Tanks to the Front

[David]

Much has been written about the British Army’s use of tanks at the front from Flers in 1916 to their final action at Mauberge on November 2^nd 1918 and the part this played in the defeat of the German forces. Much less has been said about how the British army was able to assemble and mass its tanks for major operations whilst still keeping their intentions hidden from German intelligence. If one considers that at the Battle of Amiens, for example, 450 fighting tanks and 112 supply tanks had to be massed for the initial attack at a time when the German Army Air Service was introducing new reconnaissance aircraft capable of fighting their way through the RAF’s defences. By 1918 the Allies had achieved air superiority but not supremacy and there could be no guarantee that massing tanks would not be detected. A barrage of heavy artillery could disrupt such a mass tank attack before it had started. Accordingly British Army strategy was that the bulk of attacking tanks with crews were delivered to as close the their jumping off points as possible by rail during the night preceding the dawn of the day of the attack. These tanks were ready to move forward to their start points upon detraining. The degree of logistical organisation needed to achieve this was most impressive. The following paragraphs show how this was done together with the problems that had to be overcome..
From the Factory

The testing and transport of tanks within Britain was the responsibility of the RNAS. Tanks were handed over to the army in France.

British heavy tanks were built in factories scattered across the country from Birmingham to Edinburgh and Glasgow. Each factory had its own testing grounds and was situated at or near to a railway. Most factories had their own sidings and a marshalling yard. After testing a new tank would be loaded onto a railway wagon. This represented the first problem, as there were no wagons suited to carrying heavy tanks. Those bogie-bolsters that were used were at the limit of their carrying capability and it was not unknown for structural failures to occur. If this happened during transit the whole train would be delayed. Such wagons could only be loaded end on (A1) This added a further source of delay as it meant that the wagons had to be loaded and then added to the train one at a time. This was solved by the design of the RECTANK wagon by working party of tank officers and railwaymen under the aegis of the Landship Committee. These were strong enough and could be loaded from the side (A2). Without the RECTANK the Mk V* could not have been transported. These wagons became available in adequate numbers in early 1918.

The loading gauge in part defines the carrying capabilities of a railway. This ensures that no loads are carried that cannot negotiate bends in narrow cuttings or tunnels and they do not foul low bridges, tunnels and signal gantries. Because the British railway system was the first in the world it inherited a particularly tight loading gauge to negotiate the earliest railway tunnels that were much less generous than some later constructions. This not only meant that Mk I, II and III tanks had to travel with their sponsons removed (from Mk IV onwards the sponsons could be retracted or folded inwards for transport) but that there were restrictions on what could be mounted on the roof of the tank. One wonders if this was in part a reason why Tritton and Wilson chose to go for a sponson mounted armament rather than a turret which would have caused significant transportation problems. With sponsons removed or folded all the British heavy tanks just (and only just) passed the width of the loading gauge but various roof fittings caused problems on the Marks IV, V and V*. The narrow straight unditching rails on the Mk IV would pass but the beam itself had to be carried dismounted and stowed length ways on the roof. The real problems were with the Mk V with its kinked unditching rails that would not pass the loading gauge. Not only did the tank have to travel to France with out its rails fitted but the supporting brackets themselves could not be fitted. In turn this meant that a temporary exhaust pipe had to be fitted for test and driving from and to the railhead at each end of the journey as one of the unditching rail brackets carried the operational exhaust system up and over the side hatch in the cupola and this would not pass the gauge. Mk V*s also had to travel without the rails and brackets fitted. A photograph of a Mk V* (sheeted up for transport) under a loading gauge clearly shows that there was not enough room on top for the rails. (A3)

It appears to have been the practice to transport all tanks to France sheeted up. A photograph taken in Lincoln in 1916 shows a train of Mk Is under sheets. (A4). It has frequently been said that this was for security purposes but photos of Mk Vs and V*s in 1918 show tanks sheeted in the same manner. By this time the shape of the British heavy tank was known to almost all and so no security requirement was being served. It would seem that the sheeting was largely to keep dirt and rain out of the tank during transport.

In 1916 and 1917 all tanks for France were shipped via Avonmouth or Southhampton (initially only Avonmouth) but in 1918 all tank traffic was switched to a ‘secret’ port at Richborough. Tanks going from Avonmouth and Southampton had to be detrained before being loaded on board ship and entrained again in France. However Richborough had a boat train service so that the loaded RECTANKs could be shunted directly on board and hitched up to another loco at the other end. (A5) With this service in place a tank could leave the factory and be handed over to its army crew in France on the same day.

The Tankodrome

The British Army in France effectively had its own railway company in the form of the Railway Operating Department (ROD) complete with locomotives, rolling stock and some stations. ROD trains would normally carry tanks that arrived in France from Avonmouth or Southampton the Plateau railhead. In the case of those coming off the train ferries a ROD locomotive would the attached to the RECTANKs. (A6)

The Plateau railhead was positioned close to both Central Workshops large workshops complex at Erin and to the Tankodrome. A British heavy tank could drive from one to the other in a relatively short time
The Tankodrome was the key installation so far as British tanks were concerned. New tanks arriving from France would be picked up by their crew there. Tanks that had rallied undamaged from previous battles would have been returned there, as would tanks repaired by Central Workshops. On picking up a new tank its crew would be responsible for some or all of the work required to fit it out and to provision it with fuel, water and ammunition. It is not clear just how much of the work necessary to fit the unditching rail brackets and the rails themselves would or could be carried out by the crew and how much assistance would be provided by Central Workshops personnel (and to fit the proper exhaust to Mk Vs) but once these were in place the crew were certainly responsible for putting the unditching beam in place and loading a fascine or a crib onto it if its mission in the next battle so required this. It seems likely that the actual construction of fascines was either done by Central Workshop staff or carried out under their supervision. The chains binding the fascines were under considerable tension and a fracture could (and often did) cause fatalities. Crib building was a Central Workshops responsibility. Crews would fit machine guns into position. One part of fitting out would appear to have been painting the tank and adding its company markings and any name that was applied (most of the MK V and V*s that have been shown loaded onto RECTANKs at the factory appear to be in a grey factory finish, often still with workshop information still chalked onto them).
Prior to a battle the Tankodrome must have been extremely busy. All the tanks that were to be used would be made battle ready some significant way behind the lines well away from artillery and the prying eyes of German tactical reconnaissance aircraft. Even if the activity was spotted all it told the Germans was that an attack was due (and in the latter part of 1918 this would not have been difficult to predict in any case), but not where or when.
Up to the Front

That part of the French railway network use by ROD had a much more sympathetic loading gauge. Although sponsons still had to be retracted the tanks could travel on it with unditching rails and beams fitted and cribs or fascines loaded. (A7). Shortly before a battle was due to start tank crews would drive their battle ready vehicles from the Tankodrome to Plateau and entrain. In the hours of darkness before the dawn of battle the French railway network would be full of speeding trains laden with tanks and crews hastening to their appointed battle stations. (A8) Five hundred tanks probably meant about thirty to forty trains some possibly with multiple stops to unload tanks. Just scheduling the movement of these, so that the right tanks arrived in the right place at the right time, in the days before computers was a non trivial task.

Well before dawn the tanks would have been unloaded and having swung the sponsons out their crews would be ready to roll into battle. All that was left was the drive to their jumping off point. In the early tank battles this was often a time of confusion and error. To be honest even in late 1918 it still was but much less so. Mistakes such as marking the way with white tapes – just before it snowed, were now avoided. Frequently guides with shielded red lights were provided to show the tanks the way forward. The approach had often been preprepared and camouflaged so that, for example, seemingly solid blocks of wire would be quietly swung aside. On at least one occasion the Royal Engineers had over several nights built the tanks a submerged bridge across a river blocking the approach.
As dawn broke the sentries in the German front line would find that the front before them which only the previous evening had the seemingly inactive was now filled with tanks advancing upon them.