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Old 08-24-2010, 08:13 AM
RANGERConners RANGERConners is offline
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Default Legendary Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team

Legendary Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav


"Spirit of Robert Rogers in the Footsteps of Lauri Torni and Tutelage of Frenchy Theriault...FIRST Wave"

The legendary Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66 was awarded TWO Presidential Unit Citations, the nation's highest unit decoration for extraordinary heroism for their participation in the Battles of the Ia Drang (Pleiku November 1965) and Nathan Hale (Trung Luong June 1966)...the ONLY Recon, LRRP, Ranger, Special Forces or Special Operations unit to be awarded TWO Presidential Unit Citations during a single combat tour of duty…in ANY US Conflict or War; conducted the historic FIRST night combat rappel during the Battle of the Ia Drang along the Cambodian border while attached to the 1st Airborne Brigade and lead by RANGER Lawson; and performed DOD/MACV/OP-35 directed long range reconnaissance (LRRP) operations lead by 101st RECONDO Grimes along the northern Cambodia and southern Laos borders in the spring of 1966 ..."Laying Down FIRST Tracks in the Central Highlands…Chinese Bandits Penetrate Deeper...and Where Others FEARED to Tread!"

RANGER Jerry Conners, Captain 775-847-0214 (Ranger Class 502), Master Parachutist (Honor Graduate of 101st ABN Jumpmaster Class), Special Forces Weapons Expert (1964-65 SF MOI, Weapons & Branch), 101st RECONDO (Brand Number 1919), Army Aviator, AMOC, NRAS-PAL, Military Intelligence Officer Advance Course, Task Force Gramas [Special Operations] ... "Loose Nukes" Recovery Team Greece/Turkey 1974, Sensitive Weapons Theft (RAF Anti-Terrorist Operation) Interdiction Team Misseau, Fort Campbell Sport Parachute Club 1963-64, Distinguished Military Graduate University of Nevada.

Chinese Bandit 13
Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66

Last edited by RANGERConners; 08-24-2010 at 12:36 PM. Reason: reduce characters
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Old 08-24-2010, 09:13 AM
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Old 08-24-2010, 12:31 PM
RANGERConners RANGERConners is offline
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Combat/Reconnaissance Patrol of the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav during Operation Nathan Hale June 23, 1966

On July 19, 1966 the 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Inf, 101st Airborne Division conducted air assaults northwest of Tuy Hoa in the vicinity of Trung Luong Valley and encountered heavy resistance and casualties from battles with the 66th, 95th and 18th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army 302d Division. B and C Companies of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Cav Division were inserted to reinforce the 2/327 Inf on June 20. B Co 1/8th Cav linked up with B Co 2/327 Inf in the morning on June 21 in the vicinity of LZ Eagle. The two airborne battalions experienced continuous attacks, including hand-to-hand combat, and inflicted heavy losses on the two NVA attacking battalions. One wounded NVA company commander was captured from the area in front of the rifle companies and reported his unit had been annihilated and the other NVA units had begun to withdraw on the evening of June 22d.

On June 22, Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav (Chinese Bandits) were extracted from reconnaissance operations being performed in Kontum Province and airlifted to Tuy Hoa airport and placed under the operational control of the 1st Bn 9th Cav, 1st Cav Division. At 0530, 23 June, the Chinese Bandits Recon Platoon and one Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav were inserted into separate landing zones southwest of LZ Eagle to regain contact with the one of the withdrawing NVA forces. The sun was shining and the weather dry and combat engagement was anticipated so the ranger patrol caps were stowed and helmets donned as the Bandits approached and then exited the helicopters on the tree lined hilltop LZ. Both landing zones were located adjacent to wide, ox cart size, trails that led to the higher hilltops where several hundred of the NVA 66th Regiment were believed to be occupying. The Bandit LZ was located along the ridgeline approaching the expected enemy position and the 1/9th Recon LZ was located further downhill in a draw on the Bandit’s left flank.

The Bandits moved along the ridgeline trail and at mid-morning, point man PFC Raymond Carley observed a NVA size squad moving towards them and away from the 1/9th Recon Platoon that was proceeding along the lower trail towards the intersection of both trails. Carley and three others moved into a position ahead in the vicinity of coordinates CQ 958626 where they were able to kill three of the fleeing NVA before the remaining NVA, wearing khaki uniforms and some tan helmets, retreated further uphill.

The Bandits continued up hill along the trail with Carley now opting to carry the new AK47 that he had removed from one of the NVA and having given his own M16 and ammunition to the medic assigned to Recon. Anticipating a main NVA force to be occupying the intersection of the trails being used by the Bandits and the 1/9th Recon Platoon, the 25 man Chinese Bandit force advanced slowly along both sides of the trail while listening to the voices and sounds of the NVA preparing positions along the ridgeline ahead. Carley continued uphill ahead of the other Bandits until he located the first enemy positions and machinegun along the left side of the trail where the Bandits began to move into combat positions amongst the small and sparsely treed locations below the NVA. A second machinegun position was located on the right side of the trail and moments later a third NVA machinegun opened fire and the Bandits exchanged small arms fire (rifle, machinegun, and grenades) for several minutes as they attempted to advance and attack the NVA force.

Operating without orders, SP/4 Frank Spickler, team leader of the 3d Scout Squad, immediately ran forward to assist Carley and those engaging the most concentrated NVA force located in the vicinity of coordinates CQ 962618 where he observed Carley laying along the trail about 30 feet in front of the nearest NVA position. Carley had been shot several times and although alive, he was unable to crawl clear of the withering fire. Spickler moved closer and avoided detection by the NVA until he attempted to cross the trail and pull Carley to safety. Heavy enemy fire prevented Spickler from advancing and he withdrew a short distance to obtain the assistance of other Bandits located near him. Spickler positioned one of the scouts in a location where the scout could provide suppressing fire during his effort to move Carley. Leaving his rifle with the other Bandits, Spickler again moved into position near Carley, he dashed towards him, dropping to a low craw when the NVA fired on him and then rolling near Carley, he was able to hoist Carley on his back and quickly dragged him towards the side of the trail. During this attempt, Spickler felt the impact of bullets entering Carley. Once clear of the most intense fire, Spickler carried Carley to the medic who was already treating several, but less wounded Bandits.

During his second attempt to retrieve Carley, Spickler had located SGT James Lester lying less than ten feet from where Carley had been laying. Again acting without orders, Spickler returned to the area in front of the enemy’s position where he low crawled under fire and dragged the much heavier Lester clear of direct enemy fire.

The Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav had quickly advanced along the wide trail located in the draw and came alongside the left flank of the Chinese Bandits, where both Recon Platoons unsuccessfully attempted a coordinated attack in an effort to over run the NVA positions located near the intersection of both trails.

MSG Johnson, acting platoon leader of the Chinese Bandits, directed Spickler to move forward to a position between the lead scouts and the NVA and mark the position with smoke grenades. All available indirect fire mortars and artillery were positioned to support the other elements of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and the 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Inf and only ARA equipped gunships were able to provide supporting fires. Spickler remained in position, marking the enemy lines while the gunships continually attacked the NVA located in front of the two Recon Platoons and on the higher hilltops for about thirty minutes. One gunship pass was made ‘danger close’ resulting in a 2.75-inch FF aerial rocket exploding and injury several Bandits, including SSG Robert Grimes, the 1st Scout Squad Leader and acting Platoon Sergeant.

The NVA withdrew further uphill allowing the two Recon Platoons to carry their killed and wounded scouts along the side of the lower trail that had been used by the Recon Platoon of the 1/9th Cav. However, as darkness fell, another large NVA force resumed the attack and pursued the wounded men of both Recon Platoons as they made their way towards the LZ designated for extraction. Small firefights occurred throughout the night resulting in further Bandits being wounded. Approaching the LZ that was secured by other troops from the 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division, in the early morning light, medivac helicopters arrived and both Recon Platoons were airlifted to a field medical station that had been located along Highway One. The bodies of Chinese Bandits PFC Raymond Carley and Sergeants James Lester and Honorio Ramirez and the other many wounded Bandits were left with the medics, doctors and nurses. The remaining Chinese Bandits rejoined the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav and commenced patrolling in the area SW of LZ Eagle on June 26, 1966.

This description of the actions taken by Carley and Spickler is only one of the many efforts made by the scouts of both Recon Platoons and warrant being written in recognition of those that fought that day on June 23, 1966. Efforts are underway to post the other detailed descriptions of those engagements on the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav homepage.

Raymond Carley, our youngest Chinese Bandit, is buried at Fort Rosecrans National Cemetery in San Diego County, California; Frank Spickler was awarded the Bronze Star with V Device (something that remains a source of irritation after forty years…it was initially discussed that he was to be given the Distinguished Service Cross); and Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav was awarded its SECOND Presidential Unit Citation for valor. 101st Recondo Spickler was later shot in the lung while serving as the Platoon Sergeant of the 3d Platoon, C Company, 2d Bn (ABN) 501st Infantry, 101st Airborne Division and unable to remain on jump status and left the military in 1970.

The 1965-66 Chinese Bandits were to remain a fighting airborne Recon Platoon with its LRRP Team performing extended long range reconnaissance operations along the borders of ffice:smarttags" />Laos and lace w:st="on">Cambodialace> until November 1966 when they were disbanded having lost most of its original NCOs and scouts.

Extracted from written statement made by Duke Barrett and interviews with Frank Spickler and others serving with the Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav on June 23, 1966; and the official after action reports of the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, and 2d Bn (ABN) 327th Infantry.

Historical footnote: Nathan Hale (June 6, 1755 – September 22, 1776) was a captain in the Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. Hale is best remembered for his “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country’ speech before being hung following the Battle of Long Island. An account of his capture was written by Consider Tiffany, a British Loyalist, and obtained by the Library of Congress. In Tiffany’s account, Major Robert Rogers of the Queens Rangers (“Rogers Rangers†) was the individual responsible for his capture and personally apprehended him. More information can be obtained reference Nathan Hale’s capture in the Library of Congress Information Bulletin-July-August 2003.
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Old 08-24-2010, 12:33 PM
RANGERConners RANGERConners is offline
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Short Duration Patrolling by the Chinese Bandits Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav in January 1966…RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13.

Upon completion of our first Cambodia border combat action, the 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1st Airborne Brigade was rotated to the AnKhe perimeter defensive positions that were still under construction in January 1966. The Chinese Bandits were ordered to conduct reconnaissance patrols and establish ambush positions where the 1st and 2d Scout Squads were designated areas of operations which were suspected NVA approach routes to Hong Kong Mountain located near AnKhe; and the 3d Scout Squad (Chinese Bandit 13) was selected for various reconnaissance patrolling duties at various scattered areas to the northwest and southwest where enemy movement had been recently detected. The majority of the scout squad patrols were intended to be completed in three days and involved day and night movement and the selection of one ambush position that was to be determined by the scout squad leader and based on detected or suspected enemy use of the area.

The patrols conducted by the Chinese Bandit 13 scout squad required one day of planning and preparation and were executed in three or four days, followed by a one or two day opportunity to visit the `sights of AnKhe'. Although the patrols were under the direct control of the scout squad leader, various squad members were designated as the patrol leader and all scouts were rotated into positions that provided them training to sharpen their field leadership skills in navigation, communications and general patrolling skills. The designated patrol leader was required to organize and conduct the warning and operations orders, rehearsals, and ALL execution phases of the patrol and prepare the final debriefing. Frank Spickler, Carlos Hatcher, Frank Cunningham, Louis Tyler and Raymond Carley displayed the most interest in the opportunity to being assigned the patrol leader duties and normally lead the patrols, the actual 3d Scout Squad Leader, Sergeant Jerry Conners, accompanied them. The operations were conducted with the leadership roles performed in the same manner as students attending the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools. Participating in the navigation team was of interest to all members and Sergeant Conners spent the majority of his time working with those chosen to determine the route, construct the terrain table, and perform the point team navigation role during the patrols. We had used this training method before the war to prepare their scouts for the 101st Recondo and Ranger schools where they were expected to be the honor graduates of their class and return with the Recondo guidon and Ranger honor graduate plaque. The skill improvements were essential and the confidence and morale of the Chinese Bandit 3d Scout Squad improved significantly during this period.

Our last in-country parachute training, proficiency pay jumps, were conducted a month earlier in late December; however other air assault training was performed during the period before and after the patrols. The Chinese Bandits provided the instructors for assault rappelling refresher training for the 1st Airborne Brigade. Carlos Hatcher had the most interest in helicopter operations and was responsible for maintaining the helicopter rappelling equipment, including wire rope, clamps, anchor rings, 2000lb tensile snap links and 3000+ lb tensile strength green rope (and sections cut into Swiss seats) and a roll of white `glacier' rope having a lesser stretch factor. The equipment was stored in one of our conex containers near our Jumping Mustangs LZ located downhill from our tents at AnKhe. Hatcher was an 11th Air Assault trained and designated rappelling jumpmaster and rigged the two UH-1s that we used to conduct refresher training; and performed the jumpmaster duties on one of the helicopters during the actual rappelling. The 227th Aviation Battalion regularly provided helicopter support and the crews were experienced in day and night helicopter rappelling. Their helicopters would begin to overheat after about thirty minutes and required `dropping the ropes and going for a cooling run'. Although not an aviator but having established an excellent working relationship with the flight crews while in the 11th Air Assault, Hatcher was occasionally allowed to sit in the co-pilots seat during these short low level flights and permitted to fly the helicopter. The flights lasted only ten minutes but were the highlight of Hatcher's involvement in the training. He was scheduled to attend the Army's flight school and took every opportunity to volunteer in our pathfinder and other air assault duties but was killed at Bon Song a month later. He normally served as our rear security man and fought at the right side of the scout squad leader when engaged with the enemy and had done so since December 27, 1965 when the Chinese Bandits were fired upon during an air assault near Pleiku. As the last man in movement, his appearance in the assault formation was confirmation that all men were on line and could provide an explanation when they were not. He could perform any scout duty well but was indispensable in many. He, Raymond Carley and Frank Spickler (ex-11th Air Assault Recon) designed and ordered the Chinese Bandit Sudden Death cobra pocket patches and "calling cards". Neither Hatcher or Carley lived to see them nor the scroll patch designed later by Combat Jones; however, visiting members of the Chinese Bandits place the patches on their graves.

Louis Tyler was the lead point team scout during this period. He had an eye for anything unusual along the route and did not hesitate to evaluate anything that alarmed him. He had a developed interest in topographic maps and aerial photographs, as did all Chinese Bandit 13 scouts, and took responsibility for locating the enemy and moving quickly along our route. When I hear the words to the later released rock and roll song "Run through the Jungle", I think of him. Then SSG Robert Grimes, our platoon leader and platoon sergeant at the time, selected him as a member of the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team that conducted the 75 km operation along the northern border of Cambodia in the spring of 1966. He was the lead scout on much of that operation but medivaced when he became unconscious and his fever was dangerously elevated. We spent many hours together prior to the three and four-day patrols performing the topographic map spider drills and creating practice trail sketches to sharpen our tracking skills. Tyler had an unusual interest in everything. We have been unable to locate him or his family, but continue to try.

Frank Spickler, the 3d Scout Squad Team leader, and second in command was courageous without a fault. He attempted to master everything related to conducting day and night long range patrolling and combat engagements. His position required that he more frequently serve as the patrol leader and did so. His training was something that he chose but focused on navigation and communications, including fire and aerial support coordinations and the training of the other Chinese Bandits. During this period I began to have confidence in his abilities and believed that Chinese Bandit 13 would perform as well with or without me. Frank never lost his ability to think and perform in the most dangerous situations, he simply gritted his teeth and put `getting the job done' first. The fact that he survived the Vietnam war was not something that I expected. During any engagement Spickler would maneuver himself to get into the best position to assist the men and our efforts to control any situation had an imaginary line that only he and I could see and we both operated on our side of that line. This arrangement worked and we both discussed our roles if one of us had been killed and the adjustment in the chain of command that would have been necessary. We practiced this combat change of command during several drills preparing for the patrols. No one had any doubt that Frank would take command when it became time to do so and his standards for performance would be as high and probably higher than mine. At times it was difficult to harness his energy but never an unpleasant experience, only a strong pressure felt on the reins during enemy contact. Frank would later spend many months in a hospital and almost die from a chest wound while serving as an airborne platoon sergeant in the 101st Airborne Division.

Terry Stevens was the Chinese Bandit 13 radio operator, somewhat reluctantly at first since he wanted to carry the M60 machine gun that was carried when the weapon was necessary. He carried the PRC- 25 and the field expedient vertical half rhombic in addition to his short and long antennas and the SOI tethered about his neck and was developing the ability to know his position to six digit coordinates at all times. He was able to accomplish this feat during this period where we were conducting the patrols from our base at AnKhe. He would perform a map check at each ridgeline and mid-valley crossing and then visualize his position on the map between. He also memorized the pre-arranged fire and other critical check point names and locations and could call a fire mission without consulting his map, or at least initiate the call and adjust as necessary. The advantage of his ability to do so was appreciated by all Chinese Bandits and something that is a pleasure to remember. Stevens' willingness and preference to serve as the Chinese Bandit 13 RTO occurred only when it was apparent that he was a FO first and RTO second. I rarely actually used the radio, and relied him to perform all routine radio transmissions and only did when he thought I might have something to offer or believed that something was to be gained by my personally communicating. He prepared every situation report and I only confirmed the grid coordinate locations after Stevens and another scout had completed a confirmation check. I do not recall him ever making a mistake. Although our internal SOPs required my checking all coded messages, I rarely did so and relied totally on Stevens and another scout to insure that no errors were made. Stevens was also selected for the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team and his role as an RTO was expanded since he was often not in direct contact with either SSG Grimes or myself. His command and control responsibilities required an expertise and level of initiative that was necessary since separation between LRRP team members was normally deemed essential. He performed these duties without any problems occurring. The PRC-25 did not provide the long distance capability needed during these short duration patrols; however the Division had aviations assets and relay equipment that were used to support our hourly situation reporting requirements. The inherent danger of not operating with continuous uninterrupted communication capabilities and unable to request supporting fires and other support was apparent to all. We were provided emergency frequencies for contact with other friendly forces, however no direct coordinations were or rehearsed with such units. Operating without established and continuous communications capabilities was an error that was not rectified for two months. Stevens continued to sharpen his RTO and FO skills during this early combat period and several months later I recall our running towards each other while he was initiating a call for fire and only having to say "SHIFT RIGHT and FIRE FOR EFFECT". Stevens was largely responsible for our being deadly on the battlefield.

We have been unable to locate Stevens either. Duke Barrett of the Chinese Bandit 2d Scout Squad said several years ago, "your Chinese Bandit 13 scouts came home and disappeared back into the mountains where they came from." That may not be true for those scouts that had been born and raised in cities, but it may apply to Terry Stevens, ex-11th Air Assault Recon.

Frank Cunningham had been assigned to the Chinese Bandits while we were conducting the first Cambodia border operations in early January. He had volunteered for a levy from his V Corps LRRP unit while assigned to Germany. Cunningham required little training and only an adjustment to our procedures and the terrain. He quickly demonstrated his superior scouting skills and assisted in training the other Chinese Bandits in map reading and navigation and specifically route selection. Cunningham trained and demonstrated his excellent abilities as the designated patrol leader and in January it was understood that if Frank Spickler or I would go down then Cunningham would move into our leadership position. He preferred point but was later to assume the rear security role when Hatcher was killed. Cunningham was an obvious candidate for the first LRRP team operation along the Cambodia border but was not selected to insure the leadership of Chinese Bandit 13 in the event of my death. Frank Spickler was likewise prevented from participating in our first 12 day LRRP operation, but both men would participate in the second LRRP operation along the border of Laos where we participated in an evaluation of the NVA's radio communications capabilities. Cunningham's skill and determination to perform long-range reconnaissance operations greatly influenced Chinese Bandit 13 being selected to perform such roles. His demeanor was and remains that of a genuine explorer and scout and the photograph of his Chinese Bandits aboard the UH-1 prior to an air assault captures the spirit of Larry Thorne and Robert Rogers and the Chinese Bandits. He is a reincarnation of Kit Carson.

Glen Winnescheck, a proud Wisconsin Winnebago and at my side earlier in the year when I had made an error resulting in the Chinese Bandits being exposed to enemy fire and were forced to attack and maneuver from a poor position. I was only able to yell, "enemy to front, ATTACK". Winnescheck came flying out of somewhere behind me and into his assigned fighting position on my left. The next few seconds occurred without firing our weapons but low crawling and diving to get into a more favorable and dominating position and although the Chinese Bandits were online and advancing at most times Winnescheck remained ahead of me maneuvering himself which shielded me to some degree. I was to ask him later if he had done this to protect me from fire. He did not answer and I had to say, "You will answer and I want the truth." He stared defiantly back and answered quietly "Yes." I did not have to ask him why and the memory of him awakens strong emotions. Of all the Chinese Bandits, I was the closest to Winnescheck. He is dead now, buried on the Reservation and we need to visit his grave when the tribe has a ceremony honoring him. It is not uncommon for fighting men to risk their lives for another, but it is unusual to be a man who has had the honor of one doing so for them. In January, I assumed many of us would die and that Winnescheck would do so at my side. Winnescheck fought on quietly during his tour with intense effort and commitment to the Chinese Bandits and our objective to help the Vietnamese and was of course wounded but survived the war. I regret going home and leaving him in-country alone but with other the Chinese Bandits. At the time we believed that we were freeing the oppressed and Winnescheck was committed proudly to that goal. He conducted himself honorably and was a gracious and courageous defender of the poor and disadvantaged. He served as a senior scout but it was understood that when our roles became more combat then reconnaissance he would be instrumental in overcoming the NVA opposition. He was a scout second and a warrior FIRST.

Big and Little Hall, one in red beret and the other always in the designated patrol uniform, both men rotated on point and mastered map reading and navigating. They performed point duties always as a team and were wounded early but were instrumental in developing the Chinese Bandits patrolling techniques and protocols during the January three and four-day patrolling period. Malaria brought down all of us from time to time and some more than others. Punji sticks took a toll on the point teams more than those performing other patrol duties and the Halls suffered from both experiences and Chinese Bandit 13 did not perform as well when they were absent. On one occasion while we were patrolling in the mountains near the border, Big Halls' confidence had peaked and with morale soaring donned his red beret and proceeded down a tall grassy trail following old tracks into the valley. We were spread long distances apart but when I came out of the trees and looked down the grassy slope ahead, I saw a prominent red item moving near the base of the hill. I ran down the trail to catch up with my point team and passed Little Hall to confront Big Hall. We linked up in an area that was coved in triple canopy jungle and along the trail heading towards the border of Cambodia. He had his rifle in the `ranger carry' position and was moving at a brisk walk. The tracks were still aged and there was no indication of the enemy, and he was determined to close the distance between the NVA and us. He heard me approaching when I was 20 meters behind him and turned grinning. I was wearing my snake eyes expression and he stopped smiling and waited for me. "Do you honestly think that red hat can't be seen?" I asked. "Do you want me to take it off and not wear it?" He responded. " No I want you to answer my question." It took him a few seconds to answer, "There are no NVA here and it will take us at least another half day to locate them." "Are you referring to their location on the aerial photos we were given," I replied. "Yes, but there are also no fresh tracks or other signs," he stated with conviction. I responded "You ain't that good to make that call yet. Don't wear the hat when it can be seen from a distance." And then, "Am I correct?" I asked. He replied, "Yes," immediately. Hall removed the hat and put it in his butt pack. Later it was demonstrated on many occasions that I was wrong. His knowledge was excellent and judgment regarding where the enemy were and were not was outstanding and he was permitted to wear the red beret whenever he believed it was appropriate to do so. The last time I saw him wearing it was not on patrol, although he did so, but in Sin City at the bar. Little Hall had some type of brown beret. The berets had been bought or traded from some South Vietnamese troops. Neither of the Halls, both men wounded during the same operation, has been located since their evacuation.

Other Chinese Bandits arrived later as replacements and the original eight man scout squad reached an assigned strength of twenty-three men but could rarely field nine men with individuals hospitalized for wounds and disease and authorized R & R. These new men were absorbed, trained and performed heroically and excellently.

Several of the patrols that we conducted in January 1966, have special significance but share a threshold of common experiences. The planning and preparation, air assault, day and night movements searching for the NVA, ambush selection and occupation, searching for the NVA while moving towards the pickup zones, extraction and debriefing phases were similar but the variation in the terrain and enemy situation provided the variables that kept the patrolling interesting and challenging.

All air assaults involved at least thirty minutes of flight time from our base at AnKhe and often provided by the same flight crews assigned to the 227th Aviation Battalion. The routes were never conducted directly to the insertion landing zones but varied for obvious reasons. The patrol areas in January were located at distances where artillery support was unavailable and encompassed the valleys and hills immediately east of the northern Cambodia and southern Laos borders.

The first of these three and four-day patrols was to be performed west of AnKhe in a long valley, which was not believed to be occupied or used by the NVA and only small Viet Cong units, were believed to be operating in the area. I selected Frank Spickler as the `informal' patrol leader and assisted him with the warning and operations order while Louis Tyler and Frank Cunningham worked with Raymond Carley on point team skills including map reading with emphasis placed on performing his `spider drill' exercise and creation of the terrain table. Carley had been designated the assigned M60 gunner in part due to his persistent request to carry the machinegun and another scout was temporarily designated to carry the M60 on the patrol. The area of operation provided the opportunity to make use of the machine gun and Spickler had chosen to use the weapon despite my `vote' not to do so.

Two UH-1s arrived at 0600 on the Mustang LZ located near our tents at AnKhe and the crews shut down their engines and secured their aircraft. I accompanied Spickler when he briefed the flight crews and discussed details related to our flight route, altitude, checkpoints, and actions approaching and on the landing zone where we would be inserted. The flight would take approximately 30 minutes.

With our patrol caps tucked into our shirts, we loaded aboard the helicopters thirty minutes later and began the flight to the insertion point. Spickler knelt behind and between the pilot and copilot seats and wore a flight helmet connected to the aircraft's communication system. I set in the seat nearest the pilot and observed Spickler call off each checkpoint while enroute and confirmed the release point ahead before removing the flight helmet as we approached the landing zone. Spickler gave the signal and we moved to sit on the edge of the floor with our feet on the landing struts of the helicopter. With the other helicopter to our rear, the pilot flared the helicopter and we exited onto the dry short grass field and ran towards the near tree line that marked the edge of the western hill.

The helicopters would return to AnKhe by another route and made no fake insertions. The procedure was deemed too dangerous for the flight crews and provided marginal benefits to minimizing our insertion being detected. We believed that any insertion would be investigated and that is was important that we quickly move long distances away from any landing zone and thereby increase the degree of difficulty in being followed and detected.

The Chinese Bandits from both helicopters assembled on the run and transitioned into a file formation with Carley at the lead. Tyler and Cunningham followed a short distance behind him. Carley lead the patrol northward along a trail towards the first checkpoint where we would conduct our first `laydog'. He, Tyler and Cunningham occasionally stopped to exam the trail that was dry and did not contain tracks of any kind. No member of the patrol conducted pace counts and was expected to `remain on the map' at all times with minimal map checks of the topographic maps that had been issued to each man. We moved at a 4 kilometer per hour pace and arrived at the laydog site in hour. The route along the valley consisted of gently rolling terrain with dense small, less than 25-foot tall trees and tall shrubs and became more dense and damp as we advanced northward. We occupied the site forming a 100-meter diameter circular perimeter after circling back along the trail. The scouts moved into the previously designated positions that had been identified from aerial photographs and all persons began the process to adjust to the sights, sounds and smells of the area. We did not anticipate enemy activity but understood the importance of optimizing our perception skills quickly and after only fifteen minutes of the last man occupying the site, the Chinese Bandits patrol began its file movement towards the next checkpoint.

Spickler and Terry Stevens would link up and discuss pre-arranged fire targets and emergency rendezvous points. Spickler and I assisted Stevens in his efforts to stay on the map within six digit coordinates using only infrequent map checks. Tyler and Cunningham were making similar efforts with Carley. We slowed our movement to about 2 km per hour without encountering any enemy or indigenous persons and stopped at predetermined locations where we `lay dogged' and observed and persons were permitted to eat portions of the C- rations that were carried. Each man carried only one C-ration meal per day and was permitted to carefully bury and conceal any cans, wrappers or other trash. We were easily able to advance northward for a distance of twenty-five kilometers before sundown.

I made frequent trips to the rear and brainstormed rear security duties and methods with Carlos Hatcher. I would take one of the Halls with me each time so that they would also benefit from the training involved when occasionally lagging back behind a greater distance in an effort to determine if we were being followed. During my movements along the patrol file I would normally carry my map out and had each individual point out our location using a small twig. Most of the Chinese Bandits were still struggling with terrain association at this time and their navigation skills were a major factor in their selection for participation on more difficult and dangerous missions. Earlier patrols conducted in late November and December had identified those individuals who were not committed to the mastery of navigation and other the skills required and they had been transferred to other units. `Remaining on the map' was approaching a `do or die' standard in Chinese Bandit 13 and each of the remaining men demonstrated continued improvement.

As darkness fell, the scouts moved closer together attempting to maintain visual contact with the man ahead. This was accomplished only sporadically, since the trail that we were following meandered through the tall trees and prevented continuous visual contact unless persons were to maintain a distance of less than twenty feet. On this early patrol we had planned to maintain a minimum distance between scouts of 50 meters that required adjusting as a scout was detected at lesser distances.

As planned, I joined the point team at EECT and assisted the point team in their navigation and tracking duties. We discussed many things during the next few hours, including the origin of any sighting, sound or smell and stopped frequently to examine the trail surface for any evidence of usage. Carley had not master map reading and land navigation at this stage and we stopped many times in the night to have `class'. The Chinese Bandits' rifle slings had been removed and members typically went down on one knee when stopping or leaned against a tree and selected halt positions that provided some advantage that could be either a creature comfort or afforded some tactical advantage.

We maintained our 50% awaken and alert policy at each laydog position and each scout was afforded the opportunity to sleep three hours during the first twenty-four hours of the patrol. Sleep cycles required the use of two men groupings during halts both during the day and night. Although I regularly `walked the line' to insure everyone was `accounted for' the standard for maintaining contact, knowing when to sleep and remained with each individual. We did not establish the teamwork needed to operate in this manner until late February. A counter-snoring program was enacted early and before December 1965; however, it took some time to solve the problem that was often specific to each individuals needs. In addition to 50% remaining alert, the two men grouping when sleeping was permitted also required an individual to prevent his `ranger buddy' from snoring. As we lost weight from our physical activity, minimal diet, and disease, persons that had snored previously did not or at least rarely; however, we remained vigilant to prevent the sounds of snoring or other noises being made by our sleeping comrades. Few persons talked in their sleep or experienced nightmares. We did not carry or wear gloves and learned to aggressively place a hand over the mouth and nose of others when necessary. I do not recall anyone sleep-walking but we remained alert for that behavior also.

One of the earliest errors that occurred when we stopped during laydog or other halts was a person urinating/defecating near their position. The smells dominated the odors in the area and prevented persons from developing the smell perceptions needed and would have been easily detected by anyone moving nearby. The Chinese Bandits had learned that urinating and defecating required planning and that persons having diarrhea should not patrol on missions where stealth was especially important.

An essential element at halts was the planning to do so after scouting trail intersections in all directions and then moving the entire patrol beyond that intersection where the rear security team would then monitor in the manner that was appropriate. Many previously unidentified trail intersections were discovered which required variation and flexibility to optimize our efforts to locate the enemy and minimize the risk of our discovery.

We encountered many suitable ambush sites but having found no evidence of human occupation or usage of the area, we continued northward to the planned trail intersection that turned westward and up the hillside covered in taller and sparsely spaced trees. As the sky began to lighten we approached the ridgeline having stopped many times to hold one-on-one navigation and tracking classes with specific patrol individuals. Noise discipline was not maintained and the discussions were not done quietly. I was confident of our assessment that the area was not occupied by enemy forces and took the opportunity to TRAIN. When operating in more dangerous situations, the Chinese Bandits remained in a training `mode', including individuals performing pushups and sit-ups on a frequent, often hourly basis; however, such physical training was discretionary but something that many of us believed important and necessary. Hatcher and I often `pushed away the mountains of Vietnam' with our feet elevated upslope. I do not recall for certain if he could do more than I but believe that he did so.

We performed the planned lay dog on the ridge line and I met with each Chinese Bandit to insure that they had our position plotted on their maps and remember the planned route that we would be taking during daylight and the tentative ambush site that would be occupied that night. Every Chinese Bandit correctly identified the route, ambush site and other critical points. We had only moved about six kilometers during the night and proceeded down hill along the trail reaching the next checkpoint located in the valley floor before 6 AM. We had moved more than 35 kilometers since being inserted.

At the valley floor we intercept the trail running parallel to the hill ridgeline. The valley terrain and vegetation was identical to that we had encountered the previous day and we advanced slowly southward towards at a pace that was intended to allow our passing the planned ambush site in the early evening. Again, no signs of human occupation or usage of the trail was found; however, we did not `go admin' and remained vigilant and shifted into our maximized efforts to maintain noise discipline while focusing on training the newly designated point team which consisted of the Halls. Tyler and Cunningham remained with them while Carley resumed his duties carrying the M60 machine gun. I continued moving along the file working with each man, but walked with Carley for long periods discussing our plans to get his navigation and tracking skills to the level that he sought.

Despite my direction and requests, many of the men had not abandoned their smoking habit and those individuals knew not to request that they be allowed to smoke but often carried the issued cigarettes with them hoping that conditions might permit them doing so. "Don't even think about it," I would say to some of them as we met along the trail. Chewing was not permitted either and spitting would have compounded the problem in our minimizing signs of our use of the trail.

I doubled back often to examine the signs that we were making along the trail and discussed the problem with Hatcher often. Each man avoided the trail when it was easily marked but this was more difficult to determine during darkness and we did not have the skills that would later evolve. Circling back at each planned halt and lay dog was always expected to reveal a talented enemy or local hunter following us, but that never happened until the Crazy Horse operation five months later and the circumstances were different.

The Halls had advanced navigation and tracking skills and after rotating Carley, Tyler was designated the patrol leader and Spickler moved rearward to assume his normal role in Chinese Bandits 13. I spent the much of the day with Tyler assisting him when needed and discussing our SOPs. He was very motivated and wanted to learn more. The need for a Ranger-Recondo school was evident and we talked about him going to Ranger school when he rotated home. I believed that he could have easily passed the course without attending either the 101st Recondo or 82nd Raider courses, but recommended he do so if assigned to either unit which was the expected next assignment for returning Chinese Bandits. I lost track of Tyler after the Chinese Bandit tour and do not know what he did later. Frank Spickler did attend the 101st Recondo School when he rotated but was shot in the chest on his second tour and his physical profile prevented him from attending Ranger school or remain on jump status and he left the military.

I did not intervene or coach anyone as the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol approached and passed the site selected earlier as a tentative ambush site. The site was located at a T-intersection of trails. The intersection did not reveal and signs of usage but Tyler made the decision that we would occupy the site as planned and lead the patrol southward for several kilometers before reversing direction and doubling back along side but not on the trail towards the T- intersection where the Chinese Bandits would occupy and form an L- shaped ambush. Hatcher remained back with another scout in an early warning role alongside the trail. He was not equipped with any radio equipment that would allow communication with Tyler at the actual ambush site and the SOP at the time required that he allow any personnel that numbered less than 10 persons pass without any action. If more than 10 persons were to pass, then he was expected to fire his M16 on full automatic at those following the `first ten' and immediately break contact and move rapidly to the designated rallying point that was located about 1000 meters uphill from the trail. In the event Hatcher made the decision to open fire, then all Chinese Bandits were required to immediately move towards the rally point and abandon any trip flares or Claymore mines that were setup in the kill zone. The point men, on this night, the Halls, were likewise occupying the other early warning position that was located uphill along the trail and had the same SOP.

As the men occupied their ambush position under EENT light conditions, I moved towards the Halls position and located them when they waved their patrol caps with `ranger eyes' in my direction. We talked quietly for an hour. None of the Chinese Bandits anticipated contact but remained vigilant with the `50% awake' routine. We did not have starlight scopes and the heavier infrared scopes and power source was only carried when we operating in open terrain where a long shot could be made. However, Chinese Bandit 13 did carry two smaller infrared observation devices capable of viewing objects to a range of about fifty meters. Each early warning team used one IR device.

I returned to the center of ambush site occupied by Tyler and Stevens and remained with them for several hours and informed them that I would move to Hatcher's position before moving southward further down the valley as I had planned earlier. Since we did not anticipate contact, I would move by myself southward along the trail for several thousand meters and meet the patrol in the morning at the designated checkpoint. In the event of an enemy engagement where weapons fire was exchanged, then I would meet the patrol at the designated ambush rally point. I did not take this action for practical reasons but scouting `out ahead' was something that did have some merits and I enjoyed doing so and attempting to find the NVA alone. Some of the Chinese Bandits were permitted to also do this later but not in January.

We linked up in the morning as planned and I rotated Carley back on point and Spickler as the patrol leader. The route we used crossed the valley where it narrowed and then northward along the opposite side of the valley. We occupied another ambush that night without detecting any sign of the enemy or indigenous personnel. Again, I left the patrol during the ambush and followed a trail that led towards a small treed depression in the valley. At daybreak, I reached the edge of the tree line where I found a small paper pamphlet that read "Don't be cannon fodder for Johnson, go home". I followed the trail into and down the slope into the bottom of the sink hole where I observed a pith helmet lying on the ground about 20 meters ahead. I turned and moved quickly back along the trail and in daylight back towards the checkpoint where I would link up with the patrol. I did discover human barefoot tracks that I had not noticed while moving in the darkness.

We were to be extracted from a clearing near the depression where I had located the pamphlet. When we were assembled, I notified Tyler and the others of the discovery of tracks, pamphlets and pith helmet and we discussed using the alternate LZ located further to south and near the route that we had taken the previous day. Stevens who had been transmitting hourly status reports during the daytime was instructed to send our extraction request using the alternate LZ in his next report. We were to be extracted at 7 AM and moved several kilometers backward along the trail to the LZ and arrived about twenty minutes before the aircraft were scheduled to arrive. We secured the LZ and did not locate any evidence of enemy activity but remained vigilant of the possible presence of enemy approaching from the direction where we had came and where the sightings were discovered.

Two UH-1s arrived as planned and we quickly boarded and made the return flight with each man considering what would have occurred if we had extended the patrol and followed the tracks found at the treed depression. Spickler again knelt between the pilots and called out the checkpoints along the route. Hatcher was doing the same thing in the trailing aircraft.

After landing at the Mustang LZ in AnKhe, the Chinese Bandit 13 patrol assembled at the picnic table near the field mess and compared notes and assisted in preparing the debriefing report while SSG Robert Grimes I discussed the pamphlet and other findings that were made only a few hours ago. We all ate breakfast together and the men returned to the Chinese Bandit tents while Grimes and I went to present the NATO format debriefing. The discoveries became the hot topic in the briefing and steered the group away from the equally important problem of solving our radio equipment limitations that would be only partially solved to any of our satisfaction two months later when the first DOD/MACV directed LRRP operation was performed by the Chinese Bandit LRRP team along the northern Cambodia border.

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Old 08-24-2010, 12:34 PM
RANGERConners RANGERConners is offline
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Join Date: Aug 2010
Location: Virgina City, Nevada, USA
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RAYMOND CARLEY REMEMBERED


by Ranger Jerry Conners,


Chinese Bandit Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1965-66



face down crawling
the pain does not matter anymore
they can not help me,
Don't try he yells
to those nearby
must it end

the ground is warm,
the smell of the earth
the fallen leaves in hand
engulfed in the sounds of withering fire
touched twice again
he grimaces and smiles
through gritted teeth
alone without strength
must it end,

colder now
shaking
unable to breathe
or tear the collar too close
about his neck,
struggling frantically
to hold on
numb now,
through squinted eyes some light,
soaked in blood
fingers slowly grasping emptiness,
swaying in the arms of death
let there be more




Note: Raymond Carley was killed leading the attack on June 23, 1966 during the Battle of Trung Luong where the Chinese Bandits were awarded their 2d Presidential Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism during the period 1965-66…the first was awarded for participation in the Battle of Ia Drang in November 1965.

Last edited by RANGERConners; 08-24-2010 at 12:35 PM. Reason: reduce characters
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