.
>> > I also was referring to a few other stories I have read online and in
>some
>> > books of short stories.
>> > Relax man....
>> >
>> > jeff
>> >
>> >
>> > "John?]
>"
>> > wrote in message
>> > news:300720032031177396%jmerk06@earthlink.net...
>> > > In article , jwags
>> > > wrote:
>> > >
>> > > > I am taking upon myself to try and learn as much as I can about the
>> > Vietnam
>> > > > war. I am 37 and when I was in school they barely brushed on the
>war.
>> > Just
>> > > > to get it out of the way. The only thing I really knew was the image
>> > that
>> > > > Hollywood presented.
>> > > > Which as I am finding out is not only false but very disrespectful
>and
>> > > > damaging to everyone that served our country honorably over there.
>> > > > In the early years as detailed in Moore and Galloways book among a
>few
>> > > > other short stories I have read in some compilation books. The
>medivac
>> > guys
>> > > > would not fly into a hot LZ. Instead the guys depended on their
>slick
>> > pilots
>> > > > to fly out wounded when the bullets were still flying.
>> > > > My question is, did this change as the war went on? Was this an
>> > isolated
>> > > > instance of them not flying into a hot LZ? Or was it this way
>throughout
>> > > > most of the war? Who made the call if they flew in or not?
>> > > >
>> > > > Jeff
>> > >
>> > > You seem to have a knack for reading things into a book that simply
>> > > aren't there. There are two references to MEDEVAC aircraft in the
>book
>> > > and neither says that "...the MEDEVAC guys would not fly into a hot
>> > > LZ". The reason that there is no such statement is that it is simply
>> > > untrue. Despite the tiny sliver of the total pilot population
>> > > represented by MEDEVAC pilots, two of the four Medals of Honor awarded
>> > > to helicopter pilots in Vietnam went to DUSTOFF pilots. Try doing
>some
>> > > homework at http://www.dustoff.org--Tell Joe Doc that I sent you.
>> > > Meanwhile:
>> > >
>> > > NOVOSEL, MICHAEL J.
>> > >
>> > > Rank and organization: Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, 82d Medical
>> > > Detachment, 45th Medical Company, 68th Medical Group. Place and date:
>> > > Kien Tuong Province, Republic of Vietnam, 2 October 1969. Entered
>> > > service at: Kenner, La. Born: 3 September 1922, Etna, Pa. Citation:
>For
>> > > conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his
>life
>> > > above and beyond the call of duty. CWO Novosel, 82d Medical
>Detachment,
>> > > distinguished himself while serving as commander of a medical
>> > > evacuation helicopter. He unhesitatingly maneuvered his helicopter
>into
>> > > a heavily fortified and defended enemy training area where a group of
>> > > wounded Vietnamese soldiers were pinned down by a large enemy force.
>> > > Flying without gunship or other cover and exposed to intense
>machinegun
>> > > fire, CWO Novosel was able to locate and rescue a wounded soldier.
>> > > Since all communications with the beleaguered troops had been lost, he
>> > > repeatedly circled the battle area, flying at low level under
>> > > continuous heavy fire, to attract the attention of the scattered
>> > > friendly troops. This display of courage visibly raised their morale,
>> > > as they recognized this as a signal to assemble for evacuation. On 6
>> > > occasions he and his crew were forced out of the battle area by the
>> > > intense enemy fire, only to circle and return from another direction
>to
>> > > land and extract additional troops. Near the end of the mission, a
>> > > wounded soldier was spotted close to an enemy bunker. Fully realizing
>> > > that he would attract a hail of enemy fire, CWO Novosel nevertheless
>> > > attempted the extraction by hovering the helicopter backward. As the
>> > > man was pulled on aboard, enemy automatic weapons opened fire at close
>> > > range, damaged the aircraft and wounded CWO Novosel. He momentarily
>> > > lost control of the aircraft, but quickly recovered and departed under
>> > > the withering enemy fire. In all, 15 extremely hazardous extractions
>> > > were performed in order to remove wounded personnel. As a direct
>result
>> > > of his selfless conduct, the lives of 29 soldiers were saved. The
>> > > extraordinary heroism displayed by CWO Novosel was an inspiration to
>> > > his comrades in arms and reflect great credit on him, his unit, and
>the
>> > > U.S. Army.
>

On 31 Jul 2003 13:39:16 GMT, grglnsctt@cs.com (GrgLnsctt) wrote:

>>Was this an isolated
>>instance of them not flying into a hot LZ? Or was it this way throughout
>>most of the war? Who made the call if they flew in or not?
>>
>
>Jeff,
>
>The pilot made the call. It was his deciscion to risk aircraft and crew going
>into a hot LZ. The medevac pilots in my AO and timeframe most certainly risked
>mucho hauling out our wounded. C & C (command & control - the battalion
>commander) and Utility (resupply) choppers also picked up wounded.
>
>But the medevac pilots devised extraordinary flying techniques to quickly get
>in and out of hot LZs. You might visit the VHPA website (Vietnam Helicopter
>Pilot Association) for further information.
>
>Best Regards
>
>Greg
I have nothing but respect for all the chopper pilots. They did
their best, under some pretty tough conditions. I would rather have a
pilot refuse to come into a Hot LZ, than come in and get shot down.
http://cpcug.org/user/jlacombe/tom.html

>I have nothing but respect for all the chopper pilots. They did
>their best, under some pretty tough conditions. I would rather have a
>pilot refuse to come into a Hot LZ, than come in and get shot down.

Tom,

same samo. We'd be getting it on out there and the last thing we needed was
a(nother) downed helo to contend with. All I remember is I felt a helluva lot
better being on the ground with a little concealment as opposed to being a big
fat flying target.

Best Regards

Greg

In article <5G8Wa.28401$uu5.3611@sccrnsc04>, jwags
wrote:

> Here ya go..my statement of "fact"
>
> Page 107, we were soldiers once, and young
>
> " Hauling the wounded off the battlefield was a medical evacuation
> helicopter mission. But this was early in the war and the medivac commanders
> had decreed that thier birds would not land in hot landing zones- or in
> other words, that they would not go were they were needed."
>
> Now exactly how would you interpret that statement?

Your quote is exactly correct, but puzzling. The battalion aid station
party arrived, under fire, aboard a medevac aircraft in the second
lift. Later on the first day, two more medevac aircraft attempted to
land at LZ X-Ray under fire. One succeeded and evacuated two wounded
and the other aborted the mission after receiving hits. If landing in
hot LZs was contrary to some policy, written or unwritten, they would
never have left their base or would never have commenced an approach
once they arrived on station. I frankly can't answer your question.

> This is why I asked if this was an isolated incident or something that
> changed throughout the war.
> I was not assuming that they would not risk themselves, but asking what
> really happened based on the statement made in the book.
>
> Now what exactly is wrong with that?

The aircraft commander of a helicopter is the captain of his ship, both
literally and figuratively. The decision to land or take off is his
and his alone. Try this comparison; if you see someone drowning in a
lake, would you jump in and try to save them? What if you can't get to
him and you both drown? Likewise, the aircraft commander has to assess
the risk and decide whether to risk his ship and crew to save a wounded
man. If he guesses wrong, not only could he and his crew be killed,
but many more wounded on the ground could die due to the loss of the
aircraft.

Here's some more background:
************************************************** **********************
Perhaps the mission of DUSTOFF and MEDEVAC is best said by author John
L. Cook in his book Rescue Under Fire:

"From 1962 to 1973, a total of 496,000 DUSTOFF missions were flown.*
Over 900,000 patients were airlifted from battlefields, rice paddies,
destroyed villages, and triple-canopy jungles, at all hours of the
night of day, under all weather conditions, in the face of intense
enemy fire.* While the primary objective of DUSTOFF was the evacuation
of wounded American soldiers, everyone in the combat zone benefited
from this extraordinary service, even the enemy.* Over the course of
the Vietnam War, thousands of wounded Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
soldiers were saved by DUSTOFF.* The average time-lapse between
wounding and hospitalization was less than one hour.* As a result,
fewer than one percent of all Americans wounded, who were able to
survive the first 24 hours, died.* These are unbelievably good numbers,
yet somewhere along the way they have been lost by a nation completely
self absorbed by the losses in Vietnam.

The surgeons at the evacuation hospitals often performed medical
miracles on seriously wounded soldiers, and a great deal of the credit
for the low mortality rate must go to them.* However, before the
wounded could be saved they had to get to the hospital as quickly as
possible.* It was this sense of urgency that drove the DUSTOFF crews,
and they paid a high price for their dedication.* Over their eleven
year span, more than 200 crewmen were killed, and many, many more were
wounded.* No record lists all of the DUSTOFF pilots, crew chiefs, and
medics who were wounded, and few document the bravery of those who
died.* At the peak of the war, only 140 helicopters out of a total
fleet of more than 5,000 flew DUSTOFF missions.* Yet, these 140
helicopters made a critical difference.* Flying DUSTOFF was three times
more dangerous than all other forms of helicopter missions in the
combat zone.* This figure is borne out by the high rate of DUSTOFF
losses to enemy fire.* During the course of the war, over 200 DUSTOFF's
were shot down by the enemy.

There is no question that these were truly exceptional men, performing
on an exceptional level throughout the war.* Yet, for the most part,
they were quite ordinary before becoming a part of DUSTOFF.* In many
respects, this is to be expected.* They simply rose to the level
required of them, which has always been a distinctive characteristic of
Americans in combat.* With DUSTOFF, however, it was much more than
this.* There were other intangibles that went into building the DUSTOFF
legacy, creating an environment that drove these men to a level of
performance far above what could reasonably be expected.* Part of this
can be explained by the realization that they were part of an elite
organization that included such icons as Charles Kelly, and that they
had extremely high standards to maintain.

While many of their peers back in the states were dodging the draft,
burning the flag, and protesting the war, the DUSTOFF crews simply kept
flying missions, aware that their efforts were being jeered by an
uninformed and ungrateful public at home.* In spite of all this, they
kept doing what had to be done.* Perhaps this is the ultimate
expression of courage, honor and dedication which defined the men of
DUSTOFF.* In the end, however, nothing can fully explain these truly
magnificent me.

By any measurement, flying half a million missions is a staggering
accomplishment.* Yet, all of this was accomplished by DUSTOFF crews
whose average age was barely twenty years old.* In many states today,
men that young can't even buy a beer, qualify for a credit card, or buy
a car without a co-signer.* For most, flying DUSTOFF missions was the
first real job they had ever held.* They came in all shapes and sizes,
from every state in the union, and represented every ethnic, social and
religious group in the country.* The crews included draftees,
enlistees, and West Point graduates.* Men from the coalfields of West
Virginia blended easily with men from the wheat fields of Kansas and
the oil fields of Texas.* They all had hopes, dreams, and plans for the
future, just like everyone else.* Some had girlfriends waiting for them
when they returned, and others had wives and families.* And when they
crawled into their DUSTOFF ships to fly the mission, none of this
mattered.* The only thing that mattered was the mission.* And, because
they were able to set aside every consideration, they flew a half a
million of them".
************************************************** ********************

On Thu, 31 Jul 2003 1632 GMT, "John‰]*
************************************************** *************"
wrote:
>him and you both drown? Likewise, the aircraft commander has to assess
>the risk and decide whether to risk his ship and crew to save a wounded
>man. If he guesses wrong, not only could he and his crew be killed,
>but many more wounded on the ground could die due to the loss of the
>aircraft.


AND, any further landing by medevac or other helicopters might be
prevented by a crashed ship on the LZ. Once you're down, no one can
land where you stop crashing.

The AC Hovers, the PP studies the instruments, the Gunner
watches Starboard, the Chief assesses the LZ, Tailrotor,
Port side, Main Rotor, under side and fires his Weapon
while looking at Gages all at the same time.
The Chief tells the AC where to Hover, the Gunner
should help.
The Ship is in the Chiefs name. Unless an AC loses
say Left Pedal then its the ACs fault. If a Tailrotor falls
off its sure not the ACs fault it hit nothing.
A Ship may leave to let Guns work, but must come back.
It has to stay in that AO unless out of Fuel, if so another
Ship has to be there before leaving and having a Sit Rep.

That is the Ideal, not the facts in many cases. Only Crew
coordination works, there are no individuals on board.
[Exceptions; see bottom of para.]
You may have a SF who knows the AO, but he can only
make suggestions. He has a Head Set or Flight Helmet on.
If in clear & present danger, then anyone who can see danger
can order a Ship to leave. No questions asked until later.
Ground has that same right. That someone better be right

A Chase Ship counts height and distance in Meters to the LZ
in heavy Forest and possible Hot fire areas, Ground does the
same as the Ship fly's Nap of Earth. You can't see a damn thing
at speed, just a blur for the most part.

"fob" wrote in message news:FW1Wa.1164$jg.345857@news1.news.adelphia.net. ..
No, the entire 52D was there and had a few surprises
West of the Mastiff.
Try W.E.B Griffiths/sic/ ' The Aviators. '
Boring, but the beginning is good.
I only heard Rumors of not going in, I know of
none who ever did that. Some of the books that state it
have been found to be by Wannabes....
If you don't want to Fly the Army will put you into maintaining
Air Craft. Failing that you become a Stevedore and came
home very, very wealthy.

Flying is a Volunteer job for Pilots and Crew
they get paid with Lead Coins.


"jwags" wrote in message news:6x0Wa.15726$cF.7395@rwcrnsc53...
> This is exactly why I asked.
> Because I don't know.
> And there was SEVERAL referances in that book saying that they did not
> depend on medivac but instead relied on their own huey crews to evac
> wounded. Several, as in more than two.
> I have been around usenet long enough to know there is always a few people
> in every group that feel the need to jump someones shit over anything they
> feel they can justify.
> If you notice I asked if this was an isloated incident. Implying that I did
> not believe this was true all of the time. But thought perhaps varied with
> who where and when.
> I also was referring to a few other stories I have read online and in some
> books of short stories.
> Relax man....
>
> jeff
>
>
> "John?] "
> wrote in message
> news:300720032031177396%jmerk06@earthlink.net...
> > In article , jwags
> > wrote:
> >
> > > I am taking upon myself to try and learn as much as I can about the
> Vietnam
> > > war. I am 37 and when I was in school they barely brushed on the war.
> Just
> > > to get it out of the way. The only thing I really knew was the image
> that
> > > Hollywood presented.
> > > Which as I am finding out is not only false but very disrespectful and
> > > damaging to everyone that served our country honorably over there.
> > > In the early years as detailed in Moore and Galloways book among a few
> > > other short stories I have read in some compilation books. The medivac
> guys
> > > would not fly into a hot LZ. Instead the guys depended on their slick
> pilots
> > > to fly out wounded when the bullets were still flying.
> > > My question is, did this change as the war went on? Was this an
> isolated
> > > instance of them not flying into a hot LZ? Or was it this way throughout
> > > most of the war? Who made the call if they flew in or not?
> > >
> > > Jeff
> >
> > You seem to have a knack for reading things into a book that simply
> > aren't there. There are two references to MEDEVAC aircraft in the book
> > and neither says that "...the MEDEVAC guys would not fly into a hot
> > LZ". The reason that there is no such statement is that it is simply
> > untrue. Despite the tiny sliver of the total pilot population
> > represented by MEDEVAC pilots, two of the four Medals of Honor awarded
> > to helicopter pilots in Vietnam went to DUSTOFF pilots. Try doing some
> > homework at http://www.dustoff.org--Tell Joe Doc that I sent you.
> > Meanwhile:
> >
> > NOVOSEL, MICHAEL J.
> >
> > Rank and organization: Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, 82d Medical
> > Detachment, 45th Medical Company, 68th Medical Group. Place and date:
> > Kien Tuong Province, Republic of Vietnam, 2 October 1969. Entered
> > service at: Kenner, La. Born: 3 September 1922, Etna, Pa. Citation: For
> > conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life
> > above and beyond the call of duty. CWO Novosel, 82d Medical Detachment,
> > distinguished himself while serving as commander of a medical
> > evacuation helicopter. He unhesitatingly maneuvered his helicopter into
> > a heavily fortified and defended enemy training area where a group of
> > wounded Vietnamese soldiers were pinned down by a large enemy force.
> > Flying without gunship or other cover and exposed to intense machinegun
> > fire, CWO Novosel was able to locate and rescue a wounded soldier.
> > Since all communications with the beleaguered troops had been lost, he
> > repeatedly circled the battle area, flying at low level under
> > continuous heavy fire, to attract the attention of the scattered
> > friendly troops. This display of courage visibly raised their morale,
> > as they recognized this as a signal to assemble for evacuation. On 6
> > occasions he and his crew were forced out of the battle area by the
> > intense enemy fire, only to circle and return from another direction to
> > land and extract additional troops. Near the end of the mission, a
> > wounded soldier was spotted close to an enemy bunker. Fully realizing
> > that he would attract a hail of enemy fire, CWO Novosel nevertheless
> > attempted the extraction by hovering the helicopter backward. As the
> > man was pulled on aboard, enemy automatic weapons opened fire at close
> > range, damaged the aircraft and wounded CWO Novosel. He momentarily
> > lost control of the aircraft, but quickly recovered and departed under
> > the withering enemy fire. In all, 15 extremely hazardous extractions
> > were performed in order to remove wounded personnel. As a direct result
> > of his selfless conduct, the lives of 29 soldiers were saved. The
> > extraordinary heroism displayed by CWO Novosel was an inspiration to
> > his comrades in arms and reflect great credit on him, his unit, and the
> > U.S. Army.
>
>

Thank you very much John..
that was a good read and very informative.

Jeff


"John?] "
wrote in message
news:310720031123308770%jmerk06@earthlink.net...
> In article <5G8Wa.28401$uu5.3611@sccrnsc04>, jwags
> wrote:
>
> > Here ya go..my statement of "fact"
> >
> > Page 107, we were soldiers once, and young
> >
> > " Hauling the wounded off the battlefield was a medical evacuation
> > helicopter mission. But this was early in the war and the medivac
commanders
> > had decreed that thier birds would not land in hot landing zones- or in
> > other words, that they would not go were they were needed."
> >
> > Now exactly how would you interpret that statement?
>
> Your quote is exactly correct, but puzzling. The battalion aid station
> party arrived, under fire, aboard a medevac aircraft in the second
> lift. Later on the first day, two more medevac aircraft attempted to
> land at LZ X-Ray under fire. One succeeded and evacuated two wounded
> and the other aborted the mission after receiving hits. If landing in
> hot LZs was contrary to some policy, written or unwritten, they would
> never have left their base or would never have commenced an approach
> once they arrived on station. I frankly can't answer your question.
>
> > This is why I asked if this was an isolated incident or something that
> > changed throughout the war.
> > I was not assuming that they would not risk themselves, but asking what
> > really happened based on the statement made in the book.
> >
> > Now what exactly is wrong with that?
>
> The aircraft commander of a helicopter is the captain of his ship, both
> literally and figuratively. The decision to land or take off is his
> and his alone. Try this comparison; if you see someone drowning in a
> lake, would you jump in and try to save them? What if you can't get to
> him and you both drown? Likewise, the aircraft commander has to assess
> the risk and decide whether to risk his ship and crew to save a wounded
> man. If he guesses wrong, not only could he and his crew be killed,
> but many more wounded on the ground could die due to the loss of the
> aircraft.
>
> Here's some more background:
> ************************************************** **********************
> Perhaps the mission of DUSTOFF and MEDEVAC is best said by author John
> L. Cook in his book Rescue Under Fire:
>
> "From 1962 to 1973, a total of 496,000 DUSTOFF missions were flown.
> Over 900,000 patients were airlifted from battlefields, rice paddies,
> destroyed villages, and triple-canopy jungles, at all hours of the
> night of day, under all weather conditions, in the face of intense
> enemy fire. While the primary objective of DUSTOFF was the evacuation
> of wounded American soldiers, everyone in the combat zone benefited
> from this extraordinary service, even the enemy. Over the course of
> the Vietnam War, thousands of wounded Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
> soldiers were saved by DUSTOFF. The average time-lapse between
> wounding and hospitalization was less than one hour. As a result,
> fewer than one percent of all Americans wounded, who were able to
> survive the first 24 hours, died. These are unbelievably good numbers,
> yet somewhere along the way they have been lost by a nation completely
> self absorbed by the losses in Vietnam.
>
> The surgeons at the evacuation hospitals often performed medical
> miracles on seriously wounded soldiers, and a great deal of the credit
> for the low mortality rate must go to them. However, before the
> wounded could be saved they had to get to the hospital as quickly as
> possible. It was this sense of urgency that drove the DUSTOFF crews,
> and they paid a high price for their dedication. Over their eleven
> year span, more than 200 crewmen were killed, and many, many more were
> wounded. No record lists all of the DUSTOFF pilots, crew chiefs, and
> medics who were wounded, and few document the bravery of those who
> died. At the peak of the war, only 140 helicopters out of a total
> fleet of more than 5,000 flew DUSTOFF missions. Yet, these 140
> helicopters made a critical difference. Flying DUSTOFF was three times
> more dangerous than all other forms of helicopter missions in the
> combat zone. This figure is borne out by the high rate of DUSTOFF
> losses to enemy fire. During the course of the war, over 200 DUSTOFF's
> were shot down by the enemy.
>
> There is no question that these were truly exceptional men, performing
> on an exceptional level throughout the war. Yet, for the most part,
> they were quite ordinary before becoming a part of DUSTOFF. In many
> respects, this is to be expected. They simply rose to the level
> required of them, which has always been a distinctive characteristic of
> Americans in combat. With DUSTOFF, however, it was much more than
> this. There were other intangibles that went into building the DUSTOFF
> legacy, creating an environment that drove these men to a level of
> performance far above what could reasonably be expected. Part of this
> can be explained by the realization that they were part of an elite
> organization that included such icons as Charles Kelly, and that they
> had extremely high standards to maintain.
>
> While many of their peers back in the states were dodging the draft,
> burning the flag, and protesting the war, the DUSTOFF crews simply kept
> flying missions, aware that their efforts were being jeered by an
> uninformed and ungrateful public at home. In spite of all this, they
> kept doing what had to be done. Perhaps this is the ultimate
> expression of courage, honor and dedication which defined the men of
> DUSTOFF. In the end, however, nothing can fully explain these truly
> magnificent me.
>
> By any measurement, flying half a million missions is a staggering
> accomplishment. Yet, all of this was accomplished by DUSTOFF crews
> whose average age was barely twenty years old. In many states today,
> men that young can't even buy a beer, qualify for a credit card, or buy
> a car without a co-signer. For most, flying DUSTOFF missions was the
> first real job they had ever held. They came in all shapes and sizes,
> from every state in the union, and represented every ethnic, social and
> religious group in the country. The crews included draftees,
> enlistees, and West Point graduates. Men from the coalfields of West
> Virginia blended easily with men from the wheat fields of Kansas and
> the oil fields of Texas. They all had hopes, dreams, and plans for the
> future, just like everyone else. Some had girlfriends waiting for them
> when they returned, and others had wives and families. And when they
> crawled into their DUSTOFF ships to fly the mission, none of this
> mattered. The only thing that mattered was the mission. And, because
> they were able to set aside every consideration, they flew a half a
> million of them".
> ************************************************** ********************