POW MIA Bracelet

[vetgirl]

My sister called the other night and said she had a dream about my peace sign. She wanted to know if I still had it. I said no and she said "well... I found a POW MIA bracelet in my jewelry box I think it's yours." I got it 02-05 04. thirty one years to the day. Now I need to know if I can track it after all these years

Sgt. Joseph A. Matejov USAF 02/05/73
LAOS

any help would be appreciated

Deb

[MORTARDUDE]

Deb :

Interesting story. Try some Google searches, or go to the POW-MIA websites. I am sure you will find some info. Good Luck !

Larry

[David]

Loss Date - 02/05/73
Last Name - MATEJOV
First Name - JOSEPH A.
Branch - USAF
Country - LAOS
DOB - 02/02/52
Town - EAST MEADOW
State - NY
Remarks - "KIA, POSS CAPTURED" GROUP BURIAL 12/95


MATEJOV, JOSEPH ANDREW
GROUP BURIAL 12/95

Name: Joseph Andrew Matejov
Rank/Branch: E4/US Air Force
Unit: Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron from Ubon, Thailand
Date of Birth: 02 February 1952
Home City of Record: East Meadow NY
Date of Loss: 05 February 1973
Country of Loss: Laos
Loss Coordinates: 153755N 1065957E (YC143291)
Status (in 1973): Missing In Action/Killed In Action
Category: 1
Acft/Vehicle/Ground: EC47Q

Other Personnel in Incident: Dale Brandenburg; Todd M. Melton; George R. Spitz;
Severo J. Primm III; Peter R. Cressman; Arthur R. Bollinger (all missing);
Robert E. Bernhardt (remains recovered)

Source: Compiled by Homecoming II Project 15 March 1991 from one or more of
the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence
with POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews. Updated by the P.O.W.
NETWORK 1998.

REMARKS: KIA 3 - POSS CAPT 4

SYNOPSIS: On February 5, 1973, about a week after the signing of the Paris
Peace Agreement, an EC47Q aircraft was shot down over Saravane Province,
Laos, about 50 miles east of the city of Saravane. The crew of the aircraft
consisted of the pilot, Capt. George R. Spitz; co-pilot, 2Lt. Severo J.
Primm III, Capt. Arthur R. Bollinger, 1Lt. Robert E. Bernhardt, Sgt. Dale
Brandenburg, Sgt. Joseph A. Matejov, all listed as crew members, and Sgt.
Peter R. Cressman and SSgt. Todd M. Melton, both systems operators. The
families of all aboard the aircraft were told the men were dead, and advised
to conduct memorial services.

It is known that Cressman and Matejov were members of Detachment 3, 6994th
Security Squadron from Ubon, Thailand. The aircraft, however, was flying out
of the 361st TEW Squadron (Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron) at Nakhon
Phanom Airbase, Thailand. Primm, Melton, Spitz, Brandenburg and Bernhardt
were assigned to the 361st TEW Squadron. Bollinger's unit is unknown.

The men in the 6994th were highly trained and operated in the greatest of
secrecy. They were not allowed to mingle with others from their respective
bases, nor were the pilots of the aircraft carrying them on their missions
always told what their objective was. They were cryptology experts, language
experts, and knew well how to operate some of the Air Force's most
sophisticated equipment. They were the first to hear the enemy's battle
plans.

Over five years later, Joe Matejov's mother, Mary Matejov, heard columnist
Jack Anderson, on "Good Morning America", describe a Pathet Lao radio
communique which described the capture of four "air pirates" on the same day
as the EC47Q carrying her son was shot down. NO OTHER PLANE WAS MISSING THAT
DAY. Anderson's information indicated that reconnaissance personnel had 40
uninterrupted minutes in which to survey the crash site.

The report of the reconnaissance team, which was not provided to the
families for over five years, showed that three bodies, which were thought
to have been higher ranking officers because of the seating arrangement,
were found strapped in seats. Four of the men aboard the aircraft were not
in or around the aircraft, and the partial remains of the eighth man
(Bernhardt) was recovered. No identification was brought out from the crash
site, and no attempt was made to recover the three bodies from the downed
aircraft. It is assumed that the reconnaissance team was most interested in
recovering the sensitive equipment aboard the EC47Q. The EC47Q became known
as the "Flying Pueblo". Most of the "kids" in back, as some pilots called
them, were young, in good health, and stood every chance of surviving
captivity.

There were specific reports intercepted regarding the four missing men from
the aircraft missing on February 5, 1973. Radio reports indicated that the
four were transported to the North Vietnam border. None were released in the
general POW release beginning the next month.

Peter Cressman enlisted in the United States Air Force in August, 1969 and
after two years at Elmendorf AFB in Anchorage, Alaska he volunteered for
service in Vietnam and left for Da Nang in June 1972.

In Da Nang, Peter spent his free hours at Sacred Heart Orphanage. His
letters to his hometown priest in Oakland, New Jersey, resulted in the
forming of "Operation Forget-Me-Not". Community schools, churches, merchants
and citizens joined the effort to help the innocent victims of war. The
group eventually provided a boxcar of supplies to the orphans.

Peter was transferred to the airbase at Ubon, Thailand. He believed the
secret missions being flown into Laos were illegal, and had written letters
to his congressman in that regard. His family has been active in efforts to
locate information on Peter and the nearly 2500 others who remain
unaccounted for. They founded the National Forget-Me-Not Association for
POW/MIAs in St.Petersburg, Florida, the largest POW advocacy group in the
country.

Joseph Matejov enlisted in the Air Force in 1970 from his home state of New
York and went to Southeast Asia in April, 1972. Joe's father and two
brothers were career military. His sister graduated from West Point in 1981.
Steven Matejov died in 1984 not knowing what happened to his son. Joe's
mother, Mary says, "Joe may be alive. If so, this government has a legal and
moral responsibility to get him home. The next generation of servicemen
should not have to wonder if they will answer the call to defend their
country only to be abandoned. We must stop this tragedy now, and never allow
it to happen again."

Thousands of reports received by the U.S. Government have convinced many
experts that hundreds of Americans remain captive in Southeast Asia. Members
of a crew flying a secret mission after a peace agreement had been signed
would likely be considered war criminals. If they are among those thought to
be alive, the survivors of the EC47Q have been held captive over 15 years.
It's time we brought our men home.

-----------------------------------------------------------
[matejov.94 08/14/94]

excerpts from letters....

August 6, 1994
from Mary Matejov to friends
Enclosed are the papers I spoke to you about the latest game the
Air Force is playing with me. There are remains, there are not remains
depending on who you are writing to......


April 19, 1994
from Department of the Air Force to Senator D'Amato

"....The Armed Forces Identification Review Board (AFIRB) has not met
nor made any determination concerning a group burial which would include
the remains believed to be of Sergeant Joseph A. Matejov. The
recommendation of the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, will be
only one of many factors evaluated by AFIRN. The United States Army is
the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Mortuary Affairs and is
responsible for identifying the remains of deceased personnel prior to
1993 ("ancient" remains). ......

May 14, 1994
Mrs. Mary Matejov to Col. Spinello, Commander PERSCDM

"Enclosed is a copy of a letter sent to the Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato
which states there are remains believed to be Sgt. Joseph A Matejov...I
would like these remains sent to Dr. Michael Charney of Colorado...."

May 23, 1994
Department of the Army to Mrs. Matejov

" ....Unfortunately, you have misunderstood what has transpired in this
case as there has not been a recommendation for individual identification
of the remains of Sergeant Matejov. CILHI recommended that comingled,
unsegregated remains recovered from the crashsite of the aircraft on
which Sergeant Matejov was a manifested crewman be identified as the
group remains of the crew including Sergeant Matejov. Therefore, there
are no individually segregated remains that can be identified as
Sergeant Matejov available for an independent opinion......"

May 25, 1994
Dr. Charney to Mrs. Matejov
..." It so happens that Mr. Huey was here this morning on another case,
that of Mark Danielson, also airforce, shot down June 1972. I had
spoken with Huey when he was last here, as I mentioned to you over the
phone and in my note, about the fact that you would be asking that the
"remains" of Joseph be brought, to me and that is when he said that
there was ONLY AN IDENTIFICATION TAG. THAT WAS ALL. ......I will
certainly look over the lot...as they did the teeth of Danielson
today...."


--------------------------------------------
National Alliance of Families,
Bits n Pieces

DESPITE THE VALIANT EFFORTS OF SENATOR BOB SMITH AND CONGRESSMAN BOB DORNAN AND THEIR STAFFS THE BARON 52 BURIAL REMAINS SCHEDULED TO MARCH 27TH, 1996.

ON FEB. 23, 1996, DINO CARLUCCIO, OF SENATOR SMITH'S OFFICE AND AL SANTOLI OF CONGRESSMAN DORNAN'S OFFICE MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF DPMO TO DISCUSS THE VIHN PHU LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS, THE BARON 52 INCIDENT, LIMA SITE 85 INCIDENT, LAO POW/MIA ARCHIVES, THE CASE OF DAVID HRDLICKA AND THE MISSING SERVICE PERSONNEL ACT. REPRESENTING DPMO WERE SENIOR DPMO ANALYST, FOR LAOS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS, WARREN GRAY; DIXON JORDAN, LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICER; FRANCIS O'BRIEN, GENERAL COUNSEL; AND ELBERT HAMPTON, ASST . FOR POW/MIA AFFAIRS AND DRUG POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OSD/LA). MONG POINTS ACKNOWLEDGED BY DPMO:

VINH PHU LIVE SIGHTINGS - "THE ORIGINAL 1990 LIVE SIGHTING REPORT HAD BEEN RULED A FABRICATION WITHIN 9 DAYS OF THE REPORT ARRIVING IN THE THEN-DIA SPECIAL OFFICE FOR POW/MIA. MR. GRAY INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THIS DETERMINATION AND THAT THE SOURCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY RECONTACTED AT THE TIME FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PERSON AT DIA WHO ANALYZED THE REPORT HAD ONLY BEEN THERE FOR A SHORT PERIOD AND HAD LEFT TWO DAYS AFTER THE REPORT WAS APPROVED AS A FABRICATION."

"THE USG ASKED THE VIETNAMESE IN NOV. 1995, TO VISIT THREE MOUNTAINOUS LOCATION WITH GRID COORDINATES IN VINH PHU PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM..."

"IN EARLY JANUARY 1996, THE VIETNAMESE INFORMED THE USG THAT SUCH AN INVESTIGATION WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED BECAUSE THE REPORTS OF AN UNDERGROUND PRISON FACILITY IN VINH PHU PROVINCE HAD ALREADY BEEN INVESTIGATED BY USG AND CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS IN RESPONSE TO BILL HENDON'S PUBLICIZED STATEMENTS..... MR. GRAY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE USG HAD NOT YET EXPLAINED TO THE VIETNAMESE THAT THE AREAS IN QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN VISITED BY EITHER THE USG OR CONGRESSIONAL STAFF. THE PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS WERE REPORTEDLY LIMITED TO A VILLAGE AREA SEVERAL MILES FROM THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION BASED ON COORDINATES BILL HAD HAD OBTAINED FROM THE LIVE SIGHTING REPORTS. MR. GRAY SAID THAT THE COORDINATES IN ONE OF THE HEARSAY REPORTS HAD BEEN REPORTED ERRONEOUSLY BY A DEBRIEFER AT THE TIME THE REPORT WAS OBTAINED."

"MR. GRAY SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE GENERAL WOLD HAD RAISED THE MATTER DIRECTLY WITH THE VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS DURING HIS TRIP. (NOTE: AT THE JAN. MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE ATTENDED BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ANTHONY LAKE AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION, GEN. WOLD HAD CONCURRED THAT THE MATTER NEEDED TO BE RAISED WITH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, ESPECIALLY BY THE PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION IF THE MATTER WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED BY THEN.)"

BARON 52 AND THE NSA INTERCEPTS: "MR. GRAY INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO CONDUCT HIS OWN ANALYSIS OF THIS CASE, BECAUSE HE APPARENTLY WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH A PREVIOUS ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY MR. DESATTE IN 1987.

"MR. HAMPTON FURTHER INDICATED THAT MR. GRAY SHOULD MAKE HIS OPINIONS KNOWN TO GEN. WOLD ON THE NEED FOR RE-EXAMINATION OF THE NSA MESSAGES, AND THAT, IF MR. TROWBRIDGE DID NOT OBJECT, DPMO STAFF SHOULD RECOMMEND TO GEN. WOLD THAT HE CONSIDER ASKING THE APPROPRIATE DOD OFFICIALS TO RESCIND THE DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CRESSMAN AND MATEJOV.... IF MR. TROWBRIDGE OR OTHERS HAD OBJECTIONS, THEN MR. HAMPTON STATED THE ISSUE SHOULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSED BETWEEN MEETING ATTENDEES."

"MR. CARLUCCIO INDICATED THAT HE HAD SEVERAL POINTS TO MAKE AT A LATER DATE CONCERNING THE ACTUAL NSA MESSAGES, AND THAT HE WANTED TO BE INVOLVED WITH THE RE-EXAMINATION OF THESE REPORTS BY DPMO ON BEHALF OF SENATOR SMITH. HE REMINDED THE PARTICIPANTS THAT IT WAS UNFAIR TO ASK THE CRESSMAN AND MATEJOV FAMILIES TO ACCEPT THE AFIRB (ARMED FORCES IDENTIFICATION REVIEW BOARD.) DECISION WHEN DPMO WAS CURRENTLY UNABLE TO DEMONSTRATE CONCLUSIVELY TO WHO THE NSA MESSAGES PERTAINED TO IF IT WAS NOT BARON- 52. HE A GAIN INDICATED THAT NO OTHER AIRCRAFT, SOUTH VIETNAMESE OR AMERICAN WAS SHOT DOWN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON THE DATE OF THE BARON-52 INCIDENT, AND, AS EARLY AS FEB. 14, 1973, THE DIRECTOR OF NSA HAD SPECIFIED THE LOCATION OF THE CAPTURED AIRMEN IN THE SAME REGION OF LAOS WHERE THE SHOOT-DOWN HAD OCCURRED."

[Boats]

My bracelet is for Maj. Richard G. Elzinga
USAF 26 March 1970 LAOS

Here's what I know this soldier:

ELZINGA, RICHARD GENE
Name: Richard Gene Elzinga
Rank/Branch: O3/US Air Force
Unit: 56th Special Operations Wing, Udorn AF TH (RAVENS)
Date of Birth: 13 August 1942
Home City of Record: Shedd OR
Date of Loss: 26 March 1970
Country of Loss: Laos
Loss Coordinates: 175900N 1023400E (TF543931)
Status (in 1973): Missing in Action
Category: 4
Aircraft/Vehicle/Ground: O1
Refno: 1579
Other Personnel in Incident: Henry L. Allen (missing)
Source: Compiled by Homecoming II Project 15 March 1990 with the assistance of one or more of the following: raw data from U.S. Government agency sources, correspondence with POW/MIA families, published sources, interviews. Updated by the P.O.W. NETWORK 1998.

REMARKS:

SYNOPSIS: The Steve Canyon program was a highly classified FAC (forward air control) operation covering the military regions of Laos. U.S. military operations in Laos were severely restricted during the Vietnam War era because Laos had been declared neutral by the Geneva Accords.

The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need for military support in order to defend territory used by Lao and North Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist forces in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could be "in the black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the military to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under supervision
of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos.

RAVEN was the radio call sign which identified the flyers of the Steve Canyon Program. Men recruited for the program were rated Air Force officers with at least six months experience in Vietnam. They tended to be the very best of pilots, but by definition, this meant that they were also mavericks, and considered a bit wild by the mainstream military establishment.

The Ravens came under the formal command of CINCPAC and the 7/13th Air Force 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom, but their pay records were maintained at Udorn with Detachment 1. Officially, they were on loan to the U.S. Air Attache at Vientiane. Unofficially, they were sent to outposts like Long Tieng, where their field commanders were the CIA, the Meo Generals, and the U.S. Ambassador. Once on duty, they flew FAC missions which controlled all U.S. air strikes over Laos.

All tactical strike aircraft had to be under the control of a FAC, who was intimately familiar with the locale, the populous, and the tactical situation. The FAC would find the target, order up U.S. fighter/bombers from an airborne command and control center, mark the target accurately with white phosphorus (Willy Pete) rockets, and control the operation throughout the time the planes remained on station. After the fighters had departed,
the FAC stayed over the target to make a bomb damage assessment (BDA).

The FAC also had to ensure that there were no attacks on civilians, a complex problem in a war where there were no front lines and any hamlet could suddenly become part of the combat zone. A FAC needed a fighter pilot's mentality, but but was obliged to fly slow and low in such unarmed and vulnerable aircraft as the Cessna O1 Bird Dog, and the Cessna O2.
Consequently, aircraft used by the Ravens were continually peppered with ground fire. A strong fabric tape was simply slapped over the bullet holes until the aircraft could no longer fly.
Ravens were hopelessly overworked by the war. The need for secrecy kept their numbers low (never more than 22 at one time), and the critical need of the Meo sometimes demanded each pilot fly 10 and 12 hour days.

Some Ravens completed their tour of approximately 6 months with a total of over 500 combat missions. The Ravens in at Long Tieng in Military Region II, had, for several years, the most difficult area in Laos. The base, just on the southern edge of the Plain of Jars, was also the headquarters for the CIA-funded Meo army
commanded by General Vang Pao. An interesting account of this group can be read in Christopher Robbins' book, "The Ravens".

This book contains an account of the loss of 1Lt. Henry L. Allen and Capt. Richard G. Elzinga: The post at Long Tieng had been under seige, and it became necessary for Ravens to live in Vietntiane in new quarters nicknamed Silver City, but they
continued to stage out of Long Tieng. "They called the daily flight there and back...the 'commute.'

"Hank Allen, an exceptional pilot with eyes like a hawk, took off with Dick Elzinga in the front seat of his O-1. Allen was 'short', soon to return home after a tour in which he had notched up four hundred combat missions, and he planned to return directly to the States and marry his fiancee within a fortnight. Elzinga had only just arrived in Laos, and it was his first trip up to the secret city.

Allen intended to use the 'commute' as a checkout ride. It was a cloudy day. He took off and reported over the radio...that the O-1 was airborne. It was the last thing ever heard from them. Neither of the pilots, nor the plane, was ever seen again.

"They had disappeared. Each of the Ravens spent at least two hours, on top of their usual day's flying, searching for the wreckage. No Mayday call had been heard, nor had a beeper signal been picked up from the survival radio, and no clue to the airplane's whereabouts was discovered. The disappearance
was a complete mystery."

The official point of loss was noted as 20 miles northeast of Vientiane, Laos. Both men were classified Missing in Action.
Three years later, on March 10, 1973, a Pathet Lao agent was captured carrying three of Elzinga's traveler's checks and money of three countries.

Elzinga had not been in Vientiane long enough to get a locker for his billfold. According to a 1974 list compiled by the National League of POW/MIA Families, Elzinga, at least, survived the loss of the O1 plane.

Elzinga and Allen are among nearly 600 Americans lost in Laos. Even though the Pathet Lao stated publicly that they held "tens of tens" of American prisoners, not one American held in Laos was ever released -- or negotiated for.

Since U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War ended, nearly 10,000 reports have been received by the U.S. Government relating to Americans missing in Southeast Asia. Many authorities have reluctantly concluded that hundreds are still alive in captivity today. We, as a nation, owe these men our best effort to find them and bring them home.

Until the fates of the men like Elzinga and Allen are known, their families will wonder if they are dead or alive .. and why they were abandoned.
=================================
From - Mon Apr 10 13:05:06 2000
From: "Lee, Thomas E. - SAIC"
Subject: Information correction
First I would like to establish my credentials with you, before I point out errors in the descriptive write-ups on approximately 20 entries in your data base. I am a retired US Air Force Colonel who served in Laos covertly as part of DoD Project 404 from June 1968-June 1969. I was the intelligence officer in Savannakhet operating in "civilian" status working for the US Embassy. I carried civilian documentation for presentation but also possessed my military ID card. We wore civilian clothes. One of my roles was to support the Raven forward air controllers (FAC), the US FACs operating from "in-country" bases in Laos. See my website at http://members.xoom.com/targeteer.

The following is a paragraph from your description of the "Raven"
Forward Air Controllers operating in Laos. We lost 21 of them from 1966-1973. "The non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need for military support in order to defend territory used by Lao and North Vietnamese communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist forces in Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could be "in the black" or "sheep-dipped" (clandestine; mustered out of the military to perform military duties as a civilian) to operate in Laos under supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos."
****
An error in the above description is that most of the US military
personnel operating in Laos were NOT "sheep-dipped" as you described. We were in the "Black" in that we were technically not there, we were signed to out of country units and our in-country existence was generally classified for part of the 1964-1973 period. (The existence of these operations was revealed during Congressional Hearings in late 1969 or 1970).

The Raven Program and the complementary DoD Project 404 both
began in 1966. However, there was no mustering out of the sevice for the Ravens or the Project 404 personnel. To my knowledge the only program that was "sheep dipped" as you described was Project Heavy Green (the Air Force troops supporting Site 85 and the TACAN site support). That accounted for under 100 people. (13 were lost) There were military
personnel operating within the Air America and CIA (CAS) operations that may have operated under different rules.

Critically speaking the US devised the sheep dipping process. It was used across the US intelligence community. The non-communist forces had virtually nothing to do with that process. They did play a role in accepting the US military members in "civilian" status by accepting our presence and not "spilling the beans". We were not deceiving the opposition because they knew we were military. Our deception was aimed at the World scene and the US population regarding our activities in contravention of the 1962 Geneva Accords.
****
This was a very unique period and very misunderstood period in our military history due to its classified nature. Fortunately, we are able to tell our story now. Those of us that served in Laos are trying to correct this mis-information and myth that has grown up around these activities so they are better understood in their real context.

Respectfully,
Tom Lee
(Thomas E. Lee, Colonel USAF (Ret))
Savannakhet, Laos
1968-1969

You'd have to admit this background is pretty good. I'm proud to wear Maj. Richard G. Elzinga's POW bracelet in memory of his service to country, for his family and for me so I don't forget those who were left behind.

I regret all those missing and will do what ever I can to keep their memories alive.