3rd Army commanders felt ammunition was short before Iraq invasion, internal report s

[thedrifter]

3rd Army commanders felt ammunition was short before Iraq invasion, internal report says




By John J. Lumpkin and Dafna Linzer
ASSOCIATED PRESS
10:51 p.m. November 27, 2003

WASHINGTON ? Soldiers with the Army's 3rd Infantry Division charged into Iraq in April short of the ammunition their commanders had said was necessary to invade, according to the division's postwar evaluation of the fighting.

It was one of a number of supply problems encountered by the 3rd Infantry before and during its 21-day dash to Baghdad from Kuwait, according to the internal review, a 293-page after-action report created by the division's senior officers and troops.

During the run-up to the war, division commanders requested additional ammunition be delivered to front-line units. The request was approved, but the troops could not obtain all the ordnance despite months of war preparations.

"Every attempt to gain the ammunition assets resulted in some agency or another denying requests, short-loading trucks or turning away soldiers," the report said. "The entire situation became utter chaos. ... The division crossed (into Iraq) short the ammunition it had declared necessary to commit to combat."

The report, whose authors were not identified by name, catalogued serious problems with supply, security and the handling of prisoners of war. It blamed many problems on higher headquarters or other parts of the military, although it did point out some places where the division could train its own soldiers better.

A spokesman for the division, Maj. Darryl Wright, characterized the report as a candid effort to pinpoint problems and refine tactics so the division fights better next time. He said the report, obtained by The Associated Press and other outlets, had not yet been finalized.

During the Iraq invasion, more than 12,000 troops of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) joined thousands of Marines and other soldiers in the northward thrust to Baghdad. The first U.S. infantry and armored units entered Iraq on March 20 and took Baghdad within three weeks.

The 3rd Infantry, based at Fort Stewart, Ga., suffered 44 killed during combat in Iraq. Much of its report focused on problems encountered during the rapid thrust into Iraq, which has since given way to an increasingly dangerous occupation.

The report praised the division's troops, leaders and front-line fighting gear, particularly the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle.

"The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) moved farther and faster than any other ground offensive operation in history," the report claimed.

"U.S. armored combat systems enabled the division to close with and destroy heavily armored and fanatically determined enemy forces with impunity, often within urban terrain," it said.

Yet the division had serious problems receiving supplies while on the move, including vehicle parts, ammunition, fuel and medical supplies. Had the division been required to move beyond Baghdad, or had it required more time to reach the city, its advance would have stalled, the report suggested.

"Most units literally spent 21 days in continuous combat operations without receiving a single repair part," the report said. "Shortages of predictably high-demand repair parts and vehicular fluids had the most lasting effect on fleet readiness."

In a section describing the problems combat engineers faced in receiving needed construction equipment, the report said, "The Army's current supply system failed before and during the operation."

Despite well-publicized fears that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons on advancing U.S. troops, not all soldiers had complete protective gear, the report said.

A battalion of air defense troops was among those. "More than half of the battalion deployed with some type of nuclear, biological and chemical equipment shortage," the report said.

Units ran into shortages of gloves, suits and mask filters. Some protective suits weren't fitted properly, and decontamination kits had expired. Some troops simply left their equipment at home.

The division also had problems handling enemy prisoners of war, the report said.

"Soldiers failed to properly record the circumstances of many captures," it said. "Later, we were unable to identify enemy soldiers who violated the law of war, and, therefore, cannot achieve a major goal set forth by President Bush: To punish those who violate the law of war."

Some units that operated away from the front lines had inadequate weapons to defend themselves as they faced guerrilla attacks, the report said. "Security was lacking for critical command and control nodes ... as well as for critical staff personnel."

Communications were another persistent problem. The division, along with other advancing units, stretched out across southern Iraq, with support units reaching back to Kuwait. But some transmitters didn't have the range to reach more distant units. Iridium satellite phones only functioned about half of the time, the report said.

The division also had difficulty delivering mail to the troops, the report said. Mail, in particular, is considered a critical morale booster for fighting soldiers.


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