Afghanistan Terrorism Report: May 2022

[Boats]

Afghanistan Terrorism Report: May 2022
By: Dr. Shindler & JF BirchCounter Extremism Project - 1 hr ago
Re: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?og...jcZTfxQQNzHtlW

The following is a May 2022 installment of “Afghanistan Terrorism Report.” The authors provide a monthly analysis concerning the developing terrorist threat in Afghanistan as well as a comprehensive overview of that month’s al-Qaeda and ISIS-K propaganda.

ISIS-K propaganda channels continued to highlight the high tempo of operations within Afghanistan. Similar to April 2022, incidents were concentrated in the North and East of the country, potentially indicating that ISIS-K cannot sustainably widen its operational reach to the rest of Afghanistan. Various ISIS-K outlets linked these activities to the overall ISIS campaign “vengeance for the two sheikhs,” which was announced by ISIS-linked propaganda outlets on April 17, 2022, as a response to the killing of ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi and ISIS spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi, both killed in a U.S. raid in Syria in February 2022. Several ISIS affiliates carried out the campaign which, according to ISIS propaganda, resulted in several hundred attacks. In addition to frequent attacks in Pakistan, ISIS-K propaganda continued to highlight the group’s alleged attack on the territory of Uzbekistan in April 2022 and claimed a second cross-border attack, this time on the territory of Tajikistan. The government of Tajikistan did not deny the attack but reported that bullets, not rockets, were fired on its territory in a firefight at the border. Despite the disputed nature of both attacks, the fact that ISIS-K propaganda continues to highlight these demonstrates the group’s apparent intent to reach into Central Asia and to demonstrate that the Taliban are unable to prevent cross border attacks.

During the month of May, ISIS-K propaganda indicated that the group now uses some of the attack methodologies previously employed by the Taliban. ISIS-K’s propaganda narratives regularly highlighted attacks on electricity towers in the country. Similar disruption of civilian infrastructure was part and parcel of Taliban tactics until the summer of 2021. Similarly, ISIS-K repeatedly emphasized an attack on a large hotel near Kabul airport in May. Until the Taliban takeover in August 2021, hotels were frequently the target of Taliban attacks. In 2014, increasing Taliban threats to hotels and an attack on a Lebanese restaurant in Kabul, which left four U.N. staff members dead, forced the United Nations and foreign embassies to progressively restrict international staff members from frequenting hotels and restaurants in Kabul due to security concerns.

Furthermore, pro-ISIS-K propaganda highlighted the fighting between Taliban forces and opposition forces in the Panjshir valley several times, despite these opposition forces not being linked to the group. These opposition fighters were most likely part of the National Resistance Front, which formed following the Taliban takeover of the country in August 2021. Although the Taliban denied any incidents in the valley, independent reporting confirmed ongoing clashes between Taliban and opposition forces. However, given the fact that the valley is far from any of the borders of Afghanistan (see the red star with blue center on the map below), which significantly complicates resupply, it seems currently unlikely that these opposition forces will be able to present a serious challenge to Taliban rule in the country any time soon.

Finally, the pro-ISIS-K Voice of Khurasan web magazine took responsibility for the attacks in Israel during Ramadan. In March 2022, several lone actor attacks occurred in Israel, which ISIS-core had already taken responsibility for. These were the first of these types of attacks in the country. Given the strong security architecture in Israel, these attacks were a major propaganda success for ISIS, explaining why the ISIS-K web magazine felt the need to highlight them once more, demonstrating the reach of the ISIS global network.

Map link: Map of Incidents Highlighted by ISIS-K Social Media Propaganda in May 2022
Re: https://ci4.googleusercontent.com/pr...icture1_15.png

Note: Pro-ISIS-K propaganda channels also continued their ideological criticism of the Taliban regime, arguing that its behavior and international contacts amount to religious deviancy. Although these narratives had also previously targeted al-Qaeda due to the group’s symbiotic relationship with the Taliban regime, this criticism was less pronounced than the attacks on the Taliban’s religious rule. However, this month, several ISIS-K posts and magazine articles noticeably stepped-up the ideological criticism of al-Qaeda, claiming that the United States had tamed the group, going as far as declaring that al-Qaeda had abandoned the ideology of its former leader Osama Bin Laden.

Part of ISIS-K’s ideological criticism of the Taliban regime continues to focus on the drug economy in Afghanistan. This topic had already been highlighted in April 2022, following the Taliban’s announcement that they banned drug production in the country. Pro-ISIS-K online chatter claimed that the ban was announced for commercial reasons and reports on increasing drug prices as a result of the ban in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. This mirrors independent reporting that highlights rising opium prices in the country. This potential financial windfall for the Taliban regime is exacerbated by recent reporting by the United Nations, indicating that members of the Haqqani network have assumed key positions in the central bank of Afghanistan, Da Afghanistan Bank. The leaders of this network, which remains the main contact point between the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda, already control the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Refugees, which would be critical institutions in the fight against terrorist groups in the country. Given the relaxation of international sanctions, including financial restrictions against the Taliban through U.N. Security Council resolution 2615 (2021), the European Union, and a range of General Licenses issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) since the Taliban takeover of the country, this positioning of members of the Haqqani network within the central bank is concerning. This allows the network access to data housed within FinTRACA, the Afghan Financial Investigation Unit (FIU). FinTRACA is tasked with preventing the financing of terrorism and money laundering and, among other data, maintains a database of suspicious transaction reports provided by Afghan financial institutions, including Hawaladars. Therefore, the external relaxation of financial controls via sanctions provisions in combination with the weakening of the internal control system through the access of the Haqqani network to sensitive control data will present a major challenge in the prevention of the financing of terrorism or the laundering of drug-related money in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The original link is: https://www.counterextremism.com/blo...eport-may-2022
-
If you think its hot here in the states today - its a lot hotter in Afganistan 24/7.
-