Big Ideas for NATO’s New Mission in Iraq

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Big Ideas for NATO’s New Mission in Iraq
By: David Petraeus & Vance Serchuk - Foreign Policy News - 03-06-20
Re: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/06...nato-advisors/

Sharing the burden of keeping down the Islamic State makes sense. But U.S. and NATO leaders should be coldly realistic about what European allies can do—and avoid their mistakes in Afghanistan.

Photo link: https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content...533&quality=90
A French soldier, part of the international coalition against the Islamic State, stands guard near Al-Qaim in western Iraq on Feb. 9, 2019. DAPHNE BENOIT/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Now there's a sand pile!!

Following U.S. President Donald Trump’s calls for America’s allies to “get more involved in the Middle East,” NATO defense ministers last month agreed to “enhance” the Atlantic alliance’s training mission in Iraq. Although the parameters of NATO’s new role are still to be defined, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has indicated it may include taking on some of the tasks currently being performed by U.S. forces in support of Iraqi military units focused on preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State.

In principle, having America’s NATO allies—as well as other coalition partners from around the world—assume greater responsibility for preventing the resurgence of Islamist extremist groups in Iraq makes sense. Why, after all, should the United States shoulder the lion’s share of the burden for keeping terrorism at bay when the rest of the trans-Atlantic community is equally, if not more, threatened by it?

As the Islamic State shows signs of regenerating, any attempt to outsource too much, too quickly risks becoming a path to failure.

Moreover, as U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper has argued, deploying more European forces and military hardware to the Middle East could enable Washington to reduce the U.S. presence there. That in turn might allow the Pentagon to refocus precious resources and attention toward what the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies as its new top priority: great-power competition, in particular with China in the Indo-Pacific.

For Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, having foreign forces operate under NATO’s banner might also prove more politically palatable, especially as they face pressure from Iran to expel the U.S. military, or limit its operations, following the U.S. drone strike on Jan. 3 that killed the longtime Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani.

All these arguments are indeed compelling. Yet history also suggests that U.S. and NATO policymakers need to be cautious—and coldly realistic—about how much European partners, and NATO as an organization, can truly do on their own. Particularly as the Islamic State shows signs of regenerating in Iraq and Syria, any attempt to outsource too much, too quickly to the Atlantic alliance risks becoming a path to failure.

In fact, the United States has made this error before. In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush administration handed considerable responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to NATO. Much as now in Iraq, it was considered safe to do so because the enemy—in that case the Taliban—was seen as having been largely defeated. And, also like today, it was hoped that getting European governments to dispatch soldiers to Afghanistan would free up American troops, who were stretched thin by competing demands from the war in Iraq.

What happened instead is a cautionary tale for the present moment. While many of America’s NATO allies stepped up in response to the Bush administration’s call for help, and though their forces served with courage and honor on the ground in Afghanistan, all too often these troops lacked essential enabling capabilities necessary for the battles into which they had been thrust. In other cases, so-called national caveats undermined the effectiveness of coalition members by barring them from performing basic tasks, including, in the case of one country, conducting offensive operations. Inevitably, it fell to the United States to compensate for its allies’ material shortfalls and limitations stemming from national caveats.

In addition, NATO’s multinational command structure in Afghanistan proved cumbersome, stymying the development of a unified campaign plan against the Taliban at the exact moment that their insurgency was gaining momentum. By the time leaders grasped what was happening, the security situation had severely deteriorated—prompting the United States to surge forces into Afghanistan and re-Americanize much of the war effort, at considerable cost.

The Trump administration would be wise to keep this experience in mind as it pushes for a more robust NATO presence in Iraq. To be sure, Washington can and should rally trans-Atlantic allies to increase their contributions to the mission there, including in roles as advisors to Iraqi units. But ensuring these efforts actually strengthen the overall endeavor instead of merely complicating it will require careful judgment and discipline.

To start, it is important to recognize that Iraqi military commanders—who have been at war now for many years—no longer need much advice on how to carry out most tactical operations with their forces. They also understand the human and physical terrain in their country far better than foreign advisors ever will. Rather, where Iraqis require assistance is in learning how to enable their military operations with high-end, high-tech capabilities, such as airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (both manned and unmanned); cyber operations; precision strike air and ground assets; and intelligence fusion.

Advisers without essential “enablers” will be of little to no value to their Iraqi counterparts or to the effort to keep down the Islamic State.

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Personal note: Will these issues in the Middle East ever be over with? It doesn't look like it!

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