November 17, 1967

[39mto39g]

Time Magazine


Friday, Nov. 17, 1967
Border Troubles


Before the U.S. buildup in Viet Nam was completed, the basic Communist strategy was hit-and-hide. But hiding is no longer enough; so wide-ranging is Allied surveillance and so swift U.S. response with air strikes, artillery and helilifted soldiers that few safe spots remain to the Communists in South Viet Nam. As a result, Hanoi's new commander in the field, Lieut. General Hoang Van Thai, has been forced to adopt a different strategy. U.S. analysts in Saigon have dubbed it the strategy of the periphery. In plain terms, it is hit-and-run for the nearest border?Laos, Cambodia or North Viet Nam ?where the lethal arm of U.S. power cannot pursue. The result is likely to be more and more border warfare, from the year-long face-off along the DMZ to recent battles like those for Loc Ninh two weeks ago and for Dak To last week?both of which resulted in major Communist defeats.

Aggressive Patrolling. At Loc Ninh, two enemy regiments that tried to overrun an Allied position and district town only nine miles from the Cambodian border failed disastrously despite their proximity to frontier safety (TIME, Nov. 10). By this week the Loc Ninh body count of North Vietnamese dead had grown to 926; U.S. intelligence estimated that perhaps half that many again had been dragged away for burial by their comrades, and that another 2,000 to 3,000 had been wounded. This high casualty rate (roughly 50%) for the two ill-fated Red regiments, who were ordered to take the town at all costs, made Loc Ninh one of the war's most significant Allied victories.

At Dak To last week, a deadly clutch of running battles took place within 20 miles of the Cambodian border. In the craggy jungles of the western Central Highlands around the town, six North Vietnamese regiments with a total strength of some 17,000 men have been bivouacked for months. Some 20,000 soldiers of the U.S. 4th Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade have been guarding the area, which includes the major U.S. base of Pleiku. This is the time of year when the rainy season comes to an end around Dak To?and the Communists dry off and come out fighting. Their plan had been to drive eastward from the border to seize the town of Dak To, then try to sweep southeastward for a strike against Kontum, the provincial capital. They never made it to their first objective. The U.S. forces caught them while they were still moving some 5,000 men into position in the hills above Dak To.

Heavy Price. Aggressive patrolling by two 4th Division companies drew the first fire from the North Vietnamese, and soon battles were raging throughout the hills as unit after U.S. unit moved in and made contact through the week. At nightfall the infantrymen would pull back, and air and artillery would go to work. B-52s several times came in to pound enemy positions, particularly along the lines of retreat to the Laotian border, where 150,000 Ibs. of explosives were dropped in a single raid. At week's end the fighting was still flaring in spots around Dak To, having already cost the Communists some 500 dead. This time the price was also heavy for some U.S. units, which lost a total of 53 dead.

On the eve of a trip to Washington to report to President Johnson on the war's progress, General William C. Westmoreland said last week that he "is more encouraged than at any time since I arrived here" nearly four years ago. Communist recruiting in the South is down from some 7,000 new soldiers a month in 1966 to around 3,500 today?and still declining. As a result, Hanoi is being forced to send more North Vietnamese to fill out the ranks of Southern-based units; it now has more than 100,000 men fighting in South Viet Nam, constituting 50% to 60% of the Communists' forces in the field. Supplying them has become steadily more difficult and dangerous, particularly since the Allies have so tightened their control over rice-growing regions that in some areas Communist troops are now, says Westmoreland, "literally on the verge of starvation."