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DDG-1000 Zumwalt
DDG-1000 Zumwalt / DD(X)
Multi-Mission Surface Combatant Future Surface Combatant  On 22 July 2008 Members of Maine's congressional delegation said that the Navy had decided to build only two of the advanced DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyers. Two ships are already on order from Northrop Grumman Corp.'s Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula and Bath Iron Works in Maine. The administration had requested about $2.5 billion in fiscal 2009 to buy a third DDG-1000. On 14 July 2009 it had been reported that the service wanted to end production of the DDG-1000 after just two ships. Inside the Navy, a trade publication, reported that navy leaders wanted now prefer to buy 11 more DDG-51 destroyers, an older, less capable and less expensive ship. The unit cost of the DDG-51 is about half that of the DDG-1000. In this context, the status of the CG(X) Next Generation Cruiser, which was to have been a missile-defense variant of the DDG-1000, or the CGN(X) Nuclear Guided Missile Cruiser, remained unclear. It also raises larger questions about the viability of STOM - Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and 1996 - OMFTS - Operational Maneuver from the Sea, along with the host of other programs that have been justified under these doctrinal constructs. This would mark the second time this program had been cancelled. On 01 November 2001 the Navy announced that it would issue a revised Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Future Surface Combatant Program. Formerly known as DD 21, the program will now be called "DD(X)" to more accurately reflect the program purpose. The new "downsized" destroyer was slated to displace 12,000 tons, instead of the 16,000 tons planned for the DD 21. This did not happen, and within a few years the DDG-1000 Zumwalt had re-emerged, little changed from the DD-21 Zumwalt. On 19 August 2008 it was reported that the Navy had changed course yet again and decided to build a third DDG 1000 destroyer, at Bath Iron Works. Maine Senator Susan Collins, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that Navy Secretary Donald Winter had informed her of the decision. The move came only a month after the Navy announced it would cap the Zumwalt program at two ships. The Senate had authorized $2.6 billion in funding for a third ship, while the House of Representatives had eliminated the money from its version of the defense appropriations bill. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England indicated in a letter to Collins that the shift was due in part to concerns about disruption in the nation’s shipbuilding base. “This plan will provide stability of the industrial base and continue the development of advanced surface ship technologies such as radar systems, stealth, magnetic and acoustic quieting, and automated damage control,” England wrote. Sen. Collins stated that Secretary Winter had told her that Navy also planned funding of long lead time items to restart production of the DDG-51. The Navy had announced plans to restart the DDG 51-line with one ship in 2010, two in 2011, one in 2012, two in 2013 and one each in 2014 and 2015. The DDG-1000 is the primary development program for the Navy's Family of Ships (FoS) strategy. Eliminating the authorization for funding the DDG-1000 class in this bill could dramatically increase the cost of current and future Navy shipbuilding programs, including the next generation cruiser, CG(X). Additionally, the industrial base that is so vital to our transition to a 21st century fleet of surface combatants could be decimated. There are more than 10,000 skilled workers in the U.S. working on the Mission Systems Equipment that is intended to support not only DDG-1000, but the entire Family of Ships. It will be extremely difficult and costly to reconstitute this workforce in the future. Sustaining this program lays the groundwork for the Navy's long standing plan, which includes the transition from this new destroyer to the next generation cruiser, CG(X), using the ZUMWALT hull and systems. Funding the third ship in the ZUMWALT Class is essential in FY09 to avoid the potential cost and long-term schedule implications of a break in production. Restarting procurement of the DDG-51 could have unforeseen costs that could negate the perceived financial benefit of returning to the older class of ship. The Chief of Naval Operations submitted the request for the DDG-1000 and clearly stated the Navy's need to build a total of 7 ships of this class. The Navy has ensured that the ten key technologies incorporated into this new ship class have been well tested and their performance verified, and the ship design prior to start of construction will be more mature than that for any other surface combatant ship -- indicators that the Navy well understands the program's costs. The Navy and Congress have supported this critical multi-purpose ship for fleet operations as a result of rigorous review, engineering development model risk reduction, computer-aided design, significant research and development investment, and updated cost modeling. This ship is designed to provide critical capabilities to defeat current and future evolving threats. DDG-1000 has been designed to carry out Navy missions while putting half as many sailors at risk when compared to the ships the Navy currently has to do complete these missions. It is designed for higher operational tempo and lower life-cycle costs than current Navy destroyers. Led by Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., in July 2008 a group of lawmakers from Massachusetts and Rhode Island had urged Defense Secretary Robert Gates to reconsider the Navy’s plans to buy only two DDG 1000 destroyers. On 25 July 2008 Senator Edward M. Kennedy released regarding a letter from Under Secretary John J. Young, Jr., which detailed the benefits of the DDG 1000 destroyer.“Under Secretary Young’s letter clearly argues against the Navy’s plan to cancel the DDG-1000 program. The data Secretary Young provides shows the folly of abandoning the DDG-1000 program to build more DDG-51’s. It could cost the Navy over $4 billion to halt production of DDG-1000s at two ships. Even more important, as Under Secretary Young’s letter emphasizes, the DDG-1000 has significant advantages over the DDG-51 on certain missions. The Navy needs both types of destroyers and it would be a serious mistake not to continue DDG-1000 production.” On July 23, 2008 U.S. Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine) met with U.S. Navy Secretary Donald Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead about the Navy’s proposal to limit the construction of the number of DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers to two ships. "Just as I told BIW President Dugan Shipway in a separate meeting this morning, I made clear to Navy leadership this afternoon that I will move heaven and earth to ensure the man hours promised to BIW through the DDG 1000 program remain equivalent under this new proposal – after all, the men and women of BIW have worked tirelessly to make BIW an indispensable national asset, providing the Navy and our nation with model efficiency and workmanship – and it is also critical we maintain our country’s industrial shipbuilding capability." Snowe went on to say, "I was surprised and deeply dismayed to learn of the Navy’s proposal, especially as – from the time I Chaired the Senate Seapower subcommittee and held eight hearings on the successor to the DDG-51 and visited personally with Navy commanders in the Persian Gulf in 1999 – Navy officials have repeatedly testified to the necessity of the DDG-1000. In meeting after meeting, Navy officials over the years demanded a destroyer capable of successfully defending the Nation’s interests in the 21st Century, and the professionals of BIW stepped up to the challenge in winning the DDG 1000 contract and producing a quality product on-time and on-budget. "For years, Navy leadership has advanced the DDG-1000 as much more capable than the DDG-51 in the littoral or coastal regions of the world, where more than 80 percent of the planet’s population lives. It was clear that the world’s Number One Navy had an increasing strategic focus on the littorals, the threats to maritime forces in the littorals, and the capabilities that would be provided by the DDG 1000. Indeed, Navy leadership testified in support of the DDG 1000 before Congress as recently as this year. Admiral Roughead, in testimony, said the DDG 1000 will ‘provide independent forward presence and deterrence and it will operate as an integral part of joint and combined expeditionary forces.’ On July 14, 2008 Senator Susan Collins, a Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, commented on the news report that the Navy plans to discontinue the Zumwalt Class DDG-1000 program: “The decision by the House Armed Services Committee to slash funding for the DDG-1000 has triggered a review within the Department of Defense on the future of the new destroyer. During the past several weeks, I have had extensive discussions with the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughead, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, and Defense Assistant Secretary John Young about the future of the program, which Navy officials have repeatedly testified provides much-needed capabilities. Funding for a third destroyer was in the FY09 budget request sent to Congress by the Navy. The Senate version of the Defense Authorization legislation fully funds the $2.6 billion request, while the House version fails to provide funding to build any surface combatant at all, thus creating a terrible gap in work for BIW. If the Navy is considering changing its shipbuilding requirements, I would expect the CNO to work with me and other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure a stable, well-funded shipbuilding plan that meets the need for expanded capabilities and keeps our skilled shipbuilding workforce strong."  Developed under the DD(X) destroyer program, DDG-1000 Zumwalt is the lead ship in a class of next-generation, multi-mission surface combatants tailored for land attack and littoral dominance, with capabilities designed to defeat current and projected threats as well as improve battle force defense.The Navy's new DD(X) program is the centerpiece a family of three surface combatant ships, including a destroyer, a cruiser and a smaller craft for littoral operations. At one time it seemed that the DD(X) contract could end up totaling $100 billion for some 70 warships in the DD(X) family: destroyers, cruisers, and a downsized seagoing killer called LCS, short for littoral combat ship. The cruiser and destroyer are expected to share a common hull design. The Littoral Combat Ship has an advanced hull designed for high speed and a shallow draft. DD(X) is the centerpiece of a surface combatant family of ships that will deliver a broad range of capabilities. It is provides the baseline for spiral development of technology and engineering to support a range of future ship classes such as CG(X), LHA(R) and CVN-21. This advanced multi-mission destroyer will bring revolutionary improvements to precise time-critical strike and joint fires for our Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Groups of the future. It expands the battlespace by over 400%; has the radar cross section of a fishing boat; and is as quiet as a LOS ANGELES Class submarine. DD(X) will also enable the transformation of our operations ashore. Its on-demand, persistent, time-critical strike revolutionizes our joint fire support and ground maneuver concepts of operation so that our strike fighter aircraft are freed for more difficult targets at greater ranges. DD(X) will provide credible forward presence while operating independently or as an integral part of naval, joint, or combined expeditionary forces. Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics were competitors for the DD(X)contract. The Navy asked the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer to approve the winner-take-all approach, which would force the losing bidder out of the shipbuilding market. In March 2005 twenty lawmakers said the contract to build the Navy's next-generation guided missile destroyer, the DD(X), should not be a winner-take-all contract. In March 2005 Adm. Vernon Clark, the chief of naval operations, abandoned his goal of building the Navy to a 375-ship fleet. New procedures like keeping ships deployed overseas while rotating the crews mean the Navy will need no more than 325 ships and possibly as few as 260. The rate of building new destroyers would not support more than one shipyard at acceptable costs. The plan envisioned building about 1.4 destroyers annually, but never two a year. Building those ships in two yards would cost an extra $300 million per ship. The DD-51 destroyers are built at both General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Maine and at the Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard in Mississippi. One of the two ship builders would lose the contract if the Navy adopts the sole-source plan in the future. The men and women of these shipyards have demonstrated time and again that they build the world’s best surface combat ships. But more than local employees, they are a national asset which America must retain. A loss of that magnitude could drive BIW, one of Maine’s largest private employers, out of business and would create a monopoly for destroyer production. With DD(X), local employees at Northrop Grumman Ingalls, the leading DD(X) contractor, can be ensured of a relatively steady employment. This is Mississippi’s largest private employer. To put it into perspective, Ingalls is about three times the size of Nissan, the state’s second largest in terms of job numbers. So the local implications of DD(X) to Mississippi are clear, especially along a Gulf Coast struggling to bounce back from Hurricane Katrina. The Navy agreed to put on hold its plans to contract with a single shipyard for building all of the nation’s stealth DD(X) Destroyers, calling the sole-source proposal “premature.” However, the Navy has said it will continue to seek more information on the sole-source strategy, and had not made any final decisions on whether to adopt such a proposal in the future. On 07 April 2006 the Navy announced that the first DD(X) destroyer will be designated DDG 1000. As the lead ship in the class, it will also be named in honor of former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Elmo R. “Bud” Zumwalt, Jr. Zumwalt was appointed Chief of Naval Operations in 1970. As the youngest man ever to serve as CNO, Zumwalt cemented an acclaimed reputation as a visionary leader and thoughtful reformer. July 4, 2000, then-President Bill Clinton celebrated Zumwalt’s accomplishments and memory with the naming of the class and lead ship shortly after the admiral’s passing in Durham, N.C., Jan. 2, 2000. Zumwalt was born in San Francisco in 1920 and grew up in Tulare, Calif. He was a cum laude graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy in 1942. As CNO, Zumwalt initiated wide-ranging reforms in a dramatic effort to revitalize the Navy. Time magazine hailed Zumwalt as "the Navy's most popular leader since World War II." As the Navy's senior officer, he increased the warfighting capabilities of the dwindling U.S. fleet by outfitting remaining ships with more efficient and sophisticated weapons. He retired in 1974. In 1996, he took over as chairman of the board of the U.S. Navy Memorial Foundation. In addition to numerous decorations received from the U.S. Navy, including the Navy Distinguished Service Medal (three awards), the Legion of Merit (two awards) and Bronze Star with combat "V," he received decorations and awards from a number of foreign countries. In 1998, Zumwalt was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his service to the United States. Zumwalt authored two books about his life in the Navy. On Watch (1976) recounts his Navy career and warns Americans about the Soviet naval threat. My Father, My Son (1986), co-authored with his late son, Elmo III, is an account of their Vietnam experiences and his son's tragic illness. Under the Navy’s dual lead ship acquisition strategy proposed in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works will concurrently build dual lead ships. Zumwalt will be delivered in 2012. On 14 February 2008 the Navy exercised contract modifications for the construction of the dual lead ships of the Zumwalt class (DDG 1000) to General Dynamics Bath Iron Works and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding. DDG 1000 and DDG 1001 are the lead ships of a class of next-generation multi-mission surface combatants tailored for land-attack and littoral dominance. BIW was awarded a $1.4 billion cost-plus contract for the construction of DDG 1000, and NGSB was awarded a $1.4 billion cost-plus contract for construction of DDG 1001.  Compared to current US Navy destroyers, the Zumwalt-class destroyer will triple both current naval surface fire coverage, as well as capability against anti-ship cruise missiles. It has a 50-fold radar cross section reduction compared to current destroyers, improves strike group defense 10-fold and has 10 times the operating area in shallow water regions against mines. The Zumwalt class fills an immediate and critical naval warfare gap, meeting validated Marine Corps fire support requirements.A return to the old tumblehome configuration, combined with wave piercing technology makes the Northrop Grumman DD(X) design as close to a submarine as a surface ship can be / with the lion's share of the structure actually underwater. The DD(X) design is described as 'wave-piercing,' which means that the designers have deliberately foregone the sort of buoyancy which tends to lift conventional ships over waves. Their motive is clear; they want to minimize ship motion because any motion presents an observing radar with opportunities to pick up the ship. Similarly they will want to minimize rolling motion, and they will have to accept that waves will often break over the ship's deck. The DD(X) concept is to have watch-standers trained functionally across warfare areas who can be flexibly employed as the situation demands. This approach results in a more compact, flexible watch team, which requires fewer augmentations and which is designed to flexibly respond to a variety of tactical situations. Underpinning this concept is a strategy in which crewmembers will be highly trained across multiple warfare areas or maintenance tasks and advanced skills will apply across multiple disciplines with specialized skills only being used periodically. Watchstations are manned in three sections, or 8-hour shifts, over the course of a day. The DD(X) destroyer maintenance strategy focuses on allowing sailors to concentrate on war-fighting tasks and skills rather than on ship maintenance and preservation (i.e., "rust busting" skills). The DD(X) maintenance strategy envisions no organizational level repair conducted on the ship. The DD(X) destroyer will employ extensive automated damage control systems, integrated with an optimally manned damage control organization to quickly suppress and extinguish fires and control their spread. The Navy plans the DD(X) to be a multi-mission destroyer featuring a composite deckhouse and a Wave-Piercing Tumblehome Hull displacing about 14,000 tons. Optimized for the land-attack mission, it will have two Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs) with a combined magazine capacity of approximately 750 rounds of long-range land attack and conventional munitions. Each AGS will consist of a single-barrel 155mm gun supplied from an automated magazine. An Advanced Vertical Launch System (AVLS) with 80 cells will host Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, Standard Missiles (SM2-MR) for local air defense, Evolved Seasparrow Missiles for engagement of both airborne and seaborne threats, and Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rockets for engagement of submarine threats. Two 40mm Close-In Gun Systems will enhance self-defense against air and surface threats. DD(X)'s integrated power system will allow sharing of electrical power between propulsion motors and other electrical requirements such as combat system and auxiliary services. The Navy expects the new Dual Band Radar suite and the Integrated Undersea Warfare System to provide state-of-the-art battle space surveillance and advances in survivability and a total ship computing environment to allow a significant reduction in crew size. Introduction of additional new technology could reduce manning with each successive flight of the DD(X) spiral development. The DD(X) program provided a baseline for spiral development of the DD(X) and the future cruiser or "CG(X)" with emphasis on common hullform and technology development. The Navy will use the advanced technology and networking capabilities from DD(X) and CG(X) in the development of the Littoral Combat Ship with the objective being a survivable, capable near-land platform to deal with threats of the 21st century. The intent was to innovatively combine the transformational technologies developed in the DD(X) program with the many ongoing R&D efforts involving mission focused surface ships to produce a state-of-the art surface combatant to defeat adversary attempts to deny access for US forces. DDG-1000 Zumwalt / DD(X) Program History On 1 November 2001 the Navy announced that it would issue a revised Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Future Surface Combatant Program. Formerly known as DD 21, the program would be called "DD(X)" to more accurately reflect the program purpose, which was to produce a family of advanced technology surface combatants, not a single ship class. Instead of building the large DD 21 destroyer, the Navy could use the advanced technology on a full range of ships, including a downsized destroyer, an even smaller warship to operate in coastal waters, and a larger cruiser. One of the concerns about the DD 21 was that it was much larger than the current DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Another concern [reportedly of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz] was that the Navy was investing too much in a ship primarily designed to accommodate the long-range Advanced Gun System. The House Appropriations Committee voted in October 2001 to cut funding for the DD 21 program by 75 percent. The Navy subsequently restructured the program, which was renamed the DD(X). The new "downsized" destroyer was slated to displace 12,000 tons, instead of the 16,000 tons planned for the DD 21. The Navy initially planned to develop DD(X) over four years, procuring the first one in 2005 to enter service in 2011. The initial DD(X) was characterized as being a technology demonstrator for future surface combatants, rather than a design that would quickly enter serial production. Construction of the Arleigh Burke-class of destroyers was extended from 2006 to 2009 as a result of the restructuring of the DD 21 program into the DD(X) program. The revision of the program was based on the Navy's continued careful examination of DD 21 as it reached the source selection milestone in Spring 2001. At that time, the Navy delayed the down-select decision between the two competing DD 21 teams in order to take advantage of ongoing reviews being conducted in the Department of Defense, including the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Navy issued a revised request for proposal for DD(X) on 3 December 2001, and planned to down-select a single industry team to be the design agent and technology developer in Spring 2002. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the revised program focus and reaffirmed the Department's support for the Future Surface Combatant Program. "President Bush has made transformation of the Department of Defense a high priority. Through DD(X), the Navy has charted a course to transformation that will provide capability across the full spectrum of naval warfare. The Navy's strategy supports assured access to littoral regions and also develops the capability to defeat the air and missile defense threats the nation's naval forces will face in the future." Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics E. C. "Pete" Aldridge stated that "the new program focus and new RFP will enable the Navy to fully leverage the great work already done by the two industry teams, continue risk mitigation measures and permit appropriate spiral development of technology and engineering to support a range of future surface ships to meet our Nation's maritime requirements well into the 21st Century," Aldridge said. "The DD(X) program will be the technology driver for the surface fleet of the future." "With the approval of this strategy, the Navy has defined its surface combatant roadmap for the future in a manner which ensures all maritime missions can be accomplished. Through DD(X), we are taking a significant step toward providing improved combat capability for our Sailors and Marines," said Navy Secretary Gordon England. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark said the DD(X) program reflected an awareness that effectively defeating future threats, while accomplishing naval missions, would require a range of naval capabilities and different surface platforms. "One size fits all will not work on the future battlefield," Clark said. "We must continue to exploit the robust R&D effort made on DD 21 even as we focus our research and technology funding of other approaches such as the Littoral Combat Ship concept." Though the first class of ships would be nearly identical to the DD 21 destroyer that had been on the drawing board for a few years, possible changes to future generations of ships would not be stymied by having only one plan and design. After the class was designed, the next step would be to build a new ship that the Navy is calling "CG(X)" that focuses more on air warfare, to include the Navy's role in ballistic missile defense. DD 21 was focused on land-attack missions, which are very important, but that was not the only thing the Navy needed to accomplish. The change reopened the focus to keep other missions in mind and the Navy expected to see cost-saving benefits by being able to develop technology that could be used on a family of ship classes rather than duplicating efforts and going through the same process each time. The program's revamping meant the Navy had to rebuild its profile for the new ships, and did not know how many vessels would be built or at what cost. Under DD 21, the Navy anticipated a production of 32 destroyers. It did not have a cost estimate because the builder and designer have not been selected. With DD 21, the Navy divided planning into two teams. The Blue Team solicited shipbuilding plans from General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works subsidiary in Maine with technology from Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. The Gold Team did the same, working with Ingalls Shipbuilding Company in Mississippi and parent Northrop Grumman Corp. The DD(X) program focused on developing 10 [initially 11] key Engineering Development Models (EDM) to demonstrate technologies critical to future warships. The EDMs included electric drive and integrated power management systems; multi-function and volume search radar suites, the Advanced Gun System, and new hull design emphasizing efficiency at 30-knots sustained speed, mission payload growth capacity and stealth. While the DD(X) system design work was proceeding, the EDMs were built and tested in parallel for key systems such as the integrated power system (IPS), the advanced gun system (AGS), and an integrated radar suite. Land-based and selected at-sea testing of the EDMs would be performed with the results engineered into the total ship system design. The second shipbuilder, Bath Iron Works, would perform DD(X) design and test activities as a subcontractor to Northrop Grumman, thus ensuring that both shipbuilders can compete on an equal basis for the next contractual phase, detail design and construction. The Navy initially hoped to begin production by 2005, but in 2004 delayed delivery from 2008 to 2011, with commissioning in 2013. The number of ships, two dozen, and time that bending metal would start to build the first ship and the time of introduction to the fleet would be driven by how technology developed and matured. The Navy announced on 29 April 2002 that Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc., Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS) had been selected as the lead design agent for the DD(X) ship program. Included was the award of a cost-plus award-fee contract in the amount of $2,879,347,000 for design agent activities such as the systems design of the DD(X) destroyer, and the design, construction and test of its major subsystems. NGSS was the leader of a team of contractors called the "Gold Team" that included Raytheon Systems Co. as the combat systems integrator, and a number of other companies. Gold Team's proposal also incorporated "Blue Team" member Bath Iron Works (BIW) as a subcontractor to perform DD(X) design and test activities, which would ensure BIW would have the ability to produce a detailed DD(X) design and build these ships in the future. BIW protested the Naval Sea Systems Command's (NAVSEA) award of a contract to Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., under request for proposals (RFP) No. N00024-02-R-2302, to serve as the design agent for technology development with respect to the DD(X) multi-mission naval surface combatant program. BIW asserted that the competition was not conducted on a common basis and that the evaluation of proposals was unreasonable and otherwise improper. The award of the DD(X) Design Agent contract in 2002 signaled the start of a revolution for the Navy's surface combatant fleet, with the development of transformational technologies that would create new capabilities while reducing crew size and yielding significant combat advantage. DD(X) was intended to be the foundation of a family of surface combatants, including a future cruiser, CG(X), and littoral combat ship (LCS), providing the nation with a balanced set of warfighting capabilities to meet the national security requirements in the 21st Century. It was planned that the DD(X) program would provide a baseline for spiral development of the DD(X) and the future cruiser or CG(X) with emphasis on common hullform and technology development. Advanced combat system technology and networking capabilities from DD(X) and CG(X) would be leveraged in the spiral development of the littoral combat ship to produce a survivable, capable near-land platform for the 21st century. The intent was to innovatively combine the transformational technologies developed in the DD(X) program with the many ongoing R&D efforts involving mission focused surface ships to produce a state-of-the art surface combatant to defeat adversary attempts to deny access for U.S. forces. Many of these technologies were intended to be incorporated into the DD 21 program. However, the DD 21 program allowed very little technical risk reduction though many of the technologies are quite transformational. With DD 21, the Navy was taking a single step to full capability. There was a success-oriented assumption that everything would proceed on schedule and cost. There were limited opportunities for prototyping and no room for error. In the end, these factors resulted in a program at risk of significant cost growth. Thus, DD(X) was formulated to employ a broad range of strategies to make our entire family of next-generation surface combatants more affordable. To mitigate the high technical risk, the restructured DD(X) program added several land-based and sea-based prototypes for the key technologies. This provides an excellent means of reducing risk within each area. The Navy would see potential problems earlier in the process, providing a better chance to solve them. The intent was that this strategy improves the chances of delivering a functional destroyer within cost and schedule. Additionally, the Navy planned to produce the lead ship using RDT&E funds. The Program Manager would be required to demonstrate progress on an annual basis to defend his budget. The Navy could react to problems without the risk of resorting to prior-year completion funding. The program manager could focus on establishing an efficient process for manufacturing the DD(X) class and avoid trading away producibility initiatives when costs increase. Being able to adjust the RDT&E budget for the lead ship would then provide the best chance to control costs and define a production process that would allow the Navy to affordably build these next-generation surface combatants. The Navy's FY05 budget requested funding for the first of eight new DDX destroyers by 2009, to be built by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Co. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY05, authorized $1.5 billion for the DD(X) destroyer program, including the $221.1 million requested by President Bush for detail design and advanced construction of the lead ship and an additional $99.4 million for detail design of the second ship. In 2005 Congress fully supported the DD(X) budget request and the DD(X), now named the Zumwalt class, was ready to start construction. The FY06 Budget request included $1.1B in RDT&E for continued technology development and $716M in SCN advance procurement funds for the first and second DD(X). The FYDP included full funding for the first DD(X) in FY07 and construction of one ship per year in each follow on year. H.R. 2863, the House Defense Appropriations Bill, added 4 additional ships: one DDG-51 class destroyer ($1.4 billion), two LCS ships (an increase of $440 million), and one additional T-AKE ($380 million). Included was a recommendation to cut the Navy's DD(X) destroyer program by a total of about $1 billion, the combination of a reduction of $0.7 billion for advance procurement and $0.3 billion out of R&D. Some $670 million would remain in R&D. The recommendation was consistent with the levels approved by the House for the DD(X) program in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY06. The Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for FY06 included $765.992 million for the DD(X) destroyer. The DD(X) destroyer was in the construction phase and would replace the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates and Spruance class destroyers. The FY06 appropriation conferees agreed to provide a total of $305,516,000 for advance procurement for the DD(X) class of ships instead of $320,516,000 as proposed by the Senate and no appropriation as proposed by the House. The conferees directed the Navy to include future funding requests for the DD(X) in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy appropriation. Within the funds provided, $221,116,000 was only for design and advance procurement requirements associated with the first ship of the DD(X) class and $84,400,000 was only for design and advance procurement requirements associated with construction of the second ship at an alternative second source shipyard. The conferees directed that no funds should be available for the procurement of long lead time material for items that are dependent upon delivery of a DD(X) key technology unless that technology has undergone testing, thereby reducing risk to overall program costs. The conferees directed that full funding of the remaining financial requirement for these ships, not including traditional advance procurement requirements, should be included in a future budget request. The DD(X) program's demonstrations and component tests met the exit criteria for its engineering development models established by the Undersecretary's August 2004 memorandum. While progress had been made, the level of technology maturity demonstrated remained below what was recommended by best practices. Tests of several engineering development models resulted in successful demonstration of exit criteria. In other cases, tests identified technical problems that needed to be overcome before ship installation or that had led to changes in the ship design. The permanent magnet motor, a key element of the integrated power system, failed tests, and was replaced by the advanced induction motor. Because the Navy maintained the induction motor as a fallback technology, the integrated power system was able to meet the exit criteria. The substitution of the advanced induction motor changed the noise, weight, and space usage of the power system, which had implications for the ship design. The multifunction radar, a segment of the dual band radar, successfully completed the land-based testing described in the exit criteria, but the volume search radar had encountered technical problems with a key component. The advanced gun system demonstrated exit criteria through modeling, and additional component tests verified this performance. An early failure in required munitions flight testing was overcome, and two further flight tests were completed successfully. Tests of the peripheral vertical launch system led to a redesign effort. Tests to determine the suitability of the new design were completed in June 2005. The integrated deckhouse and apertures development model began testing for antenna placement and radar cross section. Questions about the properties of the proposed component materials had delayed production of an article for fire and shock testing. In early 2005 some with the Department of Defense suggested a recompetition of DD(X) as a short-term cost reduction strategy. Senator Trent Lott [R-MS] strongly objected to this suggestion, indicating that delays would cost American taxpayers much more throughout the DD(X) program's life cycle. He further indicated that the DD(X) program was crucial to retaining America’s shipbuilding capacity. He said without the DD(X) program, American shipyards could face closure which could result in America being put into the unenviable position of asking foreign shipyards to construct America’s Navy or Coast Guard vessels. The Navy responded by awarding two preliminary contracts for DD(X) planning including efforts to prepare the DD(X) radar test facility and completion of the engineering development model and the critical design review methods. The US Navy successfully achieved a significant milestone for the multimission DD(X) destroyer with the completion of a system-wide Critical Design Review (CDR) on 14 September 2005. The review represented the culmination of years of design effort that encompassed the ship, mission system, human and shore designs that comprised DD(X). The completion of CDR marked the end of Phase III development, which resulted in the design, construction and test of 10 engineering development models (EDM) that would potentially make DD(X) the Navy's most capable multimission surface combatant ever constructed. The Navy and National Team were said to have accomplished the most thorough ship design and integration process in the history of Navy shipbuilding. DD(X) CDR reflected a disciplined, rigorous process of risk mitigation in 10 EDMs. CDRs for each of the 10 EDMs have achieved both technical maturity as well as significant cost insight. Completion of the ship CDR was the culmination of three years of work executed on schedule and within one percent of stated budget. The National Team and Navy achieved an unprecedented level of system design integration to deliver a design that provided the required warfighting capability. The DD(X) program matured the systems needed to build this class, and laid the basis to proceed to Milestone B and begin detail design and construction. In November 2005, the Department of Defense granted Milestone B approval, authorizing entrance into Phase IV of the program, including the detail design and construction of the two lead ships. On 28 November 2005 Kenneth Kreig, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition signed the final document needed to proceed with production of the groundbreaking DD(X) destroyer. The signing of the Destroyer Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) was the last major milestone needed before the Navy could proceed with detailed design for the ship and procure actual material for ship construction. Until signing of this memo the Navy had not officially moved forward with provisions to acquire materials or delineated how many ships would be initially constructed. The memo specifically approved a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships. There remained only one procedural review before construction could actually commence. However the review was essentially a routine one that would reconcile Navy and DoD individual program cost estimates and establishes testing requirements for the ship. Under the Navy's proposed dual-yard acquisition strategy, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works would simultaneously build lead ships beginning in FY07. Pending final approval of the plan, the Defense Department had authorized the Navy to award advance contracts to assist both shipyards to prepare to transition into detail design after the Milestone B decision. Development of major ship systems would continue under separate contracts. The 2007 Budget provided $2.6 billion to begin construction of two ships. The DD(X), in conjunction with the LCS and future CG(X) cruiser, would create a complementary, balanced force to address a spectrum of threats in an uncertain future. Congress denied a winner-take-all acquisition strategy in the FY05 Defense Emergency Supplemental Act and FY06 National Defense Authorization Act for the DD(X), and as a result in FY07 the Department of Defense proposed a "dual lead ship" strategy which would maximize competitive pressure and keep design efforts on track. This section would provide authority to enter into construction of the first two DD(X)s based on funding over two years from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation. In order to accomplish these objectives, the Navy has defined a new way ahead: "Dual Lead Ships." This effort tried to create a strong, mutually dependent partnership between the shipyards and the Navy to reduce cost and improve collaboration. Importantly, the Navy’s new strategy fully addressed industry’s key issues and responded to Congressional concerns. The key features are:
Split funding in FY07 and FY08 would synchronize the construction of both lead ships in the same fiscal year without creating an unaffordable spike in the SCN account. A critical aspect of the Department's acquisition plan was that both shipyards be positioned on a fair and equal footing. If one shipyard started construction first, that yard would have both a real and perceived competitive and technical advantage for several years over the follow yard. Additionally, the follow shipyard would have little incentive to provide design products in timely manner to the lead yard. Split funding the first two ships would not set a precedent for future funding of additional next generation destroyers and the Navy has budgeted for funds adequate to fully fund follow ships. The FY07 Budget request included $794M in RDT&E, N for continued software development and $2.6B in SCN for the first increment of the first and second DD(X). While the funding strategy for these ships was unique, the reasons for supporting a dual lead ship approach had been compelling. Based on Congressional direction that prohibited a winner take all strategy, the Navy consulted with industry, OSD, and Congress to chart our way forward for the DD(X) program. The key objectives are to acquire the DD(X) Class destroyers in as cost effective a manner as possible, create pressures to control and reduce cost, acquire these ships on a timeline that meets the warfighters’ needs, lower overall risk in the program, treat each of the industry partners fairly, and preserve a viable industrial capability for complex surface combatants. The Navy’s FY06-FY11 Future Years Defense Plan identified funding for one ship per year from FY07 to FY11 for a total of 5 ships. As of 1 December 2005, the Navy planned to build 8-12 DD(X). The Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) position was that there is a need for 24 DD(X) to fully support a major combat operation within desired time frames. The Marines state that they could accomplish the mission with fewer than 24 ships at risk of added time to operation and hitting fewer targets. As of March 2007, three of DDG 1000’s 12 critical technologies were fully mature. While 7 other technologies were approaching full maturity, 5 of them were not expected to be fully mature until after ship installation as testing in a realistic environment was not considered feasible. The 2 remaining technologies, the volume search radar and total ship computing environment, had only completed component level demonstrations and subsequently remained at lower levels of maturity. Concurrent with its efforts to mature ship technologies, the Navy had initiated detail design activities in the program. The Navy was planning to complete at least 75 percent of DDG 1000’s total detail design products ahead of lead ship construction. The seven other technologies then approaching full maturity included the advanced gun system and its projectile, hull form, infrared signature mockups, integrated deckhouse, integrated power system, and peripheral vertical launching system. The Navy currently planned to complete development of the integrated deckhouse and peripheral vertical launching system prior to beginning construction on DDG 1000’s two lead ships. However, practical limitations prevented the advanced gun system and its projectile, hull form, integrated power system, and infrared signature mockups from being fully demonstrated in an at-sea environment until after lead ship installation. Two other technologies, the volume search radar and total ship computing environment, remained at lower levels of maturity as of March 2007. The volume search radar, along with the multifunction radar, together comprise DDG 1000’s planned dual band radar system. While the multi-function radar had reached maturity as of March 2007, considerable testing remained for the volume search radar. The Navy planned to install volume search radar equipment at a land-based test facility during March 2007. Following installation, the volume search radar would undergo land-based testing, which the Navy planned to complete by March 2008 in an effort to increase the radar’s maturity prior to lead ship construction start planned for July 2008. However, full maturity of the technology would not occur until after ship installation. In addition, because the efforts were concurrent, there was risk that any delays or problems discovered in testing for the volume search radar could ultimately impact dual band radar production plans. According to Navy officials, in the event the volume search radar experienced delays in testing, it would not be integrated as part of the dual band radar into the deckhouse units that would be delivered to the shipbuilders. Instead, the Navy would have to task the shipbuilder with installing the volume search radar into the deckhouse, which program officials reported would require more labor hours allocated according to a 2007 Government Accountability Office review. The Navy’s total ship computing environment for DDG 1000 required developing hardware infrastructure and writing and releasing six blocks of software code. Although development of the first three software blocks progressed in line with cost and schedule estimates, program officials reported that changes in the availability of key subsystems developed external to the DDG 1000 program, introduction of nondevelopment items, and changes in program integration and test needs prompted the Navy to defer some of the functionalities planned in software release four to software blocks five and six, and full maturity of the integrated system would not be attained until after ship construction start. The Navy responded to the March 2007 Government Accountability review, stating that the assessment was factually correct, but misleading in areas of technology maturity and program funding. According to the Navy, DDG 1000 critical technologies achieved technology readiness levels appropriate to gain authorization in November 2005 to enter detail design phase. Since that event, technologies had been further tested, and were all on track to meet cost and schedule targets. Also, given the unique nature of shipbuilding, with detail design and construction efforts spread over approximately 5 years, the Navy claimed that comparing DDG 1000 technology readiness levels to GAO-developed best practices criteria was not valid. Further, the Navy noted that GAO’s cost comparison computing percent change from January 1998 to the current program baseline did not account for program progression through the acquisition cycle and could be misinterpreted as cost growth. The GAO countered in their report suggesting that the approach was valid because previous studies had shown that technological unknowns discovered late in development led to cost increases and schedule delays. The FY09 Budget Submission for construction of seven ships of this class was based on the DDG 1000 Baseline 5.3 design for a DDG 1000 of 14,564 tons displacement with two Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) including a total magazine capacity of 600 rounds. DDG 1000, a multisurface combatant, was to be the centerpiece of the US Navy's future surface fleet transformation and would serve as a versatile asset in the context of future Naval Strategy. Armed with an array of Sea Strike weapons, DDG 1000 would provide the Joint Force Commander with precision strike and volume fires. Designed with sustainable payload, multi-spectral stealth and optimal manning, DDG 1000 would take the fight to the enemy with unprecedented striking power, sustainability, survivability and information dominance. Of the seven technologies approaching full maturity as of March 2008, the Navy expected to demonstrate full maturity of the integrated deckhouse and peripheral vertical launch system by the start of ship construction in July 2008. Production of a large-scale deckhouse test unit was under way and final validation of the vertical launching system would occur in spring 2008. Practical limitations prevented the Navy from fully demonstrating all critical technologies at sea prior to ship installation. Testing of other technologies continued through ship construction start. Due to scheduling issues for the lead ships, the Navy did not have time to fully test the integrated power system prior to shipyard delivery and instead requested funds in FY08 to procure an additional unit. The Navy would conduct integrated power system testing in 2010 using this unit at a land-based test site. Considerable software development remained and land-based testing would mark the first integrated testing between the power generation and distribution system and the control system. If problems were discovered during testing, construction plans and costs were said by the GAO to potentially be at risk because the power systems needed for the first two ships would already have been delivered to the shipyards. The Navy continued to test prototypes of the ship's hull form to demonstrate stability in extreme sea conditions at higher speeds. According to Navy officials, existing computer simulation tools over-predicted the ship's tendency to capsize. The Navy was relying on testing of scale models in tanks and on the Chesapeake Bay, and was updating its computer simulation tool. Testing was aimed at developing guidance for operating the ship safely under different sea conditions. In response to the GAO's March 2008 assessment, the Navy stated that DDG 1000 would have the most mature design of any surface combatant at the start of fabrication, resulting in a more affordable construction, with fewer changes. According to the Navy, successful completion of its design review in 2005 certified that its critical technologies were capable of performing at planned levels and sufficiently mature to remain in the ship baseline, continuing into detail design and construction. Due to the long timeline required to design, develop, and deliver a Navy ship, the Navy stated that some concurrency was unavoidable to prevent the immediate obsolescence of technologies and preclude additional costs associated with stretching the timeline to allow all technologies to reach readiness levels meeting GAO best practice criteria prior to the start of ship construction. The Navy concluded that DDG 1000 strikes the best balance between management risk and delivering required capability within cost and schedule. DDG-1000 Zumwalt - Design Agent Prior to cancellation of the DD 21 program on November 30, 2001, NAVSEA had completed phases I (system concept design) and II (initial systems design), under which two teams, including a Gold Team (with Ingalls as the prime contractor and Raytheon Corporation as the system integrator), and a Blue Team, (with Bath Iron Works Corporation’s (BIW) as the prime contractor and Lockheed  The DD(X) design agent solicitation N00024-02-R-2302, issued on 30 November 2001, contemplated a cost-plus-award-fee contract under which the selected DD(X) design agent contractor was required to (1) design, develop and build, and conduct factory tests, land-based tests, and (where specified) at-sea tests of engineering development models (EDMs), and (2) engineer the results of the testing into the DD(X) system design based on the contractor's DD 21 Phase II engineering, and that will meet the operational needs and requirements established in the DD 21 Operational Requirements Document. The solicitation specified a minimum of 11 EDMs: advanced gun system and munitions, integrated power system (IPS), volume search radar (VSR), VSR/SPY-3 multi-function radar (MFR) suite, total ship computing environment, advanced vertical launching system (VLS), integrated deckhouse, autonomic fire suppression system, infrared mock-ups, hull form scale models and integrated undersea warfare system. Award was to be made on a best value basis in accordance with specified evaluation factors (management approach, technical approach, past performance, cost) where non-cost evaluation factors when combined were more important than cost. Offerors were cautioned, however, that in order to be considered for award, the government’s evaluated cost of their proposals must not exceed the total RTD&E budget listed in the RFP (i.e., $2.865 billion). The agency received and evaluated proposals from Bath Iron Works Corporation’s (BIW) and Northrop-Grumman Ingalls, conducted several rounds of oral and written discussions, and received and evaluated final proposal revisions. In earlier phases of the Land Attack Destroyer Program, the Blue Team (with BIW as the prime contractor) and the Gold Team (with Ingalls as the prime contractor) had developed individual destroyer designs. After receiving initial proposals from the Blue and Gold Teams by the February 4, 2002 closing time, NAVSEA commenced discussions with both offerors. Several rounds of oral and written discussions were held, during which offerors were furnished the agency's interim evaluation of proposals, including the evaluated strengths, weaknesses, deficiencies and risks. NAVSEA then requested the submission of final proposal revisions (FPR) by 02 April 2002. The results were as follows:
Although both proposals received overall ratings of very good for the program management and technical factors, and ratings of good for the past performance factor, the source selection authority (SSA), concurring with the recommendation of the source selection advisory council (SSAC), concluded that the Gold Team's proposal was “clearly superior” with respect to the EDM and specified performance subfactors. In this regard, the SSA and SSAC determined that the proposed Gold Team DD(X) design was superior to the Blue Team design in several significant areas, and represented “significant advances in technology, warfighting capability and survivability.” The SSA also concurred in the SSAC's finding that the Gold Team's EDM testing program was more robust than the Blue Team's, and thus will more effectively mitigate the risks associated with development of the EDM systems. The SSA, concurring with the recommendation of the SSAC, concluded that the Gold Team proposal's superiority with respect to the EDM and specified performance subfactors, which reflected the additional, advanced warfighter capability and the greater flexibility to meet future needs of the Gold Team's approach, outweighed both the Blue Team proposal's advantage with respect to software management and total ship computing environment, and the Blue Team's less than one-percent advantage in evaluated cost, such that the Gold Team proposal represented the best value. Upon learning of the resulting award to Ingalls, and after being debriefed, BIW filed this protest. Accordingly, the agency made award to Northrop-Grumman Ingalls, and a protest by Bath followed. Bath first asserted that the agency failed to conduct the competition on a common basis when it denied Bath’s request to use a decommissioned DD 963-Class destroyer for at-sea testing while at the same time accepting for purposes of the evaluation the Ingalls’s proposed use of that type of platform. GAO stated that offerors must be treated equally and be provided with a common basis for the preparation of their proposals. In this case, Bath failed to pursue the agency’s Inactive Ship Program Program Office’s denial of a ship with the DD(X) program office or with the activity responsible for granting or denying such a request, thus supporting the conclusion that use of that ship was not considered by Bath as a significant consideration. Furthermore, the agency reasonably determined that Bath would not have obtained a material technical benefit from proposing a decommissioned DD-963 instead of the large commercial ship it proposed as its IPS EDM at-sea test platform. Finally, Bath’s failure to propose a decommissioned DD-963 did not materially affect the evaluation. Second, Bath asserted that the agency underestimated the Ingalls’s likely cost of performance such that, instead of being $500,000 below the RTD&E cap, the likely cost of performance would exceed the cap. GAO responded that the agency had additional money available in its program budget to fund higher contract costs. Under such circumstances GAO will not sustain a protest even if the agency has effectively waived the funding requirements where competitive prejudice did not result. In this case, Bath failed to demonstrate it would have increased its proposed effort so as to materially improve its competitive position had it known that additional funding in the amount of any likely overrun would be available. Third, Bath asserted that the agency’s acceptance of the Ingalls’s closely integrated radar approach (i.e., VSR and MFR radars) was inconsistent with a Fourth, Bath asserted that the agency’s source selection decision failed to account for the development risk associated with Ingalls’s proposed dispersed missile vertical launching system (VLS) by not considering that there was a significant likelihood that the development of such a system would be abandoned and that the awardee instead would rely on its fallback unitary VLS (i.e., where the missiles would be located in only two places on the ship). GAO stated that the Navy had recognized the developmental risk associated with the dispersed VLS but reasonably concluded – based upon its familiarity with the Ingalls’s prior and proposed risk reduction efforts – that the overall development risk was low/manageable/satisfactory. As a result, GAO could find no basis to question the agency’s determination that the superiority of the awardee’s proposal with respect to the EDM and specified performance subfactors outweighed both the protester’s advantage with respect to software management and total ship computing environment, and cost, such that the awardee’s proposal represented the best value. Competition to design and build the Navy’s next generation destroyer reached a pivotal stage on 19 August 2002, when the GAO denied [B-290470] Bath Iron Works Corporation’s (BIW) protest of a multi-billion dollar award to Ingalls Shipbuilding to serve as the DD(X) program’s design agent for technology development. With resolution of the DD(X) bid protest in late 2002, Northrop Grumman was on track to complete the DD(X) system design and associated engineering development models (EDM) by 2005. The scope and complexity of the design work, which includes development and integration of new hull and ship systems as well as advanced combat systems, is unprecedented for a U.S. Navy surface combatant. Northrop Grumman is responsible for the total ship system design, as well as development and testing of 11 EDMs. DDG-1000 Zumwalt / DD(X) Design DD(X) will be an optimally crewed, multi-mission surface combatant designed to fulfill volume firepower and precision strike requirements. DD(X) will provide the hull form and propulsion for the future generation of surface combatants that provide an array of 21st Century Naval capabilities. DD(X) will be about 600 feet long, 79 feet wide, draw approximately 28 feet, and be capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots. Displacement will be approximately 14,000 tons. The ship’s tumblehome design will make it appear smaller than it actually is on radar. Although nearly twice the displacement of a Spruance-class destroyer, through signature reductions and its unique tumblehome hull design, DD(X) will be a stealthy warship and present a radar cross section a fraction of Spruance-class ships. DD(X) will dramatically improve naval surface fire support capabilities available for joint and coalition forces. Planned technologies, such as integrated power system and total ship computing environment in an open architecture, will provide more affordable future ship classes in terms of both construction and operation. DD(X) will be the first forward-fit surface combatant with an open architecture combat system. This investment will be leveraged to other surface ship procurements, including CVN 21 and LHA(R). A pair of 155mm guns, called the Advanced Gun System (AGS), will provide precision fire support at extended ranges. AGS will use the Long-Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP) that can reach targets up to 100 miles away. The AGS will be completely automated and each DD(X) will have a magazine capacity of 600 rounds or more. The AGS has a water-cooled barrel and can achieve a rate of fire of up to 10 rounds per minute. Two DD(X)s provide firepower equivalent to an entire battalion of 155mm howitzers, consisting of three batteries of six guns each, and the accompanying 58 cargo trucks, 42 utility trucks, 28 cargo trailers, two wrecker trucks, five water trailers, two medical vehicles, and 640 personnel. The 155-mm LRLAP round carries a 24-pound warhead. Furthermore, the AGS can fire several consecutive rounds at the same target with varied trajectories so they arrive simultaneously. The Multiple Round Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) capability can be employed against targets up to 75 miles away. One of the features that helped Northrop Grumman win the design contracts for the DD-21/DD(X) was the way it scattered Tomahawk cruise missile launchers around the perimeter of the destroyer rather than clumping them together in the center of the ship. The Blue Team proposed a VLS offering a high degree of commonality with the Navy's current MK41 Baseline VII Launch Control System and using the traditional VLS configuration of centralized missile magazines, with two unitary, centrally located 64-cell missile magazines, one fore and one aft. In contrast, the Rather than storing missiles in large clusters in the center of the ship, Northrop Grumman proposed placing them in groups of four between layers of steel along the sides. By dispersing the missiles to the periphery of the ship, the peripheral VLS reduced the probability that a single hit would destroy the missile magazine and cause the catastrophic loss of the ship. The inner steel would be thicker than the outer skin, funneling a blast outward if the missiles exploded while onboard during an attack or accidentally. It avoids the risk of having a single round go into a magazine of 48 or 64 cells and losing all the missiles at one time. Using a peripheral launching system, rather than a hybrid of the MK 41, was an innovative solution to a significant vulnerability problem in virtually all US Navy surface combatants. However, the only MK 41 mishaps of consequence have been a handful of cases where a missile's motor fired but the weapon failed to leave its launch canister - called a "restrained firing." After more than 2,000 actual missile launches [and] several incidents at sea including mine detonations, collisions and restrained firings, no MK 41 VLS-equipped ship has ever suffered any launcher-related damage or loss of life. The Gold Team proposed a superior radar approach. In this regard, the solicitation required offerors to design, develop, build and test on land a VSR radar, that is, a radar that operates within the L-Band frequency and is designed to scan large areas of aerospace to locate potential threats. However, the L-Band suffers from significant propagation loss at low altitudes, which can lead to a reduced capability to detect low-flying targets. Thus, the solicitation also required that offerors integrate the VSR radar with the SPY-3 MFR radar developed under a contract with the Navy by Raytheon, a member of the Gold Team, and then conduct land and at-sea testing with an integrated radar suite. The SPY-3 MFR is an X-Band radar--operating at a higher frequency and shorter wavelength than the L-Band--which has the potential to pinpoint and track the precise movements of target objects and has better performance against low altitude targets. The Blue Team proposed a radar suite consisting of an L-Band VSR segment and an X-Band SPY-3 MFR segment, each with its own digital processor, and integrated through the suite's command and control sensor manager. In contrast, the Gold Team proposed a “dual band radar” integration approach, under which the VSR and MFR are integrated at the waveform level, with a common scheduler and tracker residing on a common digital processor. The Navy determined that this approach to integrating the two radars was an innovative, superior approach that promised exceptionally close coordination between the radars and resulting significant advances in radar performance, including robust performance in the presence of jamming and electronic countermeasures, superior performance in all natural and man-made environments, improved track accuracy and resolution, and the ability to avoid multiple radar track-to-track correlation problems. In addition, the agency concluded that the greater software and hardware commonality of the Gold Team's approach would result in the need for significantly less software development time and maintenance, and would favorably affect hardware development and long-term operation and support costs. Harris is designing and developing the Common Data Link (CDL) X-/Ku-band phased array antenna system for the next-generation destroyer, the DD(X), that is being developed for the U.S. Navy. The low-observable, high-data-rate, multi-beam antennas will be integrated into the DD(X) composite Integrated Deckhouse Assembly (IDHA). Harris also will provide integration and test support services. The Harris Phased Array Antenna has been specifically engineered to communicate error-free within the harsh shipboard Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) environment caused by co-located high-power search and tracking radars. The unique Harris-patented architecture provides simultaneous shipboard multi-beam connectivity with up to eight Common Data Link (CDL)/Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) assets, all from the same phased array antenna. This capability eliminates the traditional requirement of a dedicated antenna for each data link asset. The Harris-built antennas address the challenge of limited shipboard topside space. They will be conformal-mounted into the DD(X)deckhouse superstructure and will contain no moving parts. Unlike the dish antennas they will replace, the low-maintenance phased array antenna “electronically steers” its multiple beams. The Gold Team design included a larger aviation landing area (made possible by its peripheral rather than centrally-located, unitary VLS) which accommodated two landing spots rather than the one spot offered by the Blue Team design. The Navy concluded that the availability of two landing spots would result in “dramatically improved aviation flexibility”; that the design would provide the ability to land (and service) helicopters that could not be landed on current cruiser or destroyer platforms, thus significantly increasing joint warfighting capability; and that the dual spot design would facilitate embarkation of next generation unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, the Navy determined that the Gold Team's proposed enclosed stern boat bay for launching and recovering boats was significantly more advantageous than the Blue Team's proposed side-launch boat bay. According to the agency, the stern boat bay would permit rapid, flexible and safe boat handling, especially at higher sea states, while the Blue Team design's over-the-side launches and recoveries would be extremely difficult at high sea states and would present a significant safety concern. The Navy recognized that the possibility of using the more advantageous stern boat bay was precluded in the Blue Team's design by the Blue Team's approach to the integrated power system (IPS). Both teams proposed as their primary IPS solution a permanent magnet motor (PMM), a motor which offers significant potential advantages, but which also is characterized by moderate development risk. However, while the Gold Team proposed a conventional shaft-driven system with the PMM internal to the hull, and thus available for on-board repair and replacement of modules, the Blue Team proposed a propulsion system in which the propulsion motors are in two external, steerable pods, mounted below the hull. Although the agency believed that the Blue Team's podded propulsion approach offered significant potential advances in ship maneuverability and ease of maintenance, it noted that this approach had never been developed for a surface combatant, having only been used on commercial cruise ships, and concluded that significant development effort would be necessary in order to militarize the pods and satisfy the Navy's speed, acoustics and shock requirements. Beyond finding the Gold Team's more conventional propulsion approach as less risky, the agency also found the Gold Team's fallback motor more advantageous. In this regard, given the risks associated with the PMM, the agency viewed a fallback solution to be “critical to the success of the DD(X) program.” However, the Blue Team's proposed fallback motor, also incorporated in a podded design, was short of the 30-knot speed requirement; would not satisfy the Navy's other requirements; and presented a moderate development risk. In contrast, the Gold Team's fallback motor met the Navy's requirements, and was considered to be low risk as a result of its technological maturity. In summary, the agency found that, overall, the Gold Team's IPS solution was more advantageous than the Blue Team's podded IPS approach. One way to reduce manpower requirements is to simplify replenishment. For example, “gun clips” for the AGS each will hold eight projectiles and eight cartridges, which will come pre-packaged to the ship in a single 6,000-pound unit. A mechanized system will handle the units horizontally until the final strike down into the DD(X) magazine, where the package will be upended and stowed vertically. Food and other stores will also be packaged in similar boxes, and stowed below using the same handling system. This speeds up underway replenishment, and reduces the amount of crew intervention. This replaces the manpower-intensive “human chain” involving all hands to carry and stow individual shells, cartridges, or cases of food. Reduced manning on Naval vessels require automated fire suppression systems to compensate for the reduced size of damage control parties. Fine water spray or water mist systems are attractive from a total ship protection standpoint. Application of this technology to electronics spaces is problematic in terms of collateral damage to equipment, performance for involved cabinets, and performance in sub-floors. A previously conducted fire hazard analysis identified gaseous agent systems as the system of choice for critical/high value spaces in a peacetime fire scenario. However, in wartime scenarios where the enclosure integrity cannot be assured, or the primary fire threat is in an adjacent space, the effectiveness of gaseous agent systems are severely compromised. A 2002 analysis of protection options for the DD(X) class destroyer indicates that there is not an optimum system when all factors of manning, automation, and performance are considered for both peacetime and war time scenarios. The concept of an inert gas/water mist hybrid fire suppression system was proposed to address this issue. The proposed technology involves the combined use of fine water spray and inert gas fire suppressants (e.g. nitrogen). Weight is a challenge for individual subsystems and the ship as a whole. The integrated power system, advanced gun system, and integrated deckhouse all have encountered problems staying within weight limits. These problems have contributed to overall weight growth in DD(X). As a result, as of mid 2005 the design was slightly over the margin reserved for weight in the system development phase, which ended with critical design review in August 2005. A number of key events to demonstrate technology occured near the end of this phase. Other elements of the design for certain subsystems, including space issues for the power system and materials issues on the deckhouse, remained unclear. These challenges could result in changes late in design or during construction, leading to higher costs.  
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DDG-1000 Zumwalt
Sea Jet Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator (AESD)
The Sea Jet Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator (AESD), funded by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), is a 133-foot vessel located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Acoustic In a program of research and development which was years in the making, Office of Naval Research (ONR), Rolls Royce Naval Marine Inc. (RRNMI), and the Signatures Department (Code 70) prepared the demonstration of an advanced waterjet-based propulsion concept, named AWJ-21. RRNMI, Walpole, MA, has developed the AWJ-21 propulsor concept with the goals of providing increased propulsive efficiency, reduced acoustic signature, and improved maneuverability over DDG 51 Class combatants. For this demonstration, a 130-foot-long craft designated the Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator (AESD) was built. The AESD is being funded by ONR to demonstrate advanced electric ship and propulsor technologies. The ground-breaking demonstration is sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. Additional benefits from the AWJ-21 technology are expected to provide more compact propulsion systems with reduced weight and volume. The AESD is an approximate quarter-scale destroyer class combatant with a length of more than 133 feet and a full load displacement of 120 tons [239,000 pounds]. The AESD hull form is based on the 5565 tumble-home hull tested early in the DD(X) program. As a result of availability of the AESD demonstrator craft, planning is underway to conduct other technology demonstrations. One such effort is the design of a low signature deckhouse for the model. The Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator (AESD) was christened on August 24, 2005. The ceremony took place at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Acoustic Research Detachment in Bayview, Idaho. Chief of Naval Research Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen delivered the principle address at the christening. The ship’s sponsor was Kathleen Harper, wife of Thurman Harper, vice president of engineering for Rolls-Royce Naval Marine, Inc. In the time-honored Navy tradition, she broke a bottle of champagne across the bow to formally christen the ship "Sea Jet." On 30 November 2005 the Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator (AESD), Sea Jet, tied-up to the pier after completing its first day of sea trials on Lake Pend Oreille at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division, Acoustic Research Detachment in Bayview, Idaho. The ship would test Rolls-Royce patented AWJ-21™ waterjet technology over the following six months on Lake Pend Oreille at the Navy’s Acoustic Research Department in Bayview, Idaho. The AWJ-21 is designed to increase ship speed, making hulls sleeker by working without rudders, shafts and propeller struts. Unlike conventional waterjets, the system works completely underwater, reducing noise and surface wake and improving stealth. The lightweight and compact AWJ-21 allows ships to operate in shallow waters. Its integrated steering and reversing system improves maneuvrability at low speeds. Carderock Division’s Acoustic Research Detachment in Bayview, ID, is where most of the testing commenced in FY 05. Members of Philadelphia’s Code 90 supported machinery and electric drive quieting for the AESD. General By mid-May 2006 it was reported [Stealth prototype drawing attention The Idaho Statesman 05-14-2006] that the Sea Jet Advanced Electric Ship Demonstrator had been operating on Lake Pend Oreille for 16 straight days, cutting through three-foot waves with a new hull design that splits the water like a razor. Following the AWJ-21 demonstration, General Dynamics Electric Boat division and Carderock Division would conduct a demonstration of the GD/EB RIMJET propulsor on the AESD. The RIMJET is a novel type of podded propulsion system that relies on a permanent magnet motor to drive the propellor. The RIMJET is a novel type of podded propulsion system that relies on a permanent magnet motor to drive the propeller, making it similar to the systems featured in this issue of Solutions (p32). In the RIMJET propulsor the motor is mounted not in the hub but in the rim, which GD Electric Boat believes provides a number of advantages. One of these is that because the RIMJET makes use of the same hydrodynamic principles as a waterjet, its applicability to high-speed vessels is much greater than conventional propulsors. Advantages over waterjets include high rotor torque capacity, rim attachment of rotor blades, minimal hull contour impact and azimuthing capability. The RIMJET’s high efficiency derives from its use of a phenomenon known as swirl recovery. Moreover, because it operates at a relatively low rpm, blade area is reduced, there is minimal duct and strut surface area, and the propulsor has low duct and strut velocities compared to hub-driven propulsors. The RIMJET has excellent cavitation performance because it operates at low rpm, it has very uniform inflow to the rotor, and the rim prevents the formation of tip vortexes. General Dynamics believes the RIMJET will also have better ‘off-design’ performance characteristics because the duct provides uniform mass-flow at off-design conditions. It also promises to be much more reliable and maintainable than hub-driven pods. GD Electric Boat says the ‘canned’ permanent magnet motor at the heart of the RDP and stator are both sea-water cooled, eliminating the need for a cooling        
DDG-1000 Zumwalt / DD(X) Schematics 
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