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#21
05-24-2003, 03:16 PM
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Q. This conversation took place on the loading dock outside? A. Right, yes. Q. Was there anyone else around that you observed? A. There were only the supervisors, the dock supervisors, who make sure that the papers are loaded. Not anyone who was listening to us. But good point. I said, if this thing is as secret and as sinister possibly as you say it is, I said, then people could be watching us right now or know that I'm having this conversation with you. And he looked at me and he says, yes, indeed that's true. He was just saying that people who would know about the program certainly have the capability to know who is visiting and talking with whom. After a half an hour -- oh, I also tried to work the deal to be able to go along with him in this van and talk with him in his van as he was delivering papers. And I have to say that, the area that he delivered papers to was really the worst part of Las Vegas. I mean, it's not a place where you'd like to get found alone. Anyway, he turned down that request. So Marlowe and I went back to the motel room. And we sat down and said, what are we going to do? You know, as far as this guy talking. And then two things occurred to me. One is, I should say one thing occurred to me, and then Marlowe made a recommendation. Marlowe said it had been his experience that, when he was trying to talk to people, what he asked them to confirm or deny things. Or act as a road map, in other words. We would come and say, I've heard this. And then the other person could say, yes, that's true, or no, that's not true. Therefore, it's not a matter of them exposing them their information, we expose ours. In other words, to know exactly what we have. The other thing -- I kept thinking about what he said, about the fact that he was not desirous of turning in, or exposing people. in other words, his mission was not designed to bring the downfall of the Government or something else like that. Or, you know, like bring action against specific individuals. And so I kept thinking about that. And it suddenly dawned on me. And I told Marlowe, I said, you know the people who are involved in this, I said, I've been going at this all wrong. I've been going and talking to these people who allegedly were involved in the new identity program, as being mean-spirited, as being people who were doing a wrong thing, that they were almost villainous, and taking away a persons life, even though they were permitting them to get out of Southeast Asia, or out of the jungles or something. And I said, the people, I said, who did this thought that they were being good, loyal, and indeed were doing it for the most patriotic reasons that were around. And so I said, rather than accusing him of being a criminal, I should accuse him, or tell him that I understand that he was doing this for the most patriotic reasons possible. And I told Russell that I was going, that I wasn't going to leave. So I decided to go back. And I went back the second night, Saturday night, and I went back early. And Russ came back, and he showed up, which was unlike his usual work habits. As I was told by other people, Russ just showed up when his papers were due off the dock. He loaded them in his truck, and took off very business-like, although he was well-liked by his co-workers. So I showed up. He showed up about a half an hour early. I said, I'm still here. And he said, yes, I expected that you would be. It was easy-going. It was not angry, like the night before, which was a real, verbal sparring match. This night there were no problems at all. He spent about 15 or 20 minutes talking with some of his coworkers. And then he says, excuse me, he says, I need to talk with this young man. So he and I sat in his van, and we talked. And I said, I told him that I wanted again to talk about the new identity program. And I had some other questions for him, specifically. I told him I wanted him to help as a road map. I told him personally, face-to-face, I could use your name in a story tomorrow. But I said, but quite honestly it's notjust your name that I want, I said, it is specific information. I want to know, one, whether or not this thing ever existed, and how it worked. And I said, also I need to apologize to you, because I was here last night accusing you of being a bad guy, and 1 know that you weren't, that you were doing this for the best of reasons. So he says, well what are your questions. And we went off. And basically what's in that story is what came from him, that allegedly the new identity program, at least the part that he knew about, began sometime around 1981, in the 1981 time frame. He said, don't get tied up with dates, specific dates, he says, because people who were involved in the beginning were not necessarily people who were involved at the end. And vice versa. Some might know about one part, but not know about the other part. I personally believe that the program began, almost accidentally, as early as 1979, not by intent or not by design. But by these people that videotape talks about, and some other cases that came out, and people also that General Kalugin talked about, when he gave information that was sent back home by Vietnam in 1979. That in 1979 the program got started only because here came these Americans back who either were late returnees, or deserters, or turncoats, or whatever, but who had been MIA, who had been POW. And what do you do with them? And because of what the United States had intended to do, or was doing, and court-martialing of Bobby Garwood, you could not have all of these other people showing up, without essentially doing, being fair and maybe putting them under suspicion or court-martial. I think that's basically how it started. There is historical precedent to this. Some of the turncoats, actually people who were captured from Korea, the 23 or so who came back under the table, or secretly, not openly. And the American public, by and large, did not know about,that. They knew a couple.of cases, but they did not know the great number for many years. Q. Excuse me. I do not mean to be argumentative. It was my understanding, and I was rather young at the time, that there were 23. But I thought as the years went on, one or two or three a year openly asked to come back, and came back. A. Yes. Q. So I'd like for you to explain a little,that they came back under the table, which, meaning that they, we didn't know that they came back. A. Okay, good point. I should not -- when I say, under the table, by that I mean that it was not openly broadcast about all of them. Certainly they, some did come out more openly, but others came out. It's my understanding that not all 23 came out when they arrived home. That it was declared either that they were coming home, or that they had arrived. Anyway, getting back to Mr. Leard and his testimony, he said that in 1981, and this would have been shortly after the ransom, alleged, I'll use the word alleged, ransom offer that was made to the Reagan administration in January of 1981. Shortly after that, American POW's came home, and it was deliberately designed that they either not be talked about, or that some were given new identities. According to Mr. Leard, the program kind of, the numbers were not extensive until the 1984-1985 time frame. That's when the largest numbers came. Specifically what I did, just to be honest, is I said, I understand that this program involved between 100 and 275 who were brought back. Early on my personal belief was that like only nine -- when I say early on, I mean like when I first became aware of this supposed program, I thought that the number was only eight or nine, but later there were larger numbers, in part because of Father Shelton's story, but because of other stories. And so I told Leard the ballpark figure. And he says, yes. He says, in that range. He says, but don't get caught up with specific numbers, he says, because people will use a specific number to get off the issue, or off the -- I'm looking for a word -- from under this situation. In other words, if I come up and if I say I understand that there were 109 brought back, and it's actually 108 or you've got two others who are coming and so it's really 111, they'll say no, there's nothing to that. So he said not to get stuck on the numbers. The number that we use in the story, I think, is approximately 275 or something like that. Q. What I'd like to do, since you've talked about this, and while it's in this exhibit, let's mark this as a separate exhibit, so that it's going to be easier for people that read the deposition to --- A. Okay. Q. Now, I'm going to show you this exhibit, which we've used in Shelton. This is your Exhibit 6. (The document referred to was marked Hendrix Exhibit No. 6 for identification.) BY MR. ERICKSON: Q. Is this the entire story, as you recall it? A. From looking at it, yes, that is, yes, from the reproduction. Q. Okay. Please continue. But I wanted to get this in specifically, for the ease of everybody reading it. A. Okay. He said that, well, basically after we started talking about people who died, people who died on the plane, people who went back, the number, in other words adding the increments, adding the units, came out to about 275. That would have been between 1981 and 1986. He said the program, as explained in the story, was ended in 1986, with the disclosure of the Iran hostage, Iran-Contra -- Q. I think, just for point of clarification, you used the figure 300. Is that -- nearly 300? A. Yes, right. Q. Okay. A. Because there were people other than the program that Leard was talking about. In other words, Leard was talking, like say for a time frame between 1981 and 1986, and there were others who supposedly came home before then. Q. How long did this conversation take place with Leard? A. About a half an hour. Q. Were you permitted to go on his route that night? A. No, I wasn't. Q. Did you ask to? A. I don't remember that I did ask, in part because all of the questions that I had set out, and I told him also that I might be back with him, but all the questions that I had set out, he answered, and answered even above and beyond what I expected. Q. Was your military affairs person with you? A. No, he was not with me. In part, I did not want to spook my source by having too many people around. I had been introduced by his wife. He knew me by face. So I felt that was better. Q. Well, Mr. Hendrix, let me go over this again. You first went over with his wife, and you were unsuccessful in talking to him. A. That's correct. Q. You wrote a letter. Did not get a response. And you made the determination, for the reasons that you've disscussed on the record, why you wanted to take -- I believe his name is Marlowe? A. Yes. Q. As your public affairs officer. You show up unannounced at the dock. And he is a little hostile. You go back with Marlowe the next day. You make a decision to try a new approach, and you go by yourself. A. Marlowe is in the parking lot. He's watching me. He sees that I'm having this conversation with this man. Q. Okay. So he was there, but he wasn't involved or listening to the conversation. A. That's correct, that's correct. Q. And the conversation that Saturday night, I believe you said, lasted approximately 30 minutes? A. Yes, in which we were talking specifically about the program. Q. And what did you do then? Did you return to Riverside? A. And I returned to Riverside and talked to my editors. And at that point, the only people that we had on the record were Russell Leard and the videotape, and my editors felt that for a story of this consequence, that we needed more than that. And so I began working on more than that. Q. Let me go back and just ask a few questions,that have come to my mind, and I'm not saying that they should have come to yours in any way, shape or form. What duty station, or what unit was he assigned to during the time he was involved in this? Did you ask that question? A. No. A good question, okay. In 1981 he was, I know because of military records, that he was in 1981 and 1982, when he was at Nellis, that he was stationed, it was a detachment at Nellis. Q. Do you know the mission of Nellis Air Force base? A. Well, stationed at Nellis, like any Air Force base, since I've been at the Air Force base, are many different units. And as a matter of fact, one detachment, for instance, can be even off Nellis proper by tens of miles. And it's my understanding that whether his detachment was on Nellis physically, or -- no, I know as a matter of fact, that it was off the, at least part of it was off the central area of Nellis, the administrative headquarters at Nellis. Q. Well your June 19, 1992 article described him as a communications and computer specialist. A. Yes, that's correct. Q. Why would a computer and communications expert be involved in this type of operation? A. Good Question. And the answer is really simple. It's because the secrets in the information of this world are taken care of by clerks. Generals do not send out the messages. They may talk on phones. They may say, I want an airplane from here to here. Or they may do something. But they do not do the scheduling. They don't do the crews. As a matter of fact many times -- don't even know how to set up the computer program, even the telecommunications system that you would need for a secure line, or whatever. So basically you need somebody who knows what they are doing. I was a personnel specialist in the Air Force. And I know that at times, I might have known more about the probability of our missiles being able to go off than even sub commanders did. Q. Now am I correct, you said this program somewhat inadvertently got started in 1979, and continued through 1986? A. My belief is that, yes, the program inadvertently began with, as you will see on the videotape, with the return of Marine MIA's Robert Greer and Frederick Schreckengost in 1989 or 196 -- excuse me, 1979. Q. Well, it was during your conversation with Mr. Leard, am I correct? He was involved in this only during the time he was in the Air Force? A. Okay. No. Thank you. In 1984-85 -- he was out of the Air Force by that time. And it is my understanding that he was since he had been in on part of it -- that they were cranking it up for the large, larger numbers in 184 and 185. And he was requested to come back in and help. He did not come back in active duty, but he was in Las Vegas at that time. Q. So in 1981-82, when he was involved in this, he was attached to Nellis Air Force Base at some specific command? A. Uh-hunh. Q. Did he indicate how many other people were involved in this operation? A. No, he didn't. I did not specifically ask him that, in part because he said that he was not going to -- at least in the earlier conversations -- that his intent was not to tell. Use -- he did not use this word, but I will use it. Necessarily to squeal on others basically. No. Q. Did vou get the impression that the entire operation -- and when I use --he word operation, I'm talking about the, the whole command structure -- was run out of Nellis, or maybe this was just a detachment? A. This is -- a specific answer to that specific question -- is I don't know. Anything that I said would be a feeling, but he did say -- I did ask him about a specific unit that I had been pursuing, whether or not it might have been involved, and he said -- again, he said this was not done, like, the command might have been organized but it was not like, they then went over and got the 67th Military Airlift Wing, and then the such and such medical squadron or something else like that to do it. He said -- and this was the reason why he supposedly was involved -- that we did this by individuals. He said, we got individuals from individual units. He says don't try to trace this thing through a unit. You trace it through the individuals, he says. And these were his words. He says, you hide a tree in the forest. Basically, the fact, he said, and again he said that we picked people -- we selected them because they were good at what they did, whether or not they were fliers, whether or not they were technicians -- computer technicians or whatever. Q. Did he ever give you any number of -- were there five people involved? 500? A. No, he did not. But obviously, what the numbers that we were talking about -- upward to 275, at least, that he said that he was familiar with. It would have to have been a sizable number. Q. Did you get the idea that this was his primary focus in '81 and '82 while he was on active duty? Or was this the type of thing that he may get a set-up -- as we say in the Navy, TAD -- or, I believe, the Air Force is TDY -- orders to report somewhere for two weeks and then come back? Or was this an ongoing effort? Or did he become that specific? A. No. He wasn't that specific and, quite honestly, I wasn't that specific in my questions. In part, because I was trying to confirm information -- trying to get enough information. And also to pursue and really find out some of the specifics that he did provide. For instance, whether or not this was handled primarily out of the Philippines. He said it wasn't, and Charlie Shelton, Jr. -- Father Shelton -- said that the information he got was that there was this operation that was being principally conducted out of Clark. Mr. Leard said that's not true. That it was a special place that was set up. I went to the detail of even listing specific locations and even as far out as Antarctica or an aircraft carrier, and he said no. He says, you will have to work on the exact location yourself. Q. Now, am I correct? Father Shelton had told you during one of your conversations with him about his conversation in 1986 in Gulfport, Mississippi, about this prior to you interviewing Mr. Leard. A. That is correct. Q. And this was -- I don't want to say a primary source -- but certainly a very important source for you to ask some of the questions that you did. A. Well, it did, in part, because I wanted to confirm or deny whether or not part of what Charlie Shelton was saying -- quite honestly, I was very skeptical of Charlie's story. thought it was a little too pat for the son of Americas only POW -- active POW -- to be sitting there and someone coming in with this information. I thought either it was a set-up of Charlie or I didn't know what else. And so, about the one thing that I was interested in specifically of Charlie's story was whether or not there were people who had died on these missions -- these air medevac missions that came out of Vietnam. And he said, he -- meaning Leard -- said that some had, but I had not written anything about Charles Shelton's story have never written anything about Charles Shelton's story and may never write anything about Charles Shelton's story. I have contacted people who supposedly were involved and they basically were not of the same -- the fellow that Charlie was talking about was not a medic, according to his family. But that doesn't mean anything. A person can say they're a medic and not be. MR. ERICKSON: Why don't we take a break. (Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the deposition in the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 12:45 p.m., this same day.) Whereupon, DAVID E. HENDRIX, the witness herein, having been previously duly sworn, was further examined and testified as follows: Q. Let's go back on the record. Mr. Hendrix, is there anything you said in your earlier testimony, before we took a break, that you want to change or modify at this time? Realizing, of course, you have requested to review it anyway. But if there is something that you want to alter, we can do it now. A. No. As far as substantive fact or anything else like that, no. Q. Let's start this.afternoon with proceeding with the same subject. When did -- if you recall -- did you talk to Father Charles Shelton about any story or information that he had concerning flights of POW's out of Vietnam in any way? A. I can't -- all I can do is give you a general time frame - It would have had to have been, I think, sometime in 1986 -- I'm not exactly sure -- but from his records, his military records -- even you can tell approximately what it was because he was already in the Air Force. He had been assigned as a chaplain to Mississippi and he was -- his home on -- he was home on leave because he was preparing to go overseas. He had gotten an assignment, I think, to Brussels, or maybe even Turkey, earlier and it was changed I think, maybe, to Brussels -- but I'm not sure. And he and my wife and I went to lunch and, as we were talking -- we were talking about different elements of the POW/MIA situation when he told me this story that -- and my wife was there also. That he had been counseling this young man who was going to marry a girl who was Catholic and this young man -- and I say young -- anyone under 30 is young to me -- and he was counseling him about taking the Catholic faith. And that the man and -- the man who was in the Air Force -- was there with his fiancee. Q. Do you remember any names or dates that this allegedly took place? A. Again, the only thing that I can say is this was -- it might have been September or October -- time frame. Can we stop a moment just so I can consult some notes? Q. Please. (Discussion off the record.) MR. ERICKSON: I will mark an exhibit for you, which will be Exhibit Number 7. (The document referred to was marked Hendrix Exhibit No. 7 for identification.) BY MR. ERICKSON: Q. This is two pieces of paper with various names and dates on it. Do you recognize this? A. Yes, I recognize that as my handwriting. I gave copies of this to Father Shelton last week because, although this is from notes taken several years ago -- quite a few years -- 3 or 4 years or so ago -- Q. Do you know when those notes were taken? Is there any way you can identify an approximate date? A. No. It would be though after he was out of the Air Force. It would be after he was back in Riverside. I remember because I wanted to chase this down. I wanted as specific information as I could -- Q. Your Exhibit Number 7 was taken from a conversation with Father Shelton? A. Yes. What I did was -- I asked Father Shelton to go back through his records. I asked him: this is how it happened? I asked him specifically for the name. He said that he could not remember it off the top of his head. And then I ... asked him: well, do you have records of something like that? And then he went back and checked these. He said he went back and checked his records and then he gave me this information. Q. Okay. What did he say about this particular incident, if you recall? A. Okay. The incident, he said, was -- as I was explaining earlier that the service member -- this staff sergeant was getting counseling because he was marrying a Catholic girl and was thinking of taking the Catholic faith. Q. What was the service member's name, if you can tell from Exhibit Number 7? A. It would be Staff Sergeant Michael John McFall. And this allegedly was his Social Security number and serial number that was given to me by Charles Shelton. He then Father Charles, during this luncheon thing -- said -- with my wife and I -- where he provided the information -- told me that as he was counseling -- and the couple were there together -- that McFall looked and saw this POW memorabilia that Father Charles had on his desk as an Air Force chaplain -- related to Father Charles' dad, Colonel Charles Shelton. And so then the staff sergeant started talking and saying that he had information about POW's and that he had, as a matter of fact, been on a flight -- on a couple of flights, in which POW's were flown -- American POW's were flown out of Haiphong and, I think, Hanoi. That supposedly that the planes had taken off -- that they were C-130's, I think -- had taken off from Clark Air Force Base, had flown to Thailand, had been remarked, and then flown into Hanoi or Haiphong, were onloaded with Caucasians who were emaciated, who were in bad physical shape. The first flight, I think, included something like -- I think, if memory is correct -- is 24 of these Caucasians, none of whom were speaking or were permitted to speak. And that -- and also that the crew members supposedly were -- had the patches and unit designator -- anythinq that would designate exactly where they were from had been removed from their uniforms, except for some crew members supposedly had an American flag on it that would designate them as being American and that one of the POW's were -- well, it was a POW -- had gone up and touched the American flag as if they were feeling something for the first time. And then -- but anyway, the flight went on and the enlisted member -- the one to whom Father Charles was talking -- the one who was giving this information to Father Charles then, he started crying, according to Father Charles. Because, he said, he -- being the service member -- said that they had been his responsibility. He said that they were his patients and that-they had died. My memory is that Father Charles said that this person to whom he talked to purported to be a medic. But, anyway, that -- that, that 3 of this 24 people died because they were in such bad shape before they landed-back at Clark for their first medical treatment. I have to say that I sat there with -- almost shaking my head -- it was really an incredible story. Q. When did this flight -- when was it to have taken place? A. Supposedly 1984, I think. 1984-85. I'm quite sure it was 1984. Q. Just to clear up for the record -- you mentioned that you had lunch with Father Shelton with your wife. A. Yes. Q. But Exhibit Number 7 -- those notes were taken at a later date? A. Yes, a later date because -- you see here, down here is the wedding November ist, 1986. So it would have been -- it was after the wedding. The date of the interview that he had with the couple who were going to be married was October 12th, 1986. According to that, my thought was -- and these are my notes, meaning what Father Charles was saying. Father Charles was sayinq-that it was his thought that it was a scheme or a plan that had evolved in 1985 and was over by the summer of 186. Q. Did he talk about any other flights or was this the only flight he talked about? A. Father Charles -- at the time of the first conversation I had with Father Charles -- at this luncheon-conversation with my wife, there was only one flight that was mentioned. it was after our conversation at this lunch that, I think, Father Charles mentioned either another flight or more than one flight. You have to remember that at lunch -- it wasn't like a formal interview situation. And we were just exchanging information and , quite honestly, I thought at the time -- my wondering was, as he was giving this information, was whether or not he was giving privileged information. Privileged under the priest-confessor type situation. I talked to him about that later and he said no, since it was not a confessional situation. That it was a counseling situation and he said also that he warned this fellow that he should not be just talking about this to anybody and that he went so far as to tell this fellow's mom, I think, that this guy had to be very careful about to whom he told things. The thing that Father Charles was -- if nothing else -- was -- while he was in the military -- was that even though this may seem incongruous, he got information about POW's and he was very active in the POW/MIA issue -- that he still, from all I could tell by his bearing, was deeply concerned and interested. That while it was supposed to be a secret for the military to be there -- or be kept secret -- but then, of course, he told me this. Q. You mention that he was home on leave preparing to go to Belgium or Europe. Did he go there or do you know? A. I thought that he had. And it was only later that I found out that, I don't think, that he ever went to Europe -- that his orders were canceled. There was an allegation about -- some fellow alleged that Father Charles had been inappropriate. I think there was a homosexual allegation or something like that that was involved. And it was my understanding then that Father Charles was offered a chance either to resign with nothing being made open or go to court-martial, at which time everything would be dragged through. And he opted for -- as he said, for the good of his faith and everything else like that -- to not fight it -- not that he didn't want to but that he decided it would be better not to. Q. You mentioned early in your testimony that you first met Father Shelton in about '84, '85. A. It would have been about June 185. Q. From then until-now, how much contact have you personaly had with him, bearing in mind that there's been several stories written. I mean, do you have a weekly meeting? Or once a month? A. No. As a matter of fact, what I meant when he and I had a conversation last week -- it was the first time we had talked in like 11 months. So there is no scheduled meeting. Q. Do you recall how many months passed from the time you had your luncheon.meeting with Father Shelton and then you basically had an interview with Father Shelton with some of his notes so that you could make what are Exhibi-. Number 7? A. I would say probably about -- it might have been 2 years -- somewhere roughly in that time frame. Q. Did Father Shelton tell you anything else at any time that gave you other information about POW's coming out of Vietnam by aircraft or by a reidentification program such as when you talked to George Russell Leard? A. Or by design? Yes, he did. He talked to me about a fellow that he knew in Arizona. Just a second here, I'm trying to think. If you want to stop the tape a second so I can get a name from my notes. Okay. Gordon LeBlanc, L-e-B-1-a-n-c. Q. And what did Gordon tell the Father? A. Again, this is from Father Charles' information, because I've not been able to get ahold of LeBlanc myself. Gordon M. LeBlanc and he is out of the Phoenix area, maybe Scottsdale. Anyway, Charles Shelton said that Gordon M. LeBlanc was a major oil exploration specialist -- major international kind of wheeler-dealer in oil-drilling projects that had significant ties to the Chinese -- Nationalist Chinese -- before the war -- World War 11 -- started and, so, this is an older fellow. And had then, as a matter of fact, for a while been in the Kennedy administration, I think, with transportation or energy field. And that he met LeBlanc -- he, meaning Charlie -- had met LeBlanc through a mutual friend and LeBlanc supposedly had this plan in which American POW's would be brought out of Southeast Asia and introduced -- would be brought out of Laos, Vietnam or wherever else they were being held -- and reintroduced into other Asian countries or Southeast Asian countries to kind of get them out of the way -- they, meaning the POW's -- out of the way so that it was not so much a problem with starting up trade relations with Vietnam again because of the intense interest to drill for oil off the coast of Vietnam. And so LeBlanc and Shelton used to talk extensively about this and about international financing and other things to help this to pass. I never met LeBlanc personally and -- as much as I could to trace him down as being a major force in oil or exploration or anything else like that -- I did not do that personally. Q. Do you know from your Air Force experience or perhaps common knowledge how many crew members would be on a C-130? A. Well, normally there would be -- and just back in the '84, '85 time frame -- there would be the pilot, the copilot -- it depends. If it were a long trip, there would be at least two of those. There would be a navigator. There would be a couple of crew chiefs and then, if you're talking air medical evacuation, there would be at least another, I would think, three, four, or five of those, depending upon on long the trip was. It was my understanding -- this more from George -- no, not from George, I'm sorry. More from other people that C-130 -- C-130's doesn't make sense to me. Until I was talking to other people and they said, well, because the C-141 is faster and it's going to get emaciated Americans to a hospital faster and all this -- but what I was told -- that no C-130 would make the most sense because almost -- there's almost every air force in the world has got a C-130 or an L-10 in it and, as a matter of fact, even the Vietnamese Air Force has got C-130's in it -- that were captured or left behind. And so you can take a C-130 and paint it and it can be even a Red Cross airplane. And you can fly them in and out. The one thing that Leard said -- because I pushed him on the type of aircraft in part because I was checking out part of what Charlie had been saying -- is -- I asked Leard about the C-130's and asked him about this unit, the 3400th Tech Training whatever -- some squadron. And Leard said, do not get tied up with specific aircraft. He said that any time any airplane lands -- and what you see on the outside doesn't tell you what's on the inside -- and, as a matter of fact, he made a point of that because that -- I was scribbling in my note pad. You know -- the answers to his question -- and he stopped me. And he said, stop, stop, stop. He said, don,t get caught up in the specific type of aircraft. Q. You mentioned that Father Shelton said that the crew members could not talk and were ordered not to talk. Did he elaborate on who gave the order for them not to talk? A. No. it would be my assumption it was just an order that went along with the flight -- with that particular mission. Q. Were there any debriefers on the plane? Or were there any non-U.S. personnel on the C-130? A. None that Father Charles mentioned. None as far as I know. I don't know whether or not this enlisted person gave that information. Q. Did you ever personally talk to -- either by telephone or in person -- with Sergeant McFall, did you say? A. McFall. I have-not talked to McFall by person. I talked to his family members. McFall, at the time I was calling him, was away TDY at an officer's candidate school or officer training school program for the Reserves. And I didn't want to spill the beans, especially to the family members -- you know -- what I was calling about. And so, I just asked if indeed they had been married. And I called first the parents -- and if the daughter had been married by this priest from Mississippi and they said yes -- and then I talked to the wife. And she said yes and she knew that Father Charles was related to POW but she could not remember anything specifically that had been mentioned. Q. Sergeant McFall's wife? A. Sergeant McFall's wife. That had been mentioned during this interview -- that really would have been significant, but of course I can take that two ways. Either nothing really was mentioned there or that you get a cold call from a reporter over the phone about something sensitive -- I mean, not everybody blabs or says what they know to be lurking in the background. But the one thing that they did say was that McFall -- I think that they said McFall was more in electronics, like an AWACS type person as opposed to being medical. Again, that doesn't prove anything one way or another, except that somehow the story has got to be straightened. Somehow you've got to find out which one is so, or if the whole -- if one is. Was he AWACS or was he medic? Or, indeed, the basic story is -- did this flight take place? Q. You mentioned off the-record, just before we started this afternoon session, that you wanted to talk about aircraft and I made a note. Maybe now is a good time for you to discuss. A. Well, basically, the point was that -- I wanted to make was -- that even though you might search for a C-130 unit or something like that -- Leard's statement that you don't -- you don't close yourself in just specifically on one type of aircraft or one type of unit -- that, as a matter of fact, a Lear Jet can be painted a certain color and go in and fly in and out and have on the inside -- land at Oakland Airport and have inside POW or MIA. Q. In either of your conversations with Leard or Father Shelton, is 24 about the size that they brought out? Or is that just what this sergeant reported to him on this particular flight? A. On the number 24 -- is the one specifically that I remember on this first flight from the sergeant -- or as Charlie related this story. As Leard talked, the flight numbers were in that range. Some might have been a little larger. But there was no specific number. In other words, there was no magic number. Q. And in your Exhibit Number 6, you talk as many as 300. So, if you equate t.he 24, there were numerous flights. A. Oh, yeah. There were several flights. Q. Did anybody -- Father Shelton or Leard -- mention that the U.S. had paid any money to the Vietnamese for these POW'S? A. They did not. But another source has. Another source has said that the United States has provided money under the table, beginning in 1983, of tens of millions of dollars to quote improve the living conditions of the American POW'S. This source I consider extremely, extremely credible. I would put absolute faith in what he said as to what he heard or what was given to him. I am not going to reveal the source but, according to him, in 1983 a White House staffer said, we are providing this aid under the table to the Vietnamese to improve the living conditions of the POW'S. Since then I've looked for ways -- obviously, if there's a paper trail, I would love to have it, and it would be in the paper tomorrow. But the best that I can come up with is that the -- every time we do a dig in Vietnam -- and I asked Mr. Ptak this in July during the meeting here -- of family members in Washington, D.C. Every dig that the Americans do in Vietnam or Laos even, for that fact, cost the American government a significant amount of money. Mr. Ptak said -- I asked him if it was like a million dollars a dig and he said he could not give a specific number but that it was a significant amount of money. And that the Americans will say let's dig here, and the Vietnamese will say let's dig here, and if there's no compromise you dig where the Vietnamese say dig. And each one of those, even though -- that they are, probably have the lowest wage rates in the world if not close to it -- I mean, there may be someone who makes less money than Vietnamese workers. Each one---of those digs and excavations, I'm told, cost at least a million dollars. And so there are lots of ways to transfer money. For instance, there have been a lot of -- since 19, in the 1980's -- a lot of water, hydroelectric projects in Laos -- through World Bank, through the United Nations, assistance and other programs -- the United States certainly still has relations with the Laos. And so basically the money can go into, into Laos and then go next door to Vietnam. Another source has suggested that is the way to do that. Also oil exploration rights. Although we're not in -- although U.S. companies are not yet drilling in Vietnam -- they have been drilling in Laos, around Pakse and Tchepone. And so there are rights there also. There are a lot of ways to transfer money. Also, since this allegedly started in 1983 in which the money was given under the table. Supposedly some of the -- well, I say, supposedly -- I don't know for sure through which third countries transfers might have been made. But a la Iran Contra, in which we transferred things through Israel -- certainly, we have a lot of friends in Southeast Asia -- the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea -- there are a lot of places. And also one interesting element that came up within the last couple of years was the disclosure like that, I think, Vietnam was sending some old military stuff to Iran, because obviously Iran had old American equipment and should need spare parts.
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 Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: "In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution." 
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#22
05-24-2003, 03:33 PM
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Q. Am I correct in remembering that when you talked to Mr. Leard he said that the Philippines was not where the prisoners were taken. Yet Father Shelton's story was that they were taken to Clark. Is that correct? A. Yes. That is correct. Leard said the Philippines was not the principal place. In other words, that some might go through the Philippines, some might even -- but there was a principal spot -- he would not say specifically where it was. He said that it was a place prepared specifically for this project -- in the Pacific by intimation -- well, it would have to be an island. And, as I said earlier, I got down to the point of asking him, like an aircraft carrier or a hospital ship or something like that? And he said, no, you're just guessing. That the island was -- I asked him whether or not it was jungle, and he stopped and thought a moment and he says, yes, I guess there-is some. But in trying to trace it down, I've checked on Kwajalein. I've checked on Johnston Island. I've checked on Eniwetok. I've checked on other places. And although he was not -- Leard was not specific about the island, other people suggest that Johnston Island might be the best spot. But I don't know for sure. In other words, it's a spot where you come in and give -- either -- not everybody may need medical treatment and so it is a reorientation camp also. And then from there, Leard said people were taken to other hospitals. Some to mainland U.S., and others to Hawaii, and others to Clark, and others to, maybe, Guam or Okinawa. Q. You mentioned that he retired-from the Air Force in '81 or '82, but he was still involved later on? A. Yes. Q. Did he mention, or did you ask, was there a civilian contractor involved with any of this operation? A. I did not ask that, quite honestly. It would not have occurred to me at that point to have asked that. Since then it has been brought to my attention. As a matter of fact another source, again who will remain undisclosed, says that according to their information it was probably done through the National Security Council but by contract with private agencies. Let me say also something else, for the record too -- I want to make sure that under the broad based program of secret reintroduction or secret return of POW'S, MIA's and others to the United States -- it's my understanding that under that broad thing there might be several sub-areas. Some people such as Greer and Schreckengost, who were supposedly brought in quietly and given new identities, and who might have been turncoats or something. Others who were just outright deserters and who were allowed to come home, and others who were what we would call bona fide POW's and either under village arrest or under being held in a prison and were brought back so there are three subcategories. Q. And it is your understanding that -- let me just use for the sake of these 300 from your article -- these new people were given new identity and really were never reunited with their wife, children, or mother, father. A. That they were never reunited with their wife, mother, and children -- at least except for some, who might have wanted to blow their cover or some may have since then done that. There are at least a couple of cases. And some, yes, but -- for the sake of those people -- they were brought in -- some died because they were in bad shape. Those who survived were cleaned up and then either sent to another hospital or given the option of living in the United States -- where, if they didn't like it there because of the culture shock -- if they were held for any number of time -- at least 15 years -- they were probably more Asian than they were Western European. And after a time, some men took the option, according to Leard, of returning to Southeast Asia and -- in some area, either the Philippines, Indonesia or whatever. And some, according to another source, even opted to go back to Laos. Q. Did the United States Government provide a lump sum of money or set up -- we're suggesting that people that perhaps had been captured certainly 6 years -- from 6 years up to 12-13 years are coming back. How do we -- if you know how do we resettle someone in the United States? Do we provide them funding? Do we set up bank accounts? How is this done? Or did Mr. Leard tell you? A. Mr. Leard specifically did not tell me that. So any information I have about that would be from other sources. Just generally, the picture that emerges is that they -- after the hospital treatment, which Mr. Leard talked about after the reorientation after the hospital treatment -- and you're reintroduced into public and you are given a job. You are sent on a job and given some money. And you are located and obviously you also have a quote handler unquote, who is your contact person with whichever agency or organization is providing the cover. And also watching how well you're doing. And some supposedly have relocated within miles of their former family. Q. What would be your speculation would be the motive for the United States Government to do this and what would be the motive for the Vietnamese Government? Because if this program took place, it would require the cooperation of both governments. A. Yes, it would. And I've been asked that I don't know how many times. And all I can come up with is my own supposition, my own conclusions as for why the U.S. and the Vietnamese would do it -- I don't have much difficulty with that. You have -- at the end of '73 -- a difficult time. Nixon is undergoing the Watergate situation and we're not getting everybody home. We can't,disclose because at thattime the war in Laos is still secret, even though it is raging and still full-tilt. You don't want to let the American public know about Laos also, and so -- and so it is a really sticky situation and we do leave a lot of peovle behind. Or some have gone to the Soviet Union. And then there are supposedly some late returnees -- some POW's up through the '75 time period -- and I've talked to one who alleges that he came out late with a planeload in August of '73. It's hard to tell whether or not that's really true or not. Q. A planeload? A. Of Americans -- 60, or 70, or something. He says that he was in another camp and there's more than one story like this. If there only one story, you would just kind of pass it off. But anyway, that he and the others were marched aboard a flight and they were flown to Travis and within 2 days they were discharged and given their severance pay and their back pay and off they went. And they went home. Q. Has there been any publicity on this? I mean I'm not necessarily questioning it but as I sit here and you tell me that a plane -- that U.S. Air Force plane, I trust, flies into Travis with 60 or 70 former U.S. POW's 2 years after. A. Well, in this particular case I'm talking about, this was only within months after the regular. But it still should have raised some eyebrows, but Travis is a big place. And you're right. No, it was not publicized. Q. This is the first I've ever heard of it and I've heard a lot of rumors since last year. A. Well, this was not publicized. There was another fellow who supposedly escaped with a couple of others in 174, '74 time frame and he managed -- this was before the fall of Saigon -- to get into friendly hands and was shipped home quietly. So, you know, there are a lot of cases of this supposedly having happened, at least through 175. Okay, Nixon is out of office. Two years later, nobody wants to confess that you left -- what about all those people in Laos that are, you know, unaccounted for? That all of those people were left behind. Then it becomes a thorny problem. The Vietnamese aren't getting their $4.2 billion or any other money. And it's really becoming a tough problem. So it's my person belief and I cannot prove this, but that in 1979 when the people that General Kulagin talked about -- supposedly his people interrogated and I know there's at least his subordinate doesn't agree with Kulagin's version. But when Kulagin's people came out and when Freer Schreckengost and a fellow by the name of John Sweeney came out and they were post Garwood, it then became a more troublesome problem because what do you do with these people? And so in '81, when the ransom offer was made, so many POW's for $4.2 billion, the United States then had to do something about it. And President Reagan or his administration authorized a couple of inserts into Laos to determine if POW's were still there. And again, this is my speculation, that after '82 or '83, they got -- they, somebody in the U.S., they, somebody in Vietnam.-- said look, how do we dispose of this? This is a real sticky problem. And then, because there had already been people who had come home, they started a little bit at a time to see if maybe they can come home secretly or under the table, nobody telling about it. Now, why would the people who come home be quiet? have not talked to one face to face. I've talked to a couple on the phone. They -- the biggest reason seems to be because others are still behind. In other words, you don't break the story or you don't tell about it or you keep the faith so others might still come out. And after so many years, you know, it just becomes the life that you live with or the lie that you live. So another thing is that -- and this goes by the POW's who came out under Operation Homecoming, is that over the 8 to 16 to 20 years chat you've been separated from your family, a lot of things happen. People remarry, children have grown up, et cetera. So there's a lot of reasons to remain quiet. Also, on the Greer case, Greer was not close to his family before he left so why should he be close when he came back? Q. Why did you run this story in 1992 after you had part of the information in 1986 and 1987? Is there any particular reason to have -- the time lag between the time you got the information from Father Shelton and from Mr. Leard in Las Vegas until the time that this was published June 19th of 1992? A. Quite honestly, part of the time was spent in trying to chase down some of the people. I always use the illustration of Bigfoot, okay. Somebody over here says they've spotted Bigfoot and found him and there are big marks in, you know, or other signs of Bigfoot having been there, but you don't have Bigfoot. You can do a story saying Bigfoot exists, but it's really better to have the person there -- Bigfoot there in front of you. And the same thing happened, was that under the first set of allegations that are on the videotape about the Greer Schreckengost and John Sweeney is that that was all I had and that was a small number. Other names started showing up, other alleged cases, some in southern California. And it was a matter of trying to trace down and see first if such a person exists and then who were they before, because quite honestly, I am not ignorant of the fact that this is a major allegation. This is a major story. There is a scene in the movie, All The President's Men, in which -- about Watergate -- in which Woodward and Bernstein are being asked by their managing editor, do you know how important this story is? And they said yes. And he says, well -- or no, he says, are you certain about your facts? And they said, yes. He said, you'd better be, because all we're talking about is the Presidency of the United States, et cetera. And when this is concluded, this story is concluded, I know of the significance and importance of this story. So it is not something that I do lightly. Something that people need to know, especially about journalists, is that 99.8 percent of us, especially me, it's the one thing that you don't want to do is be wrong. It's even stated as a negative. You don't state it as, I want to be right. You state it as, I do not want to be wrong. And part of it, as I said earlier, after I got the information from the tape then it took me a long time to make my editors watch the videotape. After I got permission to go to Leard -- and I had done a lot of this work on my own time and used vacations and everything else like that to run down leads -- is that then they came back and wanted more information. And so it took like until about 192 to have compiled enough facts or at least enough other information -- all of it is not in this story that says yes, there is more than credible evidence that something like that existed. And part of it too was disclosures by -- in the research about World War II and Korean POW's -- that some had come back non-publicly after the war was over, some in '46, '47 time frame from World War and some after Korea. There was just a lot of information that built up. And another thing, quite honestly, that helped, say, give credibility to the story or credence to the story, was General Kulagin who, quite without expectation, announced that his people had interrogated Americans in 1978 and then sent them home in 1979, but that they -- the names and phone numbers and things that they were given, that somehow they didn't check out in the United States. So, there was a lot of stuff. There was a lot of factoring. Q. We obviously won't, in this deposition, won't have time to view the tape that you provided. But for the record, could you describe what the tape's about, what it shows, where it was filmed, who filmed it, things of that nature? A. The videotape was filmed -- and it's 1983 or '84, I think maybe '84 or shortly after the National League of Families annual meeting. It shows a fellow by the name of Liam Adkins -- Liam is his nickname, his first name is William -- Adkins, A-d-k-i-n-s, U.S. Government. Some years he spells it A-t-k-i-n-s. Anyway, he is a fellow who had been special forces and said that after Bobby Garwood came out that someone that he knew wanted to do a book about -- Garwood wanted some background information. And Liam Adkins, having friends still in the military, he went to them to get records about Garwood to help provide background information on this book, that friends provided other information about other American MIA's who had been brought out-and -- in one case, discharged quietly. John Sweeney who was discharged quietly under his own name and then two others, Greer and Schreckengost who came out, were discharged and were given new identities. And again, -because of the potential embarrassment to the United States Government. And he tells about the documents that he saw. He tells also about efforts to discredit him, about the fact that he was arrested in England. You know, there is a -- I think it's mentioned in my story, the June 19th story, as a matter of fact -- who's the columnist that did a story in 1980 based on documents that he also saw. Anderson. A. Yeah, Jack Anderson, October 26th, 1980, a column Jack Anderson wrote. As many as six Americans are believed to have taken up arms against U.S. troops in Vietnam. At least two of these, both Marine privates, are known to have joined in combat with the Vietcong against American forces. Yet these two men now live in the United States, unpunished, under new identifies furnished by the Government itself. Anyway, he points out that, and I trace down that column. Anyway, I said well, if two of these can come back and get new identities, maybe there's more. I would find them to find out if they know any information about other POW'S.
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Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: "In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
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#23
05-24-2003, 08:25 PM
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 Pilot Distress SymbolsThe Committee's investigation of pilot distress symbols as a possible source of evidence of live POWs after 1973 was the first such investigation conducted by any body of Congress. During the war, the military services gave many pilots who flew combat missions individual authenticator numbers to identify themselves by radio or other means in the event their airplanes were shot down or crashed. During their pre-flight training, pilots were also given Escape and Evasion (E&E) signals to employ either as an evader or POW to facilitate their eventual recovery. Most pilots received training in methods of constructing these E&E symbols in survival courses, prior to assignment to Vietnam. Both E&E symbols and authenticator numbers were classified. It was expected that these symbols would be used to attract rescuers and would be deployed in ways which would avoid ground detection and yet be visible to overhead collecting sources. Consequently, intelligence analysts have been encumbered with the difficult task of searching for signals which could be extremely faint, or a clever blend of natural and man-made features. The Committee became interested in this area while looking into intelligence concerning the reported presence of POWs at a camp near Nhom Marrott, Laos, in 1980. This intelligence included the discovery of what appeared to be a "52", possibly followed by a "K" in the prison garden. It was learned that "K" was a pilot distress signal used during the war. The Committee discovered that the intelligence community had other overhead photographs, taken by both airborne and satellite collection platforms, showing what appeared to be symbols or unexplained markings. The earliest example was a four digit set of numbers followed by what appeared to be the letters "TH" found on a May, 1973 photograph of an area in central Laos. According to the Joint Service SERE Agency (JSSA), the four digit number could be an authenticator number followed by the primary and back-up distress symbols of a downed pilot. Another example was a 1975 photograph of a prison facility in Vietnam, in which the CIA noted unusual markings on the roof of one of the buildings. Although the CIA analysts assessed as remote the possibility that this represented a signal from a POW, they noted that the markings might be transposed to the letter "K" in Morse code. The Committee also learned of a 1988 photograph of a valley near Sam Neua, Laos, showing what clearly was a "USA" dug into a rice paddy. Beneath the "USA", DIA also noted a possible "K" created by "ground scarring."
The Committee recommends that the search for possible POW distress symbols in Southeast Asia be a written intelligence requirement and that imagery analysts be educated fully about JSSA training. This is because a prisoner under detention is not likely to have the opportunity to construct distress signals that are blatant or elaborate; they are, in fact, trained to use discreet methods to avoid detection. The more familiar imagery analysts are with JSSA training, the more likely it is that they will be able to detect such a discreet signal. Also, given the possibility that past signals could have been missed, the Committee recommends that past photography of suspect detention sites be reviewed to the extent that resources permit. The Committee notes that JSSA officials had not been consulted previously with respect to the suspected symbols, except for the 1973 "TH" photograph, which was shown to them in the mid-1980's. Accordingly, the Committee asked JSSA to evaluate a number of possible symbols and markings to see if they were consistent with JSSA training methods and distress symbols used during the war. JSSA concluded that the "USA, possible K", the "52 possible K", the "TH" , the roof top markings and one other symbol were consistent with the methods taught to pilots downed in Laos. JSSA analysis of the "USA possible K" concluded that this should be considered a valid distress symbol until proven otherwise. It should be emphasized, however, that JSSA officials are not trained in photo analysis, and are not qualified to determine whether, in fact, symbols that may seem to appear in imagery actually exist. The Committee notes that imagery anomalies are caused by regularly occurring natural phenomena and that JSSA originally identified 150 such numbers during its review of photography, of which 19 appeared to match the four-digit authenticator numbers of U.S. airmen. It was later demonstrated to the satisfaction of all parties that none of these numbers were man-made, and all were naturally occurring phenomena such as shadows, ridges, or trees, with the exception of one additional symbol identified by one consultant in an altogether different location. The DIA does not dispute that two of the possible symbols, the "USA" in 1988, and the 1973 "TH" are intentionally-constructed man- made symbols. In a message to the Committee received in January, 1993, however, the agency stated that the "'USA' symbol was not a distress symbol and had nothing to do with missing Americans." This finding was based on a December, 1992 on-site investigation which "determined that the symbol was made by Hmong tribe members." In the same message, the DIA raised the possibility that the 1973 "TH" symbol may have been made by a Hmong tribesman whose name started with the English letters "TH" and who was a passenger on an aircraft piloted by the American Emmet Kay which went down in May, 1973, "a few kilometers" away from where the symbol appeared. DIA now contends that the "52", possible "K" seen at Nhom Marrott is the result of shadowing and in no way represents a pilot distress symbol. The Committee notes, however, that DIA had earlier discounted the possibility that the symbol was caused by shadowing because of the constant shape of the figures over a period of days and at different times of the day. In fact, the intelligence community had concluded in 1980 that this symbol had been dug into the ground intentionally. Due to the complexity of interpreting symbols obtained through imagery, the Committee decided to hire two independent imagery consultants. Each consultant was given access to the necessary equipment and each submitted independently a report to the Committee. The consultants' reports, which differed on only the one symbol referred to earlier, were subsequently provided to the intelligence community for its comments and evaluation. A joint task group of DIA, CIA and NPIC imagery analysts found that an unresolved symbol found by one consultant was "probably not man- made." This consultant had detected, with "100 percent confidence" a faint "GX 2527" in a photograph of a prison facility in Vietnam taken in June, 1992. This number correlates to the primary and back-up distress symbols and authenticator number of a pilot lost in Laos in 1969. The joint agency team agreed that there were visible markings that could be interpreted as letters and numbers, but concluded that the marking "appeared" too "haphazard and ill- defined" to be man-made distress symbols. Disagreement arose within the Committee about the interpretation of some of the possible symbols, including the question of whether there is reason to believe that the "GX 2527" symbol is man-made, rather than the result of natural phenomena. However, the Committee agrees that the benefit of the doubt should go to the individual in this case, because the apparent number corresponds to a particular authenticator number and because it was identified by one analyst with 100 percent confidence. Accordingly, the Committee urges the appropriate officials in the Executive branch to request information about the serviceman involved from the Government of Vietnam. Although the Committee cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. POWs have attempted to signal their status to aerial observers, the Committee cannot conclude, based on its own investigation and the guidance of imagery experts, that this has definitely happened. Although there is now an adequate collection process in place, the Committee investigators found unacceptable lapses in time between the point of collection and evaluation; and between evaluation and follow-up. The Committee recommends better integration among the various intelligence agencies, including improved training and a better system for collecting and acting on information gathered through imagery.
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Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: "In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
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#24
05-25-2003, 06:36 AM
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 Live-Sighting ReportsNeither the Montgomery Committee nor the Woodcock Commission had the benefit of the flood of reports from refugees fleeing Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam and Cambodia, following the Communist takeover of those two countries. First-hand and hearsay accounts about live Americans being sighted did much to revive hopes among families and others that some U.S. POWs might have survived, but few reports were received before 1979. Live-sighting reports, and the U.S. response to them, dominated much of the POW/MIA discussion during the late 1970's and 1980's. In the early 1980's, George Brooks of the National League of Families conducted a study in which he found considerable fault with the way live-sighting reports were analyzed by the DIA. In Congress, however, the House Task Force on American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia reviewed 80 "live-sighting" case files and concluded that "all options available to DIA were exercised" in responding to them. The following year, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that the "DIA performs unbiased, professional and thorough analyses of POW-MIA live- sighting cases," and rejected suggestions that credible information about live Americans had been covered up. It should be noted that this was a limited inquiry into DIA procedures and that no public hearings were held. During this same period, Commodore Thomas A. Brooks (USN) of the DIA wrote an extremely critical internal memorandum on DIA's performance in evaluating live-sighting cases. According to the memo, Admiral Brooks further sought to "damage limit" Members of Congress who wanted to review POW/MIA files which were acknowledged to be "sloppy" and "unprofessional". During the first six months of 1986, the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Murkowski, conducted seven days of hearings on the POW/MIA issue, focusing primarily on "live- sighting" reports and other information that U.S. POWs were being held. The Committee received a bewildering array of allegations, claims and counter-claims from agency officials, family members, former POWs, retired military officers and Members of Congress. The Committee issued no report, but the range of testimony indicated that divisions over whether the U.S. Government was doing enough in behalf of POW/MIAs and their families were widening, rather than narrowing. Also in 1986, two other critical reviews were written at the Defense Department concerning DIA's POW/MIA efforts. One internal review concluded that it was a "mystery" that prior Congressional reports had generally praised these efforts. A summary of all three reviews is discussed below, and the entire reports are included as an appendix. Internal DIA Inquiries Meanwhile, several internal Defense Intelligence Agency reviews were conducted during this period.
Although the body of the Tighe report was classified until mid- 1992, some of the conclusions and recommendations were not. The report recommended a "complete overhaul" of the activities of the DIA PW/MIA Center in order improve the quality and thoroughness of intelligence evaluation related to the POW/MIA issue. The principal conclusions were that:
The report's finding that live U.S. POWs were possibly being held in Laos and Vietnam was based on live-sighting reports provided primarily by the refugee community which the Task Force found to be "possibly the finest human intelligence database in the U.S. post- World War II experience," and on judgments made about the likelihood, based on intelligence and history, that Vietnam would seek to retain prisoners as bargaining chips. Reagan Inter-Agency Group On January 19, 1989, the last day of President Reagan's second term, an "Inter-Agency Report of the Reagan Administration on the POW/MIA Issue in Southeast Asia" was released. The report credited President Reagan for designating the issue a matter of "highest national priority," re-opening bilateral discussions with Vietnam and Laos, upgrading intelligence priorities, and discouraging "irresponsible" private activities. The report concluded that "we have yet to find conclusive evidence of the existence of live prisoners, and returnees at Operation Homecoming in 1973 knew of no Americans who were left behind in captivity. Nevertheless, based upon circumstances of loss and other information, we know of a few instances where Americans were captured and the governments involved acknowledge that some Americans died in captivity, but there has been no accounting of them." Challenge for the Select Committee Aside from the Montgomery Committee, no full scale Congressional investigation of the issues to be dealt with by the Select Committee had ever been conducted. However, the Select Committee would have the advantage of new information that had become available since the mid-1970's, including potential access to information and cooperation from nations of the former Soviet bloc. The Committee was determined from the outset to do as thorough a job as possible. Unlike previous inquiries, the Committee would focus not on a single issue or a particular point in time, but on the entire chain of custody of the POW/MIA issue from the war to the Paris Peace Talks to the present day. The Committee's investigative methods also differ from previous inquiries in several ways. First, the Committee required sworn testimony from government officials and private citizens alike and felt compelled to use its subpoena authority on some occasions. Second, the Committee made a vigorous effort to solicit testimony not only from policy-makers in Washington, but from professionals in the field, many of whom have worked on the issue for more than a decade. Third, the Committee requested, and received, cooperation from the Executive branch, but also attempted whenever possible, to analyze information and evidence independently from the Executive branch. On several occasions, the Committee asked officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency to respond to alternative theories or interpretations of available information. The purpose was to test the "conventional wisdom" and to allow a free-flowing exchange of views for the benefit of Committee Members and the public. Finally, the Committee sought access to all POW/MIA related materials in the possession of the Executive branch, including Presidential papers, National Security Council documents and the records of the White House-based Washington Special Action Group. Much of this material had never before been made available to Congressional or other investigators of the issue. Baseline Hearings -- November, 1991 During the initial round of hearings on November 5, 6, 7 and 15, 1991, the Committee sought to establish a baseline of belief and knowledge about the POW/MIA issue, and to obtain guidance from family, veterans and activist groups about the areas on which it should concentrate its work. The testimony of the first witness, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, marked the first time that a Secretary of Defense had testified before Congress exclusively on the subject of POW/MIA affairs. The Secretary told the Committee that "to date, we have no conclusive evidence proving that Americans are being held against their will in Indochina. Nonetheless, the importance of the issue makes investigating live-sighting reports our first priority." The Secretary and subsequent Defense Department witnesses set forth in detail the process DOD uses to seek POW/MIA related information throughout Southeast Asia, including efforts to increase cooperation with governments of the region. In that connection, Secretary Cheney testified that: Vietnamese cooperation on these joint investigations has improved, but despite these improvements, we are still not satisfied with Vietnam's performance. Too often, our office finds that public pronouncements of increased cooperation by Hanoi do not produce satisfactory arrangements on the ground. Promises to cooperate on live-sightings, improved helicopter transportation and complete access to historical records remain only partially fulfilled. Vietnam's foot-dragging on unilateral repatriation of remains is especially frustrating, especially if we ever hope to achieve the fullest possible accounting in a reasonable period of time, Vietnamese unilateral efforts, as well as their participation in joint activities, will have to dramatically improve. Secretary Cheney also described Defense Department efforts to evaluate the validity of recent photographs purporting to show U.S. POWs, and alluded to the "cruel actions by some fast operators who play on the hopes of families and friends of POWs and MIAs: We must naturally pursue every lead that comes our way. . . . But each time we rush to answer. . . .false alarms, our resources are diverted from solid leads and productive lines of inquiry. Individuals who repeatedly provide false information, well intentioned or not, should be called to account for their actions. General John W. Vessey, Jr. (USA Ret.), the Special Presidential Emissary for POW/MIA Matters, reviewed the status of his efforts to gain a fuller accounting of missing Americans. In describing the U.S. and Vietnamese approaches to the issue, General Vessey told the Committee: The United States has quite consistently urged that the POW/MIA matter be approached as a humanitarian issue. We have regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the issue is not a requirement for discussing normalization of diplomatic relations. We have, however, consistently said that the pace and scope of any normalization discussions will be affected by the level of Vietnam's cooperation in resolving the POW/MIA issues. With respect to the issue of live Americans, General Vessey said: We know through extensive debriefings and subsequent investigations that all Americans seen by U.S. prisoners of war who did return in the Vietnamese prison system have been accounted for either as returned POWs or through the return of remains or having been reported as died in captivity. In the years since 1973, other than the 100 or so unresolved first-hand live-sighting reports under investigation, we have gathered no other intelligence that has been reported to me. . . .which indicates that the Vietnamese are holding live prisoners or that there was another POW system other than the one in which our returned prisoners were held. Of particular interest to the Committee was the advice and guidance that POW/MIA families, veterans and activist groups had concerning various aspects of the issue and the most appropriate focus for the Committee's work. For example, Robert Wallace, Commander-in-Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, cited a series of resolutions approved by his organization calling for accelerated government to government contacts with the nations of Southeast Asia, the establishment of a non-diplomatic U.S. Government presence in Vietnam, the appropriate declassification of POW/MIA information and more active efforts to resolve questions about Korean War POW/MIAs. John F. Sommer, Jr., Executive Director of the American Legion, recommended the review of 1) live-sighting reports and the methods used by DIA to evaluate them; 2) relevant satellite photographs; 3) the 1986 Tighe Commission report; 4) document classification procedures; 5) operation of the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii; and 6) the allegations of former DIA official, Col. Millard Peck. J. Thomas Burch, chairman of the National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, expressed concern about statements that U.S. officials have made discounting the possibility that U.S. POWs are still being held. "It is difficult to understand," Mr. Burch told the Committee, "how the Government can effectively negotiate for the return of live prisoners when it lacks the confidence of its own negotiating position. Basically, they're telling the Vietnamese they want information about live Americans at the same time they're publicly saying that they're all dead." Bill Duker, Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans of America's standing committee on POW/MIA, also testified that the highest priority should be given to the repatriation of live Americans and expressed support for the declassification of POW/MIA information, "as long as that declassification protects the privacy of the families and safeguards U.S. intelligence methods and sources." Joseph E. Andry, past National Commander of the Disabled American Veterans, urged the Select Committee to carry out a dual mission: "The first part of the mission should focus on an aggressive pursuit of live sightings in Southeast Asia. The second part. . . . should be an encompassing investigation into why our government still has not accounted for 90,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines since the end of World War II." The Committee also received testimony from the National League of POW/MIA Families and from individual family members. Ann Mills Griffith, Executive Director of the National League of Families, credited the Reagan Administration with efforts to raise public consciousness of the POW/MIA issue, to upgrade functioning of the POW/MIA Inter-Agency Group, and for developing a strategy aimed at gaining increased cooperation from the governments in Southeast Asia. Griffiths said that, unlike the past, the current process has "integrity and priority." Other family members who testified during the November hearings included Dr. Jeffrey C. Donahue, brother of Maj. Morgan Jefferson Donahue, lost in Laos in 1968; Mrs. Gladys Stevens Fleckenstein, mother of Lt. Cmdr. Larry Stevens, lost in Laos, 1969; Ms. Shelby Robertson Quast and Ms. Deborah Robertson Bardsley, daughters of Col. John Robertson, lost or captured in Vietnam in 1966; and Mr. Albro Lundy III, son of Major Albro Lundy, Jr., lost in Vietnam in 1970; Captian Robert Apodaca, son of Major Victor Apodaca, lost in North Vietnam in 1967; and Dr. Patricia Ann O'Grady, daughter of Col. John O'Grady, lost in North Vietnam in 1967. Each raised serious questions about the U.S. Government's handling of the POW/MIA issue as it affected the investigation into the status of their missing family member.
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Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: "In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
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#25
05-25-2003, 06:48 AM
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 Covert OperationsThe Committee investigated whether the United States Government may have undertaken or supported covert operations in order to confirm the presence of U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming and, if so, to review the intelligence information upon which those operations were based. The Committee has identified only one operation of this type mounted after 1973. Although operational details remain classified, the fact that the operation took place has been reported publicly. The operation was prompted by a combination of human, photographic and signals intelligence concerning the possible presence of as many as 30 American POWs at a detention camp near the village of Nhom Marrot in Laos from 1979 until early 1981. The intelligence resulted in extensive and highest-level efforts by the U.S. Government to confirm the information. Unfortunately, the results of the covert operation were inconclusive and subsequent efforts were rendered impossible by press leaks.
During the Vietnam war, intelligence support for the U.S. effort in Laos was handicapped because Administration policy, at the insistence of the State Department, excluded the significant use of military intelligence assets. This was true despite the fact that accounting for missing military personnel in Laos was the responsibility of the respective military services, and despite strenuous efforts made by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to gain support for an improved POW/MIA related military intelligence effort. The Committee believes that an expanded wartime military intelligence effort in Laos might have increased significantly our ability to account for the Americans lost in that country.
It is not possible to account for the Americans who are missing from the war in Southeast Asia without cooperation from the governments of the region, especially Vietnam. The U.S. has requested this cooperation in four forms. First, we have requested information concerning live American prisoners, former prisoners or deserters. Second, we have asked for the return of any recovered or recoverable remains of missing American servicemen. Third, we have sought accesss to files, records, documents and other materials that are relevant to the fate of missing Americans. Finally, we have asked for permission to visit certain locations within these countries for the purpose of investigating live-sighting reports and searching actual or suspected airplane crash sites. The Committee has done everything it could to complement the diplomatic and political initiatives of the Executive branch in seeking to encourage a greater degree of cooperation on POW/MIA issues from the governments of Southeast Asia.
The U.S. has long suspected that the North Vietnamese have been withholding a considerable amount of information bearing on the fate of missing Americans. The North Vietnamese maintained detailed records of U.S. servicemen who came within their prison system during the war, including many lost in North Vietnamese-controlled areas of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. U.S. intelligence agencies are convinced, moreover, that the Government of Vietnam recovered and stored an unknown quantity of remains of American servicemen for release at politically strategic points in time. The level of U.S.-Vietnamese cooperation in accounting for missing Americans has varied over the years depending on bilateral and global political conditions and on the degree of emphasis placed on the issue by officials of the United States. At the time the Select Committee was created, there was considerable progress being made in the investigation of discrepancy cases. In addition, an agreement had been reached with Vietnam to allow an official Defense Department investigating presence to be established in Hanoi. These steps were directly attributable to the work of Gen. John Vessey, the President's Special Emissary to Vietnam on POW/MIA issues. The impetus for Vietnam's cooperation has come from several directions. Gen. Vessey has provided the Vietnamese with a respected and influential source of contact within our government. Bush Administration policies have established a clear linkage between different levels of Vietnamese cooperation and American response. The disintegration of the Soviet empire has deprived Vietnam of many external sources of economic assistance and political comfort. The rapid economic growth of other Southeast Asian nations has given younger Vietnamese leaders a strong incentive to establish their own contacts with the west. And the creation of the Select Committee has demonstrated anew the high priority attached to the POW/MIA issue by the American people and government. Obviously, the Committee does not know precisely how all of these matters have been factored into the calculations of the Vietnamese Government, but clearly the overall trends are hopeful. Over the past year, Committee Members have visited Vietnam on four occasions to press for further information. Committee delegations met with a wide range of high-level Vietnamese officials, including those in charge of administering the wartime prisoner of war system. The Committee visits, coupled with ongoing efforts from the Executive branch, have yielded substantial results. These results include:
The Committee welcomes the very substantial strides towards full cooperation on the POW/MIA issue that the Government of Vietnam has made in recent months. The Committee looks forward to the implementation of those steps in the hope that they will yield significant additional information concerning missing Americans and encourages the Executive branch to do all it can to see that the promises and commitments made by Vietnam are fulfilled. In noting recent progress, the Committee does not wish to under- state the fact that the progress is coming very late--almost 20 years after the signing of the peace agreement, and after two decades of noncooperation, stalling and deception on the part of Vietnam's leaders. The Committee also recognizes that the recent changes in policy appear to be the result primarily of Vietnam's desire for economic contacts with the west. The closed and nondemocratic nature of the government in Vietnam argues for caution in accepting Vietnamese promises, for pledges given by a government unwilling to be open with its own people can hardly be taken at face value. Nonetheless, the Committee remains hopeful that recent improvements in POW/MIA cooperation are symptomatic of a trend in Vietnam that will lead ultimately to dramatic improvements in human rights, and political, economic and religious freedoms. United States policy towards Vietnam should reflect the importance of freedoms that are central to American society and which have been central to our investigation. Without a free press or representative government, the American people would not have learned the full extent of our own government's knowledge about our POW/MIAs. Our policy towards Vietnam, as towards the other nations of Southeast Asia, should be predicated on a vision of the same freedoms for the people of that region that we enjoy here at home.
More than 500 Americans are still listed as unaccounted for in Laos, including 335 who were originally considered either POW or MIA. Accordingly, the Committee has attached a high priority to gaining greater cooperation from the Lao Government. The current leaders of Laos, who are successors to the Pathet Lao forces that contended for power during the war, almost certainly have some information concerning missing Americans that they have not yet shared. At a minimum, they should be able to provide specific information about the fates of a small number of U.S. POWs known to have been held by the Pathet Lao during the early stages of the war. Unfortunately, Lao leaders have been significantly less cooperative than those in Vietnam. The Lao have denied any knowledge of U.S. POWs; they have refused access to some requested sources of information; and they have been even more reluctant than the Vietnamese to grant U.S. access to their territory for conducting live-sighting investigations and inspecting crash sights. The atmosphere has improved to some extent in recent months, however. As a result, some discrepancy case investigations are underway and negotiations are ongoing for the establishment of a permanent POW/MIA investigation office in Vientiane.
The present government of war-ravaged Cambodia cannot be expected to possess documentary information relevant to the fate of missing American servicemen. Nonetheless, the Committee met with Cambodian President Hun Sen, who expressed his government's full cooperation with the U.S. in efforts to resolve discrepancy cases. Unfortunately, the Cambodian Government is unable to guarantee security in areas controlled by the brutal and lawless Khmer Rouge. The Committee is grateful to President Hun Sen for his help on this issue, given the scope and urgency of the other perils faced by his government and his country.
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Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: "In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
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#26
05-25-2003, 07:04 AM
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Senate Select Committee - XL
 FamiliesMissing a Loved One Nothing can produce emotion, passion and controversy like war. How could anyone ever forget the scene of a returning POW from Vietnam kissing the ground as he first set foot on U.S. soil after years of captivity, and the thrill of watching his wife and children run across the tarmac and into his open arms? When a soldier comes home, it is a joyous reunion. War also claims victims and produces often untold suffering. Men and women are killed, and their loved ones mourn. Taps, flags, military funerals, tears of sadness and shattered dreams are all products of war. One of the worst tragedies of all is that some simply become "missing." Their loved ones both mourn and hope. The years drag on, and the long wait for answers can become unbearable. In this regard, the Committee notes with sadness the tragic death last year of Mrs. Marion Shelton, the devoted wife of Capt. Charles Shelton, USAF, the only serviceman still officially listed by the Department of Defense as a "POW" captured in Laos during the war. What could be worse than the emotional turmoil of "not knowing?" Two family members explained their feelings:
Another Korean War veteran and POW/MIA family member also has wondered -- and persisted in his efforts to find the truth -- for more than 40 years:
Families' Views and Experiences The Committee understands that it is impossible to make general statements about specific family members who have all suffered in their own way from the tragedy of having a "missing" loved one. Whether we speak of Vietnam or prior wars, the pain is the same. Families are diverse in their views, in the particular circumstances surrounding the loss of their loved one, in the experiences they have had in dealing with their government, and in the feelings toward the Communist governments who hold answers. Some believe the U.S. Government has done all it can over the years; others believe it has bungled inexcusably. Some of these families have decided to accept death and move on with their lives; others wait, convinced that living Americans remain in captivity. No one among the Senators on this Committee is qualified to criticize the beliefs of the families. None of us has a missing loved one from a prior war. On these questions, every POW/MIA family member has fair claim to be considered an expert in the saddest, truest sense of the word. The families have suffered the indignities of Communist governments who have refused to provide even basic humanitarian information and answers over the past half-century. They have endured the emotional roller-coaster ride of hope and failure year after year after year. They have watched governments in Southeast Asia dribble out remains and heard flat denials that records exist -- and then seen that these documents existed all along. With the full cooperation of these governments in past years, results would have been obtained for many POW/MIA families long ago. Former President Nixon himself said in January 1992:
The families have been the victims of fraud and they have seen their own ranks divided by intense differences over the best way to obtain results. Through it all, they have persevered. Through years of not knowing, both during and after the war, of bearing the brunt of bureaucracies incapable of answering questions or responding to requests, of grapplying with wrenching and sometimes conflicting information, and of dealing with the inhumane actions of former enemies, POW/MIA families have unfailingly kept their hopes alive and realistic. The feelings and commitment of POW/MIA families may best have been summed up by the son of a serviceman shot down over Laos:
Families' Central Role in Committee's Work The Committee owes its creation to the activism of family members, and from the beginning we sought to work closely with POW/MIA families. Family members were represented at the Committee's opening and closing hearings. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman addressed the 1992 conventions of the National League of Families and the National Alliance of Families. To ensure that families' concerns were addressed, the Committee's Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to the primary next-of-kin of all 2,266 then unaccounted for servicemen in January 1992, seeking their advice and participation. Over the course of the Committee's year in existence, more than 100 responded, and both the League and the Alliance have actively monitored the Committee's work. In addition, C-SPAN coverage of 18 of the Committee's 22 open hearings has kept an audience of 59 million viewers informed. "Please talk to as many families as you can -- they are the only ones holding the truth," one family member wrote. "I was glued to TV [coverage of the hearings] and watched until 5:30 a.m." The questions before the American public are the ones that still gnaw at the families. If there are leads that can be traced to a living American serviceman, then there must be facts, places, dates, and descriptions or names. Some of the rhetorical questions of activists have been provocative, but at the same time the Government has jealously guarded its documents. Through all of this, the families simply want answers and results. The Committee has focused on compelling leads and questions based on facts. The families deserved no less than an honest search to understand the truth. We sought information from all sources, public and private, including activists and current and former government officials. The families of the missing deserve not merely words, but actions, answers, and -- above all -- the truth. The Committee has labored tirelessly in their behalf to provide them the truth. It is a labor of love, devotion, and gratitude. The Search for Answers In families' search for answers, two ingredients are essential. First, they must know the U.S. is pressing Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for all information they have. As the wife of a serviceman missing in Laos, explained:
Second, families must know that the U.S. is doing all it can on behalf of missing servicemen. As Ann Mills Griffiths, the League's Executive Director told the Committee:
Many families know that the answers available most often are merely clues and not full answers; but few can accept inexplicably conflicting information as satisfactory, even in a partial answer:
This search for the truth by the families was frustrated over the years by limited information from the governments of Southeast Asia, and by our own government's failure to provide satisfactory answers. In fact, according to many families, the policies and actions of the U.S. Government during and after the war not only failed to resolve the problems, but the lack of attention and focus in past years actually made things worse. For families whose experience with the Government has shattered their faith in it, only full disclosure of everything the Government knows will reassure them. U.S. Government Actions During the War If there is one facet of the POW/MIA issue that is without ambiguity, without disagreement, it is that the treatment accorded families of missing Americans has deepened their anguish, not lessened it. War-Time Secrecy The difficulties confronting most families were rooted not only in their kin's loss, but also in the secrecy surrounding the loss. At first, families were not told -- sometimes for years -- that their husbands, sons or brothers had been captured. The impact of war- time secrecy on the lives of families can best be described in their own words. As Donnie Collins, wife of then-Captain Tom Collins (captured in October, 1965), testified:
When families were informed of their loved one's fate, they rarely were given important details. As Mrs. Collins explained:
Another MIA wife, whose husband was lost in December, 1967,
And all were cautioned to say nothing about their husbands, sons and brothers, so as not to give their captors leverage over the men.
The effect was devastating for many. As one MIA wife explained:
To her, the Government lost all credibility when its directives not to publicize the POW's fate didn't change as soon as the U.S. knew its men were being tortured:
The gag order was too much for some:
Secrecy's Effects The secrecy had two distinct ill effects. First, it back-fired:
Second, and far more damaging to both families and subsequent Government efforts, the secrecy made families an easy mark for any con artist with information to peddle. In Collins' words:
Another witness, Carol Hrdlicka, laid the blame for fraudulent schemes more forcefully at the Government's door:
In sum, another MIA wife said:
Mis-Reporting When Evidence Suggested Death Tragically for many families, strong incentives existed for combat veterans to soften the blow that reporting a buddy killed in action would deliver to families. Admiral Stockdale felt the pressures after he witnessed a plane go down:
Gen. Vessey had experienced the same situation:
In 1973, Lt. Cdr. George Coker cited two examples of what he had seen as a Navy pilot in an address to the National League of Families:
When Evidence Pointed to Life However, the Committee also uncovered cases where servicemen were reported as dead, in view of information suggesting survival. Moreover, the families were never provided with this information. For example, the Committee notes the following comments from the family members of two cases in particular:
Maj. Robert F. Coady, USAF, was listed as missing in Laos since 1969. His family was only provided the initial loss report, but recently discovered that there was additional information which suggested that Coady may have survived his incident. In 1969, the U.S. Embassy in Laos reported a possible correlation between Coady and a similar name reported by a POW who returned in 1969. Coady's sister wrote to the Committee in August 1992:
A final example concerns a serviceman believed dead during the war, but subsequently determined to have been captured. This example was brought to the Committee's attention in November 1991 by Dr. Patricia O'Grady, the daughter of Col. John O'Grady, who was captured in 1967 in Vietnam:
Public Relations Campaign Late into the war and after enormous pressure from POW/MIA families, the U.S. Government began to publicize the plight of the POWs in order to keep pressure on the North Vietnamese and gain support for the war at home. The courageous attempts by H. Ross Perot are particularly noteworty. His efforts to bring food, medicine, and Christmas packages to POWs in 1969 and 1970 and to publicize their condition improved the way they were treated, as returned POWs later described when they returned. President Nixon's description details Perot's activities and their impact:
Sen. Smith noted Perot's accomplishments when he welcomed him to testify in August:
But the P-R campaign had a stark down-side as well, as families learned when it the war ended and many forgot the POWs. In 1972, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird held a press conference to pressure Vietnam by focusing on 14 men not on Hanoi's list of POWs. "All 14 men were known to be alive, on the ground in North Vietnam, or were at one time actually identified by the North Vietnamese as having been captured," he told his audience. In 1973, when not one of those 14 came home -- including Ronald Dodge, who was shown in captivity in 1972 in a Paris Match photo -- there was no follow-up press conference. No similar U.S. effort was mounted again publicly to raise families' unanswered questions about their loved ones' fates to public attention. The families' feeling of being abandoned, with their men, still persists: As Dodge's widow explained:
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Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798: "In questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
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#27
11-18-2004, 08:26 PM
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Little Sparrow
I am personally in awe  at your posts. The documentation you have presented is without a doubt the most inclusive that I have seen.I salute you sir  What really makes me  fighting  mad is when the Senate Select Committee chaired by Kerry, along with McCain & Daschle as members shredded the documents that would have brought our troops home, either dead or alive. At least this way the families would have had closure, and would not have had to suffer the anguish all these years of not knowing.Here it is almost 30 years since the end of the war, and we still have 1835 POW's MIA's in Nam. This to me is unconscionable and a thorough disgrace. http://www.pow-miafamilies.org/powmiastatus.html July 20, 2004 1,855 Americans are still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War, though over 450 were at sea/over water losses: Vietnam - 1,416 (VN-493; VS-923); Laos - 377; Cambodia - 55; Peoples Republic of China territorial waters - 7. The League seeks the return of all US prisoners, the fullest possible accounting for those still missing and repatriation of all recoverable remains. http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.a...ryID=123008280 U.S. POW/MIA official cites breakthrough in Vietnam 7/29/2004 - WASHINGTON (AFPN) -- A U.S. official announced July 28 that accounting operations will soon resume in the Central Highlands of Vietnam to account for missing Americans lost during the Vietnam War. Mr. Jennings has notified U.S. investigators to resume contacts with officials in Vietnam?s central highlands in order to schedule operations. Of the 1,855 Americans missing from the Vietnam War, some 110 are thought to be in the central highlands area. President (General) George Washington once stated: "The willingness with which our young people are likely to serve in any war, no matter how justified, shall be directly proportional as to how they perceive the veterans of earlier wars were treated and appreciated by their Nation." President (5-Star General) Dwight D. Eisenhower: ?When you appeal to force, there's one thing you must never do - lose.? 5-Star General Douglas MacArthur: "The unfailing formula for production of morale is patriotism, self-respect, discipline, and self-confidence within a military unit, joined with fair treatment and merited appreciation from without. It cannot be produced by pampering or coddling an army, and is not necessarily destroyed by hardship, danger, or even calamity . . . It will quickly wither and die if soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude on the part of their leaders." "In war there is no substitute for victory." In the field we had a code "No Man Left Behind" and we all honored that code even if it meant giving our life. That should apply to our POW's and MIA's as well.
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#28
07-26-2006, 06:58 AM
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Here's a recent article I found on this subject:
www.pow-miafamilies.org July 8, 2006 PRESIDENT AFFIRMS COMMITMENT: In a letter dated June 21, 2006 , President Bush affirmed his commitment ?to continuing the search for all military members missing in the line of duty? ??. and provided assurance ?that this is an issue I will raise when I travel to Vietnam this Fall.? He went on to express appreciation to the League for our efforts. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PRESSES VIETNAM ON POW/MIA ISSUE: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam June 3-6 th and urged his counterpart, Defense Minister Pham Van Tra, and Prime Minister Pham Van Khai to increase their cooperation. According to media reports, the Secretary's focus adhered to the criteria established by President Bush in 2002, reinforced by Secretaries of State Powell and Rice in 2004 and 2005, respectively. He called for unilateral provision of relevant archival records, and again suggested using US Navy technology for underwater recovery operations. The Vietnamese leadership was cited as agreeing to the Secretary's requests to expand cooperation and support for the accounting effort. With worldwide coverage of his visit, the Secretary displayed the importance of the issue by spending two hours at the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) Detachment II headquarters that included a briefing on their current operations in Vietnam . The League provided input to the Defense Department leadership prior to this important visit and deeply appreciates the Secretary's emphasis on POW/MIA accounting during bilateral discussions that included much broader national security and military issues. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ADDRESSES LEAGUE: Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England addressed the families, veterans and others gathered for the League's 37 th Annual Meeting. In that forum, his address brought welcome commitment and stated in part : ?One thing that I have learned to appreciate during this year is that the League is a true force for good. You have helped turn the lessons learned from Vietnam into better processes, policies, and actions, so that we can return our military home with honor. Your voices have been heard ? and are still being heard??.You have set a new standard, with your persuasiveness, your passion and your persistence. What makes the League's efforts so powerful is its long-standing close partnership with our own Department of Defense, and with other Government Departments??.We are also joined here today because there is still a job unfinished, a mission to complete. Many of you, together with other American families, are still living with uncertainty, and without closure. As part of the total DoD mission to protect and defense America , the Department is committed to make the fullest possible accounting of our prisoners of war and those missing in action. Those who offered their service in the name of something higher than themselves are heroes, and we owe them?.and you?no less. The countries of Southeast Asia hold critical keys to our ability to product that accounting. This year ? this summer ? is a hopeful time in our partnerships with those countries. Just a few weeks ago, Secretary Rumsfeld visited Vietnam . He thanked the Government of Vietnam sincerely for its cooperation and continued assistance. The US Government's annual certification requirement is a key part of bolstering and encouraging that cooperation?.Secretary Rumsfeld thanked his hosts, and he also said: ?We still have work to do, and as we all agree, we do not want to forget the importance of this'?..He urged the Government of Vietnam to continue to take unilateral steps to increase access to information. And he did meet with positive responses from his hosts. ?These are hopeful signs. I believe we can be encouraged by them, even as the hard work continues. Vietnam is the focus point, but our partnerships with Laos and Cambodia are also very important. Our constructive work with those Governments does continue and will continue. Their ongoing cooperation with us is both welcome and essential??The relationships forged as part of that effort have laid the groundwork for broader relations with these countries, across the spectrum of US interests. This is something else that all of you can be proud of??Today's servicemen and women know, as they go into battle, that whatever may befall them, their Nation will honor their service?.and bring them home again??I do thank you all for your patriotism, hard work, and everything you do every day to take care of America. God bless you all, and God continue to bless America .? U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING FROM THE VIETNAM WAR: The number listed by DoD as missing and unaccounted for since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 is now 1,802 ? 1,377 in Vietnam, 364 in Laos, 54 in Cambodia and 7 in PRC territorial waters. Though DoD has not yet made a formal announcement, media reports quote the son carried the name of LCDR James E. Plowman, USN, listed as MIA in North Vietnam on March 24, 1967 . A total of 781 US personnel have been accounted for since 1975; however, the remains of 63 Americans were recovered and identified before the end of the war in areas where the US had access. These US personnel were accounted for without cooperation from the post-war governments of Vietnam , Laos or Cambodia , for a total of 844. Over 90% of the 1,802 still missing, including over 90 US personnel last known alive (LKA), were lost in Vietnam or in areas of Laos and Cambodia under Vietnamese wartime control. VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP CHANGES: Vietnam has a new Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, groomed for nearly a decade to assume this position, and confirmed by the recently concluded Party Congress. Prime Minister Dung also assumed third ranking in the powerful Vietnamese Politburo and is still very young in terms of senior leaders in Vietnam . PM Dung is very familiar with the POW/MIA issue, having met with US Government, League and major Veterans officials for several years. Nong Duc Manh, 65, will remain as the powerful General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, serving a second five-year term. The newly named President is Mr. Nguyen Minh Triet; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, also a member of the Politburo and Deputy Prime Minister, is Pham Gia Khiem. The new leadership has demonstrated commitment to economic reform, the highest priority of the Vietnamese government in this year of hoped-for Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the US and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). RETIRED GENERAL NAMED AS US CHAIRMAN OF US-RUSSIA COMMISSION: The White House recently published an announcement naming General Robert H. ?Doc? Foglesong, USAF (Ret) of West Virginia as the US Chairman of the US-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs . We are pleased that he addressed our 37 th Annual Meeting and hope that President Putin will name a Russian Chairman of comparable prominence and experience. JPAC OPERATIONS NEED PROTECTED FUNDING: A 53-member JPAC team began the 95 th joint field operations in Laos on June 29 th and plan to conclude on August 1 st . Following moves to their base camps, and site set-up, four recovery teams commenced excavations at four separate sites. One additional team is also conducting investigations. The 86 th joint field activities (JFAs) are continuing in Vietnam and scheduled to conclude July 21 st . Five recovery teams are conducting site excavations. One investigation team and one research-investigation team are continuing to conduct survey and investigation activities. Funds for continued JPAC operations are still in danger and must be protected. It is up to the DoD leadership to ensure adequate funding for FY07 and beyond. You can help! Call or write your elected representatives. We need the support of ALL veterans and family members on this, and we need it NOW. Go on line to www.senate.gov or www.house.gov to look for the email addresses and phone numbers you need. Now is the time for action, and it needs to come from all across America . LEADERSHIP CHANGES AT JPAC: Changes of Command were recently held in Laos and Vietnam . LTC James Saenz, USA , replaced LTC Lentfort Michell, USA , and took command of Detachment 2 in Hanoi on June 30th. LTC Wade Owens, USA , replaced LTC Rich Wheeler, USA , and too command of Detachment 3 in Vientiane on July 3rd. All are Special Forces officers. BG Mike Flowers, USA , Commander of Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, conducted the ceremonies. He was accompanied by LTC John Hahn, USMC, new military Deputy Commander of JPAC. At the League's 37 th Annual Meeting, BG Flowers announced his decision have two Deputy Commanders, one military and one civilian, and that he would soon announce the name of the new civilian Deputy Commander. All anticipate, and hope, that former CIL Commander and current Senior Advisor to the JPAC Commander Johnie Webb will be named to this position. His appointment will ensure that there is continuity in the JPAC leadership beyond the customary two-three year military assignment. This is a very important and welcome decision. Historical knowledge and direct experience are crucial for engaging most effectively, especially with foreign officials, on an issue as sensitive as the POW/MIA accounting. POW/MIA decals for windows (inside) are $20 per 100, and POW/MIA lapel pins are $3 each or 2/$5, by sending a check to the League office. For added information on any subject, please log onto the League's web site, www.pow-miafamilies.org , or call the national office at 703-465-7432 .
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Boats O Almighty Lord God, who neither slumberest nor sleepest; Protect and assist, we beseech thee, all those who at home or abroad, by land, by sea, or in the air, are serving this country, that they, being armed with thy defence, may be preserved evermore in all perils; and being filled with wisdom and girded with strength, may do their duty to thy honour and glory; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen. "IN GOD WE TRUST"
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