Ao Madness

[Andy]

OneSix:
Dow Chemical V. Stephenson. That would mean that Stephenson filed a suit against Dow and won a lower court decision. Then Dow filed an appeal causing the names to reverse. Happens all the time.

Bluehawk:
I take real issue with the idea that the kids who did the spraying are to blame. We knew the military had some great weed killer but I doubt anyone using the stuff knew about the "Ranch Hand" tests and probably didn't know what dioxins were.
(My opinion) The guys doing the spraying were trying to help keep G.I.'s alive, nothing more or less.

Stay healthy,
Andy

[BLUEHAWK]

Andy -
I don't blame the kids involved with the spraying either, but I do blame myself for blindly accepting the duty to have any part of it, unquestioningly... now that I see what I contributed to.

We THOUGHT we were trying to keep GIs alive, but we were also doing them/ourselves serious harm. My only hope is that SOME of our guys were helped out.

Seems to me that opening up the forest canopy would have given enemy artillery spotters and snipers better aim during troop movements? Hell, I wasn't infantry or cavalry, and have no damn idea at all other than the health consequences.

If I personally contributed to inflicting injury on our troops then I'm a permanent jerk. That much I do know.

[Arrow]

Onesix....

It is too bad we as a peopledid not listen to the old ways and were not so arrogant against their wisdom

I understand thatcorporation is a noun that refers to an entitymade upof individual people.

You will get no argument from me in regard to collective culpability. Degree of culpabilty could be argued.

[MORTARDUDE]

I purchased a movie awhile back from eBay :

It is Vietnam : The Secret Agent ( Code name : Agent Orange )

Copyright 1983
An MPI Home Video Release
A Green Mountain Post / Human Arts Association Production

Some quotes from the box :

"excellent, a tough, angry look at the consequences of exposure to Agent Orange"...The New York Times

"If you haven't seen it, do so. If you have see it again. The Secret Agent is still with us"...Michael Ettlinger, Vietnam Veterans of America

"extraordinary..one of the year's most terrifying horror films"..
The Boston Globe

"I died in Vietnam and didn't even know it"..Paul Reutershan, Veteran

"This film is the first comprehensive look at the history, the effects, and the implications of the deadly contaminant 2,4,5-T, a main ingredient of the defoliant code-named Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. Using rare archival and striking war footage in support of interviews with veterans, scientists, attorneys, and representatives of the US Air Force, the VA, and Dow Chemical, this movie documents the extraordinary history of chmeical warfare and the plight of our Vietnam veterans. Agent Orange is recognized as the most toxic man-made chemical. We've dumped it on our enemies in South Vietnam and we've dumped it on the dusty backroads of Southern Missouri. This film is the first attempt to address the climate of fear, frustration, and outrage among Vietnam veterans and countless others across the US and the world"

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

the coverup, by Monsanto, began in 1949 in Nitro, West Virginia, as this movie graphically portrays....After seeing this, there is no doubt who the guilty parties are...

Larry

[MORTARDUDE]

http://www.geocities.com/jadams_85601/agentorange5.html


STUDY CALLED A FRAUD

But again, there was more information available that was never presented. The Institute of Medicine in the weeks before the CDC released its results of blood tests wrote a stinging rebuke of the CDC's tests methods. It said that none of the CDC's conclusions was supported by scientific data. The CDC refused to turn this report over to the White House.
"Either it was a politically rigged operation or it was a monumentally bungled operation," said Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY), chairman of the Government Operations Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee. Other information began turning up that there were concerted efforts by various agencies of the government to conceal records and information about the effects of Agent Orange.
Daschle learned that there were major discrepancies between a January 1984 draft of the Air Force's Operation Ranch Hand study and the February 1984 report. According to Daschle, the draft showed there were twice as many birth defects among the children of Ranch Hand participants. "The draft also reported that the Ranch Handers were less well than the controls by a ratio of 5 to 1," said Daschle. But these results were deleted from the final Ranch Hand report, which said there had been no adverse effects from exposure to Agent Orange. "The Air Force deleted these findings from the final report at the suggestion of a Ranch Hand Advisory Committee set up by the White House Agent Orange Working Group," said Daschle.
Air Force scientists involved in the study said they were pressured by non-scientists within the Air Force and the White House to change the results and delete critical information for the final report. Daschle says he has even obtained two versions of the minutes of the meeting in which that pressure was applied. One confirms what the scientists told him. Another set deletes that information.
"What happened there was a fraud perpetrated by people whose names we still do not know," said Daschle.
Part of the fraud appears to have been perpetrated by the Monsanto Corp., which produces a number of chemicals containing dioxin. Monsanto knowingly rigged test results of employees who had been exposed to dioxin to make the effects of it appear far less than it actually was, according to a February 23, 1990 Environmental Protection Agency memorandum.
The memorandum was written by Dr. Cate Jenkins, a chemist in the Waste Characterization Branch, Characterization and Assessment Division of the EPA to Dr. Raymond C. Loehr, chairman of EPA's Science Advisory Board Executive Committee.
Jenkins writes that a key epidemiological study leading to the conclusion that there was no definitive data on human health effects of dioxins was based on examination of medical records of Monsanto employees from a 1949 explosion. That study "found no statistically significant excess cancer deaths," according to Jenkins.
"This study by Monsanto apparently has now been shown to be a fraud," Jenkins wrote.

"This study on behalf of Monsanto is described, where it is alleged that the record demonstrated a deliberate course of conduct by Monsanto through `altered' research to prove to the world that the only health consequences of dioxins was the relatively harmless, reversible condition of chloracne." Since this study was altered, Jenkins surmises, "It could be that other studies on exposed populations are similarly flawed and subject to fraud." The study in question was done of employees at a Nitro, West Virginia Monsanto plant following an explosion in 1949 in which a number of them were exposed to dioxins. The study, performed by two Monsanto employees, concluded that the death rate of exposed workers was the same as the death rate of unexposed workers.
However, later investigation revealed that the authors of the study omitted five deaths from the exposed group and took four workers who had been exposed and put them in the unexposed group. This decreased the death rate in the exposed group and increased the death rate in the unexposed group. The exposed group actually had 18 cancer deaths as a result of the exposure, not the nine deaths reported in the study. And there were a total of 28 cancers in the exposed group, compared to only two cancers in the unexposed group.
This type fraud appears to have been perpetrated regularly in connection with Agent Orange research, yet Congress continues to rely on this flawed research when it considers legislation that would benefit the victims of Agent Orange and the other rainbow herbicides.

MONTGOMERY HOLDS UP AGENT ORANGE LEGISLATION

Efforts to get comprehensive Agent Orange legislation through Congress to right the wrongs of the cover-ups have been unsuccessful largely through the efforts of one man: Rep. Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi, chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, who claimed to be the friend and champion of veterans in Congress - in fact had virtually single-handedly bottled up Agent Orange legislation.

The CDC, meanwhile, continues to perpetrate the scientifically flawed myth that Agent Orange and dioxin posed no health threats to Vietnam veterans.

In a study released March 29, 1990, the CDC admitted that Vietnam veterans face a higher risk of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, but denied that it was a result of exposure to Agent Orange. It said the studies showed that Vietnam veterans do not have higher rats of soft tissue sarcomas, Hodgkin's disease, nasal cancer, nasopharyngeal cancer and liver cancer.

BIZARRE FINDING

One of the more bizarre aspects of this report from the CDC was the claim that those veterans who suffered most from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma had served on Navy ships off the coast of Vietnam. It said that those who had served in III Corps, which had some of the heaviest Agent Orange spraying of the war, seemed to be at lower risk.

"There is no risk in this study associated with (dioxin) exposure," said Dr. Daniel Hoffman of the CDC. Veterans groups were appalled by the findings.

"The conclusion seems to fly in the face of other scientific studies, which indicates there is a connection between Agent Orange and cancer, birth defects and other disorders. It makes it sound like Agent Orange is like orange juice, healthy for you instead of harmful," said John Hanson, a spokesman for the American Legion.

HOUSE COMMITTEE SAYS STUDY FLAWED

The House Committee in its August 1990 report also found that the 1987 Agent Orange study canceled by CDC was done so at the behest of the White House. Its report was a stinging rebuke to the White House and the CDC. The report offered these conclusions:
"A. The CDC Agent Orange exposure study should not have been canceled because it did not document that exposure of veterans to the herbicide could not be assessed, nor did CDC explore alternative methods of determining the exposure.
"B. The original protocol for the CDC Agent Orange study was changed to the point that it was unlikely for the heaviest exposed soldiers to be identified.

"C. The blood serum analysis, which was used as proof by CDC that an Agent Orange exposure study could not be conducted, was based on erroneous assumptions and a flawed analysis.
"D. The White House compromised the independence of the CDC and undermined the study by controlling crucial decisions and guiding the course of research at the same time it had secretly taken a legal position to resist demands to compensate victims of Agent Orange exposure and industrial accidents.
"E. The Federal Government has suppressed or minimized findings of ill health effects among Vietnam veterans that could be linked to Agent Orange exposure."
An indepth reading of the report reveals even more sordid details of how the CDC and the White House stacked the deck on Agent Orange. According to the report, "The CDC study was changed from its original format so that it would have been unlikely for the soldiers who received the heaviest exposure to the herbicide to be identified. CDC accomplished this by unjustifiably discrediting the military records provided to it by the Department of Defense's Environmental Study Group (ESG)."

POLITICS AND MONEY MORE IMPORTANT THAN HUMAN LIVES

The rebuke of the White House and its Agent Orange Working Group (AOWG) was even more revealing of the manner in which Agent Orange studies have been manipulated by political and economic concerns, not concerns about human lives.
"The original mandate to focus the White House panel on the effects of all herbicides was abruptly altered by the Reagan White House," according to the report. "By focusing the work of AOWG on Agent Orange only, the administration laid the groundwork for manipulating the study to the point of uselessness. "A possible reason that the White House chose this path is revealed in confidential documents prepared by attorneys in OMB. The White House was deeply concerned that the Federal Government would be placed in the position of paying compensation to veterans suffering diseases related to Agent Orange and, moreover, feared that providing help to Vietnam veterans would set the precedent of having the U.S. compensate civilian victims of toxic contaminant exposure, too."
SOME DEFY CDC STUDY
Despite the CDC's continuing recalcitrance on the issue of Agent Orange exposure, there have been other, more enlightened voices heard. Secretary of Veterans Affairs Edward Derwinski is one of them. After hearing of the CDC's latest study, he ordered the VA to pay compensation to all veterans suffering from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, a ruling which could mean as much as $23 million to the 1,600 non-Hodgkin's lymphoma sufferers or their widows and children.
Derwinski also decided not to challenge a California court's finding that the VA was applying too strict a standard to determine whether Agent Orange harmed Vietnam veterans. Derwinski ordered the VA to abide by legislation passed in 1984 to give veterans the benefit of the doubt on health claims. "Overall, we're doing things a lot different here now," said Derwinski. "We're making decisions without sweeping things under the rug. We're not procrastinating. We're also shaking up a few people and sweeping away a few cobwebs."
Another of the more enlightened voices is that of retired Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr., who ordered certain areas of Vietnam to be sprayed with Agent Orange.
Zumwalt's son, Elmo Zumwalt III, served in the Navy in Vietnam and was exposed to the herbicide. Elmo Zumwalt III died in 1988 at the age of 42 from Hodgkin's diseases and lymphoma. Father and son believed that exposure to Agent Orange caused the cancers.
"I definitely believe my son would have had an additional 20 years of life had we not used it," said the elder Zumwalt.
Adm. Zumwalt has become a crusader on the issue of Agent Orange, charging that the government "intentionally manipulated or withheld compelling information on the adverse health effects" associated with exposure to Agent Orange. "The flawed scientific studies and manipulated conclusions are not only unduly denying justice to Vietnam veterans suffering from exposure to Agent Orange," said Zumwalt, "they are now standing in the way of a full disclosure to the American people of the likely health effects of exposure to toxic dioxins."
Daschle is another of the enlightened voices, calling not only for true, scientific studies of Agent Orange free from political interference, but investigations of the cover-ups by the White House and the CDC that enabled them to perpetrate the myth that Agent Orange is not harmful to human health.
"Can you blame veterans for wondering what is going on?" asked Daschle. "Can you blame their families who continue to watch all of this unfold, and not share their sense of frustration, their sense of indignation at the conflicting comments, the duplicity, the obfuscation that occurs time and time again when government officials at the highest level are being called upon to inform the public, but they cover up information instead?"

GOVERNMENT PLAYS WAITING GAME

But as the government continues to drag its feet, more veterans and their children continue to suffer the effects of Agent Orange. Time is on the side of the government. The longer it waits, the longer it procrastinates, the more the problems of Agent Orange exposure is diminished by the deaths of those who suffered from exposure to it. Their names could be added to the black granite wall of the Vietnam memorial, casualties of the rainbow herbicides that followed them home from the war.

RAINBOW HERBICIDES AND THEIR COMPONENTS:
- Agent Orange: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between January 1965 and April 1970.
- Agent Orange II (Super Orange): 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used in 1968 and 1969.
- Agent Purple: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between January 1962 and 1964.
- Agent Pink: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Agent Green: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Agent White: Picloram and 2,4-D.
- Agent Blue: contained cacodylic acid (arsenic).
- Dinoxol: 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Trinoxol: 2,4,5-T; used between 1962 and 1964.
- Diquat: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Bromacil: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Tandex: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Monuron: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Diuron: Used between 1962 and 1964.
- Dalapon: Used between 1962 and 1964.

[MORTARDUDE]

http://www.vvnw.org/agent_orange.htm



The following information was compiled in 1979. It was designed to bring an awareness of AGENT ORANGE and related herbicides to the American public.

Herbicides were developed during the Second World War, initial work being done at the University of Chicago and later moved to Fort Detrick, Maryland. Although they were first considered for military use at the end of the War in the Pacific, the first application (of 2-4-D) was for domestic weed control in the US.

The first recorded military use took place in Malaysia in the 1950s where the British used 2-4-5-T to clear communication routes. The first US field tests were conducted in Puerto Rico, Texas, and Fort Drum in New York (1959).

In 1960 the South Vietnamese government requested that the U.S. government conduct trials of these herbicides for use against guerrilla forces. Further tests were conducted in Thailand by Fort Detrick personnel before the chemicals were given to the RVN.

The herbicides involved were known by their code names, Orange, White and Blue. There were several others, such as Purple.

AGENT ORANGE is a 1-124-1 mixture by weight of the n-butyl esters of 2-4-5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2-4-5-T) and 2-4-dichloro-phenoxyacetic acid (2-4-D).

Agent White is a 3-882-1 mixture by weight of tri-iso-propanolamine salts of 2-4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2-4-D) and 4-amino 3-5-6-trichloropicolinic acid (pico-lorum).

Agent Blue is a 2-663-1 mixture by weight of na-dimethyl arsenate (na cacodylate) and dimethyl arsenic (cacodylic acid). Agents

Orange and White are used as defoliants and Agent Blue as a desiccant.

Agent Blue was produced by Ansul Chemical Company which has divested itself of this line prior to selling the company. Agents Orange and White are still being produced. The most widely produced and dispensed of the herbicides in both Vietnam and the U.S. is AGENT ORANGE (2-4-5-T and 2-4-D).

Adverse effects of the chemical 2-4-5-T and its chemical precursors on the workers engaged in their production had been observed as early as 1949. At that time a Monsanto-owned plant manufacturing 2-4-5-T in Nitro, West Virginia, had an explosion, and 228 workers developed Chloracne.

Chloracne symptoms include skin eruptions on the face, neck, and back, shortness of breath, intolerance to cold, palpable and tender liver, a loss of sensation in the extremities, damage to peripheral nerves, fatigue, nervousness, irritability, insomnia, loss of libido and vertigo.

Chloracne was also found in 1953 among the male workers and many of their wives, children and pets at a BASF (Badischer Anilin & Soda Fabrik)-owned 2-4-5-T plant at Ludwigshaften am Rhein in Germany.

The factory experienced an explosion months after the appearance of Chloracne among the workers. In medical examinations following the explosion, some workers were found to have severely damaged internal organs including the liver. Heightened blood pressure, myocardial degeneration, severe depression, memory and concentration disturbances were also observed. Fifteen years later some of these workers were still suffering from Chloracne and its symptoms despite treatment and no subsequent exposure. One death from intestinal sarcoma was attributed to the explosion

In 1963 another explosion occurred in a 2-4-5-T factory owned by Philips Duphar in Amsterdam, Holland. Fifty workers developed Chloracne and suffered internal damage and serious psychological disturbances as a result, and the factory was closed. In 1973 the plant was still so contaminated with Dioxin that it had to be dismantled, embedded in concrete, and buried at sea.

Dow Chemical, the largest producer of AGENT ORANGE in the U.S. experienced an outbreak of Chloracne among its workers in 1964 in one of their 2-4-5-T manufacturing plants. Over seventy workers were affected, 12 of them severely.

Dow's director of its Midland Division, Dr. Benjamin Holder, described the symptoms as fatigue, lassitude, depression, blackheads (prevalent on the face, neck, and back), and weight loss. Heavy exposure, Dr. Holder said, could lead to internal organ damage and nervous system disorders.

In 1970, Julius F. Johnson, Director of Research and Development, appearing be-fore the Hart Sub-Committee of the U.S. Congress, described Chloracne as "a skin disorder mostly prevalent of the face, neck, and back. It is similar in experience to severe acne of the kind suffered by teenagers".

Dow ran its own study of the effects of ORANGE using 220 workers and 4,600 controls. The range of exposure to 2-4-0 was 30-40/mg/do. Ten of the men were karyotyped, and no rearrangement of genetic material was reported. The 220 men were exposed to 2-8/mg/do of 2-4-5-T. Fifty two men were karyotyped negatively. No difference between the study group and the control group was reported.

Dow's testing indicated that a contaminant of 2-4-5-T (Dioxin) was responsible for the Chloracne and illness experienced by its workers. They conducted tests utilizing animals on 2-4-5-T with varying amounts of 2-3-7-8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin.

At levels of 27?8 the chemical was shown to be toxic and fatal to the animals. Cleft palates were observed in further tests. The results were not repeated with 2-4-5-T without the contaminant. Dioxin was found to be one of the most toxic substances known, a fatal dose being 0.022-0.045a in rats and 0.0006 in guinea pigs, LD-50 as milligrams per body weight.

Between 1965 and 1969 a 2-4-5-T production plant near Prague, Czechoslovakia, developed leaks in its processing area. Workers developed Chloracne and exhibited weight loss, libido diminution and insomnia.

Maximum symptoms were observed about one to two years after the initial exposure but lasted over eight years in some of the exposed workers. Several workers died of severe liver damage, and workers' families also became sick. Contaminated equipment was buried in a mine shaft.

Other studies of workers exposed to 2-4-D and 2-4-5-T were conducted by Festisov (1966), Long (1969), Poland (1971), Sundell (1972) and Piper (1973).

These studies showed exposed workers exhibiting symptoms including fatigue, headaches, loss of appetite, stomach and kidney pain, upper respiratory distress, decreased hearing, smell and neurological responses, high serum albumin values, skin and eye irritations and concentrated TCDD (Dioxin) levels in body fat and liver tissue. The studies inconclusive epidemiological results must be re-examined in light of their design deficiencies, such as lack of use of control groups (Festisov, Poland), insufficient follow-up period in a retrospective study (Sundell) and lack of longitudinal studies which would provide adequate evidence of temporary and long-range effects (NAS). Further tests showed TCDD, the contaminant in 2-4-5-T, to be an extremely toxic agent with a slow effect rate and diverse symptomatology including edema, necrotic changes of the liver, gastric hyperplasia and ulceration, hemmoroglus of gastrointestinal tract and other organs, atrophy of the kidneys, thymus and other lymphoid organs and tissues. Later, symptoms appear to lead to decreased immune responses.

AGENT ORANGE (contaminated with Dioxin) and Agent White were authorized for use in Vietnam in November 1961, to improve road and waterway visibility and clear camp perimeters.

Later, Agent Blue was authorized to destroy crops and clear areas suspected of harboring enemy base camps or supply routes. The U.S. Air Force created the 309th Air Commando Squadron to conduct the spraying. The operation, originally known as Hades, and became known as Operation Ranch Hand.

In the spring of 1962 the South Vietnamese military conducted large-scale tests of herbicides along 70 miles of Highway 15. In the summer, further tests were conducted using 2-4-D at 1.5 gallons/acre and 2-4-5-T at 3.3 gallons/acre. The herbicides used in Vietnam were applied mostly by twin engine C-123 Provider Transports (Fairchild Hiller) equipped with 3785.1 tanks and an internal defoliant dispenser (Hayes Inter-national) with 36 high-pressure nozzles distributed on three booms.

Normal spray time was two minutes, but a full load could be dumped in 30 seconds. Missions usually consisted of three to five aircraft flying in a staggered lateral formation. Single plane runs were known as sorties. Helicopters, UH-1 Huey (Bell Aerospace), trucks, boats and hand spraying equipment were also used to dispense the herbicides in Vietnam.

Targets were selected by U.S. or Vietnamese officers, approved by provincial chiefs, the Vietnamese Army general staff, the U.S. Military Assistance Command and the American Ambassador.

During this time, Air America also sprayed defoliants for the CIA in combat operations against Thai insurgents on the Isthmus of Kra. The drift of herbicides involved in these operations was estimated at an average of 20%.

AGENT ORANGE, the main herbicide dispensed in this period, was applied at up to 25 times the rate of use in the U.S. Entire tank loads were also jettisoned over one area.

Schedules of the herbicide spraying missions were recorded on HERBS tapes, a computerized record of time, place, geographic location of beginning, end and flight line of the mission, amount and type of herbicide and the military purpose of the operation. The tapes cover the period from August 1965 to February 1971. The HERBS tapes were studied for accuracy by the NAS Committee, which traveled to Vietnam, and were found to contain inaccuracies. Even so, they may offer one source to check individual dose exposure in the period covered when 85% of the missions were flown.

As early as 1964, while the spraying was increasing in Vietnam, reports circulated of increased miscarriages stillbirths and birth defects among exposed Vietnamese women and animals. Because of the war conditions collecting data to corroborate this was difficult.

Records from 1970 for Saigon's leading maternity hospital showed a monthly average of 140 miscarriages and 150 premature births in 2,800 pregnancies, but the hospital would not disclose whether or not this was an increase.

In 1966 the U.S. government started studies on the teratogenic effects of 2-4-5-T. These studies were conducted by Bionetics Research Laboratories of Bethesda, Maryland, for the National Cancer Institute.

The findings were released in 1969. Rats and mice used in the study were given 21.5 mg/kg doses of 2-4-5-T during early gestation. Almost all the offspring were born dead or with cleft palates, no eyes, cystic kidneys and enlarged livers. At 4.6 mg/kg, 39% of the offspring were born deformed. Based on these findings Dr. Lee Du Bridge, Presidential Advisor, said that the use of the chemical in populated areas and on food crops should be restricted.

Dow objected to the findings saying the sample of the 2-4-5-T was used unrepresentatively because of an abnormally high amount of TCDD (Dioxin). As a result, new tests were ordered by Dr. Burger, Dr. Du Bridge?s technical assistant, and 2-4-5-T was left in use.

Other tests were run by Dr. Jackie Verett of the FDA Toxicology Lab in Washington, D.C., Dr. Matthew Meselson of Harvard, the National Institute. Dr. Verett used a .50 parts per million Dioxin solution obtained from chemicals used in Vietnam in chicks and found resultant cysts, necrotic livers, slipped tendons, cleft palates and beak deformities.

She then used a .25 parts per trillion solution and observed the same effects. Further tests of 2-4-D and 2-4-5-T without Dioxin still produced dead and deformed offspring. English tests had demonstrated AGENT ORANGE to contain as many as 17 or more contaminates.

Dr. Meselson was the head of an American Association for Advanced Science project. His concern was Dioxin activity and the unknown results of its behavior. "The tetrachloro-dioxin re-presents just one of the 12 or 13 ways the chlorine atoms arrange themselves on a benzene ring to form Dioxin molecules. How do we know about hexa, hepta and octychlors or about how persistent the tetrachlor itself is? Moreover, I am very concerned about the Dioxin that might be formed by unreacted trichlorphenol (2-4-5-T?s precursor) when the product is exposed to heat. If it were taken up by plants or wood and these were burned, you?d get more Dioxin. Finally, I?m bothered by the bizarre mental effects suffered by German workers making 2-4-5-T. I say, when in doubt, stop it."

The National Institute of Environmental Health Ser-vices Study used samples of 2-4-5-T which were far less contaminated with Dioxin than the 2-4-5-T used in the Bionetics Study. The results showed 2-4-5-T to have significant teratogenic effects on the study of animals.

Based on this study, on April 15, 1970, Dr. Jesse L. Steinfield, Surgeon General, and David Packard, Secretary of Defense, announced government action limiting the use of 2-4-5-T in the U.S. and suspending its use in Vietnam.

The National Cancer Study conducted by Courtney showed 2-4-5-T adversely affecting the development and viability of mouse and rat fetuses.

"I suggest that the teratogenicity of 2-4-5-T is such that even its use in such apparently innocuous domestic matters as clearing brush near power lines is undesirable. Such chemicals could find their way into water supplies and could be ingested in teratogenic-doses", (statement of Dr. Arthur Galston, Yale University, December, 1969, to the Sub-Committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives).

Autopsies of 600 reindeer in northern Sweden which had consumed foliage sprayed with AGENT ORANGE showed a significant residue of the herbicide in the kidneys and liver of the deceased animals.

The Piper Study (1973) also showed Dioxin concentration in the liver and body fat of exposed workers up to ten times the normal concentration.

In 1975 the CDC in Atlanta studied AGENT ORANGE and issued a report showing that exposed animals suffered appetite loss, vascular lesions, Chloracne and gastric ulcers.

More recent tests indicate Dioxin may be concentrated in fatty tissue and released into the blood stream after the initial exposure. Vietnamese epidemiologists have indicated a four-fold increase in liver Cancer in Vietnam in the last ten years.

Despite these tests and world-wide evidence of the effects of AGENT ORANGE, it has remained in use on rice crops in Arkansas, range land in the West and Southwest, national forests and along railroad and power lines. In 1973 Matthew Meselson and Dr. Robert Boughman refined an analytical system for detecting the presence of Dioxin in parts per trillion instead of billion.

Using their system, they found Dioxin residues in Vietnamese crustaceans, indicating that Dioxin had entered the food chain as a result of earlier 2-4-5-T use.

Dow's scientists continued to maintain that 2-4-5-T, when used as directed, presents inconsequential hazards to the environment, animals and man.

The evidence shows that AGENT ORANGE was dispensed in Vietnam in amounts far in excess of previous use; thus, the exposure of U.S. soldiers and the Vietnamese was not as directed. Soldiers in Vietnam sprayed one another with AGENT ORANGE in spray fights as they were told the chemical was harmless.

While U.S. government departments were and were not dealing with 2-4-5-T, on July 10, 1976, another factory had an explosion. The factory, located in Seveso, Lombardy, Italy, was owned by ICMESA with a Swiss parent company.

The explosion produced a cloud of Dioxin which settled over several adjacent communities. The people exposed became nauseated, experienced eye and throat irritations, developed burn-like sores on exposed skin, headaches, dizziness and diarrhea -- the same symptoms recorded by exposed Vietnamese and Cambodian populations. In the next two days, small animals in the area began to die. Most of the small animals in Zone A of the exposed area died or had to be destroyed. Post mortems showed that they died of Dioxin poisoning and had extensive liver damage.

Because of the publicity on the teratogenicity of Dioxin, abortions were made available to the exposed women.

Studies of the situation at the ICMESA plant revealed that Dioxin was probably escaping periodically from the plant over a two-year period prior to the explosion. Two and a half months after the explosion, children and young people began to develop Chloracne.

A year later 130 people had confirmed Chloracne. Symp-toms included nervousness, irritability, loss of appetite and sexual drive. Spontaneous abortions appeared to double; the level of birth defects could not be determined because of the abortions. In 1977 it was discovered that 280 children in an area north of the contaminated area were suffering from Chloracne.

Deaths among workers exposed to Dioxin contamination should be examined, as they are among the earliest exposed, and evidence indicates delayed onset of fatal chronic conditions.

In 1958 a worker was assigned work on or near the reactor that was involved in the 1953 explosion in the Badischer Anilin & Soda Fabrik 2-4-5-T factory. The reactor had not been used since the explosion, and the worker used protective clothing which included a face mask. He removed the mask several times during the work. Four days later he was suffering from headaches and had developed hearing loss and Chloracne. Within six months he developed pancreatitis and an upper abdominal tumor. The man died three months later.

Another worker at the same plant who spent two hours working on the reactor wall in 1958 also developed a severe case of Chloracne. One year later a large x-ray opaque area appeared on one of his lungs. Five years after the initial exposure, the worker suffered acute psychosis and committed suicide.

Two British workers at the Coalite factory in Bolsover, England, (which had experienced an explosion in 1968) were exposed to cleaned equipment involved in the explosion three years earlier. Within a month both developed Chloracne. In the next year members of both their families also developed Chloracne.

The Philips Duphar plant in Amsterdam had the problem when workers tried to decontaminate the plant involved in the 1963 explosion six months later.

Although all but one of the workers wore deep-sea diving suits and industrial facemasks, nine of the men contracted Chloracne, and three of them died within the next two years. The worker who was not as well protected was still being treated in 1976 for severe effects and was unable to work.

Studies of these and other exposed workers? morbidity and mortality data would seem essential to construct an overview of the epidemiology of 2-4-5-T exposure, especially to help establish risk factors for exposed populations.

Studies in animals are also being conducted. Dr. James Allen, at the University of Wisconsin, has been running studies on the effects of dioxin-contaminated food on nonhuman primates. This seems particularly efficacious in light of recent evidence that rodents often used in medical research seem to be subject to inherent viruses which could distort test results.

Dr. Allen's studies with animals indicate that dioxin persists and accumulates in the tissue of primates. In his rodent studies Dr. Allen found a significant increase in the development of neoplasms suggesting the carcinogenic potential of the compound TCDD.

Beef cattle grazing on western ranges sprayed with 2-4-5-T a year earlier were found, in 1974, to have sixty parts per trillion Dioxin in their fatty tissue, a significant amount.

Dr. Meselson, who has continued his studies at Harvard, has examined the milk of women exposed to the herbicide in Texas and Oregon, and the results seemed to indicate the presence of Dioxin in parts per trillion in some of their milk. Both these results and the cattle tests indicate that Dioxin, one of the most toxic substances known to man, has entered the human food chain.

The evidence also indicates that the herbicide AGENT ORANGE (2-4-D + 2-4-5-T + contaminants, especially TCDD) has both teratogenic and carcinogenic potential for exposed animals and humans. The teratogenic effects may be checked in cases where pregnant women are exposed, but evidence in Vietnam indicates that the mother may suffer chromatine or chromosomal damage following exposure and pass this damage on to subsequently conceived children. One of the complaints of Vietnam veterans is the high incidence of birth deformities (including monsters) present in their children.

Karyotyping should be done on these veterans and their offspring and all birth defects recorded. (The U.S. has no national register for recording birth defects.)

The carcinogenic potential of 2-4-5-T, or AGENT ORANGE, will be harder to ascertain as it involves the development of chronic disease with diverse symptomatology over an undetermined and lengthy amount of time.

The symptomatology developed by populations exposed to AGENT ORANGE and its components, 2-4-D, 2-4-5-T and contaminants, has been demonstrated around the world over a lengthy period of time. Further examination of the teratogenic and carcinogenic effects have been conducted in different animal experiments.

However, no serious epidemiological study has been done in this country, and the government, for example the VA, has used this to disclaim causality. The argument used is that there is no scientifically proven causality, but no one has designed a study to attempt to establish such a correlation in humans. Dow Chemical, one of the largest producers of AGENT ORANGE and White, has conducted a considerable amount of research, especially on the unavoidable contaminant Dioxin in AGENT ORANGE.

Their most recent conclusion revealed by an 18-member task force after several months of study was that Dioxin is present everywhere in the environment where combustion occurs, and Dow went on to argue against zero effluence limits for Dioxins which the EPA and FDA are interested in.

Dow still argues that these Dioxin levels are so low as to be harmless, especially since they are airborne rather than transmitted through the food chain. The government seems to be moving toward shifting the burden of proof away from itself to the producers with irrefutable defense papers. EPA toxicologist, Lyman Condie, says that this

On March 11, 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took unprecedented steps against the chemical. In the first such emergency ban ever, the EPA ordered the immediate halt to most uses of the herbicide 2, 4,5 T which contains Dioxin, and a similar product used for weather control known as Silvex.

The emergency suspension action was temporary while further facts were gathered, but it was the most drastic measure the EPA could take under the law.

The EPA said it was acting on significant new evidence linking the herbicide 2, 4, 5-T with miscarriages in women in Oregon.

[MORTARDUDE]

http://www.vvnw.org/agent_orange.htm

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
AGENT ORANGE CLASS ACTION
LAWSUIT (MDL-381)

-- July 20, 1978 Paul Reutershan, founder and Chairman of Vietnam Veterans Agent Orange Victims, Inc. files a $10 million lawsuit against Dow, Monsanto, Diamond Shamrock, and Hercules chemical companies.

-- December 14, 1978 Paul Reutershan dies of cancer.

-- January 5, 1979 Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., at the request of VVAOV, Inc. President Frank McCarthy, amends Paul?s suit into the class action suit known as MDL-381 to cover all those who have been damaged as a result of the veteran?s exposure to Agent Orange/Dioxin, including wives, children and parents. From this point on, the suit asks for the creation of a Public Trust Fund out of chemical company profits. The suit also seeks to stop the chemical companies from manufacturing, selling, or spraying Agent Orange/Dioxin in the United States.

-- April 1979 Victor Yannacone creates Yannacone and Yannacone Associates (the Consortium), which is comprised of eleven law firms who agree to control and fund the litigation on behalf of veterans and their families.

-- November 20, 1979 Judge Pratt rules that the suit should be tried under the rules governing Federal Common Law (uniform rules covering all claimants as a method for trial).

-- November 24, 1980 Second Circuit Court of Appeals reverses Judge Pratt?s rule governing Federal Common Law, which forces the judge to try the cases in Federal Court but under the rules of each State. This means that Vietnam veterans in 20 States could not even file suit (are eliminated) due to the fact that the statute of limitations has expired in those States. Judge Feinburg dissents their decision stating it is anomalous that Federal Common Law may apply to prisoners but not to veterans.

-- March 1981 Supreme Court agrees with Second Circuit in reversing Judge Pratt?s decision on Common Law, stating that there was no Federal interest in the case. All Vietnam veterans and their families in 20 States were eliminated from the suit.

-- September 1983 Judge Pratt is promoted to Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the litigation is given to Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein.

-- October 1983 The Consortium of attorneys for the veterans declares inability to fund the litigation further and appeals to Judge Weinstein to appoint a Plaintiff?s Management Committee (PMC). Victor Yannacone loses all decision-making powers and three new law firms take over control with PMC.

-- May 7, 1984 PMC agrees to settle the case with all chemical company attorneys for $180 million. Judge Weinstein approves the settlement.

-- August 1984 Judge Weinstein begins public hearings in five cities to hear testimony on the fairness and accuracy of the settlement. The Judge heard testimony from over 400 veterans.

-- May, 1985 Judge Weinstein releases decision on distribution of $180 million, creating the Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program for disability compensation and death benefits.

-- November 1989 Monies begin to be distributed. Over a nine-year period, the assets retained in the United States were invested, and accumulated earnings of approximately $150 million, making the total funds for distribution approximately $330 million. As of September 24, 1997, the final report was made by the Special Master to the U.S. District Court. There were some outstanding distributions to be made, and we have figured those in to the breakdown, which follows:

-- An estimated total of approximately $270 million was distributed to class members as either cash payments or provision of grants for services. Of that total amount, approximately $195.6 million was cash compensation to approximately 52,000 class members, and approximately $73 million as grants that provided services for approximately 239,000 class members.

-- Additional funds were distributed to veterans in Australia (over $7 million) and New Zealand (nearly $1 million).

-- It is important to note that all administrative costs and attorney?s fees (approximately $48.8 million) came from the interest and not from the settlement itself.

[MORTARDUDE]

http://www.planetwaves.net/dioxin_critic.html

Dioxin Critic Sued

By Eric Francis
Lies Of Our Times | St. Louis Journalism Review
and Planet Waves Digital Media

Peter Montague, the vigilant chronicler of dioxin and other environmental issues, is facing a $4 million libel suit. Filed by retired Monsanto Chemical Co. scientist Dr. William Gaffey, the suit centers on Montague's report on allegations that a dioxin mortality study Gaffey had co-written for the company was fraudulent. The article that led to the legal action ran in the March 7, 1990, edition of Rachel's Hazardous Waste News (RHWN), a weekly newsletter published by the Maryland-based Environmental Research Foundation, which Montague heads.

The portion of the article dealing with Monsanto's dioxin health effect studies cited as its main source a February 23, 1990, internal Environmental Protection Agency memorandum by EPA scientist Dr. Cate Jenkens, alerting the agency to allegations that the research was fraudulent. Jenkens attached to her memo a portion of a legal brief from an unrelated dioxin contamination lawsuit against Monsanto, from which Montague also quoted. The brief accused Gaffey of concealing the cancer deaths of nine dioxin exposure victims in his study.

The study, which was published in the journal Environmental Science Research (Vol. 26, 1983, pp. 575-91), was co-authored by Judith Zack, another Monsanto scientist. Known as the "Zack-Gaffey study," it is one of three Monsanto studies conducted in 1978 and 1979 that have been sharply criticized for alleged fraud in methodology and use of data. The three studies were key to substantiating denials of adverse health effects of the Vietnam era herbicide Agent Orange due to its containing dioxin, and have helped form the basis for the prevailing notion now accepted by the mainstream media and much of the public that dioxin is not the wide-scale health threat it was once thought to be.

These three studies have been reported on or published in Scientific American, the Wall Street Journal, Science, the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), and other publications generally considered reputable.

Missing Data
Gaffey has testified that he possesses none of the data or research to prove that his study is valid, and claims that Monsanto has the information. Monsanto, in turn, said that the data are in the hands of Gaffey's former attorneys, Coburn and Croft, who are currently representing Monsanto in this case, and who, Montague's lawyers say, failed to turn over the data to Gaffey's new lawyers. Monsanto has become directly involved in the case because Montague's lawyers are seeking Gaffey's data and additional information from the company's files that they believe would prove that the Zack-Gaffey study is fraudulent, as alleged.

While Monsanto is resisting court orders to turn over its files to Montague, numerous documents which emerged in other litigation against the company lend support to the allegation that the study contains manipulated, misleading data. One is a 1984 internal Monsanto memo about the Zack-Gaffey study written by Marcie Strauss, a company official, which lists the names of the dead workers and attempts to account for observed discrepancies in the Zack-Gaffey study. For example, Strauss attempts to explain why some workers were counted as deceased in one of the Monsanto studies and as alive in another. In the Strauss memo, Monsanto denies allegations that the study was fraudulent or the data manipulated.

The three studies concluding that dioxin does not cause cancer, including the Zack-Gaffey study, were conducted in 1978 and 1979 and then released by Monsanto one at a time between 1980 and 1984. They all relate to a 1949 chemical accident in Nitro, West Virginia, that involved an explosion in a pressurized chemical reactor that produced 2,4,5-T, one component of Agent Orange. The Nitro accident exposed hundreds of workers to the herbicide, which Monsanto acknowledges contains small amounts of dioxin, an extremely toxic chemical byproduct of the production of 2,4,5-T.

Dioxin Health Effect Denials
Monsanto used the Zack-Gaffey study to support a 1980 claim that Agent Orange exposure does not cause cancer. At the time, Agent Orange and dioxin were at the center of numerous national controversies, including the Love Canal disaster, Vietnam War veterans' lawsuits against government and industry, and citizen lawsuits again spraying national forest lands with 2,4,5-T. The EPA was on the verge of canceling the 2,4,5-T product registration because of health concerns, while at the same time the Veterans' Administration was engineering its now well-documented coverup of the Agent Orange health effects.

"Monsanto Company today reported that no apparent relationship exists between TCDD, the toxic dioxin contaminant in 'Agent Orange,' and the cause of death of 58 employees exposed to it during 2,4,5-T herbicide production at the company's Nitro, W. Va., plant," the company said in an October 9, 1980, news release about the Zack-Gaffey study.

The same study was presented by Gaffey at an October 1981 environmental science symposium. It was then published in an issue of Environmental Science Research devoted to the symposium proceedings.

It did not become public record that the Zack-Gaffey study had been challenged as fraudulent until the legal brief quoted by Montague was filed in 1989 in a lawsuit titled Kemner v. Monsanto. The claim was based on Monsanto documents that emerged during the Kemner lawsuit, which dealt with a dioxin-tainted chemical spill in Sturgeon, Missouri. Eighteen months later, Jenkens, the EPA official, wrote her memo, which, along with the attached Kemner brief, was sent to Montague by two separate sources, one of whom worked for the EPA.

"For years, industry scientists have been claiming that there's no evidence that dioxins cause cancer in humans," Montague wrote in the lead to RHWN No. 171, for which he now faces libel charges. "Now there is mounting evidence that such claims rely heavily on studies that are fraudulent.... A scientist with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) says Monsanto falsified data in important studies that Monsanto used to support its claim that dioxin does not cause cancer in humans."

Montague went on to note that, "In fact, excess cancers have occurred, but it appears that the data have been manipulated to hide the facts."

Montague then quoted the 1989 Kemner brief Jenkens attached to her February 23, 1990, memo: "Zack and Gaffey deliberately and knowingly omitted 5 deaths from the exposed group and took four workers who had been exposed and put these workers in the unexposed group, serving, of course, to decrease the death rate in the exposed group and increase the death rate in the unexposed group."

In the same issue of RHWN, Montague also attacked other dioxin studies, including a study produced by Monsanto by Dr. Raymond Suskind and V.S. Hertzberg that was published in JAMA (Vol. 251, No. 18, 1984). Suskind and Zack co-authored a third published Monsanto dioxin study (the Zack-Suskind study) relating to the Nitro incident.

A year after the newsletter was published, Gaffey filed his suit in federal court in Missouri, where he lives, alleging that the statement from the Kemner brief quoted by Montague was "untrue and libelous."

In an amended complaint filed in 1992, Gaffey alleged as libelous Montague's statement, "In fact, excess cancers have occurred, but it appears that the data have been manipulated to hide the facts."

These two statements form the crux of Gaffey's libel lawsuit. Under libel law, the plaintiff has the burden, in the first instance, of proving that the allegedly libelous statements are false. While Montague hopes, indeed, to demonstrate that the statements are true, he will be cleared of the charge unless Gaffey can prove they are false.

Journalists routinely rely on quoting government and court records as sources. Court records, in particular, are considered "privileged" information, and are extremely solid ground on which to build news reports. However, Gaffey's suit draws much of its substance from the argument that Montague incorporated the views in those documents as his own, rather than merely quoting from the documents.

Montague's saying "It appears" the data were manipulated is allegedly actionable as being Montague's own statement of fact, rather than that of his sources. Still, in a case like this, in addition to demonstrating the falsity of the statement, the plaintiff also has the burden of proving that it was made either with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.

Whether it is viable or not, one effect of Galley's lawsuit was to silence coverage of Jenkens memo and the allegations of corporate fraud that it exposed. In the months following the memo's release to the press, numerous newspapers in the U.S. and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere paid serious attention to the issue. The march 23, 1990, Atlanta Constitution carried a page-one article entitled, "Dioxin Research Attacked, EPA Says; Internal Federal Memo Accuses Monsanto of Manipulating Results." The March 27, 1990, Australian carried a story titled, "Agent Orange Case Papers Demanded," reporting that the government was demanding the record of the Kemner case. Yet press coverage in the U.S. and abroad dried up once the libel case was brought against Montague. Even the suit itself has been covered only by alternative, specialized press such as Corporate Crime Reporter and Environmental Action, and has been ignored by the major media.

The Dioxin Story Grows
Industry and the media rely heavily on the three Monsanto studies on the Nitro incident when making the claim that dioxin is not especially dangerous. And, through repeated use and referencing, the studies have played a major role in creating the prevailing notion that dioxin is not the significant health threat that it was once thought to be.

In 1979, after Monsanto released information about the Zack-Suskind study, the Wall Street Journal published an article titled, "No Excess in Deaths Found in a Study of Dioxin Exposure" (October 23, 1979, p. 48). While the Journal quoted Monsanto officials, no other view was given on the issue of dioxin as a carcinogen. The full study was later published in the Journal of Occupational Magazine.

Shortly after the Zack-Gaffey study was published in Environmental Science Research in 1983, the journal Science published an editorial downplaying dioxin's impact on health based on research done in the wake of several dioxin accidents. "Some of the accidents," wrote editor Phil Abelson in the January 26, 1984, issue, "notably one in 1949, occurred long enough ago that were cancer to be associated with them, it would now be evident. Some 121 workers were involved in the 1949 accident, and while ironclad proof of a null effect is missing, so too is a basis for believing that TCDD is a dangerous carcinogen in humans."

When Abelson's views were challenged by a reader in a later issue, he pointed his audience to his sources in an editorial reply. One is a report by a panel charged to conduct a dioxin review by the American Medical Association (AMA). The AMA report, which was co-written by Suskind -- a Monsanto consultant and a member of the panel -- relied heavily on the three Monsanto studies. Another source was the proceedings of the dioxin symposium covered in Environmental Science Research, including the Zack-Gaffey study.

Three years later, Scientific American ran a major feature by Fred H. Tschirley largely downplaying the dangers of dioxin (February 1986). Writing about the 1949 Monsanto accident in Nitro, Tschirley stated, "The total number of deaths in [the exposed] group did not differ significantly from that expected in the population at large, and there were no excess deaths due to diseases of cancer or the circulatory system." While Tschirley did not directly reference any of the Monsanto studies co-authored by Zack, Gaffey, or Suskind, the findings match exactly those in one of the Monsanto studies, which were the only retrospective studies done on Nitro workers.

With Science, Scientific American, JAMA, and the Wall Street Journal on board, it's no wonder an entire religion has been based on the alleged safety of dioxin.++

[Arrow]

If I personally contributed to inflicting injury on our troops then I'm a permanent jerk. That much I do know...

Bluehawk, you can take that guilt upon yourself if you wish. However, I think you should know that this family will not confer such atitle on you or any one else in uniform that sincerely believed they were saving lives. I believe beyond a doubt that you did save lives. There is not one member of my family that would want you or any other Veteran to take away from the quality of his life and the life of his family by carrying a sadness in his heart for actions done with full intention of saving and not taking the life ofthose he served with in Vietnam.

As a matter of factwe would have each and everyone ofyoutoenjoy the precious time that you have.Live life as well as you can for as long as you can. Let your lives be a living memorial to all those that have gone on before and to their survivors. God Bless you everyone. Sis

[BLUEHAWK]

Onesix, Little Sparrow and Mortardude -
I guess if somebody would still be telling tales about AO to a full-blown Senator, then there wouldn't have been much way for an 43151A to know what all...

When, does anyone know, did Dow begin its own testing (and coverup, apparently)?

It's a crime is what it is...