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Old 08-16-2003, 05:06 AM
thedrifter thedrifter is offline
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Cool Schoomaker?s Challenge

08-14-2003

Schoomaker?s Challenge



By William F. Sauerwein



When the Army Times on June 23 heralded the recall to active duty of Gen. Peter Schoomaker as the next Army Chief of Staff, the newspaper also featured many of the dilemmas that Schoomaker must confront.



These include the impact of multiple deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas that have stressed units, and serious manpower problems including the implementation of ?Stop-Loss? and prolonged reserve mobilizations. But perhaps the biggest problem Schoomaker faces is the reported rift between the Army and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.



And the biggest challenge Schoomaker must confront is how to prevent DoD from sacrificing further Army strength in the name of transformation.



This rift appeared with the firing of then-Secretary of the Army Thomas White and retirement of former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. It continued with the announced early retirement of six senior generals (see ?Is It Fresh Blood, or a Putsch?? by Ralph Omholt, DefenseWatch, Aug. 7, 2003). Adding fuel to the fire was Rumsfeld?s conspicuous absence from Shinseki?s retirement ceremony.



Whether real or imagined, the alleged row between Rumsfeld and the Army has very serious implications, given the service?s involvement in current ?hotspots? around the globe. If the Defense Department is at odds with the Army it does not bode well for national security, or for the troops affected. As Defense Secretary, it is Rumsfeld?s job to defuse this problem and to exert the leadership to heal the wounds.



A disturbing aspect of Schoomaker?s selection and the firing of these generals, is what it says about the Army?s current leadership. If those generals were indeed ?perfumed princes,? then they should have been retired, and our promotion process fixed. But, if their only crime was disagreeing with civilian defense officials, we face a much bigger problem.



Like every other government entity, the Army has many ?turf protectors,? especially at the Pentagon level. While the doctrine from the top emphasizes the ?combined arms team? to subordinates, they seldom practice it themselves. This protection worsened with the declining defense spending ushered in by the military downsizing of the 1990s.



During that unpleasant time many Army leaders who had been warriors suddenly became careerists, and ticket punchers. Facing a 40 percent reduction in manpower, anyone could figure that that also meant a 40 percent reduction in senior leadership billets as well. In the highly politicized environment of the Clinton administration political correctness trumped the warrior spirit.



Many warriors saw their careers suddenly terminated, and more and more, ?perfumed princes? rose to high levels of command. The Army to many seemed to become little more than a stepchild in the Pentagon when it came to funding and other priorities. Only the Army?s special operations command escaped this treatment, receiving adequate support from the Pentagon and Congress.



Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Schoomaker?s selection is that Rumsfeld personally picked him. Though reputed not to be a ?yes man,? past performance is no guarantee of future conduct at a higher level. Throughout my own Army career, I knew many officers who performed exceptionally well until promoted to a level beyond their capabilities.



This personal selection trend reminds me of another time in our history, highlighted in H.R. McMaster?s 1998 investigative history of Vietnam decision-making, Dereliction of Duty. McMaster examined how the nation?s civilian leadership over a 15-year period in the 1950s and 1960s ? beginning with the Eisenhower administration and lasted through the Johnson administration ? embarked upon an ultimately successful campaign to create a fully compliant Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).



During the Vietnam War, then-Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara controlled the JCS and almost every aspect of the war. McNamara distrusted and alienated his military leaders and filled the Pentagon with civilian analysts, who approached warfare from a statistical mindset. The civilian ?whiz kids? ? including one, Les Aspin, who would himself become a disastrous secretary of defense under Clinton in 1993 ? often overrode the JCS chiefs in determining military strategy and weaponry.



Under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, McNamara forbade the JCS to meet with the president without his approval. He also favored reductions in active-duty end-strength in exchange for developing high-tech weaponry, even as he was planning a major ground war in Vietnam. Kennedy himself recalled retired Army Chief of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor as JCS Chairman, after Taylor won Kennedy?s attention with his own book, The Uncertain Trumpet, which advocated Taylor?s ?flexible-response? strategy.



McMaster reconfirmed that Kennedy, McNamara and eventually Taylor, viewed the JCS as impediments to their strategy.



While the similarities between then and now do not foretell a similar failure, and Iraq is far from becoming another Vietnam, the similarities do bear watching. The guerrilla warfare nature of terrorist operations, and current combat in Iraq, does not inevitably lead to a ?quagmire.? But it could, if we continue ignoring the advice of our military leaders like McNamara did during his tenure.



Kennedy was enamored with unconventional warfare, and the Army?s Special Forces received his personal attention. Schoomaker?s long experience with special operations reportedly caught Rumsfeld?s eye. The secretary has repeatedly praised the performance of our SOF troops in Afghanistan.



One clear implication is that Schoomaker?s promotion to Army chief may portend a DoD a preference for special operations forces that could come at the expense ? that is, deactivation ? of the Army?s current heavy forces.



This is not to denigrate the amazing exploits of our special operations forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, most recently is the performance of a 12-man A Team against an entire Iraqi division (see ?JSOC Rules!? by Ed Offley, DefenseWatch, July 31, 2003). Offley theorizes that Rumsfeld views special operations as his key to ?transformation? without having to massively increase defense spending.



However, we must also recognize that while the Special Forces enjoyed considerable success in Vietnam, we still lost the war. A Teams worked well with Montagnard tribesmen and the Studies and Observations Group (SOG) tied down 40,000 North Vietnamese troops guarding the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Yet, our overall strategy, as dictated by the Pentagon, was flawed, and we failed to exploit such success.



Schoomaker may be the best man to help the Army address its current problems. The most urgent problem is that the Pentagon has placed more demands on the Army than the service has resources to cover. The Army has about 390,000 troops in over 120 countries engaged in a variety of missions.



In addition to these ongoing missions, there are public clamors for using troops to guard our borders, to guard domestic airports, to secure other potential terrorist targets, to assist state and local law enforcement, and to provide support in response to chemical and biological hazards. Most of these missions have ?Army? written all over them, yet the Army lacks the manpower for executing them.



Someone has to step forward and say forcefully that the current Army force structure cannot perform at the current operations tempo (optempo). You cannot keep troops and equipment deployed indefinitely without rest and refit, or the system will break down.



While this acknowledgement will anger the Pentagon?s civilian leadership, it is Schoomaker?s responsibility to voice it. Pentagon civilian ?experts,? armed with computers, should not determine Army strategy or battlefield requirements. Rumsfeld and his deputies bitterly disagreed over Shinseki?s challenge to the official OSD wisdom regarding the level of troop strength required in a postwar Iraq.



It is the duty of the JCS to provide honest military advice, and not kow-tow to political pressure. The JCS did this throughout the Vietnam War, while casualties mounted for executing McNamara?s flawed strategy.



It is no comfort to Shinseki?s successor that the former Army chief was correct, and that we have too few troops on the ground to stabilize Iraq. Schoomaker has the legal and moral obligation to speak truth to his civilian bosses, whatever the consequences.



The nation deserves an Army capable of executing the variety of missions required of it. The Army deserves the appropriate level of manpower and materiel for successfully accomplishing these missions with minimal casualties. Schoomaker?s job is to ensure that both the nation and his soldiers will be well served under his tenure.



William F. Sauerwein is a Contributing Editor to DefenseWatch and can be reached at mono@gtec.com.


http://www.sftt.org/cgi-bin/csNews/c....5136780083667


Sempers,

Roger
__________________
IN LOVING MEMORY OF MY HUSBAND
SSgt. Roger A.
One Proud Marine
1961-1977
68/69
Once A Marine............Always A Marine.............

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