Bush, no Commander in Chief....

As things stand, the coalition must now choose in Iraq between two
different kinds of disaster. If their troops stay the course, they seem
certain to face increasing popular hostility and military threat. If they
depart relatively soon, Iraq will almost certainly descend into chaos of a
fearful kind. To remain will be terrible; to leave probably worse. In my
years of observing Western foreign policy, I have never witnessed a more
foolish adventure than the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.
_______________________________________

A truly foolish adventure

November 17, 2003



The Iraq invasion has proved a gigantic disaster by almost every measure.

Seven months ago, neoconservative supporters of the war on Iraq proclaimed
a stunning victory. Now, as the military situation in that country
deteriorates, it is time to attempt a balance sheet on the progress of the
invasion and occupation thus far.

Concerning the justification for the invasion, overwhelmingly the most
important fact is the failure to find even one "weapon of mass
destruction". Oddly enough, it is now obvious that Iraq's oft-repeated
pre-war claim - that it did not possess WMDs - was true. One of the most
important questions the Anglophone democracies must now face is how and
why their citizens were so comprehensively misled.

At present, best evidence suggests the near-total politicisation of the
intelligence process by a Washington pro-war cabal, whose leader was US
Vice-President Dick Cheney. It is now known that this cabal created its
own intelligence unit, the Office of Special Plans; that stale or
worthless intelligence, supplied either by carpetbaggers or Iraqi exiles,
was re-analysed to get the required results; that the pro-war group
overrode the more cautious judgements of intelligence professionals; and
that, in the end, they convinced not only President George Bush but even
more intelligent people, such as the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, of
the deadly danger of Saddam Hussein's vast WMD arsenal.

What has been the human cost of the invasion? The most authoritative
estimate of Iraqi civilian war deaths puts the figure at between 7376 and
9178. Since the formal end of hostilities a further 2200 or so Iraqi
civilians have died at coalition hands. Strangely enough, no one knows,
even approximately, how many Iraqi soldiers were killed. The humanitarian
group Medact recently suggested that the number might be as low as 13,500
or as high as 45,000.
What is truly astonishing is how little the US military knows about the
enemy. It does not know whether or not Saddam is involved.

Coalition casualties are precisely known. More than 400 soldiers have
died. Recently, the Pentagon revealed that 9000 US soldiers had been
evacuated as a result of serious injury or illness, 2000 because of war
wounds, 500 because of psychiatric breakdown.

What, then, beyond their casualties, have the Iraqi people experienced
since the invasion? According to US occupation authorities, supplies of
electricity and clean water have now finally reached their (dismal)
pre-invasion levels. Urban Iraq faces massive unemployment. According to
one common figure, 60 per cent of young men in Baghdad have no work.
Health problems of Iraqis seem even worse than before the invasion; that
is, after a decade of crippling economic sanctions.

These problems are overshadowed in the daily life of urban Iraqis by
something quite new. Before the invasion Saddam Hussein set free 100,000
hardened criminals. The occupying powers subsequently dismantled Iraq's
army and most of its police. Iraq is awash with weapons. The consequence
of all this is the near-total breakdown of law and order. In a recent
Gallup poll, 94 per cent of Iraqis said they felt more insecure now than
under Saddam; 86 per cent said they or their families felt fearful about
leaving their homes at night.

An enterprising American journalist, Jerry Fleischmann, visited the
Baghdad morgue in September. He discovered that while before the invasion
the morgue investigated 20 firearms deaths a month, in August 2003 it
investigated 581. A British journalist, Suzanne Goldenberg, recently
examined the post- invasion situation of women in Baghdad. She heard story
after story of vicious assault and rape. "Under US occupation," she
concluded, "working women have reordered their lives, wearing hijab for
the first time, or travelling with male relatives. Some barely venture out
at all."

Through opinion polls we now know a great deal about what the people of
Iraq think of the invasion of their country. According to the recent
Gallup poll, 43 per cent believe America invaded to "rob Iraq's oil"; 37
per cent to get rid of Saddam Hussein; 6 per cent to change the Middle
East in the interest of Israel; 5 per cent to assist the Iraqi people; 4
per cent to destroy WMDs; 1 per cent to introduce democracy.

And what do they think of the occupation? Seventy per cent believe life
will be better in five years. Most are pleased Saddam is gone. Only 40 per
cent, however, believe democracy can work in Iraq. Two-thirds want
American and British troops to leave within the year. A sizeable minority
thinks attacks on US and British troops are sometimes justified. About a
third think the US will "help" Iraq over the next five years. Half think
it will do "harm". As US pollster John Zogby puts it: "Only one thing is
clear: the predicted euphoria of Iraq has not materialised."

Since the occupation the military situation has steadily deteriorated. In
May, attacks on coalition troops were rare. In the Iraqi summer they
averaged 12 a day. At present the daily average is 35 to 40. Towards the
beginning of the occupation two or three coalition troops died each week.
In the past fortnight or so there have been close to 60. Soft targets have
repeatedly been blown apart. Last week the CIA station chief at Baghdad
warned that large numbers of Iraqis now supported the insurgency.

What is truly astonishing is how little the US military knows about the
enemy. It does not know whether or not Saddam is involved. According to
the US military chief, General Abizaid, there are 5000 insurgents;
according to one US intelligence assessment, 50,000. The official American
line is that the enemy is composed exclusively of foreign Islamists and
diehard Baathist remnants. Journalists, however, have discovered
anti-Saddam tribesmen who have entered the struggle because of their
ancient code of honour, after the death of clansmen at coalition hands.

What, then, of the political situation? When the coalition entered Iraq it
planned the swift introduction of democracy. Such a hope had no chance.
For democracy to succeed, Iraq has to shrug off its Saddamite legacy;
invent a liberal-democratic tradition where none exists; transcend the
religious conflicts between Shia and Sunni Muslims; reconcile the
different world views of the profoundly religious and profoundly secular
segments of society; and satisfy the nationalist appetites of the
long-starved ethnic Kurds.

No form of government is harder to create than a federal democracy divided
on ethnic and religious lines. It took the Swiss several hundred years.
Iraq is being asked to lay the foundations in months, at a time of
occupation and military insecurity, to meet the re-election timetable of
President Bush.

As things stand, the coalition must now choose in Iraq between two
different kinds of disaster. If their troops stay the course, they seem
certain to face increasing popular hostility and military threat. If they
depart relatively soon, Iraq will almost certainly descend into chaos of a
fearful kind. To remain will be terrible; to leave probably worse. In my
years of observing Western foreign policy, I have never witnessed a more
foolish adventure than the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.