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Old 10-23-2009, 12:39 AM
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Default The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962

The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962

Source: Chief of Naval Operations, Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, Operational Archives Branch, Post 46 Command File, Box 10, Washington, DC.
Related Resource: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962



IntroductionStand down and Conclusion:
Advance Preparatory Action:
1 -21 October
Lessons Learned
The Quarantine:
22 -26 October
27-30 October
IL-28 Aircraft Outloading
Abeyance and Negotiation:
31 October - 13 November
Glossary



[Note on time zone references: Three zones are referenced in the following text by the time zone letters: "Q," "R," and "Z." "R" is also noted as "Romeo," the full phonetic designation. There is no detailed explanation in the original document of exact usage; however there are indications that the "R" and "Q" designations are Eastern Standard Time (+5) and Eastern Daylight Time (+4) designators respectively. "Z," or Zulu, is Greenwich Mean Time or GMT (0), typically used by reporting units at sea and message date time groups. Times referencing events in Washington before the week-end of 27/28 October are referenced as "Q." Times after that week-end are noted as "R." This pattern is consistent in the text with a few unexplained exceptions (meeting with Congressional leaders). Times for ship intercepts are in the DDHHMM of the DTG format.]

Introduction

During the month of September, a buildup of Soviet offensive military posture in Cuba was evident through the analysis of intelligence reports and the increasein sea transport from Soviet Bloc ports.From January through July, an average of 14 Soviet dry-cargo ships per month had called at Cuban ports.In August, this figure more than doubled; in September it was 46.Soviet tankers were docking at a rate of 10 per month.In addition to ships of USSR registry, 29 Soviet satellite dry-cargo transports and four tankers entered Cuban ports during the first nine months of 1962.Including those Bloc vessels discharging Cuban cargo in October, the total number of Russian and Soviet Bloc ships was 379 -- 85 more than the total 1961 figure, even with 2 months until the end of the year.Significantly, the traffic during August, September, and October accounted mainly for the difference in the two annual figures.On October 23, there were 23 Soviet and satellite ships en route to Cuba, 16 of them dry-cargo.In addition, six others were believed to include Cuba on their itineraries.

Early intelligence reports of offensive preparedness were scattered and usually incomplete.Activity was carried out with some degree of successful secrecy under the guise of improving defensive capability. However, with the introduction of more sophisticated weapons systems of medium and intermediate range, the activity could no longer remain covert.

Reports of the arrival of large numbers of Soviet technicians and military personnel, the construction of larger launch complexes, and the extension of airstrips to accommodate high-performance aircraft pointed unmistakably to the rapid development of Cuba into a Soviet base for offensive action against the United States.Descriptions of suspicious cargoes aboard Cuba-bound ships, obtained from sources at ports of loading and unloading and from aerial photographs taken by Navy reconnaissance aircraft, together with information on vehicle and rail convoys gathered from Cuban informants, strongly indicated the preparation of missile sites of other than the surface-to-air variety Which had been under surveillance for some time.

On September 1, Commander, Naval Base Guantanamo received reliable information that Russian, Czech, Chinese, and Polish troops had been disembarked at Mariel, Cabanas and Bahio Honda in Pinar del Rio province and also at Havana, Matanzas, and Casilda.Some of these foreign troops had taken charge of all coastal artillery from Santa Fe to Esperanza and from San Galletano to Cabanas.Their numbers were estimated as "Several thousand.""Several thousand" troops also were reported to have debarked from ships at Matanzas and 1,100 more at Casilda. Cuban families were reported evacuated from an area southeast of Banes, where construction of a naval base had begun.

This same COMNAVBASE report said information had been received that on August 25 cargo unloaded from three Bloc ships at Nicaro Consisted of boxes the length of lowboy trailers and cement blocks about 8 by 4 by 1 feet in size.

Another Guantanamo intelligence report on September 5 reported heavy off-loading of military equipment from several ships under rigid security measures.An informant also said he had seen two Soviet submarines in the Bahia de Nipe area during the week of 27-31 August. There were indications of considerable activity in Bahia de Nipe area, including unloading of equipment, personnel, and munitions.

Much of this intelligence information correlated with the conclusions established over a month later that medium and intermediate range ballistic missile sites were under construction at various locations.As early as September 17, a Central Intelligence Agency report established that a previously identified surface-to-air site at Banes very near Bahia de Nipe was considered to be a surface-to-surface launch complex.

During August and September, the harassment of U.S. reconnaissanceand patrol forces became more belligerent.On August 30 an unarmedS2F was fired upon by a Cuban patrol vessel over international waters12 miles north of the island.This craft, in company with a second, maneuvered radically to bring manned guns to bear and then fired whenthe plane was within a range of 700 yards.

On September 8, two Key West S2F aircraft on another routine patrol flight were overtaken by a Soviet MIG-17 which made simulated gunnery firing runs on both U. S. planes.The incident took place 45 miles southwest of Key West and within the Air Defense Identification Zone.The intruder was acquired by Key West ground-controlled intercept radar as he closed on the patrol flight, and two F4D's were scrambled to provide fighter cover for the S2F's. A few minutes after the MIG-17 completed the harassment and disappeared, the Key West radar acquired a second target which quickly changed course and faded to the south. Photographs of the first intruder rendered positive identification.

These serious occurrences helped prompt a decision to increase the defensive capability (On September 19 CINCLANTFLT deployed a detachment of six F8U aircraft to Key West for the operational control of COMKWESTFOR.) of Naval Air Station, Key West.This wasespecially desirable since our surveillance and reconnaissance efforts had increased substantially in the Caribbean area because of the heavier frequency of ships transporting cargo to Cuba.

On October 1 the forces of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, were engaged in routine training and upkeep evolutions throughout the Western Atlantic and Caribbean areas.Commander Second Fleet, embarked in Newport News (CA-148) was at sea off Nova Scotia.The antisubmarine carriers Wasp (CVS-18), Essex (CVS-9), and Lake Champlain (CVS-39) were in the Boston/Newport area. Intrepid (CVS-11) was at sea off New York, and Randolph (CVS-15) was in Norfolk.Cruisers and destroyers were engaged in local operations stretching from Newport to Guantanamo.

In the Caribbean, the guided missile cruiser Canberra (CAG-2), six destroyers, and one amphibious ship were in Guantanamo.The ASW carrier Shangri-La (CVS-38) and seven destroyers were in Mayport, Florida.

Routine air patrols were being conducted and training was being carried out at Key West, Roosevelt Roads, P.R., and Guantanamo.

A regularly scheduled exchange of the Sixth Fleet Marine battalion landing team in the Mediterranean was in progress.

Advance Preparatory Action

Although military contingency considerations toward Cuba had their genesis long before, on October 1 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to discuss the circumstances under which military action against Cuba might be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented.The following day, the Secretary sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggesting six contingencies; among them were (a) evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of Bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors and (b) a decision by the President that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing national security."

The memorandum requested contingency preparatory actions and an evaluation of the consequences of such actions. The political objectives of the contingencies were defined as the removal of the threat of Soviet weapon systems and, if necessary, the removal of the Castro regime to assure the permanent dislocation of these weapons.

Obviously, the first of these contingencies existed and certainly would prompt the U. S. President Kennedy to invoke the second. Additionally, other contingencies were met.To a degree, "an attack against U. S. planes or vessels outside Cuban territorial air space or waters" already had occurred, and there was evidence that Cuban ships had been covertly transporting arms to other Latin American Coasts, partially satisfying "Cuban armed assistance to subversion in other parts of the Western Hemisphere."Accordingly, actions were begun on October 3 to prepare for military action against Cuba.

All preparations prior to imposition of the "naval quarantine" and the decision to implement this action were directed toward the execution of Commander in Chief, Atlantic's (CINCLANT) Operations Plan 312-62, followed by Plans 314-61 or 316-61.The first of these plans involved the air strike against selective Cuban targets.Plan 314-61 was an airborne and amphibious assault of Cuba from a positionof peak readiness. Plan 316-61 prescribed the execution of a similar invasion, but with a lesser degree of preparedness.

It was absolutely essential that these preparations be carried out with strict secrecy.In many cases, instructions and queries went out for the eyes only of those cognizant commanders at the highest echelon of command.In almost all cases, messages and memoranda were classified "Top Secret, Exclusive." Great care had to be taken to prevent disclosure of the scope of preparations and to avoid the impression that the United States was building to a point of military readiness for Cuban operations. Such an impression might have triggered a reaction by Russia to pre-empt initiative. Although the general appraisal was that Soviet Premier Khrushchev would not ignite a general war over U. S. action in Cuba, he might have been so inclined if aware of unusual preparedness without clear reason.

Wednesday, 3 October

On October 3, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), ordered increased surveillance of Cuban shipping in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf approaches.Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force (COMASWFORLANT) was directed to augment the Caribbean and Key West aerial patrol effort with additional forces as required and to conduct ocean surveillance to detect and photograph all shipping in and out of Cuba.In order to reduce to a minimum the length of time between processing and receipt of aerial reconnaissance photographs for interpretation, Commander Naval Air Force Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT) provided jet courier service to Norfolk and Washington, D.C., for delivery to CINCLANTFLT and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).

Also on the 3rd, CINCLANTFLT took initial steps to prepare his forces for a possible blockadeof Cuba and directed his subordinate commands to prepare for the formation of a blockade force. CINCLANT ordered that the units be assigned to Commander Joint Task Force 122, the blockade commander, when directed.According to CINCLANTFLT OpOrder 41-62, the forces to be readied included a blockade group, covering group, logistics group, and anti-submarine-warfare group.This blockade was part of OpPlans 314 and 316 and not independent of other action. Although this Operation Order was not the one followed when the quarantine began, advance planning for its execution 20 days before had expedited greatly the implementation of the quarantine, since the composition of forces in both cases was essentially the same.

Saturday, 6 October

On October 6, the Commander in Chief Atlantic directed development of the highest state of readiness to execute Operations Plans 312-62, 314-61, and 316-61.The basic objectives of these plans were the removal of the Castro regime, the securing on the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national interests, and the prepositioning and pre-invasion actions necessary.Consideration of matters related to relocation and prepositioning of troops, aircraft,ships, and equipment and supplies was requested of the Commanding General, 18th Airborne Corps, CINCLANTFLT, and Commander, Tactical Air Command.Each of these commands wouldshiftoperational control of certain of their units and forces to CINCLANT under the provisions of the contingency plans being forpossible execution.

Sunday, 7 October

On the 7th, CINCLANT recommended the establishment of a Military Emergency Zone to control air traffic in the Southern Florida area. With the implementation of any one ofthe plans under consideration, such a restricted area would be necessary to control nonmilitary traffic and insure the success of large-scale air attacks and airborne assaults. Although basically devoted to offensive contingency, MEZ planning called for coordination with Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), so as not to interfere with CINCONAD responsibilities. The MEZ later was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ordered established in the event operations plans requiring it were executed.

Monday, 8 October

On October 8, the Joint Chiefs sent the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) Cuban contingency memorandum to the Unified Commanders, requesting their comments and recommendations. CINCLANT responded immediately with the recommendation that his operations plans for the invasion of Cuba and the removal of the Castro regime be implemented. This reaction was in consonance with the JCS consensus. CINCLANT also recommended preparatory actions to begin at once and progressively in the future to improve readiness to execute these plans.Since CINCLANT had been present at the October 1 meeting of the JCS with SECDEF and because of the reciprocity regarding Cuban military actions, the Atlantic commander's stand was one requisite to this prior unanimity.

Among those preparations recommended by CINCLANT were the transfer of one-third of a Marine division-air wing team from the Pacific to the Atlantic command, prepositioning of forces and heavy equipment without derogating training or readiness for other critical missions, and the transfer of tactical and reconnaissance air squadrons to southern Florida.Of first priority was the prepositioning of forces at and reinforcement of Guantanamo. Many of these recommendations were approved early by the JCS and some actually were already in process of accomplishment.

To mask widespread preparations for the actions proposed, CINCLANT suggested announcement that forces were preparing for an exercise entitled "Quick Kick" amphibious brigade assault landing exercise.By doing, it would be possible to carry out operations of increasing scope without revealing actual prepositioning purposes.Therefore, PHIBRIGLEX 62 was scheduled for the period October 15-20. This exercise previously was set for November in the yearly exercise schedule.

On the 8th, CINCLANT suggested that supplies be prepositioned on Mayaguana Island in accordance with a previously arranged agreement with the British.This was to be accomplished under the cover of improvement of the Atlantic Missile Range tracking station. However, because of the chance of compromise, the concealment later was changed to classified oceanographic research.

In CINCLANT's reply to JCS's requested review of contingency plans regarding Cuba with a view towards reinforcing Guantanamo and reducing the reaction time of existing plans,one of the specific recommendations was that the Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade (5th MEB) associated amphibious lift be assigned from the Pacific to the Atlantic Command and that an amphibious squadron and battalion landing team be withdrawn from Sixth Fleet deployment. U. S. Commander in Chief, Europe, (USCINCEUR), despite JCS's recommendation of serious consideration, did not concur in the withdrawalproposed on grounds that it would seriously affect the deterrentcapability of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, CINCPAC advised that assignment of the 5th MEB was feasible but not without reducing capability to handle Southeast Asian contingencies.

Also on the 8th, an F4H squadron (VF-41) was deployed to Naval Air Station, Key West, to further reinforce air defenses in the southern Florida area.The squadron further augmented the detachment of F8U2N's which had been assigned to the station on 19 September.

Wednesday, 10 October

In noting the intelligence reports of a build-up of sophisticated aircraft revetments and surface-to-air missile sites, CINCLANTFLT ordered training to include the possibility of action against Cuban targets in the face of increased automatic anti-aircraft capability. Plans also were amended to strike and destroy these sites when such action was ordered.Training efforts went so far as to include the construction of a simulated Soviet SA-2 SAM site to improve strike tactics against this type of target.

Friday, 12 October

At 0400Q October 12, a meeting was held in the JCS Operations Directorate of operations and logistics planners from CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Strike Force (CINCSTRIKE), Chief of Staff, Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, Air Force, and Commandant, Marine Corps.The purpose of the meeting was to develop a reply to SECDEF's Cuban contingency memorandum and to reduce lead time for executing CINCLANT Operations Plan 314-61 by increasing readiness posture.

Sunday, 14 October

U-2 reconnaissance photographs of Cuba positively identified three medium-range ballistic missile sites at San Cristobal.This was the first photographic intelligence of the area since August 29, at which time there was no evidence of any such development.

Monday, 15 October

More U-2 photographs taken the day before were developed and analyzed.They further confirmed the existence of strategic missiles and sites in Cuba. Two additional U-2 flights made during the day not only reconfirmed the San Cristobal sites, but also showed two intermediate-range ballistic-missile sites under construction at Guanajay, where there had been no deployment activity on August 29.

Between 2000-2200Q, this information was relayed to theSecretary of Defense; Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric;Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General JosephCarroll; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General MaxwellD.Taylor; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Under Secretary of StateGeorge Ball; Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson; Presidential Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy; Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone and his deputy, Ray Cline; and Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin.

Atlantic Fleet forces already were at a high peak of readiness because of a heavy schedule of training operations which were underway.

Amphibious Training Landing Exercise (PHIBTRALEX) 3-62 in the Vieques area, scheduled for August 27 through November 2, was in progress and involved Amphibious Squadron 8 with the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Marines embarked.

UNITAS III, the third annual ASW training exercise with several South American countries, was underway, having begun August 17. It was to end December 10.

PHIBRIGLEX 62, ostensibly an amphibious exercise to train and exercise naval forces to conduct an amphibious assault and associated naval operations from Onslow Beach, North Carolina, to the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean was just beginning.This exercise which was to be aborted as a cover for Cuban contingency operations involved the following principal forces:

Independence (CVA-62)
Randolph (CVS-15)
Okinawa (LPH-3)
Thetis Bay (LPH-6)
15 destroyers
14 amphibious ships
3 submarines
4 mobile support ships
1 Marine Regimental Landing Team
1 Marine Air Group



Operation SWEEP CLEAR II, a Joint Canadian - U.S. mine sweeping exercise, was underway off Nova Scotia.

Tuesday, 16 October

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were ordered to emergency session at 1100Q on October 16. Admiral Anderson was recalled after a National War College/Industrial College of the Armed Forces lecture and General Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, was recalled from Europe.At this meeting came the first firm revelation that military action would be taken relative to the Soviet offensive build-up in Cuba.

At 0900Q, the President received photographic evidence of the Cuban offensive missile sites from Mr. Bundy. Three hours later, he convened a meeting at the White House with the Vice-President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, the Attorney General, GeneralTaylor, Deputy SECDEF Gilpatric, Deputy SECSTATE George Ball, Asst. SECSTATE Edwin Martin, Mr. Bundy, Presidential Assistant TedSorensen, Douglas Dillon, Charles Bohlen, and Kenneth O'Donnell. The outcome of the meeting was that reconnaissance of Cuba should beincreased greatly. Six U-2 flights were scheduled for the next day.

Conferences that afternoon at the State Department included Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Martin, Alexis Johnson, Ambassadors Bohlen, Thompson, and Stevenson.At 1830Q there was another White Housemeeting at which a Guided Missile and Astronautic IntelligenceCommittee evaluation of U-2 missions and photographs taken onOctober 14 and 15 were considered.

Wednesday, 17 October

On the 17th, the Joint Chiefs notified CINCONAD to take action without delay for the augmentation of air defenses ofthe Southeast U.S., and CINCLANT alerted shore-based Navy and Marine Corps fighter squadrons in the area to assist CONAD forces. The Chief of Naval Operations sent a personal message to the Fleet Commanders advising them to be prepared to order as many ships as possible to sea on a 24-hour notice, provided their main propulsion plants were ready.

Project "BLUE MOON" a CINCLANTFLT operations order to obtain low-level photographic reconnaissance of Cuban military buildup areas, became operational at Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Fla., utilizing F8U-1P aircraft.

During the day, there were several meetings of the executive policy group in Under Secretary of State Ball's conference room. All those at Tuesday's White House meetings except the President and the Vice President were there, with the addition of Dean Acheson, John McCone and Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson.They evaluated the evidence and discussed possible responses.

The reconnaissance flights ordered Tuesday took place.The read-out of aerial photographs produced more evidence of launching pads and signs of mobile launchers with missiles.

Thursday, 18 October

The next day (October 18) evaluation by GMAIC and other intelligence groups (The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Nation Photographic Interpretation Center) of the October 14 and 15 U-2 photographs, pluspreliminary assessment of photos taken on the 17th, confirmed the previous findings and, in addition, identified medium-range ballistic-missile sites 1 and 2 at Saguna la Grande for the first time. These photographs were the ones later referred to by the President as the first "hard evidence" of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba.

Meanwhile, the prepositioning of forces to reduce reaction time in the event of action against Cuba continued. A reinforced infantry battalion from the Pacific Command's 5th MED was ordered transferred to the operational control of CINCLANT and a light antiaircraft-missile battalion (Hawk) was ordered to Guantanamoto augment forces there.

Throughout the day, there were several high-level policy meetings at the White House and the State Department.These meetings were attended by representatives of the White House and State and Defense Departments as well as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (NSC). During a White House meeting which convened at 2100Q a final consensus began to develop.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to advise on the supplying of riot control equipment and other support which the U. 3. could give Latin American nations for internal security purposes; to determine which Latin American. nations could assist the U. S. in a blockade of Cuba; to prepare a list of offensive weapons to include in a blockade, and to consider the pro's and con's of blockading aircraft as well as ships.

Friday, 19 October
October 19 was a day of preparation for some form of military action.At 0830Q, a message went out from the Chief of Naval Personnel to District Commandants and the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training alerting them to the possibility of recalling Reservists and advising them of policy in this regard.

CINCLANT dissolved Joint Task Force 122 and assumed the responsibilitiesof the blockade force commander. At the same time he established Cuban contingency communications requirements.

That morning, MATS airlift scheduled for a Marine Attack Squadron to be moved from MCAS Beaufort to Roosevelt Roads, P.R.CINCLANT recommended that the Tactical Air Command be relieved of some of its Pacific commitments in order to make available F-100's and crews to execute CINCLANT Operations Plan 312-62.

Fleet Air, Jacksonville deployed 10 of its VFP Blue Moon aircraft to Key West.Targets, routes, and flight schedules were implemented for conducting the low-level reconnaissance flights; the planes were on 4-hour standby.

During the afternoon, the Army was directed by JCS to expedite the readiness of a Hawk battalion at Fort Meade and CINCLANT wasauthorized to direct its movement to Key West at his discretion. The Commandant, Marine Corps, was ordered to designate another Hawk battalion for temporary deployment from the Pacific Command to LANTCOM.JCS also directed CINCONAD to appraise air defenses of the Southeast U. S. and then, the remainder of the nation.

That evening, CINCPAC commands began to assemble amphibious shipping in embarkation ports in preparation for possible orders to change the operation control of the 5th MEB sea echelon to CINCLANT.

From 1500-1900Q, there was a meeting In the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.The subject discussed was Mr. Gilpatric's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that afternoon which evolved the night before during the White House meeting and proposed a less vigorous action than that espoused by the Chiefs.The JCS's replydealt extensively on the capability to cope with Communist-inspired insurgency in Latin American countries.When this meeting broke up, Admiral Anderson, who had flown back from Patuxent River, and Admiral Ricketts returned to CNO's office with the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Judge Advocate General and discussed the blockade of Cuba.

All Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and squadrons not required for air defense, reconnaissance, or ASW surveillance were ordered relocated because of overcrowding at Florida bases.The aircraft status in regard to Caribbean area was:

U.S. Naval Air Station, Jacksonville
76 fighters
157 attack
10 patrol
Various replacement and administrative aircraft.
U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo
7 fighters
12 attack
5 patrol
Utility and administrative aircraft
U.S. Naval Air Station,Key West
26 fighters
5 ASW aircraft
Replacement and administrative aircraft.
U.S. Naval Air Station, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico
15 patrol
Utility and administrative aircraft.



Meetings of the NSC interdepartmental group were held all day at the State Department, primarily in the Under Secretary's conference room.As outlines of possible courses of action emerged, working groups were established within the main policy body. Before the President left on a scheduled campaign trip, he met with General Taylor, Mr. Rusk, and Mr. McNamara, delaying his departure half an hour. During this meeting it was decided that CNO, acting for the JCS, should prepare a plan for the limited blockade of Cuba.

Meanwhile, U. S. ambassadors to Latin American countries who were in the U. S. were ordered to return to their posts.Aerial reconnaissance continued throughout the day, and an order went out canceling a scheduled Tactical Air Command full-mobility exercise. The cancellation was announced by the Pentagon and attributed to poor weather in refueling areas caused by Hurricane Ella.

During the night the first draftof the President's October 22 speech was put together.It and succeeding drafts were sent to Admiral Anderson for comment. Some recommended revisions were incorporated, others were not.

In response to query, a Pentagon spokesman denied that any alert had been ordered or that any emergency measures had been set in motion against Cuba.The spokesman also said the Pentagon had no information indicating the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba.

Saturday, 20 October

On Saturday morning, October 20, Mr. McNamara directed Admiral Anderson to prepare the position and policy papers, scenario, and implementing instructions for the limited blockade.The Air Force Chief of Staff was ordered to handle the same details for an air strike against Cuban-based Soviet offensive weapons.CNO's responsibility also included the defense of Guantanamo Naval Base. Work began on these papers at 0930Q; they were to be completed by 1330Q for presentation to the President.

Admiral Anderson's paper stated the objective of the action was to stop a further build-up of an offensive capability in Cuba and ultimately to eliminate it.This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba.CNO's scenario was followed closely in later implementing the quarantine.

The President had returned early to Washington from his campaign trip to hear reports concerning the Cuban situation.An official statement said that he had canceled the remainder of the trip because of a "cold."

The JCS position papers were ready at 1345Q and were sent to General Taylor at the White House, where a meeting was in progress with the President, the principals of the National Security Council, the Cuban planning group; and Ambassadors Stevenson, Thompson, and Lovett. A detailed intelligence briefing was given and Cuban aerial photographs exhibitedThese enlarged photographs showed the work at each missile site.

In the course of this conference, blockade papers were approved and the President's speech set for Monday night at 1900Q (October 22).Although the President at first wished to make the statement on the 21st, he was dissuaded from this to allow for adequate military preparations and to provide for time to notify our allies.The possibility remained, however, of acting sooner if a security breach developed.

That night, the State Department sent preposition messages to all Latin American posts to warn against Communist-inspired rioting and to indicate the course to be taken if violent actions transpired.

Meanwhile, the Defense Department prepared for the quarantine, and contingency military build-up continued at a rapid pace. During the morning, while the position and policy papers were in preparation, the Joint Chiefs notified CINCSTRIKE that should a decision be made to take military action against Cuba, operational control of Army and Air Force units included under Cuban contingency operations plans would be transferred to CINCLANT.They also advised cognizant commanders that the increased state of tension with respect to Cuba could lead to
military action and to expect orders for a higher world-wide defense condition of readiness.

Earlier, Commander Amphibious Force, Pacific, reported to CINCPACFLT On the status of units of Amphibious Squadron Three and 5th MEB shipping which were standing by in West Coast ports of embarkation for change of operational control to CINCLANT. Before noon, the Third Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion at Marine Corps Air Station, Twenty-nine Palms, Calif., comprising three Hawk batteries and equipment for a fourth, was ordered deployed to CINCLANT for the further operational control of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. At about the same time, CINCLANT reported that 10 "BLUE MOON" low-level photographic-reconnaissance aircraft were in position at Key West,with seven more standing by. CINCLANT recommended cancellation of the PHIBRIGLEX 62 under the guise that Hurricane Ella had scattered ships and delayed the landing.

That afternoon, JCS received CINCLANT's recommendations for the air defense of Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone.CINCLANTFLT notified the base commander at Guantanamo to be prepared to evacuate all noncombatants Saturday night or at any time in the next two days.The base commander replied that he had prepared a plan for night evacuation to minimize the possibility of early intelligence to the Cubans. The JCS were recommending actions which would delay the evacuation until Monday night.

During the evening, CNO advised the Sea Frontier Commandersand coastal District Commandants of possible positive military action in response to the Cuban situation.The action, he said,may require any part of the "full spectrum" of military possibilities. He particularly called their attention to procedures related to disaster control, control of shipping and blockade in those areas within 1,000 miles of Cuba.Earlier that afternoon, he had sent a message to CINCUSNAVEUR concerning the readiness of our ballistic missile submarines."I trust," he said, "that any Polaris subs alongside the tender at Holy Loch will be capable of getting underway with little or no notice in the event the JCS raise the defense condition of readiness or if you learn of any actions which would indicate such movements advisable."
The Air Force recommended to the JCS what reserve forces it desired to have called up to improve air defense in the Southeast U.S., a Marine Air Group was deployed to NAS, Key West, and Military Air Transport Service airlift requirements were set up for the prepositioning of personnel and equipment.

JCS directed CINCSTRIKE to withdraw Army and Air Force units involved in Exercise "THREE PAIRS" which were needed for CINCLANT OpPlans 312, 314,and 316.

Sunday, 21 October

The quarantine proclamation had been completed and the OAS and UN resolutions were prepared. Mr. Pierre Salinger (White House), Mr. Robert Manning (State), and Mr. Arthur Sylvester (Defense) met to establish public-affairs coordination.

At 1430Q, the President met with the National Security Council,Mr. Don Wilson (USIA), and Admiral Anderson to discuss the third draft of the Presidential speech and progress reports on preparations. It was positively decided that our first objective would be to block further shipments of offensive military equipment to Cuba and that our aim was also to see that the Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba under UN supervision and inspection.

The philosophy that Cuba should be invaded was not completely rejected.It was placed to the right in the spectrum of action. First would come the limited blockade, then a complete blockade.~ these failed to achieve the removal of the offensive weapons, the next step would be selective air strikes, followed finally by the implementation of one of two invasion plans - 314, where time did not permit peak readiness of the invasion force, or 316, where amphibious and airborne assault could be accomplished from a full readiness posture. The last contingency was general war, which might result from extreme Soviet reaction.

During the day a list of Congressional leaders to be summoned to Washington was prepared by the White House, and it was determined where they could be picked up by jet aircraft in the morning. Once the list was formulated, the Congressmen were asked to attend the White House meeting on Monday at 1700R.

Before the day had ended, the State Department sent top-secret telegrams to our Ambassadors describing proposed actions. The text of the President's speech with covering letter to Mr. Khrushchev was sent to the Embassy in Moscow for delivery to the Soviet Foreign Office one hour before the President's public address.Presidential letters were sent to Prime Minister MacMillan, President de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Ministers Nehru, Diefenbaker, and Fanfani, Berlin's Mayor Brandt, and others through our Embassies for delivery. The text of the President's speech was sent in code to all posts, and individual letters from the President were sent to 43 heads of government.(During the weekend, the State Department transmitted 45 separate Presidential letters or other documents to a total of 441 recipients.)
In the afternoon and evening, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to prepare to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and to reinforce that base on Monday; to assume operational control of Army and Air Force units, included under Cuban plans; and to be prepared to furnish riot support control to Latin Americancountries as required.At 2200Q, Secretary McNamara approved the procedures and rules of the quarantine.

Up to this time, much had been done to place our forces in an increased readiness posture. Steps had been taken to improve defenses in the Southeast U.S. and to reinforce Guantanamo. Covertly, our forces worldwide had been alerted to meet any of the contingencies which might arise. Many more preparations were necessary, however, before the JCS considered the stage set, not so much for the imposition of the blockade but for the possibilities such action might precipitate.It was absolutely essential that our deterrent capability be at a peak when the President made his statement so our forces would respond to any aggressive action by Cuba, the Warsaw Pact nations, or the Soviet Union.

On the 21st the JCS further appraised the situation as follows:The Caribbean Command had transferred two LST's to the operational control of CINCLANT, CINCPAC was ready to transfer the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to the Atlantic Command, and CINCLANT was now in overall operational control of forces committed to any Cuban action. To strengthen our defense posture in the Southeast U.S., a Hawk battalion at Fort Meade was being readied for movement to Key West. Additionally, CINCONAD had been authorized to deploy certain units to augment air defenses - 14 F-102's to Homestead AFB, raising the number of interceptors there to 18, and six RC-121 to McCoy AFB, to bring the total to 12.CONAD aircraft at Tyndall AFB were alerted as augmentation forces, and at Key West there was a detachment of all-weather Navy fighters and a squadron of 10 F4H's.

Increased reconnaissance of Cuba and worldwide was in effect, specific targets had been defined, pilots were being briefed on their assignments and training was underway to prepare for Cuban action. Military Sea Transport Service Upshur and U.S. Navy ships were standing by for the evacuation of Guantanamo dependents. Other MSTS ships and MATS aircraft were employed or being readied for prepositioning and Cuban support activity. SAC aircraft were alerted for possible dispersal, and CINCARIB and CINCLANT were taking action to provide for possible air attack against military installations in Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone. A Marine Hawk battalion was being sent to Guantanamo, and CINCPAC was assembling shipping for movement of the 5th MEB.

On the 21st, the Chief of Naval Operations deputized the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and Deputy CNO's VADM U.S.G. Sharp and VADM C.D. Griffin to act for him; one of these officers would be present at all times in CNO's office when CNO was absent.Legal decisions regarding the blockade became the responsibility of the Navy Judge Advocate General.Special procedures were established to insure a rapid and timely flow of information concerning the blockade to CNO, JCS, the White House, and other interested parties from the CNO Flag Plot.

CNO's responsibility not only included the execution of the blockade and defense of Guantanamo, but protection of U.S. shipping as well.At 2034Q on October 21, CINCLANT reported that Commander, Key West Forces was tasked for the protection of shipping in the Florida Straits and the Yucatan Channel with 1 DD, 2 DDE, 1 DER, 8 F8U, and 1 VP detachment. CINCARIB Sea Frontier was responsible for the Windward Passage and the evacuation of Guantanamo dependents with 1 DD, 1 AVP, 2 MSO, 2 DE, 1 VA squadron (AD's), 1 VU squadron (F8U's) and 1 VP detachment.


Monday, 22 October

President Kennedy firmly scheduled his announcement for 1900Q. The proclamation was to be signed the next day and would contain a period of grace, at the end of which CINCLANT would impose the "quarantine" -- up to this time referred to as a "limited sea blockade."

At noon, Pierre Salinger requested and received air time from the radio and television networks and announced that the President would make an important statement.Nine radio stations were asked to broadcast the speech to Latin America.

At 1600Q, the President held a cabinet meeting and at 1700Q, he met with Congressional leaders summoned to Washington.Forty-five minutes before the President went on the air, NATO, SEATO, and CENTO nation ambassadors received a background briefing at the State Department, while friendly military attaches were briefed at the Pentagon. Fifteen minutes earlier, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had entered Secretary Rusks office to receive the news of the Presidents action.
During the day, Prime Minister MacMillan was briefed by Ambassador Bruce, President de Gaulle by Dean Acheson, and Chancellor Adenauer by Ambassador Dowling. Mr. Acheson also briefed the NATO Council.

At 1930Q, a letter from Ambassador Stevenson with a draft of the U.S. resolution was given to Soviet United Nations Ambassador Zorin in his capacity as President of the Security Council, and Assistant Secretary of State Martin briefed the OAS.

At 2015Q, Secretary Rusk informed all other ambassadors and the State Department held a background briefing for the press. Secretary McNamara also briefed the press at the Pentagon on a background basis.Aerial photographs were exhibited and explained.

Twelve hours before the President began his speech on worldwide radio and television, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent out detailed plans for conducting the quarantine to all cognizant and interested commanders. The order listed prohibited items, general rules for engagement between U. S. forces and ships and aircraft of other registry or ownership, details for conducting searches, a concept of the operations, and the plan for the defense of Guantanamo naval base. The execution of the air quarantine was ordered held in abeyance until directed by higher authority.

Throughout the day, CINCLANT continued deployment and positioning of ships and other forces to enforce the quarantine.Most of the units were proceeding to a central rendezvous point at 27N, 68W to await station assignments.These were Commander Task Force 136, in Newport News and with Canberra, Lawrence, Keith, Soley, and Borie from Norfolk; Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Six in MacDonough from Charleston; Commander Destroyer Squadron 26 in Dewey with Leary, Steinaker, and J. R. Pierce from Norfolk, and Witek. COMDESRON 16 aboard Bigelow, in company with McCaffery, W. C. Lawe, Sellers, Royal, and Gearing from Mayport, was en route to 21N, 65W.The ASW carrier Essex with Commander Carrier Division 18 aboard was en route from Guantanamo for 26N, 68W, where she would join COMDESRON 24 in Blandy with Sperry, Barry, and Keppler from Newport.Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, Atlantic had positioned aircraft at Roosevelt Roads and Bermuda to commence air surveillance.

Reinforcement of Guantanamo began before noon with the arrival of the PHIBRON 8 ships Monrovia, Rockbridge, Desoto County, and Liddle for off-loading of a Marine Battalion Landing Team.

Capricornus arrived about noon and Lindenwald in the evening to complete the landing of 1,600 officers and men.MATS and Marine aircraft also were delivering personnel and equipment of a reinforced rifle battalion from the West Coast and a Battalion Landing Team from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Marines in Guantanamo now numbered 5,200 officers and men, and the base's military Navy-Marine population totaled about 8,000.

The order to place all forces worldwide on Defense Condition Three went out one hour before the President's speech except for those in CINCEUR , which were put in a military precautionary posture.

The President had used the term "quarantine" instead of "blockade", because the latter term could have been interpreted asan act of war.The proposed interdiction was aimed solely at offensive weapons and every effort was to be made to not have other nations consider the action as a warlike act.

The evacuation of dependents and other noncombatants from Guantanamo was virtually completed by the time the President went on the air.The operation began at 1100Q when the base commander dispatched special officer messengers to the housing areas to alert dependents for the evacuation.The deadline for removal of the noncombatants was 1900Q.The housing areas were cleared of dependents at 1530Q. The last evacuation ship cleared her moorings at 1630Q.In the surface contingent, 1,703 were loaded aboard Upshur; 351 in Duxbury Bay, 286 in Hyades, and 92 in Desoto County.Hospital patients, dependents at Leeward, and certain other noncombatants were evacuated by air commencing about 1400Q.Air evacuees totaled 378 and were flown out in five GV and one R4Q aircraft. The first plane took off at 1400Q and the last about 1900Q.

CNO sent a personal message to the evacuees which the base commander read over the ships? loudspeakers:"The calm and serene manner in which you have accepted the threat of possible personal danger while living in Guantanamo has been viewed with admiration and respect.

"Now our judgment dictates that you should leave the scene of an increasing danger to your own safety.I am sure you will accept this action with the same fine spirit that has been so obvious throughout your stay at Guantanamo.Rest assured that we will do all possible to provide for your welfare in the days ahead."

After the President's announcement, attention focused on international reaction.Of first concern was any indication that the Soviet Union or Cuba was preparing for military action.However, there were no early responses from the Soviet Bloc nations, except for the Cuban armed forces being placed on alert.

CNO immediately alerted his Fleet Commanders to the possibility of submarine attack with:
"I cannot emphasize too strongly how smart we must be to keep our heavy ships, particularly carriers, from being hit by surprise attack from Soviet submarines.Use all available intelligence, deceptive tactics, and evasion during forthcoming days. Good luck."

He was particularly wary of the submarine menace.His early belief that Cuban contingency operations would result in increased Soviet submarine activity, particularly in the Caribbean, was borne out during the entire operation. He had directed special emphasis on submarine intelligence measures and received at least three status briefings a day, and often many more, so as to keep intimately informed on the worldwide submarine picture.
To expand submarine intelligence capability, he solicited the assistance of the United Kingdom and Canadian Navies with:

"Although I am unaware of what the future political environment may be, I would greatly appreciate your giving us maximum intelligence support concerning potential undersea troublemakers.We have a big job to do and can use all the help we can get."

Thirty minutes after the President's speech, Admiral Anderson solicited the cooperation of Latin American navies by sending the following personal message to the Naval Chiefs of Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru:

"Greatly appreciate opportunity and ability to communicate directly with fellow officers commanding navies of free men, on which our countries depend so heavily for the preservation of our individual and collective independence.

"I only hope that our ships will always sail together and that in the present crisis, we will have as many of yours with mine as may be practicable.God bless everyone of us. George Anderson."

During the evening after the President's speech, Pentagon planners reviewed the necessity for further mobilization and preparations were ordered for a possible reserve recall. Secretary McNamara directed a step-up in induction and training of Cuban nationals.From 2240Q to 2325Q, he visited the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for discussions of the blockade and establishment of surveillance. [ Back ]


Tuesday, 23 October

On the day following the President's announcement, much interest still was shown in international reaction to the proposed U.S. action, not only that of the Soviet Bloc, but the free world as well. Russia canceled all military leaves and stopped discharges, particularly for personnel in rocket, anti-aircraft, and submarine duties. There also were several reports of Soviet long-range submarines along Russian shipping routes. A Japanese press report said that the Director General of Tass, visiting Japan, stated, "If the United States sinks a Soviet ship, there will be total war." An FBI report from New York quoted a Rumanian source to the effect that the Soviets told the Austrian Foreign Minister in Vienna that Soviet ships would resist search and risk being sunk because the Russians were anxious for a demonstration of strength with the U.S. All the Communist satellite countries had unleashed a propaganda campaign against the U. S. action. However, there were no intelligence reports that indicated any of the Soviet Bloc or satellite nations were planning any aggressive moves or preparing for any major conflicts with the United States or other countries of the free world.

The reaction of allied nations was highlighted by the Organization of American States approval of the U.S. quarantine resolution with a 19 to 0 vote. Uruguay had abstained due to lack of instructions and reserved the right to vote later.Several impromptu and passionate floor speeches were made during the OAS meeting in support of the U.S. resolution. Other free world reactions included Japan placing her air defense force on alert. Chancellor Adenauer said he and his government stood solidly behind the U.S. in the Cuban crisis.President de Gaulle ordered the French delegation to the UN to back the U.S. position, and in Canada, Prime Minister Diefenbaker endorsed President Kennedy's assessment of the Cuban arms build-up, but did not comment on the quarantine.In the Pacific area, South Viet Nam, South Korea, the Philippines, and Nationalist China all backed the U. S. move.

At about 0945Q, Secretary McNamara was briefed in Flag Plot on the merchant-ship, submarine, and overflight situations. He also was interested in the estimated arrival time at the quarantine line of Cuban-bound ship 8.

Throughout the day quarantine force ships and aircraft were moving into position.Among those on the line were the attackcarrier Enterprise, and Independence, and the ASW carrier Essex with nine escorting destroyers. Four TACAN ships had taken position along a line in the straits between Florida and Cuba's north coast. Amphibious Squadron Eight ships were in Guantanamo off-loading the Second Battalion of the Second Marine Division. Northhampton was anchored near the mouth of the Potomac, awaiting possible battle-staff augmentation. Task Group 136.1, composed of seven destroyers, two radar picket destroyers, two guided-missile destroyer leaders, and one guided-missile destroyer was en route to surface blockade stations and scheduled to arrive during the day.

Strike and cover aircraft were located on their deployment bases in the Southeastern U.S. The Force was composed of 448 fighter/attack aircraft and 67 reconnaissance/support aircraft.

Guantanamo Naval Base had been reinforced by three Marine Battalions and a fourth was afloat to take up position 150 miles northeast of Cuba.Amphibious Squadron Two was loading another battalion for departure within a few hours, and Amphibious Squadron Ten was loading Marine amphibious forces at Norfolk and Morehead City.

At 2045Q, Secretary McNamara had requested information concerning the first ships which would be intercepted, and Admiral Anderson consulted with Admiral Dennison On the matter.They decided that they should go after the Soviet vessels Kimovsk and Gagarin, effecting contact at about the same time on the 24th. The approximate location of both ships were known by direction-finder fixes and they felt search aircraft would have a good chance of spotting them. The Essex group would be used to intercept them.

Another approaching ship, Poltava, was to be assigned for interdiction to Newport News, Canberra, and four destroyers.It was believed that the intercept could be made late on the 24th.

In a memorandum to Mr. McNamara relating these plans, Admiral Anderson said that there was a hazard of possible submarines in interdicting the first two ships, but pointed out that the intercepting would be made by a Hunter/Killer Group.

"From now on, I do not intend to interfere with Dennison oreither of the Admirals on the scene unless we get some additional intelligence information which we are hoping for," Admiral Anderson wrote.

At 1930Q, the Secretary of Defense made the following public statement at a press conference concerning the quarantine and the retention of naval personnel on active duty:"The President, thirty minutes ago, at 7:00 p.m., signed the Proclamation ordering the interdiction of offensive weapons moving into Cuba, and under the terms of that Proclamation, I have taken the. necessary steps to deploy our forces to be in a position to make effective the quarantine at 2:00 p.m., tomorrow, Greenwich time.That will be the equivalent of 10:00 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time.

"Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, as their Executive Agent for the operation of the quarantine and the quarantine forces.In turn, Admiral Dennison, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, is the responsible Unified Commander. And, operating under him in direct charge of the quarantine task force will be Vice Admiral Alfred Ward, Commander of the SECOND Fleet. Admiral Ward's task force will be known as Task Force 136.It will be composed of major naval units, including carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and the associated logistical forces.

"Further, aircraft support will be supplied by units stationed at various east coast and Gulf coast ports. Thirdly, the President today signed Executive Order 11058, which authorized me as Secretary of Defense to call members of the Reserve under terms of the Congressional Resolution dated October 3, 1962, known as public Law 87-736, to active duty for periods of not more than 12 months so long as not more than 150,000 men were called under that order. And further, this Executive Order provides me with authority to extend enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and periods of active duty for training for personnel now on active duty. And as acting under the terms of that Executive Order, I have this evening instructed the Secretary of the Navy to extend the enlistments, appointments, and periods of active duty of both Navy and Marine personnel now on active duty.This is to provide the Navy with the forces necessary to increase their rate of activity, to the point necessary to support the quarantine and to insure the Marines with sufficient forces to meet whatever requirements are placed upon them, particularly the reinforcement of Guantanamo."

The President had called Mr. McNamara regarding the time when we would be ready to invade Cuba. Mr. McNamara told him seven days. The President said that he wanted to be sure that we were ready in every respect at the end of the seven days.

CINCLANTFLT was standing by to make a submarine reconnaissance of prospective landing beaches in the next two or three days. This reconnaissance, which was not executed, was to be less extensive than the one made in April when several swimmers were employed in determining the detailed characteristics of the beach.The purpose of this reconnaissance was primarily to determine whether or not man-made obstacles had been placed on the beach approaches.

During the day, SECNAV asked the Chief of Naval Personnel to prepare a directive to keep men in the Navy after the expiration of their enlistments.Their discussion resulted in a directive having sufficient flexibility to permit its application to certain categories, such as critical skills, if necessary.

The Secretary also asked that a paper be prepared setting forth the justification for the holding of people in the Navy beyond their expiration of contract to be used for discussion purposes. Admiral Smedberg requested some flexibility also in the retention of prospective officers scheduled to retire.

Mr. Korth wanted to discuss with Admiral Anderson the buttoning-up of overhauls of 40 reserve DD/DE's in anticipation of a possible recall. Both Admiral Sylvester, DNO for Logistics, and BUSHIPS were notified of this possibility some days prior.They were ready to suspend these overhauls promptly, if ordered. Admiral Sysvester was keeping a running record of the status of our ships' overhauls-- both regular and Reserve - to assist in making a judgment On expediting or stopping an overhaul on short notice. He also made a list of those ships scheduled to go in for overhaul in the near future to help decide whether or not to delay any overhauls.

Mr. McNamara asked VADM Griffin to suggest some means by which a Soviet submerged submarine could be given a signal to surface. He said that the description of this signal would be sent to the Soviet Government. VADM Griffin told M~. McNamara that a practice depth charge would probably be the most practical and effective means of transmitting such a signal, since we didn't know whether or not our underwater telephone gear was compatible with Soviet underwater communications.

The Judge Advocate General was working with the legal authorities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to revise the forms for a blockade proclamation.There were two forms based upon the "quarantine" language.This work was closely coordinated to ensure that operational and planning factors were adequately considered. [ Back ]


Wednesday, 24 October

On the day the quarantine was to take effect, the alignment of Soviet and free world nations continued to develop rapidly.The evening before, the U.S. position was presented to a special session of the United Nations Security Council. Soviet Ambassador Zorin's speech in reply emphasized that the present crisis existed between the United States and Cuba and reflected a Soviet desire to avoid the appearance of a direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation. This approach appeared to be calculated to create a climate for a U.S. reversal of the quarantine stand, to diminish the military threat to the U.S. and to reduce tensions among Soviet Bloc masses.Other Bloc reactions were becoming known.The Polish regime was playing the Cuban crisis in low key to avoid panic and a strain on low food-stocks.Although that nation's armed forces were alerted, there was no evidence of increased military activity.The Chinese communists issued a statement fully supporting the "just stand of the Soviet Government."

Various developments throughout the day suggested that the Soviet Bloc intended to proceed with extreme caution. This indication was supported by Zorin's comparatively mild statements at the UN, the lack of any Soviet move to evacuate dependents in East Germany and elsewhere, and other political developments.

Turkish officials, worried about the possibility of Soviet pressure to eliminate missile sites in their country in exchange for withdrawal of Russian missiles in Cuba, urged an increase in U. S. military aid to Turkey.

Brazil backed off somewhat from her support of the arms quarantine with the statement that the Government did not support the "use of force which may violate an independent country's territorial integrity and place world peace in jeopardy."

The Commander in Chief, Atlantic, established the surface quarantine line on an arc 500 miles from Cape Maysi between 27-30N, 75W and 20N, 65W. The line thus established was out of range of Soviet IL-28 "Beagle" bombers based in Cuba.The line was to be manned by 12 destroyers from Task Force 136, which were proceeding to the following stations:
Lat NLong WShip
28-0070-50Gearing
27-4070-06Witek
27-1069-06Lawe
26-3068-10Sellers
25-4067-20McCaffery
24-5066-40Summers
23-5066-00Leary
23-0065-40Pierce
22-0065-20Steinaker
21-0065-10Dewey
20-0065-00MacDonough
19-0065-10Greene



The destroyer line was backed up by two surface patrol units, an anti-submarine warfare/surveillance unit and a logistic support unit.

The force organization was:

CTF 136:Commander Second Fleet, Vice Admiral A. G. Ward.

CTG 136.0:Commander Flagship Group, Commanding Officer Newport News, Captain R. H. Bowers; Newport News (CA 148); Commander Destroyer Division 182 in Lawrence (DDG 4);Keith (DD 775).

CTG 136.1:Commander Surface Quarantine Group, CommanderCruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Six, Rear Admiral J. W. Ailes, III; Canberra (CAG 2) (Flagship); Newport News (CA 148); MacDonough (DLG 8); Lawrence (DDG 4); Dewey (DLG 4); Keith (DD 775); Leary (DDR 879); Steinaker (DDR 863); Pierce (DD 753); Soley (DD 707); Borie (DD 704); Bigelow (DD 942); Lawe (DD 763); Gearing (DD 710); Royal (DD 872); Sellers (DD DDG 11); Witek (EDD 848).

CTU 136.1.1: Commander Surface Blockade Unit, CommanderDestroyer Squadron 26, Captain W. R. Hunnicutt, Jr.; Dewey (DLG 4) (Flagship); Leary (DD 879); Steinaker (DD 863); Pierce(DD 753); Bigelow (DD 942); Lawe (DD 763); McCaffey (DD 860); Zellers (DD 777); Royal(DD 872); Sellers (DDG 11); Witek (EDD 848); MacDonough (DLG 8).

CTU 136.1.2: Commander Task Unit, Commanding Officer, Canberra (CAG 2), Captain R. K. Irvine; Canberra (CAG 2); Soley (DD 707); Borie (DD 704).

CTU 136.1.3: Commander Task Unit, Commanding Officer, Newport News (CA 148), Captain R. H. Bowers; Newport News (CA 148); Lawrence (DDG 4); Keith (DD 775).

CTG 136.2:Commander Task Group, Commander Carrier Division, Rear Admiral E. A. Christensen; Essex (CVS 9); Blandy (DD 943); Keppler (DD 765); Sperry (DD 697); Barry (DD 933).

CTG 136.3:Commander Task Group, Commanding Officer Elkomin (AO 55), Captain W. O. Spears; Elkomin (AO 55); Kaskaskia (AO 27); Great Sitkin (AE 17); J. P. Kennedy (DD 850); Weeks (DD 701).

Essex loaded with two S2F squadrons of 22 planes, 14 HSS-2's, and one WF-2, in company with her four destroyers were assigned to patrol the zone north and west of latitude 25N, 65W.The Bermuda ASW Group(CTG 81.5), consisting of 11 P5M's in VP-49 and 11 P5M's in VP-45, was tasked with air surveillance of a zone north and east of 25N, 65W.The Caribbean ASW Group (CTG 81.7) at Roosevelt Roads had aerial-surveillance responsibility for the zone east of the quarantine front and south of 25N; this group was made up of 11 VP-5 P2V's.

The strike force afloat consisted of the carriers Independence and Enterprise with screening destroyers.These ships had taken up their patrol positions south of Cuba in the vicinity of 18N, 74-30W.

The task at hand was to positively locate ships en route to Cuba and prepare for interception when they crossed the quarantine line. The tentative first intercept was the Kimovsk, suspected of carrying military equipment, and the second was to be the Poltova with a possible cargo of missiles.

During daylight hours and when in visual signal distance, a destroyer was to be dispatched to a position close aboard but which would not give the Soviet ship an opportunity to ram.The destroyerwould then display by visual flag hoist the international signal"K" (You should stop at once) or "ON" (You should heave to at once). These signals were to be paralleled by signal light.

In signifying his intent to stop a ship, the commander of the destroyer was to use all available communications, including international code signals, flag hoists, blinking lights, radio, loud speakers, etc. when hailing the ship, a Russian linguist would be used.If the ship did not stop upon being signaled or hailed, warning shots were to be fired across the bow.If this failed to halt the intercepted ship, minimum force was authorized to damage non vital parts of the ship but to refrain if possible from personnel injury or loss of life.

Once the ship was stopped, a party, including Russian linguists, were to board the ship. Visit and search was to include examination of the manifest and inspection of the cargo.In the event visit was refused, the ship was to be taken into custody and forcefully boarded to control the ship's operation.

If the boarding met with organized resistance, the ship was to be destroyed.If the ship submitted to custody, the boarding party was to consist of a temporary master, control and engineering personnel, and an armed guard detail. Coast Guard officers, who were expert in search-and-visit procedures, were embarked in the flagship of the Commander, Quarantine Force.

Once in custody, the seized ship would be escorted by one or more destroyers and sailed to either Charleston, San Juan, Roosevelt Roads, or Fort Lauderdale. The Coast Guard established units at those ports to take custody from the Navy prize master.

About 0900Q, SECDEF received a standard merchant ship briefing. At the same time, Flag Plot received the first directional fix report that some Soviet vessels bound for Cuba had reversed course. This information was inconclusive and Mr. McNamara was not informed.

As the time signaling the beginning of the quarantine approached, the Chief of Naval Operations was attending a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vice Admiral C.D. Griffin, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, as the duty CNO Representative, occupied CNO's office.

The moment of the quarantine's beginning arrived and passed, and matters continued without untoward incident until 1140Z when CTG 44.3 in Cambria reported a disappearing radar contact and that he suspected he was being followed by a submarine.The information was passed immediately to CNO, who left the JCS meeting and returned to his office.

At about the same time, it became apparent from radio directional fixes that some of the Soviet ships en route to Cuba had either slowed down or had altered or reversed their courses. Initial indications of these facts were confirmed by separate plots maintained in Flag Plot and in the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Section at Fort Meade.The duty officer set about to notify the secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and CNO, through the Director of Naval Intelligence, of the possibility that some of the Soviet ships were not going to penetrate the quarantine line. Later information confirmed that the ships had reversed course and returned to Soviet ports.

After being called and talking with General Taylor about the course reverse of the Soviet ships, Admiral Anderson and Admiral Griffin hurried to Flag Plot where CNO telephoned CINCUSNAVEUR and called Commander Carrier Division 18 in Essex by single side-band radio. CINCUSNAVEUR was requested to exert maximum reconnaissance effort to ascertain the position of these ships in his area of responsibility. On instructions from the White House, Commander Carrier Division 18 was directed not to intercept but to maintain surveillance of the Soviet ship Kimovsk assigned to him.

Meanwhile, General Taylor left the White House for Flag Plot, where he met with Admiral Anderson and the two of them then proceeded to CNO's office at 1137Q. General Taylor told Admiral Anderson that the President had ordered that the course-change information should not be leaked under any circumstances. This order was passed to Colonel S.B. Berry in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Captain W.D. Houser, military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

About noon, Mr. McNamara returned to Flag Plot for a briefing on the information received concerning the Russian ships reversing course.

During the morning, Deputy CINCLANTFLT had called with a request to continue the Peruvian section of UNITAS III through to completion.This proposal envisaged the training exercise being run by the senior officer remaining after the exercise commander and his staff were flown back to Trinidad. Deputy CINCLANTFLT was informed that, in view of the fact that South American navies were offering ships for our use in connection with the current crisis, psychologically it would probably not be wise to continue this training exercise with U.S. ships. Accordingly, the U.S. ships in UNITAS III were to be returned to current commands.

Vice Admiral C. Wellborn, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee, called and requested that he be kept informed as well as possible on the current Cuban situation in order that his effectiveness in the United Nations might be enhanced. He was assured that he would be kept informed to the best possible degree. He further advised that, should it be necessary to pass classified traffic to him as a matter of urgency, there was a secure channel from the JCS War Room to Colonel Cunningham on his staff in New York.

A few minutes before 1600Q, Rear Admiral Lowrance arrived to discuss the clearance of photographs for release and other information which might be made available to the press.

At 1600Q, the Defense Department announced that there were 8 to 10 surface-to-surface missile bases near various Cuban cities and that there were more than 30 missiles, 20 IL-28 jet fighter bombers, and 5,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba.

At 1710Q, Admiral Ricketts returned from a trip to the White House, where he had attended a session in the Situation Room there. He had left the Pentagon at 1521Q, leaving the office to VADM Griffin, since Admiral Anderson was still in the JCS conference.The meeting was with Mr. Rostow, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Lovett, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the Attorney General, and a few others who were drawing up c-. recommendation to the President regarding policy for interception of shipping in view of the apparent turn-around of the Soviet ships.

At the beginning of the conference Mr. Ball voiced the belief that we should not intercept any ships presently proceeding towards Cuba because the Soviets apparently had turned around all ships that contained offensive weapons. Admiral Ricketts made a strong plea that we should still intercept the ships proceeding towards Cuba regardless of whether we believe they had any offensive material on board or not. He said it would be bad for us to have declared 'the blockade and then not intercept a ship.There was a long discussion on this, and gradually more and more people came around to support the thesis of intercepting ships presently bound for Cuba.This policy was recommended to the President.

Another point discussed was the desirability of intercepting and searching ships that had reversed course and were proceeding eastward across the Atlantic. The final decision was not to intercept these ships but to continue surveillance and to make every effort to get good photographs of them and their deck cargoes.

Regarding the matter of a press announcement as to the information we had on the ships that have reversed course, it was decided that a statement would be made to the effect that it was apparent that some Soviet ships had altered course away from Cuba, and that so far it was unnecessary to intercept any shipping.

At 1741Q, Admiral Anderson arrived with VADM W. M. Beakley, Deputy Commander, Atlantic Fleet, and they immediately went into conference, after CNO directed that it be discovered whether or not a hospital ship was in commission.

At 1910Q, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric gave the "green light" for closing in on and identifying ships approaching Cuba.

Later in the evening, four low-level aerial-reconnaissance photos were released.The White House requested public media to exercise discretion in publishing information relating to national security. About the same time, the Defense Department issued an order centralizing release of information on Cuba in the Office of Public Affairs.

At 2120Q, Mr. McNamara called Admiral Ricketts, the Duty CNO, and inquired about a special shipping reconnaissance flight using four B-50's with U-2 photographic equipment. The Admiral told SECDEF that Admiral Anderson had discussed the matter with General Carroll, the Director DIA, and they had arranged to have the planes chopped to CINCLANT for the mission and that Admiral Dennison was handling the matter with the Air Force. Direct control of the flight was given to Commander, Air Force Atlantic, and the planes were ordered on an early-morning flight to photograph the Soviet ships on an eastward course.

About 2145 Mr. McNamara and Mr. Gilpatric visited IntelligencePlot. They were interested in all of the detailed movements of the Soviet Bloc ships. The various positions and changes in course and speeds were explained in some detail. They were particularly interested in the possibility of a contact during the night and what it might be. Mr. McNamara wanted to be called should a contact with a Soviet ship be made. Admiral Ricketts called Admiral Beakley and emphasized the necessity for a fast report by the intercepting ship via CINCLANT to CNO. Instructions went out from CINCLANT to the blockade force to accomplish an intercept if possible and to make a FLASH report. Admiral Beakley said he was issuing a message that any making contact with any ship headed towards Cuba would challenge the ship and if possible steam close aboard for observation and report the results of that observation. [
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Thursday, 25 October

On the second day of the quarantine, a total of eight Organization of American States nations so far had offered military assistance to the U.S. in carrying out the quarantine action. This ranged from offers of troops and ships to use of ports and airfields. Guinea, generally accepted as Soviet-oriented, had denied landing and over-flight rights to Russian aircraft. Uruguay announced its support of the quarantine resolution, making the OAS approval unanimous.

Among the Soviet Bloc countries, anti-American demonstrations continued, although they were not of major proportions, nor were similar outbreaks in Latin America and other non-bloc nations which were inspired by pro-Communist elements.

Through the night, COMCARDIV 18 with escorting destroyers and COMSECONDFLT in Newport News had been closing on the Soviet tanker Bucharest. The word had been passed that this ship was not to get through the barrier quarantine line. However, contact with the ship had been lost. She was within the line and a search was on for her when Admiral Anderson arrived in the morning. He proceeded to Flag Plot to evaluate the situation.

At 0745Q, information came in that the Essex had reestablished contact at 0500Q with Bucharest and had intercepted her at 0715Q. The Gearing sent a flashing light challenge to the Soviet tanker and she replied, "My name is Bucharest, Russian ship from the Black Sea, bound for Cuba."

The destroyer pulled alongside and Bucharest dipped her colors. Gearing returned the salute and said, "Good morning" in Russian (method of transmission not stated). The Bucharest replied, "Good morning, thank you."

While this very courteous first encounter of the quarantine was taking place, topside photographs were taken of the Bucharest. About 0930Q these photographs revealed that the ship carried no deck cargo. Earlier she had asked what material was prohibited and, when so informed, said she contained only petroleum. Since there was no reason to suspect she carried contraband, Bucharestwas cleared for continued passage to port.

Meanwhile, in the morning, the President issued an order not to intercept and board a bloc vessel first in view of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's apparent desire to avoid a direct U.S.-Russian confrontation. Best evidence of this Soviet policy was the fact that, of the 16 Soviet ships that had been located and determined to be en route to Cuba, nine east of the line had reversed or altered course away from the quarantine area. Six of these were close to entering the prohibited zone at any time. Seven more farther east had also reversed course. Among them were the first and second intercept candidates, Kimovsk and Poltava, which were not headed in an easterly direction. The Soviet Union also had asked the State Department to define an area outside of which Soviet merchantmen would not be subject to interdiction.

At 1100Q, Admiral Ricketts received a call from Mr. Gilpatric, then at the White House. He directed that quarantine forces should not stop or harass Bucharest, but might continue trailing her. He also ordered that a non-Bloc ship, other than a tanker, be stopped and boarded during the day and that quarantine forces should be in position to intercept, stop, and board the Soviet tanker Groznyy the next day.

In view of this, reconnaissance forces were directed to seek out a ship of other than Bloc registry, preferably United Kingdom, which could be intercepted at the earliest possible time. Several patrol units already had been dispatched to close on the Kimovsk and Poltava and to proceed to points of intercept with other approaching ships without regard for registry. The task up to now was to enforce the quarantine by interdicting those merchantmen closest to or within the quarantine zone. This sudden change in policy, which directed the quick boarding of a non-Bloc ship, coupled with the fact that the Soviet vessels reversing course, resulted in orders to the blockade force which scattered some of the destroyers. The position of some of them in relation to approaching non-Bloc vessels was somewhat confused.

In the search for an early intercept candidate, a Greek ship, Sirus, at first was thought to be a good prospect. She had identified herself earlier, declared her cargo, and requested permission to proceed to Cuba. However, the Lebanese merchant freighter, Marucla, was chosen as the most likely first intercept, after a destroyer had been hurriedly dispatched to close on Sirus. The Marucla was identified at first as "Zaruwi," which resulted from an erroneous reading of the letters spelling the name of the ship.
In the course of the day, a shipload of Guantanamo dependents was due to arrive in Norfolk and Vice Admiral W.R. Smedberg, the Chief of Naval Personnel, left to meet them at Admiral Anderson's request.

After Mr. Gilpatric's phone call in the morning, some interest was shown in Soviet tanker Groznyy; however, she was several hundred miles northeast of the line. Most of the activity concerned the Marucla The destroyers Pierce and Kennedy were dispatched to intercept and board her at the earliest possible moment.

The Executive Committee of the National Security Council met at 1000Q and scheduled an afternoon session for 1700Q. This was the procedure which the group planned to follow throughout the crisis. They met in the morning and afternoon each day to consider the military situation, interpret United Nations negotiations, and make policy decisions on diplomatic and military matters.

Early in the afternoon, the Pierce closed on what she thought was the Marucla, but proved to be the East German cruise ship Volkerfreund Schaft. The destroyer continued to shadow the East German until 2234Q, when the decision was made to let her pass. The Pierce then broke off and headed to join the Kennedy en route to intercept Marucla.

At 1150Q, the Defense Department announced that at least a dozen Soviet vessels had turned back, and that at 0800Q the Navy had intercepted the Soviet tanker Bucharest proceeding towards Cuba and had permitted it to proceed without boarding.

Efforts to locate the Lebanese ship Marucla were confused late in the afternoon by a report that she had turned around. This report was proven false and, as daylight faded, her position was still uncertain. At 2100Q, an S2F from the Essex spotted her. Communications which temporarily had been lost with the Pierce and Kennedy were regained, and the two ships were ordered to board the Marucla when found, day or night. This procedure was later modified to board at first light after the two ships had encountered her at 2245Q.

The day's activity ended with some tenseness because of the sighting of a submarine on the surface northeast of the line. Surveillance of this area was intense during the day because of an earlier confirmed submarine contact. Throughout the day, there had been indecision as to whether repeated possible contacts were on a new submarine or was the same which had been held earlier. However, a P5M report about 2100Q proved it to be a second "F" class SS.

All day long, Admiral Anderson's activity was devoted, as previously, to long meetings in the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference room. In his absence, his office was occupied by either Vice CNO or one of the Deputy CNO's. He was kept informed by telephone and messenger-dispatched notes of all significant developments.

After the JCS conference broke up about 1630Q, there was a long meeting in the inner office between CNO, VCNO, and the deputies concerning the proposal of a "sanitized box" surrounding Cuba. Before the Admiral left for the night, he put down his thoughts on the matter as: "On condition that ships carrying Soviet Bloc arms to Cuba will not proceed west of 60° W. This restriction will not apply to vessels of the Soviet Bloc not carrying articles on the prohibited list to Cuba or proceeding elsewhere; neither will it apply to other U.S. Navy vessels not involved in the quarantine. Duration not to exceed 48 hours."

The request for Navy's ideas on a "sanitized box" concept was relayed to CNO by the State Department through Mr. Alexis Johnson's office. What was wanted was a defined area within which Soviet ships would not enter and outside of which quarantine ships would not interdict vessels en route to Cuba. The outcome was two circles, each with a 500-mile radius. The center of one circle was Havana, the other Cape Maysi.

The geographic area within these two overlapping circles thence became the "quarantine zone" and into which Cuban-bound ships must pass before they could be boarded and stopped.

At 2225Q, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, and Admiral Anderson were briefed in Intelligence Plot. In the course of the briefing, there was considerable discussion between SECDEF and CNO on how air quarantine should be effected.

Preparation for other contingencies was continuing on schedule. FMFLANT and CG 2nd MEF were preparing to embark in Mount McKinley. CG 2nd Marine Division was to embark in the same ship and transfer later to the transport Francis Marion.

More than 30 flights a day were being flown over interested areas from all bases and sources, including Navy and SAC aircraft. SAC was continuing to meet CINCLANT surveillance requests on a day-to-day basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT to be prepared to strike all Cuban SA-2 sites within two hours, if a U-2 aircraft was shot down. Additional patrol aircraft from U.S. Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland, were ordered to augment aerial surveillance of ocean areas, flying from Bermuda and Azores.

First elements of 3rd LAAM (Hawk missile) Battalion arrived at Key West. CINCLANT directed movement of one battery to Guantanamo via MATS

CINCLANTFLT directed establishment of a VP/SS barrier near Argentia, with readiness to move to GI-UK position as directed. Six submarines sailed October 25 and four more were scheduled for October 26 movement. Estimated establishment time for the operation was between October 29-31.

The Soviet oiler, Groznyy, of special interest for interception, was sighted at 251459Q at 25-10N, 51-40W by SAC aircraft. She was reported dead in the water. OPNAV Intelligence Plot believed her cruising speed was about 14-15 knots. Assuming a westerly heading at this speed, Flag Plot estimated that the ship would be 160 - 200 miles from the quarantine barrier line at first light. Intelligence information indicated her cargo was 7,200 tons of crude oil and 566 tons of liquid NH3 in 22 pressurized tubes. She was bound from Odessa to Cuba. [
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Friday. 26 October


Shortly after CNO arrived at 0730Q, Flag Plot reported that a boarding party from the Pierce and Kennedy was en route to the Marucla to execute the first quarantine interdiction. The admiral proceeded immediately to Flag Plot to follow the action. At 0750Q the boarding party was aboard the Lebanese ship at 26-16N, 75-24W. The executive officer of J. P. Kennedy, who was in charge, obtained a copy of the merchantman's cargo manifest and checked it against bills of lading. General cargo included sulphur, asbestos, news-print, emery paper, lathes, and automotive parts. on the weather decks were 12 trucks. All holds were battened down and inaccessible; however, one was opened for inspection, since it contained questionable material listed as "electro-measuring instruments." The boarding party left the ship at 0820Q and the Marucla was released and underway for Havana at 1020Q.

The next ship selected for intercept was Groznyy, which was east of the line. Lawrence was dispatched in the morning to intercept, but later recalled. The tanker was placed under aerial surveillance.

At the 1000Q Executive Committee meeting at the White House, the Secretary of Defense reported on the quarantine and Secretary Rusk on negotiations underway between U. Thant and Ambassador Stevenson. The President authorized the release of a statement noting that missile development work is continuing in Cuba and reiterated his earlier warning that such work must cease.

There were no further merchant ship intercepts during the day; however, significant developments involved the sightings of submarines which were forced to the surface because of our intense surveillance. Three separate Soviet "F" class long-range, conventional submarines had been identified in the quarantine area. An additional "Z" class was photographed in mid-Atlantic near the Soviet auxiliary Terek on 22 October. The extent of these unprecedented Soviet submarine operations was considered significant in that plans for their deployment must have been made well in advance. CNO estimated the submarines would have had to deploy not later than the first week of October. At 0825Q, the first of two submarines contacted the day before northeast of the quarantine line was spotted on the surface for the second time.

Actions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the day resulted in the order that preparations be directed toward possible implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316-61 and that Plan 314-61 for the invasion of Cuba from a peak readiness posture be no longer considered. The Chiefs also directed CINCLANT to notify ship masters en route to Cuba via the Panama Canal that they would be subject to quarantine regulations. However, U.S. control of the canal was not to be used to conduct a thorough inspection. Any evidence of prohibited material being aboard and discovered during passage was ordered passed to CINCLANT, who would effect interdiction when the ship reached the quarantine zone.

Three more Soviet ships en route to Cuba were reported to have changed course and were returning to their ports of departure. They were the Vishnevsky, Okhotsk, and Sergev Botkin. Later in the day, Lawrence and MacDonough were shadowing Groznyy. The tanker had several cylindrical tanks topside and had declared them to contain ammonia.

The Randolph ASW Group joined the quarantine patrol forces. She was prosecuting one of three active submarine contacts. The other two were being held under surveillance by the Essex group and P2V's from Bermuda. Eight destroyers were in company with Randolph.

Argentina made the most generous of all offers from Latin American nations in support of the quarantine, announcing she was ready to place at U.S. disposal two destroyers, one submarine, one carrier, and 600 Marines.

All day, reports on the positions of ships closing on Cuba were received and evaluated. Plans for interception were made and aerial reconnaissance photographs analyzed. A request was made for a list of ships of all registries under charter to the USSR. This information would be added to the compilation of data already gathered on bloc vessels and non-bloc vessels engaged in Cuban trade.

Activity remained routine until late afternoon, when the Scandinavian tanker Kattainzhon was spotted very near the southern coast of Cuba. A search was also on to find the Groznyy.
At 1705Q a new submarine contact was made by CTF 135 west of Haiti and north of Jamaica channel. At 1840Q, a P2V sighted another submarine on the surface northeast of the Dominican Republic. The latter was positively identified as an "F" class. Surveillance of both contact areas was intensified.

[Initial line of text missing and apparently covered by a retyped correction to preceding paragraph.]... that photo-reconnaissance revealed continued build-up of missiles in Cuba. His statement came 15 minutes after a letter from Khrushchev to President Kennedy was received at the State Department through the U.N. Secretary General in which Khrushchev accepted the proposal that Soviet ships would stay out of the interception area. The President replied to Mr. U. Thant and stated that incidents could be avoided if Soviet ships stayed out of the quarantine zone. Mr. U. Thant then sent a letter to Premier Castro asking that work on missile bases be suspended while negotiations were under way. He also proposed that the U.S. suspend the quarantine during this period.

Admiral Anderson stated the Navy's position should it become U.S. policy to discuss - U. Thant's moratorium proposals. This was that the quarantine should continue within the area west of 60w longitude and between the latitudes of 15N and 30N, and that forces assigned to quarantine duty would remain within this area. This restriction would not affect U. S. ships of our quarantine forces proceeding to and from U.S. ports or other U.S. Navy ships not part of the quarantine force and operating elsewhere.

The admiral believed that all Soviet Bloc ships should remain outside this prescribed area. However, he alternately proposed that this restriction might be modified to apply only to Soviet Bloc ships carrying prohibited materials, which would be subject to visit and search.

In his opinion, the moratorium should not exceed 48 hours, during which time there should be UN observers on each missile site and each bomber base to ensure against further site construction or weapons assembly. The U. S. should continue air surveillance of Cuba during this moratorium.

At 1606Q, the JCS notified the Unified Commanders that a clearance system (CLEARCERT) had been established for vessels entering the quarantine zone. For those departing foreign ports, appropriate embassies and consulates were to issue the clearance certificates in accordance with instructions and on forms provided by the State Department. Foreign vessels departing U.S. ports would receive the certificates from the collector of customs at the port of departure.

Clearances would be granted to vessels transiting the quarantine zone but not destined for Cuba and Cuban-bound ships with cargo which did not contain prohibited material. However, it was recognized that it might be necessary to stop and search a ship which had been previously cleared.

At 2025Q a Strategic Air Command aircraft spotted the elusive Groznyy; she now was firmly back on the plotting boards.

Admiral Anderson, expressed the desire that an effort be made to have information be released about the evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo. He wished those persons be given proper recognition for the hardship they encountered.

Action also had been taken during the day to alleviate fuel situation at Key West by reducing aircraft on station by 15% and by providing barges and one oiler for afloat fuel supply.

After relocation of ASW, developmental, and all-weather fighter training squadrons and four station aircraft, there still remained a total of 153 aircraft at NAS, Key West. Fifteen helos also were located at the seaplane base several miles from the main field. Four early-warning aircraft were to arrive at NAS, Key West, 27 October for use of CONAD. Prior to the build-up, there were 61 aircraft at NAS, Key West, and 13 helos at the seaplane base.
The JCS directed CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62, with recent refinements, should receive concentrated attention in planning and such preparatory measures as were feasible for its implementation, if directed; further planning and preparation for CINCLANT OpPlan 314 was terminated.

CINCLANTFLT requested relief from requirements to provide an AGC for the Mediterranean, at least during periods when an Atlantic Fleet AGO was not available due to overhaul or refresher training. CINCLANTFLT now had an urgent need for an AGC to serve as COMPHIBGRUFOUR flagship.

Late in the evening, Rear Admiral W. J. Leverton, CINCLANTFLT Deputy Chief of Staff, called regarding air patrols for the next day in search of ships of special interest to the Secretary of Defense. He talked with Vice Admiral Sharp, the duty CNO, and reported that a P2V from Lages hoped to sight the Mir about 1200Q. A Bermuda-based P3V was taking off at early light to sight the Karl Marx about 1430Q. Another P3V from Bermuda was estimating contact with the Belovodsk about 1500Q, while a third hoped to sight the Groznyy at 0800Q and stay with her until an intercept destroyer arrived.


Saturday, 27 October

During a morning meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, a letter from Premier Khrushchev was delivered to the President which offered to remove the Soviet missiles in Cuba provided the U.S. withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The same statement had been published by Tass and broadcast over Radio Moscow.

Meanwhile, work was progressing rapidly on Cuban missile sites. Six medium-range sites were considered operational and three IRBM sites were under construction. There were hurried efforts underway to conceal them under camouflage. The President issued a public statement in response to the unacceptable Khrushchev message and replied to Khrushchev's letter of the previous evening. At 1635Q, the President issued a press release stating that the "inconsistent and conflicting" proposals of the USSR called for the necessity of dealing immediately with the Soviet missile threat in Cuba, "under which no sensible negotiation can proceed."

More nations throughout the world were lending support to the U.S. quarantine, both verbally and positively. Several African countries indicated that overflight restrictions would be placed against Soviet aircraft, if such were requested. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Pan-- made offers of assistance.

The geographic area bounded by the two 5-mile circles was adopted officially as the interception area. However, this did not preclude surveillance outside this area. Two more positions were added to the quarantine line and ten A4D-4N arrived aboard the Enterprise the preceding night to increase the carrier's attack capability.

The diplomatic impasse concerning the Cuban situation was evident in a somewhat reduced tempo of routine in CNO's office. Admiral Anderson, after attending the daily briefing and the morning JCS meeting, flew to Norfolk to attend the Navy-Pitt game. While he was there, a special phone was in his box at the stadium with a direct line to CINCLANTFLT, which could be patched directly to the Pentagon. He took advantage of this and other special communications networks to check on events in his office on several occasions.

Diplomatic maneuvering and announcements by Khrushchev in the morning and President Kennedy in the evening caused a good deal of comment.

The tenseness of the crisis heightened at about 1445Q with a news report that the Cuban Defense Minister said anti-aircraft guns had fired on what he termed "hostile aircraft." Coincidentally in this regard, a U-2, on a morning reconnaissance flight, was at that time about an hour overdue. There was no confirmation that the two incidents were related.

At 1636Q an afternoon flight of low-level reconnaissance aircraft reported they were fired on by what appeared to be a 30 mm cannon. Since JCS had issued the order to strike surface-to-air sites if a reconnaissance plane was shot down, this flight received cautious evaluation. Two of the eight-plane flight returned with engine trouble at 1604Q.

Following the firing incident, Vice Admiral Griffin, acting in CNO's absence, called for contingency plan 312 for discriminatory retaliation in the event reconnaissance aircraft were fired upon. The JCS had promulgated during the day a scenario of reaction to cope with Cuban contingencies. It called for reprisal strikes against single or all SA-2 sites within two hours if a reconnaissance aircraft was shot down, followed by a full air strike against Cuba within 12 hours if the military situation escalated to that degree.

The Military Air Transportation Service's "General War imminent" dispersal plan was approved by the Air Force. The plan provided for positioning 131 aircraft in nine squadrons at Navy and Marine Corps Air Stations in Nevada, California, Arizona, Tennessee, and Georgia. MATS requested Navy concurrence and assistance in prepositioning spare aircraft.

In other contingency actions, CINCLANTFLT promulgated Operations Order 49-62 for a limited air quarantine of Cuba. As CTF 84, Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier, was tasked with eastern Cuba, using forces at Roosevelt Roads and the Puerto Rican air national guard when activated. Commander Carrier Division Two was designated CTF 132 and was made responsible for Southern and Western Cuba. CINCONAD was to assist in the air defense identification zone and areas within range of the CONAD air defense system.

During the day, the Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade completed loading at West Coast ports and sailed at 1300Q under the operational control of Commander, Amphibious Group Three. The force was expected to arrive at Balboa, Canal Zone, on 5 November.

At 1535Q, the Pentagon announced that the Jupiter missiles were made available to Turkey pursuant to a NATO Council Resolution of December, 1957, and could not be withdrawn. A statement also was issued that a reconnaissance plane on flight over Cuba was missing and presumed lost.

At 1600Q, the Executive Committee met again with the President. Secretary McNamara reported that two, low-level reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been fired on by light anti-aircraft and small arms. The President approved a reply to Mr. Khrushchev's private letter of the previous evening, which was transmitted at 2005Q and released to the press. At 2100Q, a note was received from the Secretary General that Soviet Representative Zorin had refused to receive information about the "interception area." About 20 minutes later, the State Department received a copy of Premier Castro's reply to Mr. U. Thant, which flatly rejected a proposal that missile bases in Cuba be dismantled and demanded an immediate halt of the naval blockade.

Before the night ended, the Executive Committee discussed additional steps to be taken the following day, including the mobilization of U.S. merchant ships and the addition of petroleum, oil, and lubricants to the prohibited list.

CNO returned to his office at 2000Q from Norfolk and brought himself up to date on the current situation and incidents which occurred during his absence. General LeMay visited him shortly after 2200Q following Secretary McNamara's announcement that he had ordered activation of 24 Air Reserve Transport Squadrons and recall of 14,215 air reservists. The recall was directed by the President to take effect at 0900Q on the 28th and ordered to active military service, in place eight wings of three squadrons with 16 aircraft per squadron and two wing headquarters and support units, which included 21 squadrons of C-119's and three squadrons of C-123's.

At 2255Q, CNO left for home after being treated by Dr. (LT) Frank Rykiel for a cold.

The day ended on a note of concern over the grounding of all HSS-2 helicopters because of an investigation of two fatal accidents involving control malfunction. This action put all of the ASW helos out of commission aboard Essex and Admiral Ricketts, who was duty CNO, discussed this development with Rear Admiral Paul D. Stroop, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Weapons, before retiring.
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Sunday, 28 October


When Admiral Anderson arrived at 0835R, after attending the regular morning briefing, there was a sudden interest in pre-World War II neutrality zones in the Atlantic and Caribbean. CNO wanted to know exact dimensions and sizes and the wording of proclamations relating to the Neutrality Act. The best reference was found in Atlantic Fleet operations Plan 7-41 and Atlantic Operating Squadron Operations Order 24-39 from the Operational Historic Section [Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division].

At 0920Q, a messenger delivered a Russian domestic news report that Khrushchev had ordered the missile sites in Cuba dismantled and returned to Russia. Fifteen minutes later, another news report from the same source said that Khrushchev had sent a letter to President Kennedy on the subject.

About 1000R, the Khrushchev message was broadcast over Radio Moscow, and the full text was available at 1100Q to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. The essence of the letter was that the Soviet Premier had ordered the dismantling of the Russian missile sites in Cuba and the return to Russia of all missiles and other weapons considered offensive by the U.S., under UN inspection and supervision. The Executive Committee discussed and formulated a reply to Mr. Khrushchev which was approved, sent, and released, without waiting for the official text to be received.

The President's stand was discussed later by a State Department official at 1300R background press briefing. The position was that, while the U.S. welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's proposal, it remained to be implemented and many serious problems "will be encountered in the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba. This is not a time for gloating, nor can one reach any general conclusions about the future course of Soviet conduct in other areas."

In spite of the encouraging turn of events, however, there was no slackening of quarantine operational matters. The Joint Staff approved a proposal that the line of destroyers be withdrawn to a new, closer-in position for more efficient search and utilization of ships. Belovodsk was reported en route and approaching the quarantine zone with a deck load of crated helicopters.

The first operational response to the new diplomatic developments came at 1110R when CNO returned from the morning JCS meeting. He drafted a message which went out from the JCS that no further vessels were to be boarded and that patrolling ships should challenge visually only. This word had been passed earlier by telephone to CINCLANTFLT.

When this very critical day began, there was little indication in CNO's office that the crisis was reaching a climax which might result in a relaxation of tension.

In Cuba there was an increase in the movement of military vehicles, although there were no serious military preparations evident. Castro had signaled for a campaign of general terrorist agitation in Latin America. The Venezuelan Government said that it had intercepted a radio broadcast from Cuba ordering raids On Venezuelan oil fields, and it was believed that similar orders had gone out to Communist groups in other Latin American countries. A later report was received that saboteurs had blown up four oil-company power stations in the Lake Maracaibo district, knocking out one-sixth of Venezuela's oil production. The field could not regain its daily production quota for at least three months.

Radio Havana continued to urge Hondurans to overthrow their government, and Honduran authorities ordered increased security measures.

The JCS interpreted Khrushchev's objective in ordering the dismantling of Soviet missile bases as an attempt to ward off any unilateral action of the U.S. to destroy them. The Chiefs saw many pitfalls in the proposal which might interfere with the dismantling process and guarantees for verification.

Operational developments during the day insofar as the quarantine was concerned included appraisal of Operation Plan FIRE HOSE, which placed 16 Homestead AFB aircraft on a 30-minute alert to attack selected surface-to-air missile sites in retaliation for hostile acts against our reconnaissance aircraft. The planes were armed with napalm, 2.75 rocket pods, and 20mm cannon. The Air Force's proposal that the selective retaliation should be by drop bombing was rejected in favor of the Navy-sponsored low-level techniques which would provide for a minimum area of damage.

An ASW summary showed two positive and one highly probable "F" class Soviet submarines in an area 300 miles south of Bermuda, two positive contacts along the Windward Island chain, two possible contacts in the Windward Passage, and one "Z" class positive and one possible contact north of the Azores.

Cur patrol ships were trailing merchantmen heading for Cuba, but the word had gone out from the JCS at 1320R to take no forceful action, not to board until further notice, and to challenge visually only. The Soviet tanker Groznyy still was dead in the water, the Soviet elint trawler Shkval was being shadowed by Beale, Pella had been cleared to proceed, the Maritza had passed through the quarantine line and was not being trailed, the Belovodsk, Karl Marx, and Mir were proceeding toward Cuba.

By the end of the day, aircraft relocation had been completed and additional naval and Marine Corps Air Stations were included in providing direct support to the Cuban operation in the Caribbean. The Navy/Marine Corps aircraft status in the Southeastern U.S. was:
NAS NorfolkMCAS Cherry Point N.C.
18 antisubmarine aircraft50 fighter aircraft
11 patrol aircraft7 attack aircraft
22 transport aircraft


At 1700R, the Secretary of State briefed Latin American Ambassadors on latest developments. Forty minutes later, U. Thant communicated with President Kennedy stating his understanding of the agreement that had been reached in the exchange of U.S.-Soviet correspondence. At 1830R, the President replied to Mr. U. Thant's communication, confirming the lines On which a satisfactory settlement of the Cuban situation could be reached. Mr. U. Thant, in turn, wrote Premier Castro accepting his invitation to go to Cuba with aides to work out a solution to the problem of inspection and verification of removal of the missiles and other offensive weapons.

Secretary McNamara called in the afternoon and requested that CNO direct CINCLANT to keep a careful lookout for ALFA 66 units and to take such measures as necessary in order to prevent them from taking action against Cuba at this time. Admiral Griffin informed CINCLANT by telephone and prepared a dispatch for JCS to send to CINCLANT. The CIA Liaison Officer, Mr. Hitchcock, also was told to get his Agency moving on this same subject.

Throughout the night, surveillance and position reports continued to flow immediately to plotting boards maintained for quick reference by CNO, or his duty representative. Most of this information was or a routine nature. However, at 0430R, one or the approaching Russian ships, the Groznyy, had reached the quarantine line and stopped. She remained dead in the water all day and did not proceed into the area where she would be subject to challenge. There were also submarine surveillance reports which included another surfacing of one of the submarines northeast of the line. [
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Monday, 29 October

CNO arrived at 0738R, attended the morning briefing, and left for the JCS meeting which convened at 0900R. The President's Naval Aide called at 0847R and said that the President wanted to see Admiral Anderson and General Shoup, Marine Corps Commandant, at a time to be specified later. The meeting finally was scheduled for 1230R.

Throughout the morning there was more activity relative to the World War II neutrality zones and acts, particularly when Mr. Hitchcock of CIA brought in some information on the subject. Captain Kidd put the data together and sent it down to the Admiral at 1047R.

Following CNO's return to the office at 1125R, a report was received at 1200R that the temporarily lost Belovodsk had been resighted and was being trailed by the destroyer 'AWE. This meant that every incoming ship approaching Cuba was now under firm surveillance. Three hours later, the Belovodsk reached the quarantine line and went dead in the water.

When Admiral Anderson returned from the White House at 1300R, he said that the President was very complimentary and highly pleased.

At 1330R, Captain Kidd noted that we had had our first indications of sabotage and that considerable activity had been noted in the Soviet air arm. The report was from an Air Force source which reported there were indications that attempts had been made to imitate and frustrate our electronic transmissions.

Our Cuban photo reconnaissance flight took off as scheduled. General Taylor advised U Thant of the flight by message.

In late afternoon, our aerial surveillance patrols reported two Turkish vessels were en route to Cuba with suspicious cargo. CNO informed the Secretary of Defense of this after the JCS meeting broke up at 1811R and Mr. McNamara notified the President, who put out the word that there would be no intercepts until after Mr. Thant's visit to Cuba tomorrow.

During the day, an earlier stand-down of Cuban military preparedness apparently had ended, and Castro announced publicly he had ordered his forces to fire on all planes violating Cuban airspace. There also were indications that U.S. aircraft were being tracked by Cuban radar at all times.

CINCLANTFLT instructed CTF 136 that as of first light in the morning quarantine units were not to intercept or challenge foreign merchant ships for the duration of U Thant's visit to Cuba.

At 1300R, Lawe intercepted Belovodsk. The ship was hailed and responded.

Commander in Chief, Air Force Atlantic, reported that he was prepared to provide planes for aerial photo reconnaissance of Cuba with UN observers aboard, if directed to do so.

At 1800R, Admiral Dennison called Admiral Ricketts and informed him that the BLUE MOON low-level photo reconnaissance mission flown during the day all were successfully completed. However, he said one plane had been fired on by a 37mm weapon as the pilot was on his way out near San Julian. Admiral Dennison also reported that the Belovodsk had reached the quarantine line and was lying to. [ Back ]

Tuesday, 30 October

During the morning, surface quarantine forces were moving to new barrier positions. The flew line, proposed by CINCLANT and approved by the JCS, would permit for more efficient use of the surface forces and make them available for other duties without seriously affecting quarantine enforcement. The number of stations was reduced from 12 to 8 and the line oriented on a NW-SE axis from 28.2N, 78W to 20N, 66.4W. Instead of these stations being manned by single destroyers, the new line was composed as follows:

STATIONPOSITIONUnit
120N, 66.4W1 destroyer
220.5N, 67.3W1 destroyer
321N, 68W1 destroyer
422.5N, 70.3W1 destroyer
523.7N, 73W1 cruiser, 2 DD's
626N, 76W2 destroyers
728.8N, 78W2 destroyers
825N, 70W1 hunter-killer group



In addition to the repositioning, CTF 136 was given greater flexibility to establish random search The new line was to be established by 1200R and was ordered executed at 1905R.

CINCLANT informed the Joint Chiefs that he intended to assume direct command of Latin American forces made available for Cuban quarantine operations. CINCLANT was to chop from CINCLANTFLT to the direct operational control of CINCLANT as Commander of a combined L.A.-U.S. Task Force, with headquarters at Trinidad or on an assigned ship.

CNO noted that the "Soviets are providing excellent submarine services" for exercising our ASW capability. Seventeen contacts had been made in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean during the past eight days. Six were being actively worked and the remainder were under surveillance.

With a temporary suspension of the quarantine in effect, there was an opportunity to review and revise policy. Activity in CNO's office reflected this procedure.

At 0918R there was indication that some good submarine photos had been received; these were sent down to CNO at the JCS conference room.

There was some discussion concerning the repositioning of the destroyers to the new line which indicated not everyone realized that this move did not change any policy regarding interdiction and surveillance. The new line merely permitted more efficient search and economical utilization of ships.

CNO ordered that a ship should be on the tail of each ship of interest during the next few days while the suspension was in effect. He wanted to be informed of any significant developments in the movements of these ships.

In the morning, Admiral Dennison called and told Vice Admiral Griffin that he had taken the trailing ships off Groznyy and Belovodsk. Vice Admiral Griffin said that there was continuing high level interest in the positions of these ships and that CINCLANT should maintain the capability of fixing their positions several times during the day and in particular we should be prepared to determine within a short time interval whether these ships were going to continue on to Cuba or return to the Soviet Union.

Two public information problems cropped up during the day. The first involved the President's concern over a revealing article by Max Frankel in the New York Times. The President stated that no one would say anything regarding the Cuban situation except Messrs. Salinger, Sylvester, Manning, Bundy, and Sorensen.

The second problem involved Newport News' trip to port and a message from COMSECONDFLT requesting press guidance. Admiral Griffin telephoned Admiral Dennison and informed him -hat a decision of the highest level had been reached, and that officers aboard ships entering port were to hold no news conferences and make no statements concerning the blockade operations. Admiral Dennison said he would get this to all ships.

Units of the Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked in amphibious ships of Commandeer Amphibious Group Three began arriving in Panama during the day for canal transit. After clearing the canal, the units were to shift operational control from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.

The forces involved four Marine Battalion Landing Teams corn-posed of 8,000 officers and men. They were embarked in the following ships:

Eldorado (AGC-11)Washburn (AKA-108)
Iwo Jima (LPH-2)Belle Grove (LSD-2)
Henrico (APA-45)Carter Hall (LSD-3)
Bexar (APA-237)Cabildo (LSD-16)
Bayfield (APA-33)Colonial (LSD-18)
Noble (APA-218)Gunston Hall (LSD-5)
Okanogan (APA-220)Point Defiance (LSD-31)
Renville (APA-227)Thomastone (LSD-28)
Mathews (AKA-96)Whetstone (LSD-27)
Merrick (AKA-97)Page County (LST-1075)
Union (AKA-106)


Other amphibious forces involved in the Cuban operation to date were:

Amphibious Group 4Amphibious Squadron 2
1 Marine Battalion Landing Team1 Marine BLT
3 Amphibious ships6 Amphibious ships
Amphibious Squadron 6Amphibious Squadron 8
1 Marine BLT1 Marine BLT
5 Amphibious ships4 Amphibious ships
Amphibious Squadron 10Amphibious Squadron 12
1 Marine BLT1 Marine BLT
6 Amphibious ships2 Amphibious ships, including 1 Landing Platform Helicopter, Thetis Bay



In his daily situation summary to the Fleet Commanders, Admiral Anderson summed up his appraisal of the current negotiations for removal of the Cuban missiles and the possible outcome of the crisis:

"UN discussions prior to U Thant's departure for Cuba revealed that the Soviets would agree to International Red Cross (exclusively Swiss as distinct from the League of Red Cross Societies) inspectors seaborne in neutral ships. The Soviets are unwilling to have UN teams inspect Soviet ships. Furthermore, Kuznetzov said dismantling of missiles would take only about two weeks and that Soviets would report completion to the Security Council after which the UN could inspect the sites -- but not during the dismantling and shipping processes.

"U Thant's military adviser, Indian Brigadier Rikhye, reported after the first session with Castro that the Cubans refused any form of inspection or any foreign presence in their territory.

"Khrushchev and Castro are obviously stalling and would wrangle for weeks in the UN over the procedures for inspection. Soviet propaganda returned on October 30 to pushing the quid pro quo -- that the U.S. remove nuclear missiles from Turkey in reciprocation for Russian removal in Cuba. Continued work on the Cuban sites lends validity to the thought that Khrushchev will push this point if he can get enough operational to back his argument. I do not believe he will risk general war.

"The Soviets equate world domination goals in terms of practical achievements gained through peaceful measures, during a current era. Cuba is not vital enough for such a risk. Khrushchev will, however, exploit every advantage of indecisiveness, divisiveness, or weakness presented by the West during this situation as is the usual pattern.

"Khrushchev's minimum goal in Soviet embroilment in Cuban affairs is political control of the island. From this stronghold the Communists will branch out in all directions in the Western Hemisphere. If they can achieve an almost economically self-sufficient Cuba to exhibit as a model of progress beyond that known to the people of the area, they will have realized a firm foothold in their drive into the Western Hemisphere.

"The negotiations now underway will give Khrushchev the political control with which to attempt this if the negotiators are not careful. What is needed is the removal of not just the offensive weapons, but everything Russian and Bloc imported including most importantly the politically trained agrarian and military advisers and workers."


As political negotiations began in the UN and bilaterally between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the naval quarantine entered a new phase. On the 30th, the President agreed to suspend aerial surveillance and active quarantine operations pending the outcome of UN attempts to secure inspection guarantees and a show of Soviet good faith. The next several days, Cuban actions involved primarily only surveillance activity.

Wednesday, 31 October

Soviet merchantmen approaching the quarantine zone continued to heave to upon reaching the 500-mile line. By 31 October, Kladna and Karl Marx had joined Belovodsk and Groznyy in lying dead in the water.

Other significant developments on this first day of the new phase of operations centered around reappraisal of submarine surveillance successes and committal of Latin American assistance to the U.S. military action.

An unprecedented number of eleven submarines had been identified outside of Soviet home waters. At least four Russian "F" class submarines were operating in the area east of the Bahamas. All of these had been sighted on the surface at least once. In one case, one of these remained on the surface for 45 hours, under escort of two U.S. destroyers.

Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the U.S. Commander South Atlantic at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by 2 November. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.

That evening there was an analysis of information and press reports concerning The UN Secretary General's conferences with Cuban Premier Castro and Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's visit to Havana. About 1900R, CNO telephoned CINCLANT and later sent a confirming dispatch that the quarantine would be resumed at daybreak in the morning, but that ships should only be visually challenged and were not to be boarded without authority of the JCS. At 1930Q, Secretary McNamara called the duty admiral (RADM Gentner) reconfirming the quarantine order. He also advised that 14 low-level reconnaissance flights were to be ordered for the next day.

Diplomatic developments prompted CNO to advise his Fleet Commanders further on his thinking in regard to the possible outcome of the Cuban negotiations. U Thant had returned to New York the night before without securing inspection rights but with "assurances" that the missiles would be removed in a matter of days. Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan was en route to Cuba and Khrushchev's moderate First Deputy Premier Vasily Kuznetzov had been sent as a special envoy to the UN to negotiate on Cuban matters.

CNO's reflections were:

"Observers eventually will get into Cuba. The missiles will actually be seen being shipped out and so reported by numbers and types to the UN. The sites may even be inspected, but the entire country will not be opened or some rules will preclude inspection of the entire island. Obviously, some missiles and equipment will still remain. Khrushchev as a figure of 'peace-loving emissary' who withdrew his missiles from Cuba, will hammer for U. S. withdrawal of warmongering U. S. missiles in Turkey as show of peaceful intentions and reciprocation.

"Since observers will have seen missiles leaving Cuba, Khrushchev will say there is no need for reconnaissance flights. The flights will continue and no doubt Cubans will attempt to shoot them down Any photographs produced subsequent to the report of the missiles leaving Cuba would be branded as 'pre-missile-departure' photos, falsely introduced and, therefore, proof of further missile site construction would be a tough problem and create much wrangling.

"In the meantime, the Soviets will continue construction of sites, this time careful to camouflage as they progress, and strengthen their political hold on the island for spreading Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Just what lessons Khrushchev will have learned and what influence this present incident will have on his future actions is a matter to which we will give much attention in order to hopefully head him off -- or belatedly counter him."

Thursday, 1 November

Reconnaissance flights over Cuba were resumed. Six sorties were launched and all six returned safely. Their photographs revealed that all known MRBM sites in Cuba were either being or had been dismantled. The launch pads were destroyed, apparently by bulldozing. Missiles and launch equipment had been removed, but their location was unknown.

Construction activity at the IRBM sites had stopped and the installations were partially destroyed. However, IL-28 bomber aircraft still were being assembled. One appeared to be completed, and two more were finished except for engine cowlings. Three others lacked only engines, while 21 remained in their crates.

Based on a review of all information available, the CNO Submarine Contact Evaluation Board estimated that at least four and possibly seven Soviet submarines were operating in the Southwestern Atlantic.

Photography was available of five Soviet "F" class submarines. The Board considered that two of these were the same submarine; however, should this not be the case, an additional positive submarine existed.

One contact located south of Jamaica was evaluated as a tentative positive submarine based on standard evaluation criteria. However, analysis of additional contact information was required before accepting this as a positive Soviet submarine.

The Board believed that the four "F" class submarines deployed from Northern Fleet waters during the period September 26 - October 1 based on a 7 knot speed of advance to the area of initial contact. The contact south of Jamaica would have had to maintain a significantly higher speed of advance than the others, or would have had to depart home waters about a week earlier.

It was believed that these submarines were en route to Cuban waters to commence operations from a Cuban port as a part of the offensive build-up. Their movements subsequent to the declaration of the quarantine indicated Moscow indecision on a new course of action.

The Cecil forced a Soviet "F" class submarine to the surface after 35 hours of continuous contact. When the SS surfaced, it was on course 090 as prescribed by our instructions to Moscow of 2 October. CINCLANTFLT sent the following congratulatory message to Cecil:

"Your persistent and expert holding of contact until exhaustion with Soviet 'F' class 011 has been followed with pride and admiration. Well done."

At 2235, Groznyy, one of four Soviet ships which had been lying dead in the water east of the quarantine line) began to move towards Cuba. Shortly after, the other three, Belovodsk, Mir, and Karl Marx, got underway on a southwestward course. Other ships west of latitude 50W and heading for Cuban ports were Birgit and Sottern (Swedish); Camaguey (Cuban); Eref (Turkish); Kladna (Czech); Aspromonte (Italian); Theo Korner (East German), and Sierra Maestra (Cuban). CINCLANT's instructions were not to stop or board any of these ships unless authorized to do so by higher authority and to permit them to pass after identification-

Friday, 2 November through Wednesday, 7 November

For the next five days, the naval quarantine was characterized by continued surveillance of merchant ships entering and leaving Cuban ports and aerial reconnaissance of the dismantling of missile sites. Reconnaissance photographs showed the IRBM and MRBM sites were being disassembled and destroyed. Throughout this period, there also were repeated submarine contacts and surfacings.

Meanwhile the President appointed a special negotiating committee headed by Mr. John J. McCloy to deal with a Soviet delegation headed by First Deputy Premier Kuznetzov at the United Nations in New York. This group was to work out the details for removal of the offensive weapons in Cuba and arrange for a system of inspection.

Admiral Anderson was concerned by the fact that submarines had not been specifically included on the list of "offensive" weapons which were to be removed from Cuba. On November 3, CNO supplied the U.S. negotiators with an appraisal of the strategic implications of Soviet submarines operating from or being supported from a Cuban base. His views on this matter were:

"Soviet submarines already can refuel, reprovision and effect minor repairs in existing Cuban ports. Additional support capabilities can be introduced clandestinely in the absence of adequate inspection. The publicly announced 'fishing fleet' base is probably a cover for a submarine base, and the Soviets will continue covert attempts to improve this base capability. They ostensibly could turn over to Cuba submarines for 'defense' purposes.

"A submarine base in Cuba would enable the Soviets to place offensive weapon systems in the Western Hemisphere. The base could be used by surface-launching ballistic missile submarines as well as attack submarines. The SLBM's would be within range of American targets while in port or at sea. The U.S. ASW defensive perimeter, so important to the ASW and continental defense system, would be penetrated and the southern flank of the United States would be ex posed to short range ballistic missile attack.

"With the Gulf of Mexico a Soviet operating area, nuclear capabilities against the U.S. targets would be increased many fold. Caribbean and South American trade routes would be exposed to easy attack by Soviet submarines in early stages of a limited war at sea.

"The United States could no longer rely on intelligence information indicating a movement of large numbers of submarines toward the East Coast as a strategic warning. The Soviets could establish a pattern of operations near Cuba which would defeat or vitiate this indication. A Soviet-Cuban 'fishing fleet' could be used to support submarines, and consumable supplies, fuel and personnel could be transferred at sea to submarines operating in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.

"The United States cannot permit the USSR to establish either a Soviet or a Cuban submarine base in Cuba or allow Cuban facilities to be used for direct support of submarine operations, any more than we can permit the establishment of nuclear-capable missile and air bases. The U. S. should formally announce that submarines are included in the list of offensive weapons systems in Cuba and that necessary measures will be taken to ensure submarines do not operate from or receive support from Cuban bases. Daily aerial surveillance of Cuba should include Cuban ports in which submarines would receive support. The 'fishing fleet' should be kept under routine surveillance, and surface patrols should be maintained off Cuban ports. in addition, South American ASW capabilities should be increased so that this operation can properly become an 'all-American' undertaking."

On 4 November, the Soviet merchant ship Emilian Pugachew was inspected at Balboa, C.Z. at 0830R. Cargo consisted of canned fish, fish oil, and lumber and no prohibited items. No further intercept was made on this ship.

COMSOLANT issued OpOrder 9-62 which promulgated the quarantine instructions for the southern approaches to the Caribbean. Stations were established covering all passages through the Lesser Antilles.

All of the ships of special interest approaching or loading in Cuban waters were under surveillance or being trailed by surface quarantine forces. The relaxation of activity had permitted an opportunity to relieve and replace force units.

At 1258R on 5 November a report was received that two of the BLUE MOON low-level reconnaissance flights were being pursued by two MIG 21's. Flight 16 reported that it was jumped eight miles west of Santa Clara. The tailman saw the two Soviet fighters closing and the BLUE MOON F8U's turned and rolled into the MIG's for a head-on approach. Then, the Navy planes hit their afterburners and exited six miles east of their point of entry. The two MIG's stayed with them for about five minutes. The high combat air patrol observed the action, but could not take action until after the incident was closed.

COMSECONDFLT in Newport News relieved COMCRUDESFLOT Six in Canberra as CTF 136 and Canberra proceeded to Norfolk, Va. Other routine reliefs of quarantine units continued.

CINCLANT assigned the Dominican Republic frigates Gregori (F-103) and Luferon (F-104) to operational control of CTF 137 (COMSOLANT). They were stationed in Mona Passage, one at a time on individual eight-day patrols.

The next day, 6 November, at 1008R, a U-2 high-level reconnaissance flight was terminated because the pilot detected surface-to-air radar guidance activity. Because of the danger of possible missile attacks on the high-level reconnaissance flights, heavier reliance was placed on the low-level sorties which could operate at altitudes low enough to render SAM defenses ineffective.

Admiral Anderson submitted an analysis of the establishment of a secret naval base in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense. The President had requested the information the day before in a memorandum to SECDEF, which read:

"We must operate on the presumption that the Russians may try again. This time they may prepare themselves for action on the sea in the Cuban area. Does Admiral Anderson think they could build up a secret naval base which will put them on a near parity with us if we should once again blockade? If he thinks there is substantial danger of this, what suggestions would he now make?"

CNO reported to SECDEF that there were several ways in which the Soviets could base naval forces in Cuba; however, he pointed out that by using means for internal intelligence, aerial and other surveillance, a warning would be supplied for all but the most austere naval support build-up. He reemphasized that his recommendation that submarines operated or supported from Cuban bases should be declared offensive weapons and placed on the list of prohibited materials. He detailed these views in the memorandum.

Meanwhile, the disassembling of the missile sites continued at a rapid pace. CINCLANT reported that the movement of Soviet personnel and equipment towards ports was proceeding hurriedly.

Reconnaissance flights continued and the Cuban air defense system was tracking our high-altitude flights. However, there were no incidents of defensive action or harassment.

One of the immediate tasks of the U. S. negotiators at the UN was to insure that the U. S. position covered all of the facets of the problem and that surveillance continued. Mr. Mc Cloy was pushing for the dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba at the earliest possible date. Concerning on-site inspection of the missile bases, the Soviets had agreed to that only after dismantling and removal. However, the Cubans would not agree to any on-site inspection. Also, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans would agree to the firm U. S. requirement that aerial reconnaissance flights had to continue.

The Soviet negotiators proposed that the Red Cross inspect incoming cargoes, and the U. S. accepted this as "suitable." Four Swedish ships were tentatively suggested to transport the Red Cross inspection teams, but the problem of paying the chartering costs had all but wrecked the proposal.

Kuznetzov suggested that as a compromise on the inspection issue, the Soviets would give the U. S. photographic evidence of the dismantling. He also said that if Cuba would not permit inspection of the missile withdrawal, the Soviet Union would supply a list of the ships which were to transport the missiles and shipping schedules, then allow the U.S. ships to come alongside outbound vessels to see and count the missiles. Kuznetzov stated that the USSR had a total of only 42 offensive missiles in Cuba. However, JCS estimates on October 30 placed the number of MRBM's at 48 and IRBM's at 24 or possibly 32.

The JCS invited Cuban contingency and quarantine commanders to a Washington meeting the next day to discuss the possibility of stand down in readiness posture and SECDEF's belief that CINCLANT Operations Plan 316 might be "too thin." November 15 was suggested as an approximate date for some degree of stand down.

Wednesday, 7 November

The United States accepted the Soviet offer to inspect outbound missile-bearing ships and the Secretary of Defense notified the JCS of the procedures for conducting the at-sea inspection. The directive was sent to the quarantine force commander 1157R for immediate compliance.

The USSR provided the names of the nine vessels which were carrying out the missiles. The agreement was that the alongside inspections would begin at first light on the next day. Appropriate call signs were assigned to quarantine ships which were to affect the intercepts. The master of the Soviet ship and the commanding officer of the intercepting U. S. ship assigned were to work out their own arrangements for rendezvous at a convenient point along the track of the outbound vessel.

Photographic equipment and Russian language interpreters were placed aboard the intercepting ships. The Soviet Union had also agreed that helicopters could be used to photograph deck cargoes if seas and weather prohibited good shipboard photographic results.

Negotiations later brought further Russian agreement that outer covers would be removed partially from missile transporters in order to permit visual and photographic inspection.

Six of the nine ships designated for inspection by the USSR had already departed. They were:

ShipTimeLocationCourse/Speed
F. Kurchatov07170020-05N, 73-20W070/20
M. Anosov07084122-10N, 77W
Labinsk07181424-00N, 80-24W/16
Polzunov07081623-12N, 82-24W070/12
Bratsk07101523-20N, 82-40W
Dvinogorsk07150023-00N, 70-40W075/15



Meanwhile, the 5th MEB had completed its transit of the Panama Canal and was departing Colon. All forces involved in the transit had changed operational control to CINCLANT. CINCPACFLT offered his congratulations for the manner in which all officers and men responded to the movement operation.

Thursday, 8 November

During the morning, Mr. Gilpatric ordered that photographic confirmation of missiles and associated equipment being transported from Cuba be obtained in time for a Presidential announcement in the evening. The President wanted to say that the missiles were being removed and, if possible, that they had been counted aboard ships carrying them out. in view of this, all efforts were being directed towards the obtaining of firm fixes on the location of all outgoing
ships and the positioning of a surface quarantine vessel with each. Patrol planes were being dispatched from Jacksonville and Guantanamo to locate and help photograph the deck cargoes.

Photographs of the Dvinogorsk, Anosov, and Klirchatov already had been taken while these ships were either underway or loading in port. They showed four missiles on the first ship, eight on the second, and six on the third.

The Soviet ships were not complying with an agreement to sail a single transit route, and there was difficulty in finding all of them. At 1245R CINCLANTFLT reported that the Alapayevsk had been photographed by a VP-2- aircraft, and the pictures would be in Jacksonville by 1500R.

At 1414R, Rear Admiral Hogle at CINCLANTFLT reported that the Volgoles had been sighted by a P2V at - Her deck cargo was covered and the ship would not uncover after being asked by voice and flashing light to do so. Saufley was en route to intercept her, estimating the scene at 1700Q. The P2V was staying on top while the destroyer arrived. The pilot reported the Volgoles deck cargo as six vehicles forward and three aft, and two tube shapes forward and five aft, estimated size 8 x 6 x 55 feet.

Perry made first contact with Volgoles at 1530R and requested that she uncover the missiles, but the ship refused. Communication was made by voice on 500KC, flashing light, loud hailer, and placards.

The message sent was, "Show me your missiles, please. I must see them." The reply was, "I cannot show U.S."

All of the information surrounding the incident was forwarded to Admiral Wellborn at the United Nations, so the U. S. negotiators could protest this lack of cooperation to Kuznetzov at a 1700R meeting.

The decision was made that Perry and Vesole would trail the Volgoles through the night and try again in the morning to get the Russians to uncover the missiles. Admiral Anderson did not recommend forceful action to get the Volgoles or any other ship to uncover under the existing "ground rules."

Mr. Gilpatric directed that in the morning and in all other intercepts the message to intercepted ships would be: "Your government has agreed to uncover missiles. Please do so."

When it became obvious that the Russian ships were not going to follow the guidelines for rendezvousing with our patrol forces, Admiral Anderson passed the order to CINCLANT, "Don't wait -- go find them."

Also during the day, Mr. Gilpatric had initiated action to prepare a plan whereby newsmen could be flown out to photograph the inspection of one or more of the Russian ships during an intercept.

Since Soviet missile ships were making no attempt to pass through the designated geographic check points, CINCLANTFLT directed his forces to intercept, track and photograph all ships.

Alapayevsk, when hailed and photographed, reported no missiles aboard, only personnel and equipment.

Seven of the nine Soviet missile ships were sighted underway and departing Cuban waters. The remaining two (L. Komsomol and Polzunov) were expected to get underway shortly. Six of these ships were photographed during the day.

The following was the status of designated missile ships that were known to have departed Cuba:

ShipTimeLocationCourse/SpeedPhoto
F. Kurchatov08111220-06N, 67-42W075/18Yes
M. Anosov08103023-55N, 70-03W085/17Yes
Labinsk08140521-30N, 75-42W080/12----
Bratsk08240021-30N, 74-40W060/12Yes
Dvinogorsk08135625-11N, 63-15WDIWYes
Volgoles08125523-17N, 81-45W085/12Yes
Alapayevsk08240023-20N, 73-40W070/15Yes



Friday, 9 November

At about 0700R, Blandy intercepted Dvinogorsk and asked her to roll back the coverings on the missiles. The Soviet vessel complied. Blandy reported that there was a large cylindrical object beneath, encased in a water-tight seal.

Early in the morning, photographs of missile-bearing ships began arriving at the Pentagon via helicopter.

At 0800R Newport News and Leary intercepted the Labinsk. Newport News went alongside and hailed the Soviet vessel on 500KC. "How many missiles on board?" The reply was, "All on deck. See for yourself."

In response to a request to uncover the missiles, the canvas was rolled back on one. The same cylindrical shape was observed as was by Blandy on the Dvinogorsk; Newport News reported this one as being mounted on a wheeled vehicle.

After Vesole hailed Volgoles at first light, the formerly reluctant ship complied with a request to roll back the canvas covering a missile.

Our intercepting ships were wondering what they should do about the inner-seal problem. Mr. Gilpatric said not to request that it be broken.

A plan was finally devised where five newsmen left in each of two P3V's from NAS, Patuxent River. One was to overfly Komsomol and the other one Anosov. However, Admiral Griffin and CINCLANTFLT were more inclined to favor a slower plan whereby an intercept would have been staged on the next day with one of the remaining unchallenged Soviet ships. In either event, time was running out on the possibility of being able to catch a ship before they were all inspected.

During a special 1330R meeting at the UN a protest was received from the Russians that force was used against Dvinogorsk; that Alexandrovsk, which was not a missile-carrying ship, had been stopped; and that Volgoles was stopped twice. A request for confirmation of these alleged incidents was passed to CINCLANT. Mr. McCloy called Mr. Gilpatric on the matter, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense said the incidents would be investigated and we would apologize only if such were warranted. Mr. Gilpatric then directed his naval aide, Captain Houser, to look into the matter and commented, "Let's make sure the Navy doesn't put us in that spot again.'

Search by two DD's and aircraft was continuing for Kurchatov. Anosov and Polzunov were being trailed by DD's with air and surface inspection scheduled for first light 10 November.

Individual details on missile-carrying ships during the day were (times Romeo):
Labinsk

090300Leary and Newport News assigned to intercept.
090615Intercept made.
090730Outer covers on missiles removed.
090748Request to remove inner cover ignored.
090854Deck cargo reported by Newport News as 2 missiles without nose cones. Outer cover removed for 1/3 of length from after end.
091100090836 posit 22-55N, 72-31W reported by CTG 136.2 Photos obtained
091113Leary trailing.
091134Leary discontinued trail. Labinsk proceeding.
091155Posit at 090818 22-18N, 71-57N on course 095, speed 15.




Bratsk

090300R. A. Owens assigned to intercept.
090700Expect intercept at 090730.
090735Owens intercepted.
090736Wasp helo overhead posit 22-55N, 72-31W. Deck cargo 2 mobile cranes, 2 canvas covered trucks, 2 vans, and 2 missile shaped objects. Outer covers on missile shapes removed.
091113Basilone trailing. Owens relieved by Basilone at 1130.
092212Basilone ordered to discontinue trail.




Komsomol

90735Komsomol departed Casilda. Norfolk closing to photo.
91022Norfolk reports Master initially cooperative but will only uncover nose and tail of one out of 8 missiles.
091034Instructed Komsomol to proceed CHECK POINT south of GTMO.
091052Posit 21-24N, 78-48W, course 153, speed 18.
091140Photography completed.
091215Dahlgren joining .Norfolk.
091245P2V overhead.
091320Master informed Norfolk he was requesting further instructions from his Government before removal of covers; complying with request to proceed to CHECK POINT.
091350Deck cargo includes 8 missiles less nose cones and 7 trucks.
091505Master continues to report no authority to uncover missiles. Posit 20-31N, 78-50W.
091623Covers now being removed from missiles, closed to 400 yards for photos.
091652Canvas covers removed from missiles but weather seals left in place. Photo coverage obtained. --Norfolk returned to trailing station, posit 20-15N, 78-27W, course 128, speed 18.




Kurchatov

082100Best posit 21-15N, 64-30W, course 075, speed 18.
090300Biddle assigned to intercept.
090700Biddle in tail chase.
090950PATRON 44 to launch one P3V to locate and photo.
091040Best posit 23-30N, 60-30W, estimated course 071, speed 20. Blandy directed to search for Kurchatov.
091059P2V assisting in search.
091113Biddle continues search.
092400Biddle, Blandy and air search continues for Kurchatov




Anosov

090855Barry reports intercept time of about 091700.
091011CTG 81.5 reported sighting of 090919 at 25-30N, 60-13W, course 090, speed 15.
091059P2V assisting in search.
091210Best posit 25-30N, 63-13W.
091420Sighted by aircraft at 25-44N, 61-51W. Estimate Barry will arrive 30 minutes before dusk. Also 2 P2V with newsmen aboard at arrive at about the same time.
091530Communications established between Anosov and Barry.
091920Barry intercepted at 091800 posit 25-45N, 61-05W. Intends to trail all night close first light for photos. P3V will be on scene first light for photos.




Dvinogrosk

082030Posit 25-00N, 63-15W, dead in the water.
090300TG 83.3 assigned to intercept.
090656COMDESRON 24 in Blandy reported cover removed from first missile, however inner cover not removed. Probably 4 missiles. Posit 25-29.5N, 60-11.1W, course 075, speed 15.
090718Outer covers removed from other missiles.
090752COMDESRON 24 reports missiles resemble modified T11.
090855COMDESRON 24 reports intercept, photography, and visual observations completed.
091040Blandy discontinued trailing.




Volgoles

082100Vesole directed to reattempt to have covers removed from missiles during early day light 9 November.
090630Asked that covers be removed from missiles.
090724Outer cover removed from one missile.
090822Removing outer covers from missiles, 3 missiles viewed with outer covers removed.
090924COMDESRON 6 in Vesole reports 7 missile shapes sighted. Thanked Master for his cooperation. Continuing trail.
091055VESOLE directed by CINCLANT to continue trail.
091146Vesole discontinues trail. Volgoles proceeding.




Polzunov

090300Steinaker assigned to intercept.
090700Intercept expected about 091859.
091059P2V assisting in search.
091113Steinaker proceeding to intercept.
091316Steinaker directed to commence calling Polzunov on radio.
092400CINCLANTFLT reports Polzunov underway. Rhodes trailing. Vesole expected to join about 0400, with interpreter on board. Aircraft scheduled overhead at first light. ---- Karl Marx appears to be in company with Polzunov.




Alapayesk

081420Posit 22-20N, 71-55W, photos obtained. 180-200 men on deck, no missile shapes sighted. Master stated to Holder, "Have rocket technician in accordance with agreement between Governments of USSR and USA."
081545Helo flight from Wasp with Chief of Staff, COMCARDIV 14 aboard. Exchanged tie clasp and bottle of vodka. Three of five cargo hatches open. Cots, blankets and about 50 boxes under open hatches sighted. Four fuel trucks, five stake trucks, one dump truck, two earth movers sighted on deck.
091113Holder continues trail.
092212Holder ordered to discontinue trail.




Saturday, 10 November

Vice Admiral Beakley's personally drafted message replying to the Soviet protest of the preceding afternoon was approved by Mr. Gilpatric and forwarded to Mr. McCloy at the UN. The reply stated that the quarantine forces were not ordered to carry out the actions against the Dvinogorsk and Alexandrovsk and that these incidents could not be confirmed. As far as the Volgoles was concerned, Vice Admiral Beakley pointed out that the second intercept was effected because on the first the ship had refused to remove covers from the missile transporters.

There was a great deal of pressure from the White House to complete the missile count so that the President could make an announcement that the operation had been completed. However, one ship -- the Kurchatov -- eluded surveillance.

In order that the UN negotiators might be informed on happenings involving the ship intercepts and inspections, all communications were ordered relayed immediately from the CNO Communications Center to Admiral Wellborn through the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier communications stations.

Details on the sightings and inspection of ships of interest during the day were:

Karl Marx (Not on UN Inspection List)

100104Karl Marx underway with Polzunov 5 miles astern. Rhodes is in between. Vesole should join about 0400.
100728Close observation previously directed held in abeyance to permit coordination with news media.
101050Rhodes directed to close and photograph, aerial photography as directed by CTG 81.6. When completed cease trailing.




Bratsk

101700Posit 27-08N, 64-27W, course 060, speed 15. CTG 83.3 directed to search for, locate and shadow Bratsk, closing Essex to within helo range. MK3 neutron detector being flown direct Bermuda then COD to Essex. On receipt Essex to conduct helo flights on Bratsk and to report results soonest.




L. Komsomol

100400Posit: 37-05N, 75-01W, course 072.
101326CINCLANT directed cease trailing.
101928CTF 136 directed to reintercept and inspect with MK3 neutron detector. CTF 81 directed to search and locate once in AM and once in PM until CTF 136 task completed.




Kurchatov

101324Aircraft report sighting at 101050 at posit 26-25N, 53-37W, course 060, speed 15. Blandy directed to close, photo, and conduct visual inspection.
101726Blandy posit 27-17N, 51-48W, course 078, speed 22. Still does not hold.




Anosov

100430Posit 26-50N, 55-51W.
100627One aircraft overhead, second aircraft expected in 5 minutes.
100642Barry alongside to starboard. Observed two long shapes and one long curved shape. Requested covers be removed, complied, approximately 200 personnel, including women, on deck.
100755Missiles not completely uncovered, Barry reports 8 missiles sighted.
100811Aircraft departed.
100844Refused to change course to reduce effect of seas.
100941Barry directed rejoin COMCARDIV 18 (Essex Group) when completed.
101053Barry completed. Departed. Posit 26-52N, 55-39W, course 325, speed 17.




Polzunov

100104Polzunov underway 5 miles astern of Karl Marx with Rhodes in between. Vesole to join about 0400.
100142Posit 23-28N, 81-17W, course 080, speed 12.
100728Close observation delayed to permit coordination with news media.
101232Posit: 22-58N, 79-01W, course 115, speed 15, Vesole in company. Aerial photography conducted.
101352Vesole makes approach in coordination with aircraft.
101400Removing covers as requested.
101404Vesole alongside.
101414Vesole completes inspection, five missiles sighted.
101424Vesole directed to discontinue trail.
101518News media in participating aircraft express satisfaction with coverage.
101928CINCLANT directs CTF 136 to intercept and inspect with MK3 neutron detector. CTF 81 to search and locate once in AM and once in PM until CTE 136 task completed.



A Newport News helicopter using a MK3 neutron detector over the Bratsk reported that the instrument showed active reactions but that the results were not conclusive. Therefore, the WaspGroup was directed to conduct a second flight using the detector over the Bratsk and obtain more conclusive data. Similar operations were directed by CTF 136 for Polzunov and L. Komsomol.

A summary of inspection results at the end of the day indicated the following:


ShipInspectedPhotoNo. of Missiles
LabinskYesYes2
BratskYesYes2
L. KomsomolYesYes8
KurchatovNoYes6 (probable)
AnosovYesYes8
DvinogorskYesYes4
VolgolesYesYes7
PolzunovYesYes5
AlapayevskYesYes0
Total42



The search for Kurchatov was being continued by Blandy and aircraft.

Sunday, 11 November

With the interception of Kurchatov by Blandy, all ships reported by the Soviets as having missiles aboard had been inspected. A total of 42 missiles were visually sighted and photographed.

A re-Inspection of Bratsk and Polzunov with the Naval Research Laboratory neutron sensing device produced negative results, and the remaining re-inspection schedule was canceled.

The BLUE MOON low-level Cuba reconnaissance flights for the day returned without incident. On previous and succeeding days, these flights were alternately flown by Navy and Air Force aircraft. In addition, high-altitude BRASS KNOB U-2 photographic missions also were made. Although these reconnaissance flights were scheduled for each day, the missions were frequently canceled or their sorties reduced.

Monday, 12 November

At a special Executive Committee meeting in the morning, which was attended by the UN Cuban negotiating team, there was a lengthy discussion concerning the removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers. On the previous Saturday, Deputy Secretary of State Ball had recommended a strong stand on the issue; concurred in by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze.

Mr. McCloy was optimistic in that he believed the Russians could regain ownership of the aircraft, even though they legally belonged to the Cubans. He also said the Soviet negotiators were pushing hard for a lifting of the quarantine and a formal pledge that the U.S. would not invade Cuba.

Before the meeting adjourned, the Executive Committee adopted Secretary of State Rusk's position that when the IL-28's were on the way out of Cuba the negotiators would discuss the possibility of lifting the quarantine, and, when an acceptable arrangement was reached for inspecting ships carrying materials to Cuba, the U. S. would consider a guarantee against invasion.

As far as operational matters during the day were concerned, submarine activity in the quarantine area was continuing at a reduced rate. Only one positive contact was being prosecuted; all others had remained "cold" for more than 72 hours.

Three new ships were designated for intercept and trail -- the East German freighter Theodor Korner and the Russian freighters Atkarsk and Okhotsk.

During the day, the Argentia submarine/air antisubmarine barrier was disestablished.

At 1525R, CINCLANT reported that the master of [deleted] freighter [deleted] requested that the destroyer Perry send an intelligence officer to his ship. The commanding officer of Perry replied that he could not comply unless he received a request for a boarding party. The freighter's master then officially requested the boarding party, which was dispatched and headed by the Perry's commanding officer.

After departing the freighter, the commanding officer was flown to Key West for a debriefing. He said the [deleted] master had offered his services [deleted] collecting any information which the U.S. might want.

While Perry was in the vicinity of Trajan, two MIG's buzzed the ships at an altitude of about 300 feet and then headed for Cuba.

CINCLANT informed the duty CNO (VADM Sharp) of his instructions as to hailing and intercepting ships, namely, that he was designating ships for intercept which, according to information available to him, had suspicious cargoes. A quarantine force ship then was named to close the suspicious ship and hail her, requesting the port of departure, destination, and type of cargo. He pointed out that all ships of the force were exchanging calls with any other vessel they encountered, but were not going out of their way to intercept a ship unless directed to do so by CINCLANT.

Admiral Dennison also told Vice Admiral Sharp that he was sending out a message to CTF 136 notifying him that there was great interest in Washington on the details of contacts with ships inbound for and outbound from Cuba. He had instructed CTF 136 to insure that incident reports included the methods of communicating and the exact text of the exchanges.

Tuesday, 13 November

The quarantine line was still intact, but only trailing actions were being pursued. CTF 137 had five ships on the southern line, and all forces remained alert for any eventuality.

Admiral Anderson told his Fleet Commanders that they could look with pride on the outstanding manner in which the Navy and Marine Corps forces reacted to carry out the actions necessary to implement quarantine directives and the thoroughly professional performances of our units in preparing for other contingencies.

"I am certain that we have benefitted from the actions of the past several weeks. Our forces were exercised, our control systems were checked, our command arrangements were tested and the decision-making process back here was given a rigorous work out and proved itself throughout the operation."

In view of the fact that negotiations were reaching a stage where the policy makers would have to consider lifting the blockade, Admiral Anderson communicated his philosophy on the matter to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

His summary and views were that the quarantine was imposed to stop the importation of offensive weapons into Cuba and this quarantine had not subsequently been lifted. However, ships on station had been directed to hail ships bound for Cuba, but not to board them. Because of this declaration, 16 Bloc ships had reversed course and returned to the Soviet Union and no ships with suspicious cargoes had attempted to pass the quarantine line.

There were one East German and sixteen Soviet cargo ships en route to Cuba, which could be carrying suspicious cargo below decks. Two of the Soviet ships, the Okhotsk and the Orenburg, had 72-foot hatches, capable of carrying missiles.

If the quarantine was to remain effective with the object of insuring that offensive weapons were not imported into Cuba, the admiral recommended the visit and search of Bloc and Free World ships which could be carrying offensive weapons. This particularly applied to the Soviet ships with large hatches.

In view of the lapse of time since a Bloc had transited the quarantine line, CNO felt it should be made known that the U.S. still intended to enforce The quarantine by search when necessary.

The admiral recommended that quarantine forces then board a Free World non-Bloc-chartered ship en route to Cuba, if time permitted, followed by the interdiction and search of a Bloc ship.

The next step should be to visit and search each of the Soviet cargo ships as they arrived at the quarantine line.

The decision was reached to lift the quarantine and terminate the October 23 proclamation if the USSR agreed to remove the IL-28's. However, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance was to continue, and the U.S. was to withhold a declaration of assurances against an invasion of Cuba until agreement was reached for suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of offensive weapons.

If the Soviets refused to remove the bombers, the United States was to continue the limited quarantine by intercepting and boarding all ships en route to Cuba according to CNO's plan. The interdiction would be carried out in an escalating manner. The first ships to be stopped would be ones of a Free World, non-Bloc nation under charter, next a Bloc ship, and, finally, a Soviet ship. At 0858R, CINCLANT was advised of the possibility that the quarantine might be re-instituted and was told to provide the names and times of the first intercepts in each category.

The President and Secretary of Defense were concerned about the ability of surface patrol units to use force without sinking a ship or inflicting casualties. This concern was a great deterrent to granting permission to forcibly stop a ship and one cause for the Executive Committee's decision throughout the quarantine to avoid direct confrontation with a Soviet vessel. Admiral Anderson informed SECDEF of the procedures which would be followed should it be necessary to use force.

The action would be carried out at short range using 3- or 5-inch guns. Nonexplosive shells would be used for destruction of the rudder and propeller. The following sequence of events would be followed if the ship failed to stop after hailing: First, a powder charge would be fired with no projectile in the breach; next, a shot would be sent across the bow of the reluctant ship, and finally, the ship's stern would be fired on.

The admiral noted that it would be highly unlikely that any captain of a merchant ship would attempt to proceed after having received a shot across his bow and a deliberate near miss in the vicinity of his propeller.


Stand down and Conclusion

On Wednesday, 14 November, the final week of the naval quarantine began and all major decisions and actions were being taken at the diplomatic level. The one remaining bar to success in obtaining the removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba concerned the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers. However, U. S. negotiators were confident that the USSR would acquiesce on this point.

For the next six days, quarantine forces continued to intercept, trail, and photograph ships of special interest approaching Cuba. Routine replacement and relief of surface units continued. However, there was no stand down of contingency forces, which had reached a peak of readiness for any eventuality. The first sign of relaxation came on the 14th, when the JCS removed the worldwide communication MINIMIZE order which had been issued on October 21. The restriction remained, however, within the 15th Naval District and most of the Western Atlantic. The Strategic Air Command, which had generated an awesome nuclear deterrent capability, was authorized to reduce its airborne alert to 1/8th, returning to a status held prior to October 21. At 2400R on October 23 the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan status was 844 aircraft and 337 missiles. At 1800R on November 14 the status was 1,613 aircraft and 355 missiles.

While the U.S. and USSR negotiators parried on the IL-28 question and tried to cope with Castro's intransigence, on Thursday, 15 November, five large-hatch Russian ships left Soviet ports and were believed en route to Cuba. A covert aerial inspection using a neutron sensor was ordered in an effort to detect the presence of nuclear cargo.

Soviet submarine activity was nil, with only two possible contacts reported on the morning of the 14th. Atkarsk was hailed and photographed by W. A. Lee, and an aircraft photographed Okhotsk. However, Theodor Korner had not been sighted. Eight ships of the 5th MEB group were scheduled for 24-hour visits to Jamaican ports from November 18-21.

By Friday, 15 November, Korner had not been sighted since departing the Baltic on October 30. CINCLANTFLT canceled a special aircraft search for her, but quarantine forces remained alert for this ship during their routine patrols.

Atkarsk was transiting Providence Channel with McCaffery trailing. No topside cargo was observed and air/surface photos had been taken. Sellers intercepted Okhotsk at 2030E and was trailing. She was expected to be inside the 500-mile quarantine line by daylight 17 November and Sellers was to close for hailing, visual observation, and photography when within the quarantine area.

Up to this point in the quarantine operation, naval aircraft had flown 30,000 flight hours in 9,000 sorties for a total distance of six million miles. Sixty-eight squadrons composed of 19,000 personnel, and eight aircraft carriers, whose combined crews totaled 25,000 personnel, had participated in the action.

The 90 COMCRUDESLANT ships which were involved had steamed for a total of 780,000 miles, and each of the carriers had covered a 10,000-mile track. COMSERVLANT had provided logistic support to an afloat population of 85,000 in 183 ships which were deployed over a 2,100-mile front.

On the 16th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with the President for a discus-ion on removal of the IL-28's and the military implications of negotiating a no-invasion policy towards Cuba. Their stand was that the IL-28's should be removed, preferably by negotiation, otherwise by blockade or direct military action, if required. They recommended that the removal of Soviet personnel from Cuba be made an immediate objective of negotiation with the USSR as a condition for granting a no-invasion pledge. Also in this regard, the JCS said that any such assurance to Castro should state U. S. obligations under the Rio Pact and link the assurance to Cuban good behavior and acceptance of aerial surveillance. The Chiefs opposed the seeking of a means for long-term verification and inspection against offensive weapons in Cuba in exchange for United Nations inspection of the Caribbean and a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

Up to Saturday, 17 November, there had been no basic changes in force posture. Naval units were still at sea and ready. The Continental Air Defense Command's interceptor forces were at their wartime dispersal bases at 1/3rd alert and still were substantially augmented in the Southeast U.S., and particularly in Florida. SAC aircraft remained dispersed with 1/8th airborne and a total generated force of 1,456 planes and 355 missiles. Air forces committed to CINCLANT operations plans were ready for a daylight response for selective targets within Cuba within a two-to-twelve hour timetable. Contingency invasion forces were ready on a seven-day reaction basis, following an assault air strike. The commanders of these forces reported that they could maintain their current status of readiness for about 30 more days without adverse effects.

The position of Theodor Korner finally was established at 31-30N, 29-30W. Atkarsk entered Havana, and Okhotsk was being trailed by Sellers. A cargo of approximately 240 tons of steel was sighted and the ship was cooperative.

Three pilots reported a possible SAM missile launch from Cuba at 1100R. The object first was noticed by a white trail of flame at high altitude, described as extremely brilliant. The flame became shorter and seemed to burn out with several red flashes. The object was on a steady course and might have originated from the Matanzas SA-2 site which was 50 miles distant from the reporting aircraft. There had been no evidence of a deliberate attempt to shoot down U. S. aircraft, although several reconnaissance planes were over water in the vicinity at the time.

On Sunday, 18 November, the policy of canceling low-level reconnaissance flights remained in effect. Although there had been high-level flights since the 14th, the BLUE MOON sorties were being canceled on a day-to-day basis. There was concern that these cancellations were diplomatically unwise in view of Castro's publicly announced intentions to shoot down U. S. surveillance aircraft.

During the day, COMCARDIV 20 in Lake Champlain relieved COMCARDIV 14 in Wasp as CTG 136.2. CINCLANT reported that the Guatemalan frigate Burrunida, which was in overhaul at a Miami shipyard, had been formally placed at the disposition of the U.S. for quarantine use. Argentina also asked the U.S. to submit a request for two P2V aircraft to support the operation. These were the last two of many offers made by OAS nations prior to the lifting of the quarantine.

Meanwhile, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Havana radio had broadcast orders for all domestic aircraft to clear Cuban skies. Concurrently, a notice to airmen was published forbidding international flights into or over the island without 24-hour advance notice. No reason was given for the order; however, it was held likely that Castro intended to take action on his threat to shoot down reconnaissance planes.

Okhotsk was being trailed by Rhodes and was expected to arrive in Havana about 0800R the next day.

During the next two days, 19-20 November, quarantine operations remained in effect while the final curtain was slowly being drawn on the negotiations to secure removal of the IL-28's. On the 19th, Castro announced that if the Soviet Union wished to remove the aircraft he would not obstruct such a move. This was followed by the USSR's agreement to return the planes to Russia and affect the withdrawal within 30 days.

At 1800R, on the 20th, President Kennedy announced the accord during a press conference. At 1945R the JCS sent the following message:

"Lift quarantine effective immediately. Return LANTFLT ships to home ports and normal operating areas at your discretion. Maintain one CVA with air group in ready status in Mayport Caribbean area. Instructions will be furnished later as to future movements and disposition of PACFLT amphibious forces. Anticipate requirement for sighting and photographing Soviet ships departing Cuban ports with IL-28 aircraft.

As the order went out to dissolve the quarantine forces, more than 63 ships of the mighty force which had clearly demonstrated its capability to respond quickly to their country's needs had an opportunity to be home for Thanksgiving. other ships followed, many arriving during the following weekend.

Admiral Anderson pointed out that the entire operation had been a magnificent testimonial not only to the senior leaders of our Government, but also to those commandeers and commanding officers at lower levels who were so quickly able to move - - -large numbers of troops -- their ships -- many ships -- and their aircraft of many types in position to carry out lengthy, tedious, and often very sensitive operations with a high degree of leadership, professional competence, courage, and diplomatic skill.

As the Cuban quarantine came to an end, preparations to implement CINCLANT contingency plans were being partially relaxed with Atlantic Fleet units returning to home ports and normal operating areas. Admiral Anderson advised his Fleet Commanders to anticipate the photographic surveillance by surface ships and helicopters of Soviet merchant ships out loading IL-28's from Cuban ports.

He suggested that the tempo of operations in all areas be dropped to essential minimum levels, and offered, "My grateful appreciation to all for their fine work, long hours, patience, and perseverance. Well done."

One hundred and eighty-three ships had taken an active part in Cuban operations during the quarantine. The carriers Independence and Enterprise had remained at sea for 36 and 32 consecutive days, respectively, with their screening destroyers rotating for short-in-port periods -- some of only one-day's duration

Our hunter/killer ASW forces had averaged 23 days at sea and had processed submarine contacts for a total of 2,889 hours.

Participating Atlantic Fleet amphibious forces had spent from l- to 26 days at sea, and logistics units had averaged 20 days of steaming within a 30-day period.

This narrative can be most succinctly concluded by COMSECONDFLT's remarks in his first weekly summary to CINCLANT after the quarantine's end:

"Again the United States had turned to seapower to wield the iron fist in a velvet glove and again the Navy and ships of the Atlantic Fleet had shown this confidence was not misplaced."' [ Back ]


Lessons Learned

Movement of forces which have organic lift capability was prompt and logistic coordination was handled in a timely fashion. However, where lift was not organic, there was approximately a 24 hour delay between the decision to preposition forces and the time when they actually began to move during the period 18-22 October. The reason for the delay was inadequate preparation on the part of J-4 transportation personnel to set up proper coordinating procedures with MATS. CNO discovered that, for example, the urgency was not recognized for the airlifting of ammunition and POL from Albany, Ga., to Guantanamo to support the Marine battalion being airlifted from the West Coast, even though the Marine Corps had made the request direct to MATS with the highest precedence. It was not until CNO intervened that MATS and other logistics support activities were made cognizant of the necessity for the closest coordination and assignment of appropriate priorities to MATS lift requirements in support of the Cuban operations. [ Back ]

Communications

The choke in communications became readily apparent at the onset of the operation. Much of the problem was internal to the Pentagon in the Navy Communications Center. Even traffic of the highest precedence took as much as three hours for distribution and delivery to the action officer's desk (CNO) after receipt. The delay was partially overcome by having advance thermofax-reproduced copies made in the communications center and delivered directly to CNO.

Operational Immediate traffic required from 30 minutes to four hours between transmission by the sender and receipt by OPNAV, depending upon the circuits used. Priority traffic, in one glaring instance, was 26 hours en route.

In order to respond immediately to the civilian secretariat and the Department of Defense, it became necessary to install single sideband receivers in Flag Plot to provide on-the-scene read-out information. [ Back ]

Identification of Ships from High Level Reconnaissance

Strategic Air Command reconnaissance aircraft sent FLASH messages of sightings of merchant vessels. These reports did not indicate the type of ship or its course and speed. It was frequently necessary to wait until the planes returned, their photographs were developed, and their pilots debriefed before it could be determined whether or not the reported sighting was of a ship of interest.

In another operation of this type, reconnaissance pilots should use the Recognition and Identification Guide for Shipping (RIG-1). By referring to this booklet, FLASH reports could be sent with proper ship identification information. [ Back ]

IL-28 Outloading

With the Soviet agreement to remove the 11-28's and the lifting of the quarantine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared to recommend relaxations in the readiness posture. On November 21, the JCS solicited CINCLANT's opinions in this regard, particularly as related to Cuban contingency reaction times and aerial reconnaissance. Although the U.S. did not set any deadline by which the bomber removal should be effected, Soviet negotiators said this would be accomplished in about 30 days.

During this period, readiness posture was to be maintained within reduced reaction times as a measure against Soviet reluctance or bad faith. It also was necessary to continue aerial surveillance to insure compliance with the agreement. Readiness to retaliate against attack on reconnaissance aircraft also wag required.

On November 23, the JCS approved certain rules of engagement for support of low-level BLUE MOON reconnaissance flights. The rules provided combat air patrols for the flights in the event of aerial interception, fighter strikes against surface anti-aircraft sites firing upon the reconnaissance planes; and flak-suppression flights along routes to be flown by the BLUE MOON aircraft. These
special rules were promulgated because it was anticipated that weather for the next 30 days would necessitate reliance on low-level reconnaissance missions and restrict intelligence collection by the high-altitude BRASS KNOB U-2 flights.

While the JCS awaited CINCLANT stand-own recommendations, relaxation began in other areas. On November 21 the Secretary of the Navy rescinded the October 23 order which involuntarily extended the periods of obligated service for naval personnel. The same day, the Air Force authorized the release by November 28 of reservists called into active service.

Although the quarantine had been lifted, CINCLANTFLT continued to maintain a plot of merchant shipping to and from Cuba. There had been no indication of a relaxation of Cuban military posture, and on November 24, CINCLANT recommended further reinforcement of Guantanamo. However, the JCS disapproved this recommendation, which was based on CINCLANT's personal inspection of the base. The Chiefs believed reinforcement was unnecessary, although they held out that further build-up could be required in the event Operations Plan 316-62 was ordered executed.

Also on the 24th, Cuba began to demobilize its alerted militia units, but the Castro regime was continuing its propaganda broadcasts against the governments of other Latin American countries. Top Cuban government leaders met to discuss a reply to the U.S. reconnaissance activity.

On November 28th, the JCS appraised the Cuban situation and forwarded their stand-down recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. These included termination of the l/8th airborne alert, the return of B-47 aircraft to home bases, except for those in Florida, authorization for the various commands concerned to return to DEFCON 5 status except where specific situations dictate otherwise, the release of the Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units, and the authority for the return to normal operations of U. S. naval ships and air squadrons associated with the maritime quarantine.

All other forces, however, were being maintained at high readiness, and military forces were capable of reacting on a 12-hour basis for CINCLANT OpPlan 312-62 and on a 7-day basis for CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62, except that necessary shipping had not been accumulated.

In this new situation, the JCS saw the need for high and low-level aerial reconnaissance over Cuba and over Soviet shipping in order to ascertain whether the Soviet commitments were being ful filled. At the same time, they recognized the needs of our forces and the personnel hardships which high alert levels imposed.

In recognition of these facts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the following alert posture criteria to be appropriate with further reduction to normal pre-Cuba posture prior to Christmas, contingent on actual Soviet withdrawal of IL-28 aircraft from Cuba:

a. Overflight reconnaissance.

(1)High-level: Alert posture which would permit an average of two U-2 flights per day cumulative from November 21 and not more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day.

(2)Low-level: Four aircraft on 12-hour alert, and eight aircraft on 24-hour alert; similar readiness for all aircraft which were to support these reconnaissance missions.

b.Local reprisal strike aircraft: 24 hours following a decision to execute.

c.Reimposition of the quarantine of Cuba: 72 hours.

d.Attack on SAM sites, IL-28's, and/or all air defenses in Cuba: 48 hours.

e.Execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 312-62:72 hours.

f. Execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62:18 days.

g.Air Defense: Resume normal posture except for those units needed to increase the air defense of the Southeastern United States on a permanent basis. Long-term air defense needs for this region were under study.

h.Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.

Relaxation of readiness posture to these levels was seen as permitting the following actions to be taken:

a.CINCLANT and component headquarters could maintain their activated communications net. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT headquarters elements could be returned to home stations except for reduced staffs maintained at Homestead AFB.

b.Air forces: The reaction times provided could permit the return of all units, less those required for conduct of and combat support to reconnaissance missions, to home bases and the resumption of normal training. War-reserve material and selected support and control personnel would remain at Florida bases.

c.Marine forces: All West Coast units less the 3rd LAAM Battalion could be returned to home station- at once. The FMF Atlantic units which presently were part of the recent Guantanamo defense augmentation would remain as deployed with a goal of returning to home stations by December 20. The 5th MEB shipping would be utilized insofar as practicable in returning Marines to the West Coast.

d.Army forces: All Army units could be returned to home stations except those required to support CINCLANT and component headquarters and the 159th Boat Battalion, which would remain temporarily at Fort Lauderdale pending completion of studies to determine a suitable location that would enable it to meet the required reaction time.

e.Navy forces: One CVA Group was being retained temporarily in the Guantanamo sea area to support the defense of Guantanamo until December 20. A Carrier Task Group was also retained in the Norfolk-Mayport area against the possible requirement for sighting Soviet ships departing Cuban ports with IL-28 aircraft and to support possible air-strikes under CINCLANT OpPlan 312-62.

The timely availability of shipping continued to be the critical factor in establishing an adequate force ashore within the 18 day reaction time for CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62. To assure that this reaction time could be met, the following actions were recommended:

a.COMSTS should be given authority to recall transports without completion of voyages in process when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62.

b.COMSTS should be given authority to requisition ships if the decision were made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OpPlan 316-62.

c.The recommissioning of the 11 LST's should be continued.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to review the situation on a continuing basis in order to determine whether the criteria could be relaxed to permit a continuing phase-own to an approximately normal posture by about December 20. If the continued phase-down were warranted, the remaining units were to be returned to home stations, and dependents returned to Guantanamo prior to Christmas.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a reassessment of the situation on a continuing basis in order to ascertain whether the IL-28 withdrawal warranted continued relaxation to normal readiness levels prior to Christmas.

The Secretary of Defense approved the JCS proposals, and CINCLANT was requested to implement measures to accomplish the actions recommended.

Also on November 28, preliminary analysis of reconnaissance photographs taken three days before indicated that IL-28 and UIL-28 aircraft at San Julien airfield were being disassembled. Of the 13 planes which had been uncrated, six still were completely assembled, the remaining seven had no engines, and the wings had been removed from three.

For the next several days, reconnaissance photographs taken from high-altitudes by U-2 aircraft showed continued disassembly of the IL-28 bombers at San Julien. They also revealed that crated IL-28's at Holguin had been removed between November 25 and 27; their whereabouts were unknown. Also, during this period, CINCLANT began to implement JCS policy for a gradually relaxation of readiness posture. On November 30 elements of Amphibious Squadron Three with personnel and equipment of the Second Battalion, First Marines, were loading for departure from Guantanamo to arrive in Panama between December 1-5.

The first of the IL-28's were reported outbound from Cuba on December 1. The Soviet freighter Okhotsk was sighted underway in the Florida Straits with three fuselages on her weather deck. In addition, reconnaissance photographs for the past few days had revealed the outloading of missile erectors at Mariel.

From December 1 through December 3, operations were characterized by further deployment of forces in execution of stand-down policy. Analysis on December 3 of reconnaissance photographs taken three days before indicated that all 13 of the previously assembled I-28 aircraft at San Julien were being broken down and crated.

On December 5, the Soviet Union, through the Cuban negotiation team at the United Nations, provided a list of the ships which would be outloading the IL-28's and their shipping schedules.

The schedule listed 42 IL-28's to be shipped from Cuba on December 5, 6, and 7. Twelve were to be aboard the Okhotsk from Nuevitas on the 5th; 15 in the Kasimov from Mariel on the 6th or 7th; and 15 in the Krasnograd from Mariel, also on the 6th or 7th. Soviet negotiators said that the ship masters would cooperate in close air and surface inspection as they had during the removal of the missiles. However, the schedule not withstanding, the Okhotsk had left Mariel on the 1st and the Kasimov left at 1530R on the 5th from the same port. A reconnaissance aircraft reported visual evidence of 15 IL-28's aboard the second ship. The Okhotsk proceeded to Nuevitas where she loaded II-28 crates and departed on the 5th. Photographs showed four crates had been loaded aboard on the 3rd. An underway surveillance report said that in addition to the previously reported three fuselages on her deck, there were now 16 large crates. The destroyers Blandy and Robertswere closing for further alongside inspection. Eleven of the crates aboard the Kasimov were open at the port end, revealing aircraft fuselages; four canvas-covered fuselages also were visible on deck.

From December 2-5 reconnaissance photography revealed the crating of IL-28's at San Julien airfield and crated aircraft at Mariel port, plus fuselages. These photos were taken by U-2 high-level sorties because low-level missions had been suspended for several days. These BLUE MOON flights were not to be resumed without JCS authority and would not be reinstituted unless the BRASS KNOB missions were unable to satisfy intelligence needs.

CINCLANT reported that as of the 5th, during the past three months, there had been a significant decline in shipping to Cuba. The decline was most marked in Soviet flag vessels, which had dropped from 66 in September to 31 in November. The number of Soviet satellite ships calling at Cuban ports had declined from 55 in September to 39 in November. On the 5th, the day of the CINCLANT report, there were 30 Bloc ships in Cuban ports - 18 of them Russian - 18 ships en route to Cuba, and 16 on their way out.

At 0900R on December 6, the CINCLANTFLT duty officer reported to CNO Flag Plot that the third Soviet ship scheduled for outloading the IL-28's had left port. The Krasnograd was underway from Mariel at 0830R. At 0825R, an aircraft sighted 15 crates aboard which could accommodate IL-28 fuselages. Apparently, the last of the bombers were on their way home. However, alongside inspection was yet to confirm this fact.

At 0930R on December 7, CINCLANTFLT reported a total of 42 IL-28 fuselages had been sighted and photographed aboard the Soviet merchant ships Kasimov, Krasnograd, and Okhotsk. The Okhotsk had been the last of the three to submit to alongside inspection, during which the crew removed the ends of nine crates on deck to reveal their contents.

Interpretation of high-level BRASS KNOB reconnaissance photographs taken on December 5 and 6 revealed that there were no longer any weapons classified as offensive by the President remaining on Cuban soil. The naval quarantine had apparently accomplished U.S. political objective and once again the U. S. Navy had proven itself an effective instrument of national power.

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