Strategic Dynamics Of Asymmetric Warfare And Pendulum Of Security Threats In Philippi

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Strategic Dynamics Of Asymmetric Warfare And Pendulum Of Security Threats In Philippines And VUCA World – Analysis
By: By Jumel Gabilan Estrañero and Maria Kristina Decena Siuagan* Eurasia View News: 08-16-21
Re: https://www.eurasiareview.com/160820...orld-analysis/

With a Clausewitzian perspective of war, i.e. achieving victory by defeating the opponent’s army which is the way Western wars are fought is mostly based on conventional strategies and organizations. Quoting Minberger and Svendsen (2013): “Small states have been copying the larger nations way of planning for war, with limited analysis of to whether this is the most effective strategy for them. Analyses of large numbers of historical cases show that a conventional approach is a road to defeat for small states when facing larger conventional opponents. Another solution might be to change the national strategy to an irregular one”

In the research entitled Irregular Warfare as a National Military Strategy Approach for Small States, it offers the potential for small states to improve the effectiveness of their military by adopting an irregular strategy rather than the traditional or conventional approach. In terms of strategy, they further argue that a small state should avoid open confrontation with a larger opponent’s military forces, while making any attack by an aggressor costlier (politically, militarily and/or economically) than the aggressor is willing to pay”, hence, developing an indirect strategy that leads to an irregular warfare approach rather than a conventional one. This is based on the premise that the small state is inferior in military terms and obviously cannot win a war fought conventionally.

Moreover, Minberger and Svendsen (2013) offer another perspective to summarize their Ends, Ways and Means strategy for small states. They believe that for a small state to resolve a conflict, it must not rely on the military means alone but rather utilize in combination other means available to it – “the use of all the state´s tools (diplomacy, informational, military, and economics), aimed at spreading the conflict into the international arena and context, and, thereby, producing the psychological pressure required for an aggressor to reconsider his plans”.

Further, Dusan Gregor’s master thesis entitled, David’s Sling: Irregular Warfare as a Small State’s Strategy Option, he argues that as powerful states continue to increase their military might, small states, on the other hand, face both a political and military challenge of deciding what vital military capabilities to keep and how to possibly overcome an adversary that is technologically and numerically superior. He purports that because small states often try to imitate great powers as regards their ability to fight wars, such an approach is considered risky “due to limited financial, technological, material, and human resources, a small nation’s military would not pose a credible deterrence and, if deterrence fails, may not repel a superior assailant.” By introducing irregular warfare concept as a strategic option, the possibility of a small state winning a war against a conventionally superior enemy increases. He analyzes this concept under the regular joint military functions of command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.

In Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars, author Andrew Mack who was the first to introduce the term ‘asymmetric conflict’ contends that an actor’s relative determination or interest explains the successful outcome or failure in such conflicts. He argues that military superiority is not a guarantee of success in war. The crux of the matter is that regardless of material power resources, the victor will be the actor with the most resolve. Mack concluded an interesting aspect of asymmetric wars, such as the Vietnam War, that many strong actors do not win the conflict in a military sense, nor are they defeated militarily. Such military defeat would have been impossible as the insurgents (Vietcongs) could not launch an invasion.

Philippine Context of Asymmetric Defense Build-Up and Challenges:

In analyzing the security policy regarding the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) capability upgrade program, more particularly the development of the Asymmetric Warfare capability, we can further determine if the approach of procuring conventional weapons to boost the AFP’s defense capability is still rational, responsive, and adaptive to the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) security environment that our military forces are operating in, vis-à-vis the development of the AFP’s Asymmetric Warfare capability.

AFP’s Asymmetric Warfare capability as a strategic option for the Philippines primarily for deterrence and defense purposes, but may also include calculated pre-emptive offensive actions. This capability is understood to be limited to a state-on-state, weak versus strong power dynamics not involving non-state actors (although not negating the fact that such capability may be harnessed by the Philippine government later on to address this type of adversary). On capability development, the term is aptly directed to refer to a state or country with weak military capabilities. Additionally, the definition of “asymmetry” by Metz & Johnson was used to help readers achieve a full grounding or establish a common operational understanding of what asymmetry in warfare is. The asymmetries of method, technology, and organization is used.

As a basis, the Republic Act No. 7898, also known as the “AFP Modernization Act”, RA 7898, which was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on February 23, 1995, is an act providing for the modernization of the AFP. As stated therein, “It is hereby declared the policy of the State to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines.”

In this sense, one of the main thrusts of the modernization program is “The development of a self-reliant and credible strategic armed force along the concept of a “Citizens Armed Force”; the reconfiguration of the Armed Forces of the Philippines structure; and the professionalization of the AFP.” Additionally, under Section 4, Capability, Material, and Technology Development (CMTD) is cited as one of the components of the program which “…entails the development and employment of certain capabilities that can address the assessed threats: Provided, that the acquisition of air force, navy and army equipment and material of such types and quantities shall be made in accordance with the need to develop AFP capabilities pursuant to its modernization objectives.” The law was designed for a 15-year duration with a 50-billion-peso initial budget covering the first 5 years. However, due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, funding was halted and consequently neglected by succeeding presidencies until its eventual expiration in 2010.

Under the name of the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RAFPMP), RA 10349, is an act amending Republic Act No. 7898. It was signed into law by President Benigno Aquino III on 11 December 2012, serving as a supplemental law extending the previous program to another 15 years. It was allocated 75 billion pesos as an initial budget for the first 5 years in order to continue modernizing all the Major Services of the AFP. The RAFPMP is being implemented in three phases called Horizon I (2013 – 2017), Horizon II (2018 – 2022), and Horizon III (2023 – 2028), respectively.

Now, out of the Total Budget for Horizon 1 amounting to PhP96.5B, 65% or PhP62.7B of the budget goes to the projects capable for territorial defense in West Philippine Sea while the remaining PhP33.8B goes to ISO/HADR & Counter-terror Capabilities.

Meanwhile, the general assessment of the RAFPMP as contained in the Revised AFPMP Year-End Report CY-2020 shows that underlying factors have made its status far beyond its completion. Delivery and completion dates after contract signing normally range from 2 to 5 years and seller countries usually do not readily provide data on high-end weapons systems as these projects normally undergo government-to-government (G2G) arrangements or bilateral agreements for information sharing, while other projects require host systems or platforms to be completed first prior to integration and/or installation. These factors cause delays in the implementation of the RAFPMP, even if the projects are already on its Contract Implementation Stage.

That significantly affects not only the attainment of the AFP’s target Equipment Readiness which is the main component in modernizing the AFP, but also the yearly Financial Performance. Relatedly, limitation in funding is one of the problems encountered in implementing the projects for the Modernization Program. For Horizon 2 that will end next year (2022), with a total budget cost of 285B, only 57B or 20% were released from 2018-2020.

In summary, in order to attain a Fully Mission Capable for Territorial Defense in WPS or Minimum Credible Defense as per Horizon 2 objective, the AFP shall continue to procure and implement the remaining Horizon 1 and 2 approved project list and the additional “Game Changer” projects with a total of PhP362.49B is projected for annual programming from 2021 to 2027.

In realizing the DND vision set for year 2028 which guarantees: “(1) Philippine security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) a reliable partner in national development, and (3) a strategic player in the Asia-Pacific region”, efforts as outlined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2018-2022, i.e., building and sustaining the readiness of a defense force composed of highly trained and well-equipped soldiers and significantly increasing defense capability and capacity through modernization are purposively indicated.

Credible Defense Posture of the NDS, under Force Structure and Organizational Development, it is stated therein that: “It is the mission of the Defense Department to maintain an armed forces that is efficient and responsive to engage in conventional and unconventional warfare such as internal and external operations as well as disaster relief and rescue operations, while continuously contributing to economic development and other non-traditional military roles.” Moreover, it says that “…activities during time of conflict include Peace Enforcement, Counter Terrorism, and Conventional and Unconventional Warfare.” Hence, in relation to the threats that the DND has identified, the Philippines has to address these challenges across the whole spectrum of defense and security – requiring the collaboration and coordination of various government sectors, the armed forces, and the people, in general.

Furthermore, the NDS re-echoes the current administration’s firm resolve to “allocate modernization packages for the military as can be surmised upon the government’s agenda to ensure sustained efforts for upgrading the armed forces” in the light of the country’s positive economic outlook.

From the AFP’s end, the AFP should develop asymmetric warfare capabilities and this was mirrored in the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) stating that asymmetric warfare should be one of the enabling concepts of the JOC. The first move to progress into having asymmetric capability is to develop the technology and we need to give attention to the new dynamics of Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) that is one of the foundations of asymmetric warfare.

In strengthening military capability despite limited budget for defense as well as plans of recalibrating strategies of procuring very costly conventional warfare capabilities instead of acquiring and/or developing cheaper but high-impact asymmetric warfare capabilities that have all the potential to increase the AFP’s posture for defense as well as deterrence.

The AFP is developing conventional warfare capabilities because it is the measure of the armed forces for itself and other states’ armed forces are also being measured in the same manner. The development the AFP’s conventional warfare capabilities will be the staging point for asymmetric warfare because the former is also the source of technology enrichment of an armed forces. It cannot develop an asymmetric warfare capability without it being in a stage that it already knows the technologies for conventional warfare, and that the it can only recalibrate and refocus if it already developed its conventional capabilities.

In the political arena, the Philippines lags behind in the so-called political warfare. China, being a big and powerful country is in fact the world leader in this kind of warfare despite United State’s pushback on QUAD Security Order in the Indo-Pacific region. Regional security concerns are highly dependent on developments in this arena. They have been in the forefront of political warfare and it is high time we try to look into this highly complex front. It does not depend directly on having superior weaponry, so poor and small countries can get involved.
At the backdrop of all these, guided by the National Security Policy (NSP) and National Security Strategy (NSS), the Philippines, through its armed forces must demonstrate to the world that it is capable of protecting and defending what it owns by accomplishing the strategic objective of developing the defense capability for the protection of the country’s territory, sovereignty, and maritime interests in the midst of China’s aggressive stance in the South China Sea (SCS) particularly in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

In context, the success of a small state (i.e. Philippines and other ASEAN nations) winning against its strong enemies has few exceptional historical proofs (as in the case of Israel in the Six-day War). But the tendency of small states to imitate or copy great powers in their defense planning with respect to military capabilities, i.e. building on conventional or traditional strengths often prove counter-productive, likely to lead to defeat in war, and in some instances, cause internal political, economic, social, environmental, and security challenges in the end.

** The ideas and opinions stated herein do not reflect those of the publisher’s, and are not representative of any government or organization.

*About the author(s):

* Jumel Gabilan Estrañero is a defense, security, and policy analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He has completed the Executive Course in National Security at the National Defense College of the Philippines and has participated in NADI Track II discussions in Singapore (an ASEAN-led security forum on terrorism). His articles were published by Global Security Encyclopedia Handbook (Palgrave Macmillan) and Routledge, Eurasia Review, Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Global Village Space, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Times, Malaya Business Insights, Asia Maritime Review, The Nation (Thailand), Southeast Asian Times, and Global Politics. He is also one of the authors of the book entitled Handbook of Terrorism 2019 (Philippines) and Disruptive Innovation: Duterte Legacy (Political, Economic, and Security Reference), and A Philippine Counterterrorism Handbook. His specializations include geopolitics of the South China Sea, counter-terrorism/insurgency, cybersecurity, peacebuilding, strategic policy, and intelligence.

* Maria Kristina Decena Siuagan, one of the co-authors of the book “The Challenges Posed by Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A Philippine Counterterrorism Handbook (2019). She worked as a national security specialist before and currently a graduating law student. A dedicated public servant, she had likewise worked as a writer and defense & security analyst for the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as an administrative officer at the Department of National Defense. A licensed nurse and a senior law student, with passion with law and national security, she is an online published author, whose works had appeared in Global Security Encyclopedia Handbook (Palgrave Macmillan) and Routledge, Eurasia Review, Global Security Review, Geopolitical Monitor, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Malaya Business Insights, and Southeast Asian Times. Whenever she has spare time, she blogs about God, life, and law school at http://www.totetallylegal.com and http://www.openconcavity.wordpress.com.