A-10 Retirement Move Threatens Troop Security

[thedrifter]

05-30-2003

A-10 Retirement Move Threatens Troop Security



By Ralph Omholt



Just when you thought the U.S. military services had finally learned the value of operating and fighting together, the Air Force has come up with a boneheaded, selfish and destructive plan whose impact will lessen overall U.S. combat power.



I?m referring, of course, to the Air Force?s decision to retire its entire fleet of A-10 ?Warthog? close-air-support aircraft.



News reports reveal that in early April, Maj. Gen. David A. Deptula, Director of Plans and Programs at Air Combat Command headquarters, drafted a memo to justify the decommissioning of the A-10 fleet. There are eight active-duty A-10 squadrons in the service today, down from 18 in 1991. Deptula?s memo sets the stage for the retirement of those remaining squadrons as early as 2004.



Unlike its swept-wing, supersonic cousins, the A-10 was built specifically to fly low to the ground in support of field ground troops. The A-10s delivered a combat soldier?s most precious commodity ? time. That commodity translates into the ability to advance, or simply to survive. Disregarding its unconventional appearance, the A-10 is considered one of the most effective weapons systems of both the 1991 Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom this spring.



While equipped with jet engines, the Warthog is specifically designed to loiter over the battlefield for prolonged periods in support of ground troops. Its fuselage and cockpit are heavily armored to withstand enemy ground fire. And it is an aircraft built particularly around a gun ? the 30-mm. GAU-8/A Gatling cannon that can fire 3,900 rounds of tank-piercing ammunition per minute ? that strikes terror in the hearts of the enemy. The Warthog can also drop bombs, with desired precision.



Just ask the Iraqi troops who faced the Warthog?s killing power two months ago. Writing in The New York Times on May 27, military aviation expert Robert T. Coram noted that ?Iraqi prisoners interrogated after the war said the aircraft they feared most were the A-10 and the ancient B-52 bomber.?



Even more incredible is the timing of the Air Force decision to kill off the A-10. Coram revealed that Deptula?s memo appeared even as a group of A-10s were saving a 3rd Infantry Division unit from an Iraqi counterattack:



?The United States Army had arrived at a Tigris River bridge on the edge of Baghdad to find Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers positioned at the other end. A deadly crossfire ensued. A call for help went out, and despite heavy clouds and fog, down the river came two A-10s at an altitude of less than 1,000 feet, spitting out a mix of armor-piercing and explosive bullets at the rate of 3,900 rounds per minute. The Iraqi resistance was obliterated. This was a classic case of ?close air support.? ?



So why would the Air Force want to terminate such a successful and battle-tested aircraft?



Coram, author of an excellent biography of the late military visionary Col. John Boyd, noted that this reflects the Air Force?s historic prejudice against close-air support missions (and fighter aircraft as a whole) in favor of long-range bombers. The move also reaffirms the Air Force fetish with high technology ? and weapons sales. From the F-16 ?Falcon? to the advanced F-22 ?Raptor,? the Air Force has never seen an aircraft it liked unless that aircraft could be loaded up with as many ?gold-plated? systems as possible.



Retaining the A-10 is obviously not an Air Force priority: Building as many high-tech F/A-22s, at $252 million per copy, or F-35 joint strike fighters, with an estimated unit cost of approximately $40 million, is the top priority.



And what does the Air Force propose to bring in as a replacement for the A-10 in close air support? Historically, the Air Force has attempted to use the F-16 fighter jet as a close air support aircraft. However, in the 1991 Gulf War and in the Balkans, the Air Force couldn't allow the F-16 to fly below 10,000 feet due to its vulnerability to anti-aircraft guns and missiles, not to mention its inability to loiter over the battlefield. Its ability to protect ground troops was seriously limited by those factors.



Now, the Air Force argues that the incoming F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will suffice as a replacement aircraft for the A-10. However, that aircraft reportedly is as vulnerable to ground fire as the F-16, casting doubt as to whether the generals will ever allow it to operate low enough to do a sufficient job.



(And why not use Army attack helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache? As combat experience in Iraq confirmed, helicopters can?t fill that requirement since their ability to carry sufficient fuel and armament is compromised by a limited speed and weight capacity. However agile they may be, they cannot do the same job. The modern helicopter has proven too fragile for intense combat operations.)



Whether the A-10s are continued to be flown by the Air Force, or ? as proposed by some experts, turned over to the Army or Marines ? the Warthog remains the single jet aircraft designed to effectively and reliably support ground troops. Until a battle-proven replacement is provided, the A-10s should continue in service.



The absence of such a proven weapons system can only put American troops fighting in future conflicts in serious danger.



Ralph Omholt is a Contributing Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at skydrifter@attbi.com.

Sempers,

Roger