S/26910 of 21/12/1993 Fifth report under resolution 699

[David]

S/26910 of 21/12/1993 Fifth report under resolution 699

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).



93-71274 (E) 221293 /...





Annex




Sixth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special

Commission, established by the Secretary-General

pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council

resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the


Special Commission







INTRODUCTION




1. The present report is the sixth on the activities of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), submitted to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. It is the fifth such report provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991). It covers the period from 14 June to 14 December 1993. It is further to the reports contained in documents S/23165, S/23268, S/24108 and Corr.1, S/24984 and S/25977.






I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES




2. Since the last report, there have been further changes in the composition of the Special Commission. Mr. Charles Duelfer has been appointed by the Secretary-General as Deputy Executive Chairman in replacement for Mr. Pierce Corden, and Mr. Terrence Taylor has replaced Mr. Ron Manley on the Commission.




3. The organizational structure remains essentially as reported previously. Currently there are 35 staff in the Office of the Executive Chairman in New York, 23 in the Bahrain Field Office and 77 in the Baghdad Field Office.




4. There is still no agreement on the sale of Iraqi oil to finance United Nations operations resulting from the cease-fire resolution. The financing of the Special Commission's work thus remains a matter of concern. Current expenses have been met from voluntary contributions from Member States and funds made available from frozen Iraqi assets in accordance with Security Council resolution 778 (1992). However, in the absence both of Iraqi agreement to sell oil and of Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 699 (1991) to meet the full costs of the tasks authorized by section C of resolution 687 (1991), the problem of the financing of the Commission's operations remains a matter of great concern and further cash contributions by Governments are urgently required. At the time of writing, the Commission's available funds stood at approximately $1 million, i.e., sufficient to fund operations until mid-January 1994.




5. Governments have continued to support the operation of the Special Commission through the contribution of personnel, services and equipment. A statement of the Commission's operating costs, together with further information on organizational and administrative issues, can be found in appendix I to the present report.





II. STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES




6. The status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations specialized agencies involved in the implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions continue to be regulated by the relevant agreements and Council resolutions and decisions.




7. The Special Commission and IAEA, on the one hand, and the Government of Bahrain, on the other, by an exchange of letters dated 20 September and 23 October 1993 respectively, have extended for a further six months, until 31 March 1994, the agreement provided for in the exchange of letters relating to the facilities, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and IAEA in Bahrain.




8. In Iraq, during the initial part of the period covered by the present report, there were further problems in the implementation of the Special Commission's status, privileges and immunities and with the security of Commission personnel and property. However, since the visit of the Executive Chairman to Iraq in July 1993, the situation has improved considerably and the most recent inspections, including the largest and most intensive yet conducted by the Commission, have passed without incident and with Iraq extending all the facilities requested by the inspection team. However, it should be noted that during UNSCOM65, the investigation into allegations of chemical weapons use by the Government of Iraq against opposition forces, Iraq refused the inspection team's demand to interview army personnel who were in the vicinity of the site of the alleged attack at the time when it was said to have occurred.







III. DEVELOPMENTS





A. Political developments: the attitude of Iraq




9. The period under review has seen many political developments. The first issue to arise concerned the removal of certain precursor chemicals and production equipment from the Fallujah sites to Muthanna for destruction there. This rapidly became intertwined with two other issues: the installation of remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two rocket engine test stands, and the issue of "dialogue" between Iraq, on the one hand, and the Special Commission and IAEA, or the Security Council, on the other.




10. The fundamental underlying issue for Iraq was its desire to see an end to the first phase of implementation of its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991), e.g., the identification and elimination of proscribed weapons and weapons programmes, and for this to be followed by implementation by the Security Council of paragraph 22 of that resolution, i.e., the lifting of the oil embargo, before proceeding to ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Iraq objected to the destruction of the chemicals and equipment on the grounds that they could be redeployed (despite their obvious and direct connection with the chemical weapons programme) and to the installation of the cameras on the grounds that this would, in effect, constitute ongoing monitoring and verification under resolution 715 (1991), a resolution which Iraq had not yet accepted and whose terms, according to Iraq, were still the subject of discussion between Iraq and the Security Council. Instead, Iraq proposed that action on each of these items await the conclusion of a dialogue on all outstanding issues between it and the Special Commission and IAEA.




11. These developments led to the Security Council issuing a statement on 18 June 1993 (S/25970), demanding that Iraq accede to the removal and destruction of the chemicals and equipment in question and cease its obstruction forthwith of the installation of the cameras. Iraq acceded to the removal and destruction of the chemicals and equipment but it continued to refuse the installation of the cameras. In order to resolve this impasse, the Executive Chairman visited Baghdad in July 1993. The result of this visit was a report (S/26127) which recorded position papers of the Commission and Iraq, the Commission's comments on Iraq's position paper and conclusions reflecting common understandings of the two sides.




12. In its paper, Iraq stated for the first time its readiness to comply with the provisions of the plans of ongoing monitoring and verification as contained in resolution 715 (1991). The report noted the agreement of both sides to hold high-level technical talks in New York at which one of the prime subjects would be the nature and implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification. All outstanding issues, including the activation of the cameras, were to be addressed. In the meantime, the cameras were to be installed, tested and maintained. The Commission would send inspectors to the two test sites as and when it wished and Iraq would inform the Commission of each rocket test sufficiently in advance for the Commission to send personnel to observe the test. This arrangement was observed. Iraq did, during an army manoeuvre in November 1993, launch some short-range missiles without notifying the Commission. On learning of these launches, the Commission informed Iraq that it would also require Iraq to inform it of all such launches. The Iraqi side undertook to set in place procedures for such reporting in accordance with the plan.




13. The first round of high-level technical talks took place in New York from 31 August to 10 September 1993 and resulted in a joint report (S/26451). During these talks, the Commission explained to Iraq precisely what ongoing monitoring and verification would entail and Iraq appeared to accept most of the methods to be used. Its prime concerns related to how the intrusive rights and privileges of the Commission, being extended indefinitely into the future, would be implemented so as not to endanger the safety of the Iraqi leadership, infringe on Iraq's sovereignty or hinder its economic or technical development. For the Commission and IAEA, key questions were identified, the answers to which were necessary if they were ever to be in a position to conclude their work on the identification phase of their operations. Most of these key questions related to foreign suppliers and technical advice although, in the chemical weapons area, some related to past production levels.




14. It was agreed at the end of the high-level technical talks to conduct a further round of high-level talks in Baghdad shortly thereafter in order to resolve all the outstanding issues. Iraq promised, in this second round, to provide answers to all the questions identified but not answered during the New York talks. However, the Commission stipulated that there would be no second round unless the monitoring cameras were activated. Before this happened, a further incident arose when the Iraqi side delayed the installation on board one of the Commission's CH53g helicopters of gamma detection sensors, which the Government of France had made available for surveillance and detection purposes. This dispute was quickly resolved upon the return of General Amer, Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, to Baghdad from the New York talks, but this delay resulted in the campaign of survey flights having to be reduced. Furthermore, Iraq did not agree immediately to the activation of the monitoring cameras; agreement was only forthcoming on 23 September 1993, activation being on 25 September 1993.




15. The activation of the cameras and the conduct of the gamma detection surveys permitted the second round of the high-level talks to proceed. A small advance team was sent to Baghdad on 27 September 1993 in order to elicit from the Iraqi side the responses to the questions identified in New York. While Iraq was forthcoming on some of these immediately, most answers were not given before the arrival of the Executive Chairman on 1 October, as Iraq sought to place conditions on the handing over of the information, i.e., that the Commission side should declare the information adequate before even seeing it.




16. After intensive discussions on all outstanding issues, Iraq did hand over a more detailed account of its chemical weapons production in the past and, for the first time, details on the suppliers of critical equipment or materials in each of the categories, including on those who provided technical advice. However, in exchange for this, Iraq sought to have the information treated as solely confidential to the Commission and requested a statement from the Commission that Iraq was now fully in compliance with section C of resolution 687 (1991), less the future monitoring aspects thereof. This latter statement the Commission could not give, rather wording the report with caveats relating to adequate verification of the newly received information. This did not fully satisfy the Iraqi side, which still sought a definitive statement on the part of the Commission and IAEA to the effect that Iraq was now in full compliance with its obligations. In particular, it sought a statement that the Commission was fully satisfied with the newly provided data. In recognition that the Commission might need some time to study, verify and assess the new data, Iraq accepted instead that there would be a further round of talks in New York.




17. This further round of talks took place in New York from 15 to 30 November 1993, comprising high-level technical talks and, during the second week, parallel political talks. A full report of this round is to be found in document S/26825.




18. In the technical talks, the Commission informed Iraq that, at that stage, the information available in all areas had been deemed to be credible and that the Commission would deploy its best efforts to expedite the process of further verifying that information with a view to arriving at a definitive conclusion in the shortest possible time. In subsequent working groups, Iraq provided information supplementary to that provided in the previous round in Baghdad on its past proscribed programmes and on sites, equipment and materials to be monitored pursuant to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Discussions were held on alternative means of verification, on a process to address past difficulties in verification and on how ongoing monitoring and verification would be implemented.




19. During the political talks, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, met with the Executive Chairman and held consultations with members of the Security Council. Following these consultations, Iraq announced, by means of a letter from its Foreign Minister to the President of the Security Council (S/26811, annex), that the "Government of Iraq has decided to accept the obligations set forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the plans for monitoring and verification as contained therein". In welcoming this development, the Commission requested that Iraq submit, as soon as possible, consolidated declarations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Iraq, in response to this request, submitted to the Commission a statement (S/26825, enclosure II) confirming that declarations previously made by Iraq were to be considered to have been made under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans.




20. In conclusion, there have been major positive developments at the political level since the previous report. Iraq has acknowledged its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder. It has declared its earlier declarations in relation to future monitoring to have been made under and in conformity with resolution 715 (1991) and the plans and it has undertaken to cooperate with the Special Commission in the implementation of the plans in order to arrive, at the earliest feasible time, at the stage where both the Commission and IAEA will be in a position to report to the Council that Iraq was in their view meeting all the requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991).







B. Operational developments




21. Recent operational developments have also been encouraging in that the inspection teams that have conducted activities in Iraq since the September talks have been well received by the Iraqi counterparts and their tasks have been facilitated by Iraq. These inspections have been amongst the most intensive, especially UNSCOM63, which was the largest and longest inspection undertaken by the Commission to date. One, to investigate allegations that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Shiah opposition elements in the southern marshes, was also highly politically sensitive. Nevertheless, Iraq did facilitate this inspection with the exception of refusing to allow the team to interview army personnel as noted in paragraph 8 above.




22. In the chemical weapons area, activities focused on destruction activities. There has been one chemical inspection, the one referred to in the previous paragraph, to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use, and one joint chemical and biological inspection which was able to address satisfactorily concerns that Iraq might have developed a bomb for delivery of chemical or biological weapons (see appendix II, para. 1). Considerable time has been devoted to the development of an updated inventory of chemical production equipment at the Muthanna site. Full accounts of inspection and destruction activities can be found in appendices II and III respectively.




23. On ballistic missiles, efforts have concentrated on three main aspects: trying to establish a definitive material balance for the SCUDs supplied by the former Soviet Union; trying to account for Iraq's production capacity in the ballistic missiles area; and establishing an interim monitoring regime for Iraq's dual-capable missile facilities. This last has proved necessary because of Iraq's refusal until very recently to acknowledge its obligations under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification (see appendix II).




24. Aerial surveillance activities have continued apace, using both U-2 (a total of 186 missions flown as of 10 December 1993) and helicopter platforms (335 targets now flown). Helicopter missions continue to be flown in support of ground inspections and to provide a time-series photographic record of sites which shall need monitoring under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.




25. Additional sensors (gamma detection, forward-looking infrared radar, ground penetrating radar) have been mounted onto the helicopters for specific missions to give them greater monitoring and detection capability. The gamma detection sensors and the ground penetrating radar have made it necessary that the helicopters operate in a new mode, one of survey. In both cases, the object is to map areas using the sensor: in the case of gamma detection, to map background radiation levels as a reference against which to judge for future gamma surveys and to identify any unusual sources of radiation which might require immediate investigation; in the case of ground penetrating radar, to search for underground chambers or hidden items. Such missions have been flown in and around Baghdad and in central, western and north-western Iraq. Iraq has withdrawn its previous objections to flights within the area which it had claimed to constitute the limits of Baghdad.




26. Details of aerial operations are contained in appendix IV to the present report.







C. Iraq's declarations





1. Full, final and complete declarations




27. As was noted in annex I to the report of the high-level technical talks, held in New York from 31 August to 10 September 1993, between the Commission and IAEA on the one hand, and an Iraqi delegation led by General Amer Rashid on the other (S/26451), the two sides identified critical areas, which essentially related to Iraq's past programmes, where further information was required from the Iraqi side if the Commission and IAEA were to be able to fulfil their mandates. It was agreed that those issues not resolved during the New York round of talks would be taken up in Baghdad. Indeed, during the visit of the Executive Chairman of the Commission to Baghdad from 1 to 8 October 1993, he received answers from the Iraqi side to the Commission's questions. A full report of this visit is to be found in document S/26571. As noted in that report, the newly provided information must be verified, assessed and confirmed by Commission staff in New York before the Commission can state that Iraq has discharged its obligation, in compliance with paragraphs 8 and 9 (a) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), to provide the information necessary to constitute full, final and complete disclosures of its past programmes - an essential condition for the proper planning of ongoing monitoring and verification.




28. In relation to the information provided in the chemical weapons area, Iraq's earlier accounts of its past chemical weapons production had blatantly failed to take into account past disposal of chemical weapons. In Baghdad, the Iraqi side gave for the first time an account of chemical weapons production which addressed the obvious shortfalls of earlier declarations.




29. In each of the weapons areas, the Commission's evaluation of this new information is that it is credible but still incomplete. The quantities for imports and production declared by Iraq are within the Commission's estimate range. However, verification has been rendered difficult as Iraq claims that all relevant documentation about its past programmes has been destroyed. The Commission took the occasion of the high-level talks in New York in November 1993 to press the Iraqi side for further information and to facilitate, to the extent possible, preferably by retrieving documentation, the Commission's task of verifying Iraq's new declarations.







2. Declarations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans




30. Under the Commission's ongoing monitoring and verification plan (document S/22871/Rev.1), Iraq is obliged to provide certain declarations. The first were due by 10 November 1991, concerning: (a) initial information on the dual-purpose activities, facilities and items specified in the plan and its annexes; and (b) a report on the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), other relevant Security Council resolutions and the plan. Iraq is further obliged to update the information on (a) each 15 January and 15 July, and to report further on (b) when requested to do so by the Commission. This is in addition to the information to be provided under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).




31. In relation to the declarations referred to in (a) in paragraph 30 above, Iraq handed to the Commission, during the visit to Baghdad in October 1993, a set of declarations which updated the two sets of information provided by Iraq in July 1992 and February 1993, in relation to future ongoing monitoring and verification. It also handed over declarations concerning sites that should be subject to baseline inspections under the monitoring regime. The Commission discussed these declarations with the Iraqi side and how they could be improved to bring them in line with the requirements of the plan. The Commission also undertook, upon the delegation's return to New York, to create a standardized reporting format to facilitate Iraq's reporting and the Commission's manipulation of the data provided. However, the Commission informed the Iraqi side that, as these declarations had not been made formally under resolution 715 (1991), they could not be accepted by the Commission as fulfilment of Iraq's reporting obligations. Once Iraq acknowledged its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder, Iraq would need to submit the required declarations formally under and in accordance with the resolution.




32. As noted in paragraph 19 above, Iraq has since both accepted the obligations contained in resolution 715 (1991) and stated that earlier declarations made in relation to monitoring should be considered to have been made under and in conformity with resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder. While this addresses the question of the legal status of Iraq's earlier declarations, it does not address the problems arising from the declarations' inadequacies, inadequacies that the Commission will have to take up with the Iraqi side before it can fully implement the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification.




33. On the declarations referred to in (b) in paragraph 30 above, the Commission has still received nothing from Iraq. These are clearly required before any determination is made that Iraq is in compliance with its reporting requirements.






IV. ISSUES AND PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE




34. Before the Commission will be in a position to report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations, the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire the weapons proscribed to it should be initiated and smoothly functioning, i.e., Iraq should:




(a) Supplement and revise its declarations to the point where, in the view of the Commission, they conform with the full, final and complete disclosures required under resolution 707 (1991) and of initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification adopted by the Council in resolution 715 (1991). In regard to the former, supplementation by supporting documentary evidence clearly provides the most satisfactory solution but, as noted in paragraph 18 above, the Commission has discussed with Iraq alternative means whereby Iraq might assist the Commission in adequately verifying its various declarations;




(b) Establish a track record of accepting and cooperating in the implementation of all aspects of the plans, including compliance with the Commission's privileges and immunities as required for effective and efficient monitoring and verification, ensuring the safety and security of personnel and property, landing rights for aircraft and non-obstruction of inspections and logistics.




For its part, the Commission must, on the basis of Iraq's revised declarations, draw up a list of sites which should be subject to baseline inspections to assess whether and, if so, how each site should be monitored and with what frequency. For each site a monitoring and verification protocol will need to be compiled, containing the information on the site essential for effective monitoring and the details of the monitoring and verification activities to be conducted at the site in question. Once these have been prepared in draft, baseline inspections can proceed and final drafts of the protocols can be submitted by the inspection teams to the Executive Chairman for approval.




35. In addition, the Commission, IAEA and the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990) are required, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991), to develop a mechanism for monitoring any future sales of supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder.




36. Further inspection activities are planned in each of the weapons categories, albeit with the focus now on ongoing monitoring and verification. Destruction activities currently focus on chemical weapons, chemical precursors and chemical production equipment at Muthanna. Preparations for the implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification are under way and ideas on the potential form of an import control regime for after the lifting of sanctions have been discussed with IAEA. New staff recruitment reflects the shift of emphasis towards: verifying definitively Iraq's accounts of its past programmes and its supplier networks; preparations for and operations under ongoing monitoring and verification; and further elaboration of the ideas for import and export monitoring.




37. The priorities for the Special Commission are now:




(a) Verification and supplementation of Iraq's declarations to the level at which the Commission can accept them as fulfilling the requirements of the relevant resolutions;




(b) Initiation of monitoring inspections;




(c) Development of the mechanism for import and export monitoring;




(d) Establishment of practice and precedent in the exercise of the Commission's privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for effective and efficient implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification;




(e) Completion of the destruction activities, essentially in relation to Iraq's former chemical weapons programme at Muthanna.




38. With Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved thereunder, the vast majority of the Commission's work will now focus on ongoing monitoring and verification activities. It therefore would make sense to consolidate the Commission's reporting obligations to the Security Council under resolution 699 (1991), which requires the Commission to report each six months on all its activities, and under resolution 715 (1991), which requires it to report each six months on its ongoing monitoring and verification activities. Currently these reporting obligations are for 17 June and 17 December and 10 April and 10 October respectively. Given that Iraq is obliged to make its declarations under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification each 15 January and 15 July, a reporting requirement for the Commission of each 15 February and 15 August would allow the Commission to incorporate the most recent Iraqi declarations into its reports to the Council. The Special Commission recommends to the Security

Council such a consolidated reporting schedule. The Commission would, of course, continue to submit special reports as and when these would be useful, or at the Council's request.


Appendix I





Organizational and administrative issues







A. Staffing of the Special Commission




1. The Commission has currently a total of 135 positions distributed amongst its three offices. Fifty positions are fully financed by the Commission. The balance of the staff are on loan from their Governments for assignments ranging from 3 to 12 months. Personnel, equipment and services have been provided for the Commission's activities by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. IAEA has a total of seven staff financed by the Commission in support of the work mandated by section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).







B. Financial situation of the Special Commission




2. Expenditures until the end of December 1993 will amount to about US$ 56 million. Out of this, a total of $11.6 million has been used for the 1993 payments required to finance the contract for the removal of nuclear fuel. The 1994 cash required to cover the operations of the Special Commission and IAEA is estimated to be around $35 million, including $9.3 million for the 1994 payments required for the removal of nuclear fuel.




3. In addition, there have been a large number of contributions in kind and in services provided by various Governments. Germany has indicated that it estimates its contribution to UNSCOM, particularly in the provision of aircraft and crews, will be close to $30 million by the end of 1993. Out of this amount, about $17.5 million is considered an advance which will require reimbursement.


C. Financial status of the Special Commission






Countries United States dollars




United States 2 000 000

2 000 000*




Japan 2 500 000*




Kuwait 1 000 000




United Kingdom 175 400




Saudi Arabia 1 730 000

30 000 000 Escrow account




Various 16 647 300 Escrow account




Total contributions 56 052 700




1991-1992




Expenditures up to 31 December 1992 27 625 200




1993




Estimated 1993 expenditures 28 427 500**




1994




Projected 1994 requirements 35 000 000***
























________________________




* Loan to be repaid.




** Including US$ 11.6 million disbursed in 1993 for the removal of nuclear fuel.




*** Including US$ 9.3 million for the removal of nuclear fuel to be disbursed in 1994.

Appendix II




Inspection activities






Chemical and biological weapons inspections




1. UNSCOM60, comprising experts already in Iraq, investigated, inter alia, indications that Iraq had a larger stock of DB-0 bombs than initially declared and that these munitions might have had a biological warfare application. During this inspection, Iraq declared larger stocks, stating that the bomb was a failed prototype munition for chemical weapons and that the larger numbers represented munitions scrapped during the production and testing phases.




2. UNSCOM63, while primarily focused on searching for possible underground stores of ballistic missiles, also searched for possible hidden stocks of chemical weapons and biological weapons facilities. As reported in paragraph 23 below, no proscribed items or activities were found in this regard.




3. UNSCOM65 was constituted at short notice to investigate persistent reports that chemical weapons had been used by Iraqi Government troops against opposition elements in the southern marshes of Iraq. Initially, the team assembled as a fact-finding mission and visited the Islamic Republic of Iran to obtain clarification about the allegations from persons claiming to have witnessed the incident, specifically to obtain an exact location of the site at which the alleged chemical weapon attack took place. Upon obtaining this information, this team returned to Bahrain for further preparations and entered Iraq, as UNSCOM65, on 19 November 1993.




4. During the inspection, the team conducted a thorough inspection of the site and took a large number of soil, water, flora and fauna samples which will be analysed in various laboratories with expertise in the analysis of such samples. The team also inspected the area around the site of the alleged attack. Vehicles, boats and helicopters were used in this survey. During the inspection the team did not find any immediate evidence of the use of chemical weapons. One unexploded munition was discovered at the site but was in too dangerous a condition for the team to take samples from. Consequently, a second team of explosive demolition experts from the Commission's chemical destruction group at Muthanna was dispatched to the site, on 25 November 1993, and concluded that this munition was not a chemical munition but a high-explosive, rocket-propelled grenade. It was destroyed by these experts.




5. In the course of its investigation the Commission has also obtained some documents, which are now subject to forensic examination and analysis.




6. Analysis of the samples is expected to take some time to conclude. The Commission will not, until the results of these analyses are available, be in a position to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the question of whether chemical weapons were used or not.




Ballistic missile inspections




7. The Commission has continued intensive and multifaceted inspection efforts in the ballistic missile area. A third interim monitoring mission (IMT-1c) was carried out in June. Monitoring camera systems were installed and activated at two missile test stands and a detailed engineering survey of all known missile test sites in Iraq was conducted. UNSCOM63, the largest inspection team to date, conducted inspections in Iraq in September and October.




Interim monitoring




8. Iraq's persistent refusal, until 26 November 1993, to acknowledge its obligations under Security Council resolution 715 (1991) prevented timely implementation of the plan approved under that resolution for ongoing monitoring and verification by the Commission of relevant activities in Iraq. The plan foresaw immediate implementation as of October 1991. Meanwhile, as had been ascertained in the course of ballistic missile inspections under resolution 687 (1991), Iraq was actively pursuing missile-related activities. Consequently, the Commission initiated, in January 1993, a new type of inspection activity in Iraq, interim monitoring.




9. The prime objectives of interim monitoring were to continue to collect information on missile programmes in Iraq and to deter Iraq from launching covert programmes in prohibited missile systems. Interim monitoring was not intended to substitute for ongoing monitoring and verification under resolution 715 (1991). Instead, the interim monitoring teams were tasked with gathering technical information and providing in-depth assessments in order to assist the Commission in preparation for effective execution of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, once Iraq acknowledged its obligations under resolution 715 (1991).




10. The activities of the first two interim monitoring teams were given in the previous report (S/25977). A third missile interim monitoring team, UNSCOM57/IMT-1c, conducted its activities in Iraq from 4 to 28 June 1993. The main objective of this mission was to assess existing Iraqi capabilities in the area of precision machining related to ballistic missiles production, in particular gyroscope devices and liquid-fuel engine manufacture. The team conducted inspection activities at 16 industrial facilities and at two military sites.




11. The interim monitoring inspections provided comprehensive technical assessments of current Iraqi missile programmes of relevance under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), including research, development and production capabilities. The teams were able to collect valuable information and technical data needed for the planning and implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification activities in Iraq under resolution 715 (1991).




Camera systems at missile test stands




12. On 6 June 1993, the Commission informed Iraq of its intention to install remote-controlled camera systems at two missile engine test stands, Al-Yawm Al-Azim and Al-Rafah. The purpose of this inspection effort was to verify that no prohibited activities were taking place at these test stands. The camera system was designed to monitor activities continuously and record all tests at those locations. Iraq responded that it would not accept any monitoring activities and would insist that the Commission limit itself to inspection activities under resolution 687 (1991). In his report to the Council (S/25960), the Executive Chairman stated that Iraq's obstruction was a further failure by Iraq to fulfil its obligations in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and agreements with the Commission. On 18 June 1993, the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the Council, stated that Iraq must accept installation by UNSCOM of monitoring devices at the test stands.




13. Even after this statement by the Security Council, Iraq continued its obstruction of the installation of the cameras. On 5 July 1993, after the initial installation team had spent over a month in Iraq awaiting a change in the position of the Government of Iraq which would allow it to proceed with its mission, it was instructed by the Executive Chairman to withdraw. As an interim measure, the Commission, after having informed the Council, dispatched a team (UNSCOM60) to Iraq, on 10 July, to seal the relevant equipment and facilities at both sites so as to ensure that they were not used until the cameras had been installed. The Iraqi authorities blocked this team from carrying out its mission. On 12 July 1993, the Executive Chairman reported these events to the President of the Security Council. The Executive Chairman stated that the matter had been elevated by Iraq from a specific issue of monitoring the missile test sites in question to a level of principle concerning Iraq's acceptance of ongoing monitoring and verification under resolution 715 (1991).




14. The Executive Chairman visited Baghdad from 15 to 19 July 1993, in order to seek full compliance by Iraq with the Council's decision of 18 June 1993. On the issue of the monitoring of the two missile test stands, Iraq, as a result of this visit, agreed on an interim basis to permit the installation of cameras at Al-Yawm Al-Azim and Al-Rafah. It was also understood that a long-term solution of this issue, including the question of the activation of these cameras, would be one of the topics to be covered during high-level technical talks in New York. Pending the outcome of those talks, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq gave the Executive Chairman assurances that Iraq would provide the Commission with sufficient notice of any test firings to permit it to observe those firings and that Iraq would facilitate inspections of the two sites by the Commission at such times and as frequently as the Commission should deem necessary. A full account of this visit is contained in the Executive Chairman's report to the Security Council (S/26127).




15. Pursuant to the above arrangements, the Commission dispatched to Baghdad, on 25 July, a small technical team to install the camera systems at the Al-Yawm Al-Azim and Al-Rafah sites. The installation of the cameras, including their testing, was completed on 3 August 1993. As part of the interim arrangements, the Commission sent a number of missile experts to Baghdad to observe any missile tests that Iraq might declare to the Commission. UNSCOM62 operated in Iraq for this purpose from 23 August till 27 September 1993. UNSCOM62 also performed detailed engineering surveys of test facilities at Al-Yawm Al-Azim, Al-Rafah and five other test stands capable of missile and rocket engine tests.




16. After the first round of high-level talks in New York, the Government of Iraq informed the Commission that it had agreed to the activation of the camera systems at Al-Rafah and Al-Yawm Al-Azim. On 25 September 1993, the cameras were activated. Since then they have been operating on a continuous basis. The cameras are arranged in a manner that enables UNSCOM to assess whether a test was of a prohibited missile, engine or motor. In accordance with operating procedures established by the Commission, these camera systems provide 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week coverage of the missile test stands at Al-Rafah and Al-Yawm Al-Azim. Missile test monitoring handbooks, to include engineering baselines for the test sites, checklists and reporting forms for the Iraqis, were developed. An upgrade of the camera systems, to include radio links and improved lenses, was undertaken from 2 to 10 December 1993.




UNSCOM63




17. UNSCOM63 carried out its mission in Iraq from 30 September to 30 October 1993. The objective was twofold: to investigate reports made available to the Commission concerning suspected prohibited activities in Iraq and the continued concealment of proscribed items, notably missiles; and to verify information provided by Iraq on its past prohibited activities, especially on the operational use of missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres. These tasks were identified as critical to the Commission's intention to complete the identification phase of its work under resolution 687 (1991).




18. UNSCOM63's objective was such as to require the largest inspection team to date, a long period of detailed preparation and intensive training, in-depth analytical work, innovative use of advanced sensors and deployment of additional UNSCOM aerial assets in Iraq.




19. In addition to utilizing proven inspection procedures, UNSCOM63's mission required the use of new inspection techniques since much of the information to be checked by the team referred to underground storage for prohibited items. As a consequence, ground-penetrating radar (GPR) mounted on helicopters was used to increase the effectiveness of the survey of areas to be inspected. The GPR was custom-designed to maximize its capability to detect prohibited items, especially missiles, missile launchers and possible hide sites.




20. Two additional helicopters were deployed to Iraq to support the inspection. These were Bell 412 helicopters, manned and equipped specifically to meet the requirements of UNSCOM63. The primary mission of these helicopters was to conduct GPR surveys. They also performed aerial inspection of specific sites and provided an additional means of securing sites to be inspected including, as necessary, at night, using forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR).




21. UNSCOM63 started its inspection activities in Iraq on 30 September 1993. Until the arrival of the two Bell helicopters on 3 October 1993, the team conducted ground inspections of a number of sites in and around Baghdad. The first series of inspections utilizing GPR were conducted from 4 to 7 October. Several locations in central Iraq were surveyed to check if prohibited items were present. On 9 October UNSCOM63 relocated to western Iraq. The objective of this phase was to test the veracity of some critical information on the operational use of Al Hussein missiles during the Gulf war. The areas of GPR inspections centred around known launch positions of Al Hussein missiles and varied in size from 20 to 45 square kilometres. Intensive GPR and ground searches were conducted at these locations in order to identify launcher hide sites. In addition, two sites were investigated on the ground and from the air to determine if these were or had been the locations of prohibited activities. On 25 October 1993, UNSCOM63 relocated to an area in north-west Iraq to verify information on past proscribed activities and the presence of prohibited items. This required a search of a very large area (1,000 square kilometres) as well as inspections, including GPR surveys, of specific locations already known to the team or identified through area searches. The inspection in north-west Iraq was completed by 28 October 1993, after intensive area searches, aerial surveys and ground inspections of specific locations had been accomplished. In parallel with this task, the team visited sites containing declared prohibited items and verified the destruction of these items by Iraq as previously instructed by the Commission.




22. During its deployment in Iraq, UNSCOM63 inspected more than 30 sites and areas. Altogether, 28 GPR missions were flown, totalling more than 56 hours of flying time. The Iraqi authorities were keen to ensure that the inspection proceeded without incident: Iraq provided all the support requested by the inspection team; access to all sites and areas to be inspected was granted; no problems were encountered by the team in execution of its operational plan, including the introduction and use of its aerial assets; and the Iraqi authorities honoured those inspection rights invoked by UNSCOM63.




23. No undeclared prohibited items or activities were identified by UNSCOM63. UNSCOM63 discovered no evidence that contradicted the information provided by Iraq on issues that related to its mission.




Gamma radiation detection surveys




24. The first special aerial inspection team mission which focused on the detection of gamma emissions was flown from 10 to 25 September 1993. Owing to some early obstruction on the part of Iraq, flights did not begin until 15 September and, consequently, the coverage of the mission was considerably reduced. Partial surveys were conducted at Al Tuwaitha, Al Atheer and Al Jezira. Gamma signals were detected from multiple points at all sites. Preliminary analysis indicates the usefulness of this technique in identifying specific locations warranting more detailed ground inspections. Use will be made of this gamma detection capability in the future.




25. The second such aerial inspection using the gamma detection equipment was flown from 2 to 15 December 1993. During this mission, more extensive coverage of previously covered sites was accomplished and additional sites surveyed. Gamma signals were detected from all sites, but the significance of this will not be apparent until the results of the analysis are available.

Appendix III





Destruction of Iraq's chemical agents and munitions






1. A full background report on chemical destruction activities has been given in previous reports. The present report focuses solely on developments since June 1993.







A. Status and activities of the Chemical Destruction Group




Personnel




2. Contributing nations have maintained their support for the Chemical Destruction Group (CDG). However, staffing is a permanent problem, as experts with the required qualifications are few and are required for work in the supplying countries. The continued support of these countries will be required until CDG completes its task. As of December 1993, CDG has 27 experts from 12 nations.




Safety and security aspects




3. Safety standards at Muthanna have been kept at the high level established by the Destruction Advisory Panel and the Commission. Recommendations from the Iraqi side to lower some standards in order to speed up destruction activities have been rejected. Regular air sampling has been conducted. Additional warning devices, such as remote-control mustard detectors, have been added to improve safety measures. These high safety standards have paid dividends in ensuring that various minor incidents have been contained. If safety procedures were not followed, the work is of a nature that some of the incidents could have resulted in serious accidents. However, the environment for everyday work remains extremely hazardous due to daily exposure to chemical agents.




Destruction activities




4. The key factors affecting the rate at which CDG destroys chemicals have not changed:




(a) Meteorological/environmental conditions;




(b) Reliability and status of destruction equipment;




(c) Support from the Iraqi side;




(d) Condition of the items to be destroyed (e.g., corroded containers, polymerized mustard, etc.).




5. Figures for the status of destruction at Muthanna, as of 6 December 1993, are listed in section C below. They are listed as absolute figures. However, there is some uncertainty as to the exact amounts of agent actually destroyed because of various factors, such as leakage from containers and deterioration of agent prior to destruction.




6. Over the reporting period, destruction activities went smoothly; the major limitations to continuous destruction were:




(a) Maintenance work to the incinerator and hydrolysis plants;




(b) Spare parts supply problems;




(c) Unfavourable meteorological conditions, mainly wind speed and wind direction.




7. Planning figures for daily destruction rates are approximately 3,500 litres of mustard and 350 litres of tabun. However, the polymerized mustard agent stored in 1-ton containers at Muthanna poses a problem. Destruction is likely to be highly time-consuming.







B. Future tasks of the Chemical Destruction Group: an outline




8. Destruction of precursors, chemical agents and munitions will probably be completed by March/April 1994. Other outstanding issues are:




(a) What chemical production equipment should be destroyed;




(b) What destruction methods to use for this equipment;




(c) How to store chemical waste from destruction;




(d) How to seal bunkers that have been identified for sealing;




(e) Which chemicals Iraq should be permitted to use elsewhere;




(f) What final verification of destruction activities will be required prior to the withdrawal of CDG.




A plan for winding down CDG's work, which will address all these questions, is now being developed.




9. The provisional deadline for completing CDG's tasks is set at mid-1994. This estimate is based on CDG's destruction timetable, the time required for the closing-down operations and time built in for slippage. Flexibility will be needed to allow for adjustments to operational needs.







C. Status of destruction activities as of 6 December 1993




Munitions




283 122mm rockets and warheads

6 410 122mm rocket warheads

863 122mm rocket motors

16 695 122mm rocket propellant grains

2 388 122mm rocket motor tubes

12 638 155mm mustard-filled artillery shells

34 155mm empty projectiles

2 155mm oil-filled projectiles

29 Al Hussein warheads for GB/GF

337 R400 bombs

333 R400 tail fin assemblies

471 250-gauge tail fin assemblies

4 250-gauge bomb, oil-filled

5 172 250-gauge bomb, empty

1 097 250-gauge bomb, polymust a/ (partial)

4 500-gauge bomb, oil-filled

675 500-gauge bomb, polymust (partial)

1 115 DB 2 bomb

61 DB 0 bomb




28 332 Total munitions destroyed






CW agent




17 815 1 b/ GA nerve agent

330 1 GB nerve agent

60 498 1 GB/GF nerve agent

247 966 1 mustard




326 609 1 Total CW agent destroyed
























________________________




a/ I.e., polymerized mustard agent.




b/ Litres.

Precursors




123 722 1 D4

14 600 1 DF

1 120 1 dichlorethane

211 023 1 isopropyl alcohol

153 980 1 thio-diethyleneglycol

1 200 1 cyclohexanol/isopropyl alcohol

297 400 1 phosphorus oxychloride

148 800 1 thionyl chloride

415 000 1 phosphorous trichloride

30 000 1 di-isopropylamine

3 000 1 morpholine

53 000 1 chlorobenzaldehyde

1 900 1 ethylchlorohydrine

16 000 1 monoethyleneglycol




1 470 745 1 Total precursors destroyed







Appendix IV





Information Assessment Unit






1. Over the past six months the Information Assessment Unit has continued to evolve in response to the changing requirements of the Commission's work. The major activity in this respect concerns preparations for full-scale monitoring activity in Iraq. The preparations have had an impact on all aspects of the work undertaken by the Unit.




2. The Unit's information collection activities have expanded, drawing upon the Commission's own assets, as well as those of external organizations. Supporting Governments and agencies remain a significant source of information and assessment on past proscribed programmes in Iraq. The number of Governments and agencies with whom the Unit has contact has grown over the past six months. These contacts are important not only for gaining information on past activities, but also for establishing links for ongoing monitoring and verification purposes. External organizations also play an important role in providing the Unit with technical data on equipment and systems in Iraq, thus allowing the Unit's analysts to make informed evaluations on their capabilities and functions.




3. The Information Assessment Unit continues to derive great benefit from its aerial surveillance platforms. These have expanded in role and number over the last few months. The Commission's high-altitude reconnaissance plane (U-2) flies up to three times a week; some 186 missions had been flown as of 13 December 1993. The aircraft's missions are assigned by the Unit and now encompass a number of different roles. The U-2 overflies on a regular basis sites identified as requiring ongoing monitoring and verification and new sites of potential interest as designated by the Unit. In addition, the aircraft has been undertaking photography of areas of Iraq which are of particular relevance to the Commission's work. Mosaics of these areas are being produced and provide the analysts with reference photography of large areas. The final function of the aircraft is to provide aerial surveillance of inspection sites before and during ground teams' visits, in order to ensure that no proscribed or evasion activity has taken place.




4. The second aerial asset available to the Information Assessment Unit is the aerial inspection team. This consists of three inspectors based in Iraq and operating from CH-53g helicopters. Some 215 flights have been undertaken to date by the team covering 335 sites. The emphasis for the team's activities is increasingly focused on sites determined to be of relevance for ongoing monitoring and verification purposes. The detailed photography from these missions provides the Unit's analysts with a means of monitoring changes which take place over time at a particular facility. The aerial inspection team also plays a valuable part in providing aerial surveillance over inspection sites.




5. In September and December 1993, the team undertook a new role with the introduction of a gamma detection programme utilizing equipment mounted on a CH-53g aircraft. A full report on this activity is to be found in paragraphs 24 and 25 of appendix II to the present report. Two other additional types of aerial detection devices have also been introduced into Iraq recently; ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR). Both systems were mounted on Bell 412 helicopters. The GPR, which can detect concealed objects and underground cavities, was the focus of UNSCOM63's inspection activities reported on in appendix II. The FLIR was also used in this inspection for aerial surveillance activities during the first-ever, night-time operations. Its main function was to assist in the overnight securing of the sites to be inspected.




6. The photographic product derived from all these aerial assets is held in the Information Assessment Unit in New York where it is assessed by the Unit's photographic interpreters and analysts. Material relating to nuclear facilities is also shared with IAEA. The product now constitutes a very comprehensive library of material which can be drawn upon by the analysts for assessment and monitoring purposes and for use in preparing inspections.




7. The capability for handling written data in the Unit has also expanded with the introduction of new computer hardware and software which offers the analysts a comprehensive means of storing, retrieving and manipulating data.




8. The analytical work undertaken in the Information Assessment Unit continues to be the basis for much of the Commission's activity. In addition to providing assessments on the status of Iraq's compliance with the terms of the cease-fire resolution 687 (1991), the Unit's work also generates the inspection programme. In its assessment role, the Unit is increasingly focusing on defining the sites, facilities and equipment relevant for ongoing monitoring and verification, together with the modalities and techniques to be employed. New staff members have also been recruited to focus on specific aspects of monitoring, such as import control. The Unit continues to benefit from experienced staff who have amassed a wealth of knowledge on Iraq's proscribed programmes.







Appendix V





Ongoing monitoring and verification






1. Work under the ongoing monitoring and verification phase is under way. The ongoing monitoring and verification effort in the three weapons areas for which the Commission has direct responsibility (ballistic missile, chemical and biological) is being coordinated in order to achieve continuity and harmony in approach. Various tasks have already been undertaken.




2. Pending receipt from Iraq of the complete information required under and in accordance with resolution 715 (1991) and the Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, a list of the sites/facilities which would be subject to baseline inspections has been drawn up. Monitoring and verification protocols for each site to be monitored, containing all relevant materials and information (e.g., name of site/facility, its general function, its location, its geographical coordinates, aerial surveillance data), are being prepared. Concepts for ongoing monitoring and verification inspections have been drawn up, providing for a combination of unannounced and announced inspections. A preliminary assessment of operational and planning requirements has been undertaken in respect of the personnel (length of stay, background, expertise, need for training), equipment (monitoring sensors and technology and standard operational equipment) and assets (ground and air) which will be needed for monitoring purposes. As required by paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991), an import/export control mechanism will be put in place, the planning modalities and requirements of which are currently being identified.




3. The monitoring database, which will constitute the backbone of the ongoing monitoring and verification effort, will be organized geographically and will contain all relevant information, whatever its form (aerial imagery, site diagram, floor plan, equipment drawings, photography, inspection reports, texts of Iraqi declarations, etc.).




4. Formats for Iraq's declarations in accordance with its reporting obligations under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification have been developed. Monitoring and verification protocols for the sites to be inspected are being prepared. These will serve as the basis on which inspections will be conducted at sites identified as requiring regular inspection under the ongoing monitoring and verification regime.







Appendix VI





Suppliers and import monitoring






1. The Commission and IAEA have both long insisted that Iraq provide data on the suppliers of materials and technical expertise for its past banned-weapons programmes. During the high-level technical talks in New York in September, critical items were identified for which details on suppliers were essential if the Commission and IAEA were to be able to fulfil their mandates. Iraq promised to provide details on these at the second round of high-level talks in Baghdad. These were given on the last day of those talks, 8 October 1993.




2. The purpose of insisting on supplier information was twofold:




(a) To discover the full list of who supplied Iraq, thus enabling the Commission and IAEA, by investigating with the supplier companies through the relevant Governments, to establish material balances for each of the weapons programmes. This would be achieved through the rough equation:




items supplied + items locally manufactured

=

items used + items destroyed + items under UNSCOM/IAEA control




(b) To ascertain the techniques used by Iraq to acquire items which were subject to export controls, thereby enabling the Commission and IAEA better to design, as required under paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991), a system for monitoring Iraq's imports and exports to be in place before the lifting of sanctions.




3. The information provided by Iraq responded to the questions identified in New York. In the chemical area, Iraq provided: aggregate quantities of precursors imported against companies and country of origin; aggregate quantities of empty munitions imported against companies and country of origin; and aggregate quantities of production equipment imported by type, capacity, material, company and country of origin. In the biological area, Iraq answered questions about the sources of complex media, toxins, micro-organisms, aerosol generators and incubation chambers, in aggregate quantities by company and country of origin. In the ballistic missile area, the Commission's questions concentrated on critical items essential for the production of ballistic missiles, e.g., gyroscope and fuel components. For these, Iraq provided the name of the company, the country of origin, the quantities supplied, the point of entry into Iraq and the consignee.




4. The Commission is assessing Iraq's declarations, both by seeking confirmation from the named supplying companies, through the relevant Governments, of the items and quantities supplied to Iraq, and by analysing samples of, e.g., maraging steel, to assess whether the material did in fact originate from the source declared by Iraq.




5. It is noticeable that some of the items of concern to the Commission and IAEA did not require export licences at the time. Where such licences were required, Iraq had developed means to circumvent them. Routes of supply can be summarized as follows:




(a) Direct from the manufacturing company to Iraq;




(b) Via a middleman to Iraq. In many of these cases, the manufacturing company did not know the eventual use to which its products would be put, although some of the companies might well have been in a position to suspect the purpose;




(c) Via a third country;




(d) Via a second company in the same country. Transfers of this kind have not generally required export licences.




6. The Commission is required, under paragraph 7 of resolution 715 (1991) and in coordination with IAEA and the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990), to elaborate a mechanism for monitoring Iraq's imports and exports of certain listed items. This will require, in order best to focus the resources and efforts of the Commission, the identification, on the basis of the annexes to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, of key choke points in the development and production of the banned weapons capabilities. It should be noted that paragraph 12 of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (S/22871/Rev.1) requires that this mechanism should be developed "at the earliest possible date, and not later than before the lifting of sanctions" covering items relevant to the monitoring plan.




7. The Commission intends to hold in New York, in early 1994, meetings with weapons and export control experts from key supplier countries with the purpose of deriving from the annexes lists of items to be controlled under the regime. On the basis of the results of these meetings, the Commission will consult with IAEA and the Sanctions Committee referred to above on how to proceed with the elaboration of the mechanism and its presentation to the Security Council.







Appendix VII





Inspection schedule




(In-country dates)




Nuclear




15 May-21 May 1991 IAEA1/UNSCOM1

22 June-3 July 1991 IAEA2/UNSCOM4

7 July-18 July 1991 IAEA3/UNSCOM5

27 July-10 August 1991 IAEA4/UNSCOM6

14 September-20 September 1991 IAEA5/UNSCOM14

21 September-30 September 1991 IAEA6/UNSCOM16

11 October-22 October 1991 IAEA7/UNSCOM19

11 November-18 November 1991 IAEA8/UNSCOM22

11 January-14 January 1992 IAEA9/UNSCOM25

5 February-13 February 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM27

5 February-13 February 1992 IAEA10/UNSCOM30

7 April-15 April 1992 IAEA11/UNSCOM33

26 May-4 June 1992 IAEA12/UNSCOM37

14 July-21 July 1992 IAEA13/UNSCOM41

31 August-7 September 1992 IAEA14/UNSCOM43

8 November-19 November 1992 IAEA15/UNSCOM46

5 December-14 December 1992 IAEA16/UNSCOM47

22 January-27 January 1993 IAEA17/UNSCOM49

3 March-11 March 1993 IAEA18/UNSCOM52

30 April-7 May 1993 IAEA19/UNSCOM56

25 June-30 June 1993 IAEA20/UNSCOM58

23 July-28 July 1993 IAEA21/UNSCOM61

1 November-9 November 1993 IAEA22/UNSCOM64




Chemical




9 June-15 June 1991 CW1/UNSCOM2

15 August-22 August 1991 CW2/UNSCOM9

31 August-8 September 1991 CW3/UNSCOM11

31 August-5 September 1991 CW4/UNSCOM12

6 October-9 November 1991 CW5/UNSCOM17

22 October-2 November 1991 CW6/UNSCOM20

18 November-1 December 1991 CBW1/UNSCOM21

27 January-5 February 1992 CW7/UNSCOM26

21 February-24 March 1992 CD1/UNSCOM29

5 April-13 April 1992 CD2/UNSCOM32

15 April-29 April 1992 CW8/UNSCOM35

18 June 1992- CDG/UNSCOM38

26 June-10 July 1992 CBW2/UNSCOM39

21 September-29 September 1992 CW9/UNSCOM44

6 December-14 December 1992 CBW3/UNSCOM47

6 April-18 April 1993 CW10/UNSCOM55

27 June-30 June 1993 CW11/UNSCOM59

19 November-22 November 1993 CW12/UNSCOM65




Biological




2 August-8 August 1991 BW1/UNSCOM7

20 September-3 October 1991 BW2/UNSCOM15

11 March-18 March 1993 BW3/UNSCOM53




Ballistic missiles




30 June-7 July 1991 BM1/UNSCOM3

18 July-20 July 1991 BM2/UNSCOM10

8 August-15 August 1991 BM3/UNSCOM8

6 September-13 September 1991 BM4/UNSCOM13

1 October-9 October 1991 BM5/UNSCOM18

1 December-9 December 1991 BM6/UNSCOM23

9 December-17 December 1991 BM7/UNSCOM24

21 February-29 February 1992 BM8/UNSCOM28

21 March-29 March 1992 BM9/UNSCOM31

13 April-21 April 1992 BM10/UNSCOM34

14 May-22 May 1992 BM11/UNSCOM36

11 July-29 July 1992 BM12/UNSCOM40 A+B

7 August-18 August 1992 BM13/UNSCOM42

16 October-30 October 1992 BM14/UNSCOM45

25 January-23 March 1993 IMT1a/UNSCOM48

12 February-21 February 1993 BM15/UNSCOM50

22 February-23 February 1993 BM16/UNSCOM51

27 March-17 May 1993 IMT1b/UNSCOM54

5 June-28 June 1993 IMT1c/UNSCOM57

10 July-11 July 1993 BM17/UNSCOM60

24 August-15 September 1993 BM18/UNSCOM62

28 September-1 November 1993 BM19/UNSCOM63




Computer search




12 February 1992 UNSCOM30




Special missions




30 June-3 July 1991

11 August-14 August 1991

4 October-6 October 1991

11 November-15 November 1991

27 January-30 January 1992

21 February-24 February 1992

17 July-19 July 1992

28 July-29 July 1992

6 September-12 September 1992

4 November-9 November 1992

4 November-8 November 1992

12 March-18 March 1993

14 March-20 March 1993

19 April-24 April 1993

4 June-5 July 1993

15 July-19 July 1993

25 July-5 August 1993

9 August-12 August 1993

10 September-24 September 1993

27 September-1 October 1993

1 October-8 October 1993

5 October 1993-

2 December-10 December 1993

2 December-16 December 1993