interesting reading

[Hawk]

http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earl...saddam__1.html

Another Saddam (and U.S. Intelligence) Massacre
The list of crimes committed by Saddam Hussein against his own people and the international community is long, but once again the former Iraqi President was granted another delay in his trial, a trial that is initially slated to focus on a 1982 massacre of Iraqi civilians in Dujail.


I have a suggestion for another massacre, one that was unleashed in response to the worst instance of civil unrest since the beginning of President Saddam Hussein?s rule.


What happened in this massacre bears heavily on the current health of American veterans, on our view of the competence of the U.S. intelligence community and the current weapons of mass destruction debate.

In a little noticed discovery, the Iraq Survey Group investigating Iraq's WMD concluded last year that the former regime dropped chemical weapons on Shi'ite rebel groups during their post-Desert Storm revolt in March 1991. This finding directly contradicts the Pentagon review of potential causes of Gulf War Syndrome as well as the earlier conclusions of the intelligence community which had looked into the matter.

When the post-war ceasefire began on February 28, 1991 after Desert Storm, Shi'ia citizens and groups in southern Iraq saw the destruction of much of the Iraqi army and civil infrastructure as an opportunity to overthrow the Baghdad regime. Of course, President Bush the elder and other U.S. officials encouraged the uprising, and during the first week of March, rebellions spontaneously broke out in several major cities in southern Iraq, including Basra, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Karbala.

Kurds were soon protesting in Baghdad and Kirkuk in the north was surrounded on three sides by rebels, but in the south, the Iraqi government carried out a successful brutal suppression, leveling neighborhoods and killing thousands. By the end of March, Shi'ia rebel activity had all but ceased.

Shi'ia refugees pouring across the demarcation line in southern Iraq suggested that Baghdad was using chemical warfare agents against civilians. U.S. intelligence observed what they thought was the use of napalm and white phosphorus as incendiaries and anti-personnel weapons, and they tracked 130 Iraqi helicopter flights in southern Iraq, half of which were ground attack sorties. But U.S. intelligence had no particular hard intelligence about chemical weapons use, and the Bush administration was more seized with their embarrassment at Iraqi use of helicopters at all -- Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf agreed to let the Iraqis use helicopters for transport at the Safwan ceasefire talks and they felt tricked when they were used for fighting.

With U.S. military forces deployed just outside the cities of Basra and Nasiriyah, the debate over Gulf War Syndrome later focused on potential exposure of these front-line troops to Iraqi chemicals. On August 4, 1998 the Pentagon concluded that it had determined it "unlikely" that Iraqi chemical agents were released during the aerial bombardment or US occupation of bunkers around Nasiriyah. And on May 10, 2000, the Pentagon concluded in its "Close-Out Report: Possible Post-War Use of Chemical Warfare Agents Against Civilians by Iraq" that:

"We were unable to obtain definitive evidence of Iraq's post-war use of blister agents or any other kind of chemical warfare agent. Nor does it appear continued investigation is likely to yield such evidence or shed further light on this issue. ? continued investigation is not likely to yield evidence beneficial to our interest in the unexplained illnesses of Gulf War veterans."

But then after Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraq Survey Group conducted a comprehensive investigation of Iraqi WMD inside the country, including multiple interviews with Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership, and concluded just the opposite. The Iraq Survey Group Volume 2 report (caution: huge pdf file) says:

"In March 1991, the former Regime used multiple helicopter sorties to drop CW [chemical weapons]-filled bombs on rebel groups as a part of its strategy to end the revolt in the South?. The fall of Karbala deeply affected key decision-makers. According to a former senior member of the CW program, the Regime was shaking and wanted something "very quick and effective" to put down the revolt. ? In the early morning of 7 March 1991 an unidentified Iraqi requested permission to use "liquids" against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regime forces intended to use the "liquid" to defeat dug-in forces as part of a larger assault.

"Husayn Kamil, then Director of MIC [the military industrialization commission], ordered senior officials in the chemical weapons program to ready CW for use against the revolt. His initial instruction was to use VX [a nerve agent]. When informed that no VX was available he ordered mustard to be used. However, mustard was ruled out and Sarin [another nerve agent] selected because the persistence of mustard made it more likely to be detected.

"On or about 7 March 1991, R-400 aerial bombs located at the Tamuz Airbase were readied for use. Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) technicians mixed the two components of the Iraqi "binary" nerve agent system inside the R-400s. Explosive burster charges were loaded into the bombs and the weapons assembled near the runway. ? Helicopters from nearby bases flew to Tamuz, were armed with the Sarin-laden R-400s and other conventional ordnance. Dozens of sorties were flown against Shi?a rebels in Karbala and the surrounding areas. A senior participant from the CW program estimates that 10 to 20 R-400s were used. Other reporting suggests as many as 32 R-400s may have been dropped.?


"Following the initial helicopter sorties, the senior chemical weapons program officer overseeing the operation received an angry call from Husayn Kamil?s office. The caller said the attacks had been unsuccessful and further measures were required. ? Over the next two weeks helicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded with CS[tear gas]-filled bombs. One participant estimated that more than 200 CS filled aerial bombs were used on rebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf."

In 1991, U.S. forces did receive reports from refugees indicating Iraqi use of mustard (a blister agent), as well as napalm and white phosphorus in southern Iraq. The Defense Intelligence Agency even issued a Desert Storm Bulletin concerning the possible intent of the Iraqi military to use chemical agents based upon intercepts of Iraqi communications and human source reporting:

"With the continuing unrest in Iraq, Iraqi forces may resort to the use of chemical weapons to quell the disturbances. Specific term used ? was 'burning the skin aircraft' to employ 'special ordnance,' a term frequently used to refer to chemical munitions."

But the Gulf War Syndrome investigations found that too many of the refugees generally categorized all weapons as "chemical" and concluded that no chemical agents were used. They based their own conclusions in part on what they say were "in-depth, long-term analyses" of the Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA who each assessed independently that no weapons had been used:


"On July 13, 1999, the senior CIA official assisting Gulf War illness investigations stated, "It is unlikely that Iraq used chemical warfare agents against Shiite rebels in areas near Coalition forces immediately following Desert Storm." A DIA message was more succinct: "There is no confirmed evidence that Iraq used either mustard [i.e., blister] or nerve agents during the Shiia rebellion in March 1991."

So here's what I conclude from all of this:


The U.S. intelligence community failed to detect and competently report the Iraqi use of chemical warfare agents in March 1991, perhaps no surprise given the conclusions they drew in 2002-2003 about Iraqi WMD.
Refugees reported a variety of substances, including the use of white phosphorus in southern Iraq as chemical agents, certainly a prelude to understanding incidents like Fallujah in November 2004 when "chemical weapons" and incendiaries were reported used.
The U.S. military and the intelligence community overstated the effects of bombing of Iraqi airfields and command and control infrastructure in Desert Storm, certainly a prelude to the starry eyes conclusions regarding the potential impact of "shock and awe" attacks in 2003. Iraq obviously had enough communications capabilities, command and control, and assets available to undertake a complicated marshalling of its helicopters and chemical weapons after 43 days of bombing.
The Gulf War Syndrome investigations failed to account for the actual use of chemical weapons by Iraq in March 1991 near U.S. forces. This could bear upon the health of U.S. veterans, and just as importantly, could bear upon the health of the Iraqi civilian population between the two wars. Activists, for instance, are obsessed with U.S. use of depleted uranium as the cause of all sorts of Iraqi (and U.S. veteran) health problems. The March 1991 revelations might indicate that there are a lot of other stimuli to consider.
As the debate continues to swirl about Iraqi WMD, the events of March 1991 should remind us that even with intense study and analysis over many years, even with all that U.S. intelligence collection can muster, even with loads of "eyewitness" accounts; we just often don't know what really happens in a closed country like Iraq. If nothing else, that should be sobering reminder as the administration and the intelligence community attempt to redeem themselves on the question of terrorist use of WMD, or when it comes to North Korea and Iran.

By William M. Arkin | November 28, 2005; 12:00 PM ET