'The damage is done': Military historian says Putin's plan to intimidate NATO has bac

[Boats]

'The damage is done': Military historian says Putin's plan to intimidate NATO has backfired
By: Tom Boggioni - Rawstory News - 03-11-22
& Sebastien Roblin - The Week News 03-11-22
Re: https://www.rawstory.com/putins-plan...timidate-nato/
Re: https://theweek.com/world/1011170/if...e-did-it-wrong

According to military historian and security analyst Sébastien Roblin, if Vladimir Putin's goal in invading Ukraine was an attempt to intimidate other European countries from joining NATO, it could not have gone worse as he exposed weaknesses his government has been hiding from the world.

Writing for The Week, Roblin explained that the inability of the Russian army to crush Ukraine quickly and decisively exposed an ill-equipped, poorly-trained armed forces unprepared to invade and conquer which has undermined the country's reputation for military might.

As the analyst points out, the secret is out and "the damage is done."

Beginning, "Russia's war in Ukraine is ostensibly all about deterring NATO from its sphere of influence, but the irony is the fight so far has gravely degraded Russia's military position in Europe — and above all its ability to compel with threats of force that fall under the nuclear threshold," he added, "While the Kremlin's increasingly de-platformed media is unsurprisingly weaving a narrative of brilliant success for its domestic audience and fawning overseas admirers, the shortcomings and blunders of its forces are clear to all who can see the imagery pouring out of Ukraine."

Pointing to reports of Russian military fuel and food shortages, botched assaults, battlefield communication failures and "A shocking number of high-ranking generals and colonels killed on the battlefield," Roblin claims the Ukraine invasion has exposed "the soft white underbelly" of Russia's armed forces.

Admitting that a direct war with NATO would have been planned differently, the analyst claimed that, nonetheless, "in terms of conventional deterrence, the damage is done: The limitations of Russia's military, and the deluded judgments informing its employment, have left an indelible impression, making the threat of Russian conventional military power less convincing than before, even while the perceived need to defend against it has increased."

Conceding that Russia likely didn't bring its "A game" to the Ukraine invasion, Roblin also claimed the world's response to the incursion exposed more weaknesses in Russia, including what may prove to be a long occupation that further erodes the armed forces.

"Such an occupation will brutalize both occupier and occupied and incur onerous costs on the Kremlin. Rubles that could have gone to finding ways to defeat NATO stealth fighters and Aegis warships will have to be poured into sustaining tens or even hundreds of thousands of occupation troops and their ambush-protected vehicles as they thanklessly prop whatever hated puppet regime is imposed by Moscow," he explained. "Indeed, had Russia not invaded Ukraine in 2022, Germany would have maintained its anemic military spending and begun piping gas from Nord Stream 2. And the Biden administration would have likely sought to shift more of the U.S. military out of Europe and the Middle East and into the Asia-Pacific."

"Instead, Putin's criminal invasion has made Russia weaker, and encouraged the states it views as threats to grow more united," he concluded.

Furthermore, Putin's invasion has dispelled the (largely misconceived) mystique of "hybrid warfare" that grew around his military actions in Ukraine and Syria in the mid-2010s. Instead, Moscow's dreaded global disinformation machine fizzled dramatically with unconvincing false flag operations, its notorious hackers failed to produce notable exploits in cyber-destabilization, and its electronic warfare units are puzzlingly missing.

Instead, "new generation warfare" tactics U.S. analysts observed Russian forces practicing in Syria and Ukraine, which emphasized use of drones and electronic reconnaissance to direct precision air and artillery strikes, now seem to have been only reflective of what a limited subset of Russia's military could do, and then only under specific conditions.

Some will argue, with some truth, that Moscow didn't bring its "A game" to the Ukraine invasion. Indeed, drunk on its own propaganda of Ukrainian brutality and incompetence, the Kremlin planned a Crimea-like smash-and-grab operation that assumed Kyiv would fall rapidly, and the rest of Ukraine with it.

To be sure Russia can and will endure the sanctions thrust upon it, having experienced much worse in its history. But the financial and economic problems that have greatly delayed its touted military modernization—including new T-14 tanks and Su-57 stealth fighters—seem certain to worsen.

Furthermore, even a Russian "victory" in Ukraine (still far from guaranteed) could prove more costly than defeat: Leaving Moscow committed to a long-term occupation of a country full of very angry people with nearly 35 times the land mass of Chechnya and 29 times the population prior.

Such an occupation will brutalize both occupier and occupied and incur onerous costs on the Kremlin. Rubles that could have gone to finding ways to defeat NATO stealth fighters and Aegis warships will have to be poured into sustaining tens or even hundreds of thousands of occupation troops and their ambush-protected vehicles as they thanklessly prop whatever hated puppet regime is imposed by Moscow.

Russia's actions in Ukraine therefore have persuaded leaders across Europe that Russia poses an unpredictable threat, but also one it can likely beat on the conventional battlefield. Indeed, Russia now appears destined to face a reinvigorated NATO alliance, with member states like Germany reinvesting in atrophied military capabilities and rotating, or potentially even permanently basing, larger forces than before to Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Finland and Sweden, which have long shied away from the alliance, have seriously begun considering membership.

By its own paranoid logic, the Kremlin in return will have to maintain even larger forces in its Western Military District to contain this expanded 'threat.'

If there is a silver-lining for Russia, it's that NATO truly isn't capable of, nor interested in, an offensive war against Russia. Germany will not launch a second Operation Barbarossa, nor will Washington dispatch a second 'Polar Bear' expedition to install Alexei Navalny in the Kremlin.

Indeed, had Russia not invaded Ukraine in 2022, Germany would have maintained its anemic military spending and begun piping gas from Nord Stream 2. And the Biden administration would have likely sought to shift more of the U.S. military out of Europe and the Middle East and into the Asia-Pacific.

Instead, Putin's criminal invasion has made Russia weaker, and encouraged the states it views as threats to grow more united.
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Personal Note: Nothing will change until Putin is replaced by another.