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Old 05-15-2014, 10:25 AM
A.B A.B is offline
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Join Date: Oct 2003
Posts: 163
Angry POW / MIA. Some reading.....

Anyone of you planning on to write to your congressman? How about adding the following list when doing so? Some of the reading may perhaps surprise you. Unfortunatly however, it may very well do so in a somewhat bloodpreassure-hightening fashion! If you check some of the below listed, you will understand what I mean by that.....


_________________________
_________________________


Adam, John G.
USAF
Laos,
name mentioned by Soviet correspondent. (NSA correlation)

** Allen, Henry L.
USAF
Laos,
believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last report mid 1980s.


Ard, Randolph J.
USA
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Surviv Code 1)


Armstrong, John W.
USAF
Laos,
known captured. Interviewed by Soviet correspondent. (NSA intercept correlation.)


Ayers, Richard L.
USAF
-Laos,
possible correlation as POW in Cu Loc and Zoo prisons according to hearsay information provided by POW returnee Leo Hyatt H097) -Shoot-down of aircraft confirmed by Hanoi radio with no mention of fate of the crew.


Baker, Arthur D.
USAF
Laos,
believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive (DoD April 1991 list)


Balcom, Ralph C.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Bannon, Paul W.
USAF
Laos,
possible correlation to live-sighting information and intelligence pertaining to 1981 Nhom marrot activities (25 June 1981 Defense Department closed-door testimony)


Barden, Howard L.
USAF
Laos.
survival possible, DIA 1979 rpt.


Bogiages, Christos C.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Bouchard, Micahel
USN
Laos,
possible POW in good health according to notes obtained in prison by POW returnee Roger Miller. The name "Boucher" was passed.


Brandenberg, Dale
USAF
Laos,
EC47Q, Baron 52, believed to have been captured according to analysts in 1973 based on NSA intelligence reports.


Brashear, William J.
USAF
-Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive. (DoD April 1991 list)


Breuer, Donald C.
USMC
Laos,
good parachute reported by enemy reports they are attempting capture according to NSA intercept correlation.


Brown, George R.
USA
Laos,
known to be alive on the ground during helicopter exfiltration. When the rope ladder broke and hostile forces approached, the helicopter departed leaving Brown and Huston, alive and unwounded. Search team inserted four days later. No sign of Brown or Huston. (JCRC report)


Brown, Robert M.
USAF
Laos/NVN,
Captured alive according to same day intelligence report indicating capture of pilot(s) of a low flying aircraft in same location and giving orders to "conceal the accomplishment." (No other shootdowns correlate to this report.) Intelligence report one week later requested special Vietnamese team to transport the hulk of an F-111. NSA analyst recalls Brown on list of POWs moved to Sam Neua for movement to USSR. Brown's military ID card has surfaced in good condition at military museum in Vinh. NVN defector states intact portion of F-111 sent to China same month as Brown shoot-down, NVN photographers not allowed to keep photos of the F-111.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/b/b191.htm

Brownlee, Charles R.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


** Bunker, Park G.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Burnett, Sheldon J.
USA
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Bynum, Neil S.
USAF
Laos,
one pilot parachuted and probably captured according to NSA intercept correlation.


Calfee, James Henry
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/c/cls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Carlock, Ralph L.
USAF
-Laos,
POW, captured by PL forces according to FBIS intercepted PL radio communication. -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive. (DoD April 1991 list)


Carr, Donald Gene
USA
Laos,
reported as POW (DoD DOI Rpt. July 1971)


** Carroll, John L.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


** Chestnut, Joseph L.
USAF
-Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -captured according to NVN records. (source: Bob Destatte, Bill Bell JTF-FA -sighted alive in captivity after the war. Source: Bill Bell, JTF-FA. Remains returned


Clarke, Fred L.
USAF
Laos,
one parachute observed from mid-air collision, possible correlation. (DIA report, 1979)


Clarke, George W.
USAF
-Laos/VN,
hostile captured. (DoD June 1973 list) -listed as POW by DIA, 1973. -last known alive, Laos. (DoD April 1991 list)


Coady, Robert F.
USAF
Laos,
hearsay POW - Rumble debrief. (DIA 3 Oct. 1969, State 25 Sept. 1969)


Cohron, James D.
USA
Laos,
last known alive (DoD April 1991 list)


Cornwell, Leroy J.
USAF
Laos,
name reported by POW returnee Arthur Cormier. (JSSA).


Creed, Barton S.
USN
-Laos,
voice contact on ground, DIA 1973. "may have been captured" DIA rpt. 1979. -JTF-FA Survive Code 1 (13 March 1992) -listed as POW by DIA, 1973 -last known alive (DoD April 1991 list) -NSA intercept correlation.


Cressman, Peter R.
USAF
Laos,
EC47Q, Baron 52, believed to have been captured according to analysts in 1973 based on NSA intelligence reports.


Cristman, Frederick L.
USA
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Danielson, Benjamin F.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Davidson, David A.
USA
Laos,
captured alive by enemy forces according to NSA/DIA intercept correlation.


Davis, Edgar F.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Davis, James Woodrow
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/d/dls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Debruin, Eugene H.
----
Laos,
pilot of a C-46. Shown alive in photo.


Dinan, David T.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Duckett, Thomas A.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


** Elzinga, Richard K.
USAF
Laos,
believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground.


Fallon, Patrick M.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Fors, Gary H.
USMC
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Fryer, Bruce C.
USN
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Galbraith, Russell D.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Garcia, Ricardo M.
USA
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Gassman, Fred A.
USA
Laos,
captured alive by enemy forces according to NSA/DIA intercept correlation.


Gates, James W.
USA
Laos,
radio contact on ground. (DIA rpt.) -out of aircraft before crash (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive. (DoD April 1991 list)


Gish, Henry Gerald
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/g/gls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Gould, Frank A.
USAF
Laos,
alive and waiting rescue according to Giroux, Peter J. returnee debrief G104. -SAR team reported seeing mirror flashes from area where rest of crew was picked up, but nightfall prevented further rescue attempts (JCRC). -parachuted onto hill, awaiting rescue, voice contact and beeper heard. Ground search following day found helmet and parachute, but no sign of Gould. -Gould is the subject of live-sighting reports from Laos in the 1990's. (DIA Stoney Beach reports.)


Grace, James W.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) Attempted rescue unsuccessful. family member post-capture identification in Communist propaganda film. (PL guard)
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/g/g068.htm


Greenwood, Robert R.
USAF
Laos,
POW at "Zoo" prison in Vietnam according to second hand info -- see Brunhaver B102 debrief. -out of aircraft before crash. JTF-FA Survive Code 1


Hall, Willis Rozelle
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/h/hls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Helwig, Roger D.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


** Herold, Richard W.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Hesford, Peter D.
USAF
Laos,
believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive. (DoD April 1991 list)


Hess, Frederick W.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA survive Code 1)


Holland, Melvin Arnold
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
possibly captured, based on report the following day by Tahi survivor of Lima Site 85 incident, and comments by former PL General Singkapo in 1991, whose subsequent recanting remains suspect. (Both sources stated three Americans were captured by NVN troops during the incident.)
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/h/h189.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Holmes, David H.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 2) Search and Rescue unable to locate pilot (DIA 1979 report)


Hrdlicka, David L.
USAF
POW in Laos,
voice recording and P.L./Pravda photograph including his name. -letter signed by Hrdlicka while in captivity appeared in NVN/PL magazine.


Hunter, Russell P.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)

Huston, Charles G.
USA
Laos,
known to be alive on the ground during helicopter exfiltration. When the rope ladder broke and hostile forces approached, the helicopter departed leaving Brown and Huston, alive and unwounded. Search team inserted four days later. No sign of Brown or Huston. (JCRC report)


** Jackson, Paul V.
USAF
Laos,
known captured according to NSA intercept correlation. (L19, 01D)


Johnston, Steven B.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Ketchie, Scott D.
USMC
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 2) -known captured according to NSA intercept correlation.


Kiefel, Ernest P.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1


Kirk, Herbert Arthur
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/k/kls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Kryszak, Theodore E.
USAF
Laos,
no trace of crew, wreckage sited.


Kubley, Roy R.
USAF
Laos,
survival possible according to DIA 1979 analytical comments.


LaFayette, John W.
USA
Laos,
radio contact on ground. (DIA 1979 report) -out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive (DoD April 1991 list)


Lemon, Jeffrey C.
USAF
Laos,
possibly captured alive, according to NSA intercept correlation. (F4D Two-seater, one captured, one found dead.)


Luna, Crater P.
USAF
Laos,
voice contact on the ground.(JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -listed as POW by DIA, 1973 -likelihood he was captured (DIA 1992 analytical comment)


Lundy, ALbro L.
USAF
Laos,
our of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -alleged post-capture photo positively identified by family.

Martin, Russell D.
USAF
Laos,
no trace of crew, wreckage found.


Matejov, Joseph A.
USAF
Laos,
EC47Q, Baron 52, believed to have been captured according to analysts in 1973 based on NSA intelligence reports.


Mauterer, Oscar
USAF
Laos,
ejected and possibly captured. DIA analytical comments, 1979 rpt.) -out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive. (DoD April 1991 list)


McIntire, Scott W.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -possible POW according to NSA correlation. Possible conflicting SAR information.


Melton, Todd M.
USAF
Laos,
EC47Q, Baron 52, believed to have been captured according to analysts in 1973 based on NSA intelligence reports.


Milius, Paul L.
USN
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 2)


Morrisey, Robert D.
USAF
Laos/NVN,
Captured alive according to same day intelligence report indicatingcapture of pilots (s) of a lowflying aircraft in same locationand giving orders to "concealthe accomplishment." (No othershootdowns correlate to thisreport.) Intelligence report oneweek later requested specialVietnamese team to transport thehulf od an F-111. NSA analystrecalls Brown on list of POWsmoved to Sam Neua for movement to USSR. NVN defector states intact portion (possibly the ejection capsule) of F-111 sent to China same month as Morrisey/Brown shootdown, NVN photographers not allowed to keep photos of the F-111.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/m/m182.htm


Mullen, William F.
USMC
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Mullins, Harold E.
USAF
Laos,
no trace of crew, wreckage sited.


Mundt, Henry G.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive. (DoD April 1991 list)


Pike, Dennis S.
USN
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 2)


Pittman, Allan D.
----
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Preston, James A.
USAF
Laos,
name heard by several returned POWs over Voice of Vietnam or Camp Radio. (Hyatt, Risner, Rivers, Rutledge, Shumaker.)


Price, David Stanley
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/p/pls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Pugh, Dennis G.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1) -known captured according to NSA intercept correlation.


Reed, James W.
USAF
Laos,
known to have parachuted from aircraft, orders given by enemy to capture the individual according to NSA intercept correlation.


Rose, Luther L.
USAF
Laos,
no trace of crew, wreckage found.


Rowley, Charles S.
USA
Laos,
positively identified as a POW by returnee Larry Starkfrom "either propaganda pictureof group of Laos POWs viewingfilm shown at Hanoi Hilton withStark in February, 1973. (Stark debrief) -Additional information obtained from Select Committee deposition of US Embassy official from Laos during the war.


Shelton, Charles
USAF
....,
captured by P.L. forces, voice contact.


Sigafoos, Walter H.
USAF
Laos,
possibly captured according to NSA intercept correlation. (F4D two-seater, one captured, one found dead).


Singleton, Daniel L.
USAF
Laos,
possibly captured according to NSA intercept correlation. (F4E two-seater, one captured). -POW early returnee (1969) Wesley Rumble listed a "Larry Singleton" on a list of hearsay names that he was given to memorize. Daniel L. Singleton was shot down in January, 1969.


Skinner, Owen G.
USAF
Laos, out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Smith, Harding E. USAF
Laos,
no trace of crew, wreckage found.


Smith, Warren P.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Sparks, Jon M.
USA
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Springsteadah, Donald Kenneth
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/s/sls02.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html


Stevens, Larry J .
USN
Laos,
alleged post-capture photograph positively identified by family members.


Stewart, Virgil G.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Utley, Russell K.
USAF
Laos,
possibly captured alive according to NSA intercept correlation (F4E two seater -one captured)


Walker, Lloyd F.
USAF
Laos,
survival possible but no sign. (DIA analytical comments)


Walker, Samuel F.
USAF
Laos,
one parachute observed, mid-air collision. (DIA analytical comment 1979)



Warren, Ervin
USAF
Laos,
no trace of crew, wreckage found (DIA analytical comment, 1979)


Warren, Gray D.
USAF
Laos,
one pilot parachuted and probably captured according to NSA intercept correlation. (F4D-Two seater)


Wilkins, George H.
USN
----,
identified alive by Thai returnees.


Williamson, James D.
USA
Laos,
POW according to hearsay information, JSSA. no sign of crew, DIA. -believed by POW returnees Friese and Uyeyama to have signed propaganda statement.


Wood, Don C.
USAF
Laos,
Identified in Pathet Lao film, possibly captured. (DIA, 1979) -believed to have successfully got out of his aircraft and was alive on the ground. Last known alive (DoD April 1991 list)


Wood, William C.
USAF
Laos,
out of aircraft before crash. (JTF-FA Survive Code 1)


Worley, Don Franklin
USAF / TDY-Civilian to Lockheed, Lima Site 85-Phou Pha Thi, Laos
Laos,
An estimated 6-7 Battalions of PAVN/PL troops were assembled at the base of Site 85. General Vang Pao's troops were ineffective against this large enemy force, they were responsible for a 12 mile perimeter defense. During the enemy's advance on Phou Pha Thi, General Vang Pao's 700 troops could do nothing but harass the enemy. Site 85 even called in air support in its own defense, but it was not effective enough to deter the enemy's progress. To paraphrase Dr. Timothy Castle's outstanding book on this disaster, "One Day Too Long",... they waited "Two Days Too Long" to evacuate the personnel on Site 85. This was the largest North Vietnamese offensive ever conducted in Laos. After seeing the radar image ( http://limasite85.us/images/enemy-loc04.jpg ), how could there have been any doubt that it was time to destroy the equipment and evacuate. The decision makers evidently did not have the whole story or 1) still considered Site 85 impregnable or 2) wanted to squeeze one more day of operations out of the Site.
Considering the sizable enemy force assembled, Helicopters should have been assigned and sitting on the ground at Site 85 for possible evacuation. On March 11, 1968, the inevitable happened. Three teams of PAVN commandos, under cover of darkness, scaled the cliffs of Phou Pha Thi. (There is also the theory that they came in through the South defensive gate because the CIA trained locals had abandoned it.) Against previously agreed upon terms, Major Richard Secord (now retired Major General Richard Secord and author of "Honored and Betrayed", Chapter 6 concerns Lima Site 85) provided M-16's, Grenades and a few hand weapons to the Site 85 personnel. The non-combat technicians were no match for the trained PAVN commandos.
http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/w/wls01.htm
http://www.foia.cia.gov/search-resul...ction=&=Search
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...ss/Linder.html
http://limasite85.us/index.html
http://limasite85.us/Lima-Site-85-Personnel-List.htm
http://ravenfac.com/ravens/articles/lima-site-85.html

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