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Command Chronology!!!
COMMAND CHRONOLOGY!!!
Subject: RCT 5 Narrative History >Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2003 1632 -0400 > >The initial organization for combat for RCT-5 included the organic 5th >Marine Regiment Battalions (1st, 2d and 3d Battalions) as well as separate >battalions from both the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, to include 1st Light >Armored Reconnaissance Bn, 2nd Tank Bn. Additionally 2nd Battalion, 11th >Marines and Combat Service Support Company 115 were in Direct Support to >RCT-5. By the time the RCT crossed the line of departure, the RCT had >grown >to include elements of the 1st United Kingdom (UK) Division. RCT-5 attacked >with approximately 7500 personnel and in excess of 2000 pieces of rolling >stock. Following the successful completion of the "Opening Gambit", the >seizure of the strategically important Ramalyah Oilfields, the elements of >the 1st UK Division detached and the RCT's end strength remained >consistently around 6,000 Marines and sailors. Finally, as the RCT >attacked >up Highway 1, 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Bn was attached adding >another 900 Marines and Sailors under Col Dunford's control and leadership. > > >In the early morning hours of 18 March the Division was ordered to move to >their Dispersal Areas (DA), the first step of pending combat action. >Because of the numerous hours spent rehearsing and imaging, the RCT >executed >the move seamlessly. No sooner than the bulk of the RCT arrived in their >dispersal areas, and with much of the CSS elements still enroute, the RCT >was ordered to occupy positions just short of their Attack Positions (AP) >in >order to facilitate easy transition into the APs. Colonel Dunford's quick >assessment and fragmentary order issued over the TAC net got the RCT in >place ready for the next step. On the 19th of March Colonel Dunford spent >the day on the road moving from battalion to battalion reviewing the plan >with leaders and reassuring the Marines of their preparedness to execute >the >task at hand. > >On 20 March, RCT-5 was given the order to attack the next morning. Mid- >afternoon Colonel Dunford was queried about how soon the RCT could be >prepared to attack, after a quick assessment and confirmation with his >subordinate commanders, six hours was set as the optimal time, although the >RCT could be ready earlier if required. Despite best-laid plans, the RCT >was ordered to attack in 2 hours, some nine hours earlier than originally >planned, and ahead of the coalition's and Division's Main effort time of >attack. Because of the detailed preparations for combat demanded by >Colonel >Dunford earlier in the prior months, RCT-5 was ready to execute. As such, >Colonel Dunford's RCT was first unit across the international border, the >line of departure into Iraq. > > > >The summary of RCT 5 Actions: > >* 20 Mar: RCT 5 attacked into Iraqi as the 1st MarDiv's supporting >effort and is the first element of the coalition force to cross the >international border -- 9 hours in advance of the Division's main effort. >RCT 5's objectives were the strategically important Southern and Northern >Rumaylah Oilfields; Additionally the RCT was to block the 6th Armor >Division >and to contain the 57th Mech Inf Div. The RCT's scheme of maneuver >involved 2 breach sites consisting of 3 lanes apiece. In the Western >breach >site, early on an enemy minefield was detected effectively closing the lane >for the duration of the operation. The RCT's combat units were split >between the 2 lanes with 2d Tanks followed in trace by 2/5 attacking in the >West and 1/5 followed by 3/5 attacking through the Eastern breach sites. >The DS artillery, CSS units and both elements of the Command Group utilized >the Eastern breach site. As part of the Division scheme of maneuver, RCT 5 >"pulled" 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and RCT 1 through the western breach >site. Despite the call to go 9 hours early and the added friction of >conducting the breach and movement at night the RCT lost zero vehicles to >enemy fires. > >* 21 Mar: Jump and Forward Command Post displaced north through the >Southern Rumaylah Oilfield, in trace of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, en >route >one HMMWV was destroyed due to unexploded ordnance. > >* 22-23 Mar: After 3rd LAR was decisively engaged by a superior enemy >force, RCT 5 was called on to conduct a Forward Passage of Lines, attach >3rd >LAR and assume the Division's main effort. Specific taskings was, RCT 5 as >the Division's Main effort, conduct a movement to contact along Highway 1 >to >clear enemy in zone in order to facilitate the introduction of follow-on >forces. Hwy 1 is an unfinished four-lane highway that provides direct >access to Baghdad from the Southern region. The selection of this avenue >of >approach undoubtedly caught the Iraqi's off guard, this coupled with the >tempo that the RCT generated quickly positioned the RCT and subsequently >the >Division in such a way as to severely threaten the Southern approaches to >Baghdad well ahead of planning dates. > >* 24-25 Mar: As the 1st MarDiv's Main effort, 3/5 was the lead element >in movement to contact along Hwy 1 to cross roads in the vicinity of Ad >Diwaniyah. 3/5 was engaged in heavy fighting with irregular forces during >a >devastating sandstorm. 27 Mar: as the 1st MarDiv's Main effort 2/5 attacks to seize >Hantush Airfield; Jump CP moved with 2/5 to facilitate command and control. >Despite the successful seizure of the airfield, RCT 5 ordered to >consolidate >in original positions in the vicinity of Ad Diwaniyah cross roads. > >* 28-30 Mar: As a result of the speed that RCT 5 attacked up Hwy 1 >the RCT and subsequently the division quickly out stripped the logisticians >ability to adequately feed, fuel and water its units. As such the 1st >MarDiv ordered an operational pause to consolidate CSS. As the >logistician's worked the CSS RCT 5 conducted limited objective attacks and >local security patrols along the Hwy 1 corridor consolidating its gains and >clearing enemy in zone. > >* 31 Mar: As 1st Marine Division's Main effort, RCT-5 with 2/5 in the >lead, attacked to re-seize Hantush Airfield in order to open airfield as a >FARP/Logistics hub. The 2/5 attack was also a part of the Divisions >deception plan to deceive the enemy into thinking the division would >continue up the heavily defended approaches along Hwy 1. > >* 1 Apr: With the stage set for the divisions deception RCT 5 as 1st >MarDiv's Main effort, with 1/5 as the lead unit, was ordered to attack up >Rt >27 to seize a bridge over Saddam Canal in order to facilitate the movement >of follow on forces. > >* 2 Apr: As 1st MarDiv's Main effort, RCT-5, with 2/5 as the lead >unit, attacks on Route 27 to seize an establsihed bridge crossing site over >the Tigris river west of An Numaniyah, 2nd Tanks attacks to seize the >bridge >and establish a bridge head at An Numaniyah and blocks to the west. > >* 3 Apr: as 1st MarDiv's Main effort, 2d Tanks attacks along Hwy 6, >3/5 follows in support to clear enemy vicinity of Aziziyah. 2d Tanks >clears >to Hamid as Sayyid. 4 Apr: as 1st MarDiv Main effort's, 2d Tanks attacks along Hwy 6 >to >clear SE approaches to Baghdad. During occupation/set-up of the RCT COC >the >command group came under 120mm mortar shelling. > >* 5-7 Apr: Frustrated by the limited bridges available to cross and >the Iraqi's defense of the same RCT 5 was tasked to reconnoiter potential >crossing sites across the Dialah river. The RCT covered over 20 kilometers >of riverbank and more importantly the approaches in from the MSR in an >attempt to identify a gap to be exploited. The RCT was able to identify >suitable potential bridging sites and AAV fording sites, but was frustrated >by the insufficient access to the river from the MSR. Based on RCT 5 >assessment/input to the CG 1st MarDiv greatly shaped the Division's scheme >of maneuver for the closing the cordon around they city of Baghdad. > 8-9 Apr: As a 1st MarDiv's Supporting effort, RCT 5 attacked >across >the Dialah to the northeast suburbs of Baghdad. Alpha command echelon link >ups with Col Dunford as a firefight is ensuing across the street. Amid the >chaos of the looters, snipers and the pulsating congestion innocent >civilians of the volatile city. In early evening, RCT 5 received a order >to >conduct a link-up with 3ID units on bridges on Western side of Baghdad to >complete the cordon of the city. Colonel Dunford and his Jump CP drove >unescorted through unsecured streets to link up with lead echelon, 2/5, and >conducted an all night movement to contact. > >* 10 Apr: As the 1st MarDiv's supporting effort, RCT-5, with 1/5 as >the lead unit, attacked to seize the Almilyah Palace. En route, 1/5 was >instructed to conduct a hasty search of 2 possible American POW holding >sites. As the attack was underway, Saddam Hussein is sighted in vicinity >of >palace, and 1/5 was ordered to cordon the area to capture Hussein. To >facilitate the rapidly changing situation, the RCT-5 Quick Reaction Force, >2d Tanks, was activated. 1/5 became engaged in a fierce battle. The QRF >was vectored to the Iman Abu Hanifah Mosque, where a key figure supposedly >fled. En route to the mosque to reinforce a company from 1/5 the QRF came >under withering rocket and small arms fire that resulted in M1A1 mobility >kill. The butcher's bill for the fighting at the palace and mosque was 1 >KIA and 70 some WIA. > >* 11 Apr: RCT 5 occupies assigned sectors in Baghdad. > >* 12 Apr: RCT 5 ordered to follow in support of TF Tripoli as they >conduct a movement to contact to Samarah and Tikkrit. RCT 5 (-) conducts a >movement to contact to Samarah. The remainder of the RCT remains in >Baghdad >as the Division QRF force. > >* 13- 17 Apr: RCT 5(-) conducted a presence mission in sector in >Baghdad and in Samarah. The remainder of the RCT remained tasked as the >Division QRF. > >* 17 Apr: RCT 5 is ordered to conduct a relief in place with 82d >Airborne Brigade operating in the Karbala region, south east of Baghdad >approximately 150 kilometers to the Southeast. To facilitate command and >control the RCT command echelons conducted d a link up south of Baghdad and >subsequently pushed the A echelon forward to Ad Diwanyah to begin >face-to-face coordination with the Brigade, 82nd Airborne. > >* 18 Apr: RCT 5 conducts a tactical road march in order to >facilitate >the RIP with the Brigade, 82nd Airborne. Co-locate HQs in Ad Diwaniyah. > >* 19 Apr: 2/5 completes their road march to As Samawah and begins to >conduct RIP, 3/5 completed their road march to Ad Diwaniyah and initiated >left side/right side rides to facilitate a mutual understanding of the >battlespace. The remainder of the RCT closes on the Jump and Alpha Command >Echelon in Ad Diwaniyah. > >* 20 Apr: RIP complete, RCT 5 consolidating in vicinity of Ad >Diwaniyah. > >RCT 5 under Col Dunford's leadership participated in approximately 10 >engagements with determined enemy forces resulting in countless enemy dead, >wounded and __ Enemy Prisoners of War, the destruction of countless numbers >of enemy armor assets, to include main battle tanks, APCs, ZSU's and the >like. RCT 5's combat losses totaled 12 Killed in action, 126 wounded in >action, 0 Missing in action. Equipment wise the RCT's final tally was 3 >M1A1s lost due to mobility kills, one MK138, and one TOW HMMWV. In all the >RCT moved over 1200 kilometers from Living Support Area's in Kuwait to the >RCT's final command post location in Ad Diwanyah, Iraq. The Marine's of >the >RCT spent 18 days in MOPP 1 or 2. Throughout the RCT was challenged by >extended lines of communication, austere weather, and extremely limited >resources. Sempers, Roger
__________________
IN LOVING MEMORY OF MY HUSBAND SSgt. Roger A. One Proud Marine 1961-1977 68/69 http://www.geocities.com/thedrifter001/ |
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