Army report details more findings in Abu Ghraib investigation

[darrels joy]

ARNEWS
Army report details more findings in Abu Ghraib investigation
by Joe Burlas
WASHINGTON (Army News Service, Aug. 25, 2004) -- The Army?s latest findings on the detainee abuse that occurred in Iraq?s Abu Ghraib prison late last year determined that abuse can be traced to issues affecting command and control, doctrine and the level of training and experience of Solders operating in a dangerous environment -- facing almost daily deadly hazards, according to Army senior leaders.

Gen. Paul Kern, Army Materiel Command commanding general and the officer ultimately assigned the responsibility to oversee the Army Regulation 381 Procedure 15 investigation into possible military intelligence personnel involvement in the alleged abuse at Abu Ghraib, briefed the press about results of the investigation at the Pentagon Aug. 25.

The investigation is commonly known as the Fay-Jones investigation, referring to its top two investigators, Maj. Gen. George R. Fay and Lt. Gen. Anthony J. Jones. It is just one of several investigations into various aspects of the overall issue of detainee abuse. The results of an independent panel that reviewed Department of Defense detention operations, headed by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, was made public Aug. 24.

?This was clearly a deviation of everything we?ve taught people on how to behave,? Kern said. ?There are values that we treasure in the U.S. Army and in the United States that were not upheld in the report we turned in ? that in itself is extremely troubling. There were failures of leadership of people seeing these things and not correcting them. There were failures of discipline -- hallmarks against what we believe are the values and creed by which we live in the military, that is very troubling.

New Alleged Abusers

The investigation identified 23 MI Soldiers who were assigned to the 205th MI Brigade in Iraq, four civilian contractors working with the 205th and three military police Soldiers working at the prison who may have been involved beyond the seven already identified in previous investigations. Investigators also found that other Soldiers and civilians knew about the abuse and failed to report it.

The names of the MI and MP Soldiers have been forwarded with the investigation results to each Soldier?s commander for determination whether the alleged abuser should be court-martialed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or if other action is appropriate. The names and investigation results of the contractors have been forwarded to the U.S. Justice Department for possible criminal charges under federal laws.

?Our primary focus was to look at the 205th MI Brigade and how its Soldiers might have been involved in detainee abuse,? said Maj. Maricela Alvarado, one of the Jones-Fay investigators and executive officer to Fay. ?We found there was clearly some MI involvement in intentionally violent and abusive techniques in line with what we have all seen on TV and in the newspaper, some unauthorized use of guard dogs and the use of other unauthorized techniques, and numerous cases of failure to report abuse that Soldiers had seen or were aware of, knew was wrong, but did nothing about it.?

Abuse at Tactical Level

One major finding of the investigation was that no one in the chain of command above the 205th MI Brigade was directly involved in incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib. Further, it acknowledged that organizations and personnel above the 205th were indirectly involved through lack of oversight, failure to react to warnings, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross report that warned of some abuse, and policy memos that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level.

For purposes of the investigation, detainee abuse was defined as
treatment of a detainee that violates U.S. law or international law, or inhumane treatment without legal justification.

The last part of the definition, Alvarado said, is in accordance with
the Geneva Convention. The convention allows different types of
treatment for different categories of prisoners or detainees. For
example, it forbids forcing officer prisoners of war to do manual
labor, while allowing enlisted service members to do manual labor as long as that labor is not in direct support of the enemy war effort.

Choosing Wrong Over Right

This investigation identified 44 alleged instances of detainee abuse committed by MP and MI Soldiers, as well as civilian contractors. In 16 of these instances, MI personnel allegedly requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited MP Soldiers to abuse the detainees. The abuse, however, was directed on an individual basis and never officially sanctioned or approved. In 11 instances, MI personnel were directly involved in the abuse.

These individuals clearly chose to do the wrong thing in violation of their training and established polices, Alvarado said. ?There was no gray area -- they knew they were doing wrong,? she said.

Lack of Training

The report found about half of the new alleged cases were Soldiers believing they were doing the right thing -- either because the interrogation technique they used was allowed in other theaters at other times, or because they honestly believed the technique they used was authorized by higher up the chain of command, Alvarado said.

?We have MI operations going on in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, GITMO (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) and Iraq -- all with different sets of rules for what is authorized and what is not in the interrogation process,? she said.

The report detailed multiple deployments of MI units with little
train-up time for new missions prior to new deployments as part of the problem with Soldiers not knowing what may have been an approved technique a year ago in Kosovo not being right in Iraq today. That problem was exacerbated in the 205th MI Brigade, Alvarado said, as investigators found no evidence that the brigade or its subordinate units conducted any refresher training once they arrived in Iraq.

Ghost Detainees

The investigation also looked into reports of ?ghost detainees? --
individuals who were detained in military facilities but not logged
into the military system. Alvarado said it was difficult getting an
accurate number of how many ghost detainees were detained at Abu Ghraib since they were not in-processed, but investigators found evidence of about seven or eight ghost detainees held at Abu Ghraib. She said they were cases of other government agencies bringing in detainees and then telling Army personnel that they were to be kept off the books.

?The Army has certain rules to abide by and one is to document every detainee that comes into custody,? Alvarado said. ?It applies to every detainee brought into an Army facility. We clearly failed to follow our own policy.?

Moving on Recommendations

The Army is moving on the report?s recommendations, including training MI officers in interrogation operations, something currently not included in officer qualification courses. Another recommendation which has also been corrected is the placement of one sole individual responsible for overseeing both detention and interrogation operations.

?The good news out of the investigation is that the vast majority of MI Soldiers know what is right and what is wrong, and they are choosing to do the right thing in a very difficult environment,? Alvarado said.

Thorough Certification

?We are recommending in our report that actions be taken to fix all these things,? Kern said. ?What I will tell you today is we have just returned from both Afghanistan and Iraq, that you will not find those conditions there today. We are doing a very thorough certification process with the people involved with detention and interrogations.

?There are people who are very clearly in charge of Abu Ghraib -- Maj. Gen. Geoff Miller, who has brought organization, discipline and leadership to that prison facility,? he said. ?There are actions being taken in our schools to change doctrine, to improve training. We are training in theater for those who may have missed the school training. So the circumstances today, notwithstanding actions still to be taken on our report, are much improved.?

The investigation report is about 10,000 pages long with appendices. Investigators conducted 172 interviews with privates through the general officers and included civilian contractors and detainees. The investigation started in late April and wrapped up in late July.

An executive summary of the report can be viewed at
www.army.mil/ocpa/reports .
link: http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=6300