Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

[David]

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
Current operations have proven that USMC unarmored ground vehicles are unsuitable to support combat operations. Mine warfare is nothing new to the US. In WWII and Korea, the US lost about 5 percent of its casualties to mines and ambushes. However, mine related casualties skyrocketed to 33 percent during Vietnam and 26 percent for Somalia.

In Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, RPGs, mines, IEDs, and small arms fire have been responsible for over 30 percent of Marine Corps level III and IV casualties. According to audiotapes released in November 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ordered his followers to "Block off all their main and secondary supply lines for these are their main arteries and ambush them along those routes for they are exposed and easy prey." The Corps was responding to the threat slowly because it took time for industry to build what is needed. As a result the enemy adapts before the Corps gets a chance to protect Marins. As of 2005 the enemy was inside the Corp's OODA loop and had the Marins chasing their tales.

The Marine Corps responded to these guerilla tactics by with a proactive-reactive strategy in order to increase the survivability of vehicles. Marines began armoring vehicles with steel from whatever source was available, and then as the threat grew and evolved, we followed this ad hoc armor with factory produced Marine Armor Kits (MAK) for HWWMVs and Marine Armor Systems (MAS) for MTVRs. This was then followed with the acquisition of the ultimate in HMMWV protection, the Up-Armored HMMWV. These armoring efforts have provided an immediate response to the threat that has saved lives and reduced casualties, but it does not correct the deficiencies that still exist with the current ground tactical vehicle fleet. The MAK and MAS kits should afford the time we need to launch a counter-attack aimed at the heart of the problem: the vulnerability of the current ground tactical vehicle fleet.

The current ground tactical vehicle fleet does not have the survivability needed to support and sustain operations on the modern battlefield. While the US has superior intelligence collection, training, and tactical skill, the enemy continued to exploit the vulnerability of Marines in the current vehicle fleet. The most likely threat the Ground Tactical Vehicle Fleet (GTVF) will encounter under ship to objective maneuver (STOM) scenario is a combination of mines and small arms employed by unconventional forces operating in a non-contiguous battlespace. The legacy GTVF was not designed to withstand this threat. The GTVF was designed to support the Cold War linear battlefield.

The Marine Corps must develop a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) combat vehicle fleet capable of sustained operations in a chaotic, mine-infested, non-linear battlespace. Marines can no longer disregard survivability in favor of reliance on the ability to predict and neutralize threats. Unprotected vehicles result in unnecessary casualties that degrade operational readiness and that are politically untenable. There is a fleeting opportunity to skip a generation in research and development and move directly to a mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle designed from the ground up that gives us an order of magnitude increase in survivability.

A Baseline Survivability Index would be similar to how the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration establishes Federal Highway Safety Standards to protect vehicle occupants. If the Marines established a BLSI for every Marine Corps Vehicle, it would mitigate and reduce risk associated with combat and non-combat killers. Every vehicle system would possess the same Base Line Survivability Index. Every Marine is a rifleman, every vehicle system is a weapon system. If it going to go into harms way, if someone is going to shoot at it with real bullets, it needs to be protected from that threat. The BLSI will specify key performance parameters that will protect every Marine operator to a specified minimum level. That level should be established in combat because it will be the goal to ensure that every vehicle system becomes a combat vehicle system. The end result would be a Ground tactical vehicle fleet that became a Ground Combat Vehicle Fleet that is survivable, adaptable and supports operations across across the range of military operations.

This would created a Multi-mission Mult-role Family of Vehicles: RECON, C2, Cargo Truck, Fighting Vehicle. It must be capable of fighting and sustaining among non-linear battlespace. It must be strategically agile and tactically mobile to enable broad range of big M and little M operations. Getting to the battlefield only to by stymied by mines is not good enough. Adversary countries are already purchasing this capability.

The requirement for MRAP is not limited solely to combat operations. The mine and IED threat is pervasive throughout most of the developing world and the vulnerability of US ground tactical vehicles is a liability any time the US deploys. According to the International Committee to Ban Landmines, over 87 countries have a significant landmine or unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems. This coupled with the easy accessibility of mines and other ordnance on the world arms market makes MRAP essential for every Marine vehicle. The enemies of the United States will spare no expense to kill Marines whenever they are given the opportunity.

MRAP vehicles exist today. Companies abroad and in the United States produce MRAP systems, and both Army and Marine Corps engineers are successfully exploiting this technology in Iraq and Afghanistan. MRAP-equipped units that before required dedicated infantry support to complete their mission would now be equipped with a survivable, offensive weapon system that would enable independent operations. MRAP vehicles are inherently offensive in character, built from the ground up to survive a combination of mines, RPGs and small arms fire, and would better support Marine concepts of Ship to Objective Maneuver and the emerging concept of distributed operations.

The cost of acquiring a MRAP vehicle fleet will be significant. However, it is militarily and financially less expensive to acquire MRAP vehicles than to continue to suffer casualties in excess of Vietnam's historical loss rates. Protecting people is cheaper than replacing them in an all-volunteer service. Research by the Math and Statistics branch of the Naval Safety Center incicates that the financial costs associated to casualties should be adjusted upward no less than 250% from its current 1988 baseline to account for the real dollar costs of care and replacement. Adjusted enlisted casualties average $500,000 dollars while officers, depending upon their military occupation range from one to two million dollars each. This means the average light tactical vehicle with one officer and four enlisted personnel is protecting 2.5 million dollars of the DOD's budget. This $2.5 million is real O&M dollars. The argument that "we can't afford armored vehicles" is specious. The opposite is true, at 2.5 million dollars of precious cargo each, the Corps cannot afford UN-armored vehicles.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Requirements
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a requirement for the procurement of Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles for the Marine Corps and other Joint Forces. The MRAP vehicles are required to increase survivability and mobility of Marines and Soldiers operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats such as small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices. Marines and Soldiers are expected to respond to a variety of missions.

To support these mission profiles, the U.S. Government is seeking two categories/configurations of the MRAP vehicle. MRAP vehicles are armored vehicles with a blast resistant underbody designed to protect the crew from mine blasts, fragmentary and direct fire weapons. MRAP vehicles will consist of two categories: Category I vehicles (6 persons or more including driver) support operations in an urban environment and other restricted/confined spaces; including mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control. Category II vehicles (10 persons or more including driver) will provide a reconfigurable vehicle that is capable of supporting multi-mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, explosive ordnance disposal, ambulance, and combat engineering. The MRAP will provide deployed commanders, various units, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Combat Engineer teams with survivable ground mobility platforms.

In order to perform these multiple missions, it is required that the MRAP vehicles of both types be reconfigurable to meet all mission requirements for that type. Reconfiguration capability shall be primarily accomplished by removing/adding passenger seats and adding/removing GFE equipment, such as communications equipment, weapon stations, crew served weapons, ambulance litters and equipment, etc. The contractor is required to provide vehicles that provide flexible reconfiguration, but are not required to design the vehicles to integrate GFE items unless specified herein.

Performance requirements for both Category I and Category II MRAP vehicles are set forth in the MRAP Performance Specification. All Categories shall sustain a forward speed = than 65 mph on a paved 0 % grade. All vehicles shall be capable, under its own power, of sustained off-road speeds of no less than 5 mph. All vehicles shall be capable, under its own power, of sustained road speeds over trails of no less than 25 mph. All vehicles shall ascend a reinforced surface with a 40% grade at a speed of 10 mph. All vehicles shall ascend and descend a 60% longitudinal grade at a minimum of 2 Miles per Hour (MPH). Each category shall ascend a grade of 5% at 45 mph in a forward direction. All vehicles shall be capable of operating on fuel carried in internal fuel storage tanks for a distance equal to or greater than 300 statute miles, at an average speed of 45 mph on a hard level surface. Each category shall demonstrate a minimum Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF) reliability of not less than 1,200 miles (1,931 kilometers (km)) of operation. The RTM shall have an operational reliability of 0.90 based on an 18-hour mission day, which equates to a mean time between failures (MTBF) of 170 hours.

The MRAP shall be fit for self-deployment on highways worldwide; and the vehicle shall be capable of being transported by rail, marine, and air modes in C-17 and C-5 aircraft in accordance with MIL STD 1366 as described in MIL HDBK 1791. The MRAP shall be capable of being transported by a C-130 aircraft (objective). The vehicle design shall enable preparation for fixed wing air transport, and reassembly after, to be accomplished in not more than 60 minutes using only onboard tools (objective).

The diesel engine shall be capable of meeting all performance requirements in all environmental conditions using JP-8. The MRAP must also have the capability to complete its missions using JP-5 and commercial grade diesel as alternate fuels.

All variants shall provide integral protection for the crew from blast, shock, fragments, and fatal acceleration effects of mine blasts. The crew compartment shall withstand the blast effects without breach of the floor when a mine is detonated under any wheel or directly under the crew compartment. All vehicle tires shall have a minimum 30-mile run flat capability at 30 mph on a hard surface road after complete loss of air pressure in any two tires. The weapons turret for the USMC vehicle shall have the capability to support the Marine Corps Transparent Armored Gunner’s Shield.

In response to the MRAP RFP, offerors shall submit a proposal identifying specific capabilities for their proposed vehicle systems. These proposals shall be incorporated into this contract as an attachment at time of award. The MRAP Performance Specification and the contractor’s technical proposal shall together form the contract requirements for MRAP vehicles. The contractor’s proposal must meet or exceed all requirements in the Performance Specification identified as Threshold requirements. The Government reserves the right to test MRAP vehicles against the requirements of the Performance Specification and contractor technical proposal as specified herein. If the contractor’s MRAP vehicles fail to meet these requirements in testing, then the contractor shall correct these deficiencies in the vehicle design through an ECO/ECP, and apply this design change to all delivered and to be delivered vehicles, all at no cost to the Government. The terms of any vehicle or sub-system warranties offered as part of the contractor’s MRAP proposal shall become in effect at time of initial contract award.

A Firm Fixed Price (FFP) Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) is the contract type effective for the performance period of this contract. Performance shall be made only as authorized by delivery orders issued in accordance with the ordering clause of this contract. The Government shall purchase a “minimum” quantity of two (2) Category I and two (2) Category II Vehicles for this contract within 30 days after contract award. The “maximum” quantity of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles for this contract shall not exceed 1,500–Category I, and 2,600–Category II.

As a result of MRAP source selection, the Government may award one or multiple ID/IQ contracts to successful offerors. These initial ID/IQ contracts shall include an initial funded base quantity of vehicles (2 of each type) that shall be used for Performance Verification Testing (PVT) as described in the Performance Specification. Upon completion of this testing, the Government may award follow-on delivery orders (which may include awards under more than one ID/IQ contract), above the initial contract minimum order. Delivery Orders will be issued in accordance with FAR 16.505.

If the Government elects to award these follow-on delivery orders, the following criteria shall be used as the basis for deciding how to place these orders (in descending order of priority). The Contractor or Contractors vehicle systems that demonstrate the best overall performance in PVT testing (with survivability being the highest priority). The Contractor or Contractors that demonstrate the greatest capability to produce and deliver vehicles with the shortest ramp up time and greatest maximum production capacity, in order to meet the urgent delivery requirements for these vehicles.

Funding availability/affordability will also be a consideration in making the business decision as to how to proceed with an order or combination of follow-on orders. Due to the urgency of the requirement, the Government need not wait for all test vehicles to be delivered and tested before deciding to execute additional delivery orders. Early delivery of initial ID/IQ test vehicles is encouraged. The Government reserves the right not to test an offeror’s vehicle if adequate US Government test data is available and validated by Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC).

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles - Procurement
The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force initially requested 1,169 MRAP vehicles. There are different variants such as, multi-mission combat vehicles, ambulance variant vehicles, troop transport vehicles and so on. The MRAP vehicle’s final design and manufacturer has not yet been determined. As of 10 June 2005 MRAP was one of a dozen USMC Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) awaiting DWG review or require solution resolution. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle UUNS requested an MRAP vehicle capability to increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats. EFDC was developing a course of action for development of a future vehicle that provides the requested capability.

The Marine Corps Systems Command issued a request for industry bids in November 2006 for 4,060 vehicles — 2,500 for the Army, 538 for the Navy and 1,022 for the Marine Corps.

On 27 January 2007 the Navy awarded firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity multiple award contract for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The Government can order up to 4,100 MRAP vehicles composed of 1,500 Category I and 2,600 Category II. Each awardee will receive an initial delivery order for two test vehicles per Category to include associated vehicle support. The total value of the initial delivery orders for 36 test vehicles is $34,574,582. The Government may place additional delivery orders for production vehicles. Vehicles procured under these contracts will be deployed to and supported in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initial test vehicles will be delivered no later than 60 days after contract award. Logistics support will continue up to two years after fielding for test and any production vehicles.

Work will be performed respectively in York, Pa.; Oshkosh, Wis.; North Charleston, S.C.; York, Pa.; Ladson, S.C.; Sealy, Texas; New Orleans, La.; New Haven, Mich.; Westpoint, Miss., and work is expected to be completed January 2008 (2012 with options). Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. These contracts were awarded based on full and open competition from solicitation M67854-07-R-5000. The Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va., is the contracting activity. (Contract Numbers: BAE Systems- M67854-07-D-5025; Oshkosh Truck Corporation- M67854-07-D-5026; Protected Vehicles, Inc.- M67854-07-D-5027; General Dynamics Land Systems- M67854-07-D-5028; Force Protection Industries- M67854-07-D-5031; Armor Holdings- M67854-07-D-5030; Textron Marine & Land- M67854-07-D-5033; General Purpose Vehicles LLC- M67854-07-D-5029; International Military and Government LLC- M67854-07-D-5032). Category I 4x4 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) MRUV
BAE Systems RG33
Force Protection Industries Cougar HEV
General Dynamics Land Systems RG-31
General Purpose Vehicles LLC Seargeant
International Military and Government LLC MaxxPro™
Oshkosh Truck Corporation Bushmaster 4 x 4
Textron Marine & Land Cadillac Gage DINGO 2 4X4
Category II 6x6 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) JERRV
BAE Systems RG33L
Force Protection Industries Buffalo
General Purpose Vehicles LLC Commander
International Military and Government LLC MaxxPro™ XL
Oshkosh Truck Corporation Bushmaster 6 x 6
Protected Vehicles, Inc. Golan CAT II


As of May 2007 estimates valued the total military MRAP procurement at more than $8 billion and in excess of 7,700 units.

As of May 2007 US Central Command indicated it may need as many as 17,700 vehicles, enough to ensure that every soldier who leaves a base in Iraq is riding in one. Nine companies had been selected to build test vehicles, and the Marine had planned to choose multiple winners from the various vehicles submitted. The Army would like one primary design.

On 17 May 2007 it was reported that the Army had asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates to approve spending almost $20 billion for new armored vehicles. This move came a week after Gates called deploying the vehicles the military's top hardware priority. According to a memo dated 15 May 2007 and obtained by USA TODAY, acting Army Secretary Pete Geren asked Gates for as many as 17,770 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs).

By June 2007 Acting Army Secretary Pete Geren had asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates for as many as 17,770 MRAPs, at a cost of $20 billion. The vehicles would be shipped to Iraq after production by July 2009.

[PatoLoco]

Just had our first death in an MRAP this week. Investigation is underway, though many believed it was just a matter of time-- it's not bomb proof, just bomb resistant.

http://abcnews.go.com/International/...ory?id=4169312