All POW/MIA Senate Select Committee

Arrow · #1 05-20-2003, 06:17 PM

Senate Select Committee - XL

Families

Missing a Loved One

Nothing can produce emotion, passion and controversy like war. How could anyone ever forget the scene of a returning POW from Vietnam kissing the ground as he first set foot on U.S. soil after years of captivity, and the thrill of watching his wife and children run across the tarmac and into his open arms? When a soldier comes home, it is a joyous reunion.

War also claims victims and produces often untold suffering. Men and women are killed, and their loved ones mourn. Taps, flags, military funerals, tears of sadness and shattered dreams are all products of war. One of the worst tragedies of all is that some simply become "missing." Their loved ones both mourn and hope. The years drag on, and the long wait for answers can become unbearable. In this regard, the Committee notes with sadness the tragic death last year of Mrs. Marion Shelton, the devoted wife of Capt. Charles Shelton, USAF, the only serviceman still officially listed by the Department of Defense as a "POW" captured in Laos during the war.

What could be worse than the emotional turmoil of "not knowing?" Two family members explained their feelings:

When a beloved son becomes missing in any war, parents like us become the living dead.

He loved the Air Force and because of that love, I chose to serve in the same branch. I feel I owe an awful lot to my big brother, Buddy. Not a day goes by that I don't wonder what happened to him and if he could still be alive.

For many Korean War POW/MIA families, this anguish has lasted for four decades; for Vietnam War POW/MIA families, many have hoped and prayed for 20 years.

National security is no longer a valid excuse for events that happened 40 years ago. . . .

I feel the American people need to understand some of the anguish that families experience when a father is taken away and there's no explanation given to the child as to why. . . .

[My daughter] writes, "I recently returned from Russia where I spent two weeks with my mother searching for clues regarding my father's disappearance. I found no answers, just more questions. I don't know what to say, except that as I write this memories of my childhood haunt me, and I am crying. They are tears of sadness, for I never met my father.

"I grew up wondering what he was like. I was told he was dead. Then a year ago I found out he was probably taken prisoner of war at the time of the incident and might still even be alive. These days I cry, wondering about all the pain and suffering he must have endured, and I wonder if he's still alive somewhere in Russia, or maybe someone else is still alive.

"Please keep working on the exchange of information between our two countries. There are many good people on both sides willing to help."

Another Korean War veteran and POW/MIA family member also has wondered -- and persisted in his efforts to find the truth -- for more than 40 years:

I was a Korean War veteran; two tours of duty in Korea. I had four brothers on the front line at one time. My youngest brother was captured on November 4, 1950 at Anju, northeast of Anju, right up here on the map.

In 1953, when the last group of prisoners of war were released on September 3rd or 4th, and I looked at the television set after I had gotten home -- I came out all right -- and I didn't see my brother's name on that list, I told my mother and father there are three things wrong here. You have to be a prisoner of war, killed in action, or missing in action. That's three categories. And I'm sure he was one of those three, and I was hoping he would have been alive, and is still alive today.

So, I made a promise to my mother and father in 1950 that I would never stop looking for him until I brought him home, dead or alive.

Families' Views and Experiences

The Committee understands that it is impossible to make general statements about specific family members who have all suffered in their own way from the tragedy of having a "missing" loved one. Whether we speak of Vietnam or prior wars, the pain is the same.

Families are diverse in their views, in the particular circumstances surrounding the loss of their loved one, in the experiences they have had in dealing with their government, and in the feelings toward the Communist governments who hold answers.

Some believe the U.S. Government has done all it can over the years; others believe it has bungled inexcusably. Some of these families have decided to accept death and move on with their lives; others wait, convinced that living Americans remain in captivity.

No one among the Senators on this Committee is qualified to criticize the beliefs of the families. None of us has a missing loved one from a prior war. On these questions, every POW/MIA family member has fair claim to be considered an expert in the saddest, truest sense of the word.

The families have suffered the indignities of Communist governments who have refused to provide even basic humanitarian information and answers over the past half-century. They have endured the emotional roller-coaster ride of hope and failure year after year after year. They have watched governments in Southeast Asia dribble out remains and heard flat denials that records exist -- and then seen that these documents existed all along.

With the full cooperation of these governments in past years, results would have been obtained for many POW/MIA families long ago. Former President Nixon himself said in January 1992:

It has been obscene, the way they have just dribbled out information to these poor families who simply want to know what happened.

The families have been the victims of fraud and they have seen their own ranks divided by intense differences over the best way to obtain results. Through it all, they have persevered.

Through years of not knowing, both during and after the war, of bearing the brunt of bureaucracies incapable of answering questions or responding to requests, of grapplying with wrenching and sometimes conflicting information, and of dealing with the inhumane actions of former enemies, POW/MIA families have unfailingly kept their hopes alive and realistic.

The feelings and commitment of POW/MIA families may best have been summed up by the son of a serviceman shot down over Laos:

I was 16 years old when my dad was shot down. Dad was 42. He was a big man with a good sense of humor and a big appetite for life. He liked sports cars, bagpipe music, Irish whiskey; he fished, he rode broncos in the Rodeo; he loved New Mexico and the Air Force.

I remember him vividly, and miss him terribly. Nonetheless, I have long been resigned to the fact that he's almost certainly dead, and resigned to the fact that I will probably never know what happened to him. But that does not relieve me or you of the obligation to try to find out what did happen to him.

I don't expect the impossible, only the confidence that the Government that ordered my father into combat is doing all that it can to determine his fate and that my family knows all that this Government knows.

Families' Central Role in Committee's Work

The Committee owes its creation to the activism of family members, and from the beginning we sought to work closely with POW/MIA families. Family members were represented at the Committee's opening and closing hearings. In addition, the Chairman and Vice Chairman addressed the 1992 conventions of the National League of Families and the National Alliance of Families.

To ensure that families' concerns were addressed, the Committee's Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to the primary next-of-kin of all 2,266 then unaccounted for servicemen in January 1992, seeking their advice and participation. Over the course of the Committee's year in existence, more than 100 responded, and both the League and the Alliance have actively monitored the Committee's work.

In addition, C-SPAN coverage of 18 of the Committee's 22 open hearings has kept an audience of 59 million viewers informed. "Please talk to as many families as you can -- they are the only ones holding the truth," one family member wrote. "I was glued to TV [coverage of the hearings] and watched until 5:30 a.m."

The questions before the American public are the ones that still gnaw at the families. If there are leads that can be traced to a living American serviceman, then there must be facts, places, dates, and descriptions or names. Some of the rhetorical questions of activists have been provocative, but at the same time the Government has jealously guarded its documents.

Through all of this, the families simply want answers and results. The Committee has focused on compelling leads and questions based on facts. The families deserved no less than an honest search to understand the truth. We sought information from all sources, public and private, including activists and current and former government officials.

The families of the missing deserve not merely words, but actions, answers, and -- above all -- the truth. The Committee has labored tirelessly in their behalf to provide them the truth. It is a labor of love, devotion, and gratitude.

The Search for Answers

In families' search for answers, two ingredients are essential. First, they must know the U.S. is pressing Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for all information they have. As the wife of a serviceman missing in Laos, explained:

"If these men are not alive today, it's because they were either starved, executed, mistreated, or simply died of broken hearts in the last 20 years it has taken to go looking for them. They [the Lao or Vietnamese] know where my husband is. I know this. My family will not rest until we find the fate of David."

Second, families must know that the U.S. is doing all it can on behalf of missing servicemen. As Ann Mills Griffiths, the League's Executive Director told the Committee:

The vast majority of the POW/MIA families are realistic. We don't expect miracles. We expect seriousness by our own government, Executive and Legislative branches, rather than spontaneous reaction to the squeaky wheel or the latest editorial.

Beyond that, however, what constitutes an answer about the fate of a missing loved one varies from individual to individual. To satisfy U.S. Government "accounting," policy requires "the man alive, the man's remains, or convincing evidence of why it's not possible." For families, the standard is generally different: photographs are compelling for some; for others, positively identified remains are the only acceptable proof; for still others, even remains are not convincing.

Many families know that the answers available most often are merely clues and not full answers; but few can accept inexplicably conflicting information as satisfactory, even in a partial answer:

[At the time of my brother's disappearance], the Army told us that every effort was being made to locate him, including dropping leaflets with his picture. Three months later, the story changed. They said he had been engaged in a skirmish, that he was ahead of the majority group and then shot. No other information was provided at the time and we never got his body or any of his personal effects. As far as my family is concerned, there are still many unanswered questions: What really happened? Who were the men with him? Where are his things?

I am not expecting a miracle, but I do want to know and have an explanation/accounting of what took place. Were there, for example, eyewitnesses? Is this a crash site that has previously been excavated? What is the terrain?. . . . My personal goal is to do for [him] what I couldn't do then and resolve my grief issues. . . This is the least I can do; Len and others like him made the ultimate sacrifice.

It was during a monsoon, and due to the terrain, a ground crew could not get to the plane and a helicopter could not land. After about seven days, they presumed them dead. . . . we have wondered for 23 or 24 years. Just to know for sure -- something -- would help. My mother has never remarried, thinking that someday a miracle might happen and he could come home. We all need to know. . .

He saved seven men and carried them to a safe place and then returned to his post. All of the men he saved have since died. This is just a father who is still hoping for that "someday" when we will hear more.

If my father is dead, I want him brought back and buried at Arlington with the rest of the dead heroes. Because no matter what anyone thinks of the futile and tragic war in Vietnam, the men who fought there were heroes. If my father is alive after all these years, he must think we've forgotten him. I want him to know that we haven't. There is still time to bring him home. If others are alive, we must bring them all home. My wish is simple. If my father is alive, I want to know him, not things about him. If he is dead, I want to be able to put a flower on his grave.

This search for the truth by the families was frustrated over the years by limited information from the governments of Southeast Asia, and by our own government's failure to provide satisfactory answers. In fact, according to many families, the policies and actions of the U.S. Government during and after the war not only failed to resolve the problems, but the lack of attention and focus in past years actually made things worse.

For families whose experience with the Government has shattered their faith in it, only full disclosure of everything the Government knows will reassure them.

U.S. Government Actions During the War

If there is one facet of the POW/MIA issue that is without ambiguity, without disagreement, it is that the treatment accorded families of missing Americans has deepened their anguish, not lessened it.

War-Time Secrecy

The difficulties confronting most families were rooted not only in their kin's loss, but also in the secrecy surrounding the loss. At first, families were not told -- sometimes for years -- that their husbands, sons or brothers had been captured. The impact of war- time secrecy on the lives of families can best be described in their own words. As Donnie Collins, wife of then-Captain Tom Collins (captured in October, 1965), testified:

Mrs. Collins: Tom was missing four years, two months, and two weeks, and I received a letter from him in Christmas of '69. Now, I knew before then, but not through anything the Government did. I found on my own that Tom was seen alive in Hanoi in 1966. . . . I was more fortunate than most family members. I had friends in high places.

Sen. Smith: Do you have any reason to believe that anybody in the United States Government knew he was alive and did not tell you?

Mrs. Collins: Oh, yes, I'm certain that they did.

When families were informed of their loved one's fate, they rarely were given important details. As Mrs. Collins explained:

I, as an MIA wife, was frustrated by knowing little, being left out of the loop, and it seemed at times being treated as the enemy, more feared by the administration and military intelligence than the North Vietnamese whom we should have been unified against. This was typical of the attitude of the Government in those years.

Another MIA wife, whose husband was lost in December, 1967,

. . . was notified about my husband's MIA status by telephone. When I asked if my husband's navigator, who he had trained with, was with him, Air Force would not give me an answer. . . . since [his] navigator's wife was pregnant, I did not want to call and upset her if her husband had not been on that plane. It took a sideways call to the Pentagon from one of the colonels on base to get the needed information. He told me never to tell who got me the information.

And all were cautioned to say nothing about their husbands, sons and brothers, so as not to give their captors leverage over the men.

. . . [T]hey said, "you don't need to know this. . . . if you were to let this out, this could cause his death -- now, you wouldn't want to do that, would you?" I love that old hang-that-guilt-trip-on-them.

The effect was devastating for many. As one MIA wife explained:

I needed the support of other families who knew what I was going through. I asked my Personnel Affairs officer and sergeant to deliver my hand written notes to other wives who lived within 100 miles. There were only a few, but I did not know the names and right-to-privacy laws demanded that I go through the casualty office. In my notes I offered my home as a rest or coffee stop when other women came to shop. When I received no word of reply from my notes, I accepted the fact that the other women wanted their privacy and I'd have to go it alone.

Everyday some well-meaning civilian would call or come by and say, "My dear, I don't know how you do it." I'd just be devastated! When they'd leave or hang up I'd think, "Yes -- how do I do it?" I really needed the support of the other women; the other wives of POW and MIA.

I did not learn for four years that my notes had not been delivered to the single hearings or picture viewings at the base. Why were we never allowed to get together? Why were my notes withheld?

To her, the Government lost all credibility when its directives not to publicize the POW's fate didn't change as soon as the U.S. knew its men were being tortured:

Giving the Johnson Administration and its Ambassador at Large in charge of prisoner of war affairs, Averill Harriman, the benefit of the doubt, some might assume that these guidelines really were engendered in the best interest of the wives.

That rationale became totally invalid for me, however, when the Johnson Administration learned for a fact certain that American prisoners of war were being brutally tortured, but continued to insist that we wives remain silent in order to continue our husband's so- called good treatment by the North Vietnamese.

I know the Government knew of the brutal torture for a fact certain, because I was the conduit who delivered the message to the Johnson Administration. Averill Harriman never came off his insistence that we wives must keep quiet in order to ensure the so-called good treatment of our loved ones.

It was not until more than two years after Averill Harriman knew our men were being tortured that Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense in the newly elected Nixon Administration, publicly acknowledged the gross mistreatment of our men and the violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

On the 19th of May, 1969, when Secretary Laird first made this public announcement, Jim Stockdale had been in prison for almost four years. . . .

No one in the Johnson Administration, not McNamara, nor Rusk, nor the Bundy brothers, nor Clifford, ever seemed to realize that we wives were not so stupid as to not be able to figure out that they wanted to suppress the truth about our men's circumstances in order to keep the American public from being emotionally involved in the Vietnam War.

Just as they never called up the reserves or imposed rent controls, they didn't want the truth about our men's torture to emotionally involve the American people in their stick and carrot war.

I knew only too well they had started their war under false pretenses, because my husband had led all of the air strikes in the Tonkin Gulf incidents. President Johnson had even doubly endangered all of the lives of the men in the first air strike against the North Vietnamese mainland by announcing their arrival to the enemy on the radio an hour and a half before they arrived.

The gag order was too much for some:

Mrs. Collins: Let me just go back and point out a couple of things. That Tom was heard on the radio. He was seen coming out of the plane. He had a wing man, there were another two in the formation. He was seen on the ground. So they did know he got on the ground. They did talk to him. Yet even later on, they never allowed anyone who was with him on his wing or behind him, the two behind him, to tell me anything at all, even that bare little element to hang onto.

As I say, I can deal with dead. . . . But missing, they didn't know how to deal with missing. So they decided that the best thing to do was don't tell the families anything.

I want to remind you that Tom was security ops officer. Because of that, he had such a security clearance you would never achieve to, Senator. John will tell you that. And because of that, I was brought into the loop and I was also part of the security clearance. So Tom didn't marry a dodo who fell off the turnip truck when it went through town on Saturday. Most pilots did not.

Vice Chairman Smith: That is very obvious, by the way.

Mrs. Collins: Thank you. And because of that, why they could not sort out and tell the families the basic elements. When I later found out in early '68 that they had had this information in his jacket, I was angry but I told no one, including his parents, what was in the jacket, no one.

Now, if you read my testimony you realize that I was jumped on by big-time people. I mean State Department threatened me with you're going to shut up or else, and I never could figure out what or else was. I guess the firing squad, send Tom to Hanoi, something equally obnoxious.

As I responded to them finally, no military has control over a wife. Only the military member himself may discipline her. So if you can find Tom and get him home and he wants to kick me in the rear end, let him go at it, but don't threaten me. And finally I had to call friends in high places to get the State Department off me because I decided, in '66, to ask some questions in the public. So I was probably the first one to get swatted.

Secrecy's Effects

The secrecy had two distinct ill effects. First, it back-fired:

. . . the old military cliche that wives and families should be told nothing and should know nothing was, and I presume to some degree is still, the rule. This is an over-reaction to legitimate military security needs, and has probably resulted in more inadvertent leaks through ignorance than if the spouses and families had been brought into the network in matters that concerned them. . . . Had they brought us into the loop, telling us the things that we had a right to know from the onset, we would never find ourselves in this position today.

Second, and far more damaging to both families and subsequent Government efforts, the secrecy made families an easy mark for any con artist with information to peddle. In Collins' words:

The closed-door attitude of the Government, which started and became ingrained in the early war years, has contributed greatly to making the families vulnerable and prey for the antiwar activists on the left and the con artists and mystics on the right. If the Government was silent to their questions, then where were they to go for information and help? Some elements of both groups meant well, but their impact has been cruel to the families.

Another witness, Carol Hrdlicka, laid the blame for fraudulent schemes more forcefully at the Government's door:

I can appreciate these other scams, but I have to tell you that if our Government had done their job in the first place, I wouldn't be in the situation where I could be a victim or Carol Collins could be a victim.

In sum, another MIA wife said:

I tell you as I told the [PFOD] hearing: if a situation like this happens again I hope you all are smart enough to know you can trust the families with inside knowledge to protect them from con artists. I did not bite when asked for a donation to bring home the men. I felt I had paid enough.

Mis-Reporting

When Evidence Suggested Death

Tragically for many families, strong incentives existed for combat veterans to soften the blow that reporting a buddy killed in action would deliver to families. Admiral Stockdale felt the pressures after he witnessed a plane go down:

He was in an AD -- last called a Mayday, hit about 1,000 feet going in a steep dive, and of course, as you know, John, [there was] no ejection seat in that plane. They went out there the next morning and they found that the Vietnamese had removed the debris.

And the squadron commander said the guy is -- he's dead. And I went up to see Captain Bart Connally and I said I'm just getting started in this thing. And I sent the message, whether I should have called him KIA or MIA. . . . He said, "I did this in World War II, of course, and, he said, there's a great temptation to do the wife a favor. But in the long run I think you do her an injustice, because you're giving her the wrong message. If you think he's dead, say he's dead."

Now, I did that [reported the man killed in action]. . . . I've been told that people who were seen to spin in the traffic pattern and crash in their plane were listed as MIA for that same darned reason. We ought to think of a better way to compensate families besides lying to them.

Gen. Vessey had experienced the same situation:

Sen. McCain: You and I have discussed, and I mentioned to Admiral Stockdale yesterday, this very tragic situation that exists when a person is listed as missing or captured, especially in the case of the air war.

There were cases that we know of -- Admiral Stockdale cited one yesterday, where the plane hit the ground and exploded and no chute was cited; but with the knowledge that if that person is declared dead, all benefits cease after his death (gratuities, insurance, etc.), [his buddies listed] that person as missing. Then the pay and benefits continue for an indeterminate length of time.

Do you have any idea how we can get around this dilemma, General?

Gen. Vessey: . . . It's something that drives our making inaccurate reports. The very fact that you deprive your comrade's family of their livelihood by declaring him dead. . . so the inclination generally has been, if there's any doubt at all, move [the status report] toward the missing rather than face the facts. . . . I think the present system will drive us to the same problems that we had from the war in Vietnam.

In 1973, Lt. Cdr. George Coker cited two examples of what he had seen as a Navy pilot in an address to the National League of Families:

A guy is flying, he does see his wingman shot down. Two guys go in, and they're deader than a doornail. He's thinking to himself, "If I report that they're dead, the wife's going to be brokenhearted, she'll get death gratuities, and that's it. If I report him MIA, his pay keeps going, and it will cushion the blow for a little while."

"I just saw your son fly into the ground." Do you think I'm going to tell you that? Hell, no, because the way I think, if I tell you your son got target fixation and flew into the ground, to my way of thinking, what I would be saying to you is, "You know, what you had for a son is a real idiot."

That's not true, so what am I going to say? "Well, he flew down, and he probably lost control, he was probably hit by a 57 or something and lost control of the aircraft and went in." But I'm not going to say, "I think he had target fixation." . . .

But now I've given you a shred of hope. It's not an out- and-out false report. I told you he flew into the ground, but I just twisted 'why.' So now he has the option of ejecting.

When Evidence Pointed to Life

However, the Committee also uncovered cases where servicemen were reported as dead, in view of information suggesting survival. Moreover, the families were never provided with this information.

For example, the Committee notes the following comments from the family members of two cases in particular:

Lance Corp. Kenneth L. Plumadore was officially listed as KIA/BNR, although a 1992 case narrative from the JTF-FA indicates that PAVN forces may have captured him. IN 1992, Plumadore's sister wrote to the Pentagon:

If what I am told is correct and the government continues to withhold intellience data on my brother's capture that has been concealed from his family for 25 years, I submit to you the following questions: What reason is there for secrecy now? Why am I not entitled to know everything about my brother that you know?

Maj. Robert F. Coady, USAF, was listed as missing in Laos since 1969. His family was only provided the initial loss report, but recently discovered that there was additional information which suggested that Coady may have survived his incident. In 1969, the U.S. Embassy in Laos reported a possible correlation between Coady and a similar name reported by a POW who returned in 1969. Coady's sister wrote to the Committee in August 1992:

When my family asked if there was any information on my brother, we were told there was nothing but the initial report of his loss. I could not believe that after 17 years of believing the Air Force I found out that there was information regarding my brother not given to the family. I find this totally unacceptable.

A final example concerns a serviceman believed dead during the war, but subsequently determined to have been captured. This example was brought to the Committee's attention in November 1991 by Dr. Patricia O'Grady, the daughter of Col. John O'Grady, who was captured in 1967 in Vietnam:

O'Grady: I testify before you today on behalf of my father, Col. John O'Grady, who is finally known to have been captured alive. This information could have been obtained many years ago, but after 24 years, I can finally tell you how many cigarettes were in his pack, and I can also tell you where his actual captors live today. Yet this information was not released to me directly or readily. This information was only released to me accidentally. . . . up until 1991, August of this year, they have disputed that my father was in fact captured alive.

Sen. Smith: . . . but now they say otherwise?

O'Grady: Now they say it, based upon the fact that they have finally found his actual captors and they interviewed them in detail.

Public Relations Campaign

Late into the war and after enormous pressure from POW/MIA families, the U.S. Government began to publicize the plight of the POWs in order to keep pressure on the North Vietnamese and gain support for the war at home.

The courageous attempts by H. Ross Perot are particularly noteworty. His efforts to bring food, medicine, and Christmas packages to POWs in 1969 and 1970 and to publicize their condition improved the way they were treated, as returned POWs later described when they returned. President Nixon's description details Perot's activities and their impact:

Ross Perot supported what we were trying to do in Vietnam, unlike many other people in the business community who took a walk, and I appreciate that. He did everything he could to help the POWs while many others were doing nothing at all. At a time when many people in the American establishment were not supporting the POWs, Ross Perot was doing so.

Sen. Smith noted Perot's accomplishments when he welcomed him to testify in August:

My words of thanks for your efforts, Mr. Perot, pale in comparison to the recognition you have already received from former POWs themselves, the families, and our nation's veterans groups. As many know, Mr. Perot has a painting proudly hanging in his office which is signed by all the POWs who came home in 1973, thanking him for drawing public attention to their plight. I also note that the Department of Defense awarded Mr. Perot its highest civilian honor for his efforts -- the Defense Medal of Distinguished Public Service.

But the P-R campaign had a stark down-side as well, as families learned when it the war ended and many forgot the POWs. In 1972, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird held a press conference to pressure Vietnam by focusing on 14 men not on Hanoi's list of POWs. "All 14 men were known to be alive, on the ground in North Vietnam, or were at one time actually identified by the North Vietnamese as having been captured," he told his audience.

In 1973, when not one of those 14 came home -- including Ronald Dodge, who was shown in captivity in 1972 in a Paris Match photo -- there was no follow-up press conference. No similar U.S. effort was mounted again publicly to raise families' unanswered questions about their loved ones' fates to public attention. The families' feeling of being abandoned, with their men, still persists: As Dodge's widow explained:

Sen. Reid: What more do you think we as a committee could do that we have not done?. . .

Ms. Otis: . . . what I've been wanting is for the public to really care. And I know it's been really too long, but the Government and the media didn't press this in the beginning. They just assumed everybody was dead. And we felt so abandoned because not only did our Government or the media care, but the public didn't seem to care.

Arrow · #2 05-20-2003, 06:24 PM

Senate Select Committee - XLI

Post-War Government Policies

Presumed Findings of Death

For years after the war ended, few Americans wanted to re-examine its effects; families' questions were greeted with silence.

Then, beginning in 1978 and continuing through 1981, came proceedings to declare missing servicemen dead. The "presumptive findings of death" pitted families against the Government, with many trying to prove life against a presumption so strong that even post-capture photographs and other "hard evidence" failed to persuade the judges. Only one, Charles Shelton, remained listed as the symbolic POW.

For those who accepted the death of their kin, the proceedings were welcomed. They provided finality for a situation that left families dangling, letting families go on with their lives. But for those who had not gotten satisfactory answers, the rulings were traumatic. Their own words best express the experience:

These men -- many -- were declared dead not on information, but on the lack of information, that we had. . . . Your comment that 'this thing has taken on a life of its own' is so very true. It has taken over my life, and many others' unable to go through the steps of grief and dying and acceptance because of this limbo.

Commander Dodge's status change hearing was in February 1979. The next-of-kin had to prove the missing serviceman alive. The Government, with all of their resources, did not have to prove him dead.

In 1977, the Air Force Casualty Office contacted me and advised me that they were going to review David's case, and unless I had any new evidence that he was alive, they were going to declare him dead. I then stated that I had no evidence since I was not allowed access to intelligence. Why is it that the burden of proof is always on the families?

The process, and not only its conclusion, worsened the matter for many families. As the wife of a serviceman missing in Laos in December 1967, explained:

He said the hearing would be held and told me the day. I told him I'd get in touch with my children and we'd be down. He said, "Oh, you don't need to come. It is just a hearing. We will let you know about it." I said, "You are talking about killing off my husband legally. The way you've talked to me so far, I don't trust you."

. . . . He said, "Isn't there anything I can do?" I said, "You can make reservations for me at the visiting quarters. There will be my son, two daughters, my mother and myself." He said, "Oh, I can't do that. You can't stay there. You'll have to get a motel."

They closed my husband's case and declared him killed in action as of August 17, 1979. He was such an honorable, straightforward man; he would not be pleased with the situation I'd been placed in all of these years.

The League of Families chronicled the process from families' perspective:

Immediately after the signing of the Paris Accords, January 27, 1973, the Department of Defense planned to initiate presumptive finding of death rulings based on U.S. knowledge of incident circumstances and lapse of time without information to indicate the individual was still living. What was obviously not yet available was knowledge from the Vietnamese, Lao or Cambodian governments. . . the families, under the umbrella of the League, initiated a class-action suit to stop the status reviews. . . .

The court decided. . . that PNOK [primary next-of-kin] receiving compensation must be provided hearing rights. The Defense Department extended these rights to all PNOK, whether or not currently receiving government benefits. . . .

some in the League publicly offered to return their government pay if active-duty status could be retained. This was to prevent the Indochinese governments from throwing back the claim that our own government had legally determined our relatives were dead. This, too, was unsuccessful.

With the presumptive findings of death came another problem; the more presumed dead, the fewer it appeared were still prisoner, missing or unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. We, the families, knew that legal administrative rulings had nothing to do with accountability and that the numbers were actually more [than mere numbers] -- they were Americans. . . .

Changing Definitions

At the same time, the U.S. Government added to the POW/MIA list. At the end of 1978, 224 were listed as POWs; by the end of 1980, that had grown to 2,500 -- simply by changing the definition to include war-time killed-in-action.

Taken together, the action seemed to signal that the Government had made a decision was being made to move on -- that one serviceman, whose fate was uncertain, now would get the same level of attention as the next, whose death was witnessed by his comrades.

The solution was satisfactory to no one, and the stroke-of-a-pen changes, based not on facts but on some other consideration, raised even more questions about the sense and sincerity of Government efforts.

Live-Sighting Reports

For scores of families -- including some whose kin's remains had been returned -- the next information to be confronted came with the flood of Vietnamese refugees: reports that Americans were alive in Southeast Asia. The reports were tantalizing, and the heavily blacked-out sections of classified information made them more so. The slowness of live-sighting investigations, and the fruitless efforts of families to gain access to the intelligence contained in hundreds of these reports, marked a new battlefront for many families.

Questions during the mid-1980s about the sincerity of U.S. efforts heightened families' concerns. While some of the allegations of conspiracy or incompetence came with fund-raising appeals, others were leaked by insiders with no readily apparent motive besides altruism. A spate of internal DIA reviews spelled out the agency's shortcomings and, for many, confirmed fears that the "highest national priority" label assigned to POW/MIA efforts by the Reagan Administration was nothing more than words.

Repatriation of Remains

For some 379 families, the next development was the return of remains from Southeast Asia. In many cases, the remains were only fragments of bone, sometimes commingled in the casket with another servicemen who had died in the same crash. Sometimes, they were determined to be the remains of Asian people; in a few cases, they were found to be animal bones. Serious questions about the capability of the U.S. lab that identifies remains to make accurate determinations further shook families' faith in the U.S. Government (see Chapter 5).

In the half-century since World War II, technology has bettered the chance of identifying remains, but the science is far from an exact one.

There have been so many conflicting reports concerning Bill. We have always felt he was alive, and being held in Russia, even though remains (a few single teeth said to compare favorably with Bill's) was sent home in November of 1957. When we had the casket opened by court order, we found a sack with a few single teeth and a few bone fragments so that identification was impossible as far as we were concerned. We buried the body as Bill, even though we still believed that he was in Russia.

We have felt so helpless all these years, trying and trying to get positive proof of whether he is in Russia or not. My parents both died believing that the U.S. Government had not been honest with them. . . .

The combination of:

past experience with the Government on POW/MIA matters;

only partly conclusive results; and

the few number of bones available to make the determination makes it impossible for many families to accept the remains as proof of their kin's death.

Each day I wait, and look, and hope for some revelation as to how did my son die -- if he did! Oh yes, I know my Government considers [his case] a closed book because Hanoi sent back a box of bones with his name on it. But there was no identification tag, nor picture, nor anything in the way of personal effects found on his person returned to us. No fingerprints! No dental records!

I do know Hanoi had David either dead or alive -- the Pravda (1965) article told me that. He did not go down in his plane as previously thought. I want any and all information my Government has on David -- my family can handle it!. . . .

Casualty Officers

I was shocked, surprised and stunned. . . . It took some getting used to, and I can't describe the overwhelming relief I felt, knowing how, where and when he died, and that it was quick. . . . My baby, Sue, was six weeks old when the telegram was delivered to me. . . . In an instant, I [had] lost my husband, home, status as a wife, social life, my planned future -- and I was just getting over childbirth. I heard nothing from the three surviving crew members. All official business was handled by mail. I had no advisor or advocate from the military to help me sort out my life and figure out what I should do. I felt abandoned. . . . a way must be found to see that dependents of men who died serving their country are given the personal support they need.

The Defense Department has come a great distance since the days of telegrams announcing the loss of a serviceman. Today, officers serve the point of contact for families and the efforts of most are well-regarded by the families they serve.

However, few have the experience and clout needed to pry information out of the DIA, and their stints in the job are short: except in the Air Force, assignments last no more than three years. This forces families to drive the information-gathering process -- and their lack of security clearance and knowledge ill-equips them to get the answers they seek.

Simply put, the agencies of our Government responsible for the MIA issue do not provide us of their own volition and in a timely manner all information that they had about my father's fate, despite their often-repeated promise to do just that.

The inability of casualty officers to satisfy families' legitimate needs for information often worsens communication. In their eagerness to learn all they can, many families have turned to other channels -- pressing intelligence analysts or private activists for more. The different interpretations, and sometimes different facts, obtained through these channels have exposed a bureaucracy that is lumbering and often senseless in its operations. It has left many families unsure about who to believe.

Our family has never been officially told that Steven was taken prisoner, but we had received a declassified document from another POW/MIA family, that stated Steven was positively identified by photograph in November of 1968 (three months after his disappearance) as being taken prisoner. I do not know which list he now falls under, the 111 confirmed to have died in captivity or the 133 of whom no other information is available. I'm sure we will be notified in time.

I just wanted to say we are proud of Steven for his unselfishness in fighting for his country, and how proud we are of you and the committee for having the courage to look into this matter to the extent you have in order to resolve the issue.

Secretary Cheney's plan to use the POW/MIA office to trouble-shoot is commendable, but further efforts to unify POW/MIA operations are needed. Too much is lost in "translation" between the men and women in the field and POW/MIA families, because information goes first through DIA and then casualty office channels. Oftentimes, information also is passed through the Inter-Agency Group (see Chapter 5), further delaying notification of the individual's family.

While the Committee recognizes the need for some "channels," it also urges DoD to let the public, and especially family members, hear directly from those who have first-hand information about searching for unaccounted-for servicemen.

Families Turn Elsewhere for Help

The National League of Families

The League's origins can be traced to the West Coast during the late 1960s. Sybil Stockdale, wife of Admiral James Stockdale, the ranking POW in the "Hanoi Hilton," initiated the movement which evolved from a loosely organized, small group of families into the formal organization now known as the National League of Familise of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia.

The impetus for this action was the strong belief by these POW families that the U.S. Government's policy of keeping a low profile on POW/MIAs was unjustified and causing the families undue pain -- and perhaps even risking the lives, health and the very return of their missing loved ones (as described above in "War-Time Secrecy.")

In October 1968, the first media account of a POW story was published. As a result of that story, many families began to communicate directly with each other. What once was a small group grew to hundreds and ultimately several thousand family members.

The League's first major activity was to directly confront the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris with inquiries about the fate of their loved ones. On other occasions, family members travelled to Laos and Vietnam on their own to seek answers.

Over the past 25 years, both during and after the war, the League has pressed hard through its public awareness programs and its intense pressure on the U.S. Government to get answers. The League's goals are:

to obtain the release of all prisoners;

repatriation of all recoverable remains;

to provide the fullest possible accounting for all of the missing.

Through the U.S. Government's POW/MIA Inter-Agency Group, the League has participated over the last decade in the development of official policy in the areas of intelligence and diplomatic efforts on the POW/MIA issue. The participation of the League's Executive Director, Ann Mills Griffiths, as a member of the IAG has led to great controversy and division among family members (see Chapter 5), but even criticics recognize that Griffiths' participation on the IAG has givven the League a key role in influencing government policy on the POW/MIA issue, however. In addition, the Committee recognizes that the League has provided a continuity to changing U.S. officials' responsible for policy on this issue spanning 25 years and five Presidencies of both political parties. The National Alliance of Families

The Alliance was founded in Seattle in June 1990 under the leadership of Dolores Alfond, sister of Maj. Victor Apodaca who is missing from the Vietnam War. The Alliance has been a leader in the effort to unite family members, former POWs and other citizens who seek information on missing personnel from World War II, the Korean Conflict, Cold War incidents, and the Vietnam War.

The Alliance also has been a strong advocate for the declassification of all Government documents pertaining to the missing from these wars. Another primary purpose of the National Alliance has been to educate communities (including public and civic organizations, schools, and the general public) about POW/MIA issues. Like the League, the Alliance also has held major forums with family members and Government officials in Washington, D.C.

Fellow Combat Veterans

Another, natural alternative for families hungry for information was the men who served with their kin. Contacts were ad hoc and often secretive: officially, the Government observed servicemen's privacy rights; unofficially, individual servicemen often passed on information as personal favors, and witnesses regularly reached out to their buddies' families voluntarily. For untold numbers of families, the stories that these witnesses told made the difference.

I know my brother went down into the South China Sea. The radar technician was a very good friend of the family and he watched the plane go down into the sea. So I feel I know where my brother is. I feel he was not captured, so as far as I'm concerned, he's gone. Let him lie in peace.

For some veterans, though, the requests continued -- from family members unable to accept their necessarily incomplete stories, or from children who wanted to hear it first-hand. Often, the requests were not only for the facts of a 20-year-old incident, but for an explanation of the war itself, an answer to rumors, and more. In one letter to the son of an MIA, his co-pilot struggled to answer cosmic questions with a careful recounting of facts:

What happened to your dad and I was the real definition of rotten coincidence. . . . [We were on a mission to make] strikes into Laos and Cambodia to stop supplies from getting into South Vietnam from the North. We didn't talk much about them only as a matter of policy. There were not "secret missions" or CIA-driven. . . . As we rolled in and released the bombs, two anti-aircraft rounds struck the airplane on the starboard (right) side forward of the engine intake. The explosion caused the engine to explode also and the right wing blew off at the fold. At this point, we looked at each other and ejected from the aircraft. I went out a second or so before Mike and wound up on the west side of a small river. He was on the east. . . the material and people we were after were there.

I gathered my stuff, hid it, called our wingman and tried to talk to Mike on the radio kind of all at once. I also found that my hands and face were burned pretty well and there was some shrapnel in my arm and head. At this point, these were the least of our problems. I then tried to find Mike by wandering around in the jungle in the dark (12:30 a.m.). Not a good idea as I fell down a small cliff (8-10 feet) and had to climb out. At this time I could see down to the river and saw 4-6 troopers come across the river and head my way. I hid in a bamboo thicket and waited. . . .

There was enough evidence that Mike might be held in the general area where we were hit that a "bright light" team was interested to attempt to find and rescue him. They are mercenaries that "lived in the area." They found nothing indicating his having been there. You've been told the rest and most likely more than I. It was hard to accept, but I feel he was killed that first night. I would hope that I was wrong.

Your dad was a great guy and a good friend. He did his job better than most, but unfortunately was killed. The best part is he was doing what he loved the most.

Private Groups

. . . you become obsessed. You cannot sleep, eat, work, because you would waltz with the devil to bring one man home.

The Government's shortcomings in live-sighting investigations and elsewhere prompted some families to turn to latter-day Rambos, as well as to responsible veterans and family organizations, for additional help.

Most of us have been tempted at some point to participate in some form of POW rescue based on nothing more than questionable and circumstantial information at best, such as unverified photos, live sightings, and anonymous reports. If it sounds hokey and mystic, it probably is, and it almost always plays a very cruel hoax on the families by raising false hopes. . .

I am very pleased to know this committee will take up these issues and problems in the near future, and hope this will eliminate once and for all the con artists, and clear the way for those who are credible and knowledgeable to resolve the long standing tragedy of our MIAs.

Another POW/MIA wife was not able to ignore the information profferred by a private group:

After the [positive] analysis had come out from Los Alamos and Dr. Charney I began to doubt my own view of the picture, which was there was a slight possibility that it could be Don. I mean I just -- I did not know. But something that my son said to me sort of turned me around. He said, "Mother, that picture is obviously an American. I mean he looks like an American to me. . . . he's somebody's father, he's somebody's brother, husband, cousin. If there's a chance in a billion that it's my dad, you've got to do something."

So with that, that's when I started.

The result of many encounters are devastating, emotionally and financially.

One former Congressman was shown on a nation-wide television show telling a national audience that he knows who the prisoners are and where they are. He should be made to go on nationwide television and retract his lies.

One former Lieutenant Colonel has been exposed on television for claiming a photo he obtained was of an American prisoner still in captivity. This was nothing more than a diabolical plot to raise money; [it] caused the family involved untold grief and compelled our Government to expend untold assets to track down this 'prisoner.'

One extremely convincing former Lieutenant Colonel Bo Gritz hoodwinked me into believing his story that he knew where prisoners were being held in Laos and could get them out. In 1981, the prisoner and missing issue was getting little or no attention and I saw this as an opportunity -- not necessarily to recover my son, but to get at least one prisoner out to prove what we had been working for. Since my wife and I had been notified by the Navy Department that our son "had survived to evade" and were informed by his squadron commander that Nick had been captured and escaped, I am sure you can appreciate the vulnerable situation we were in. The "secret rescue mission" failed very quickly; it never got out of the state of Florida and cost us $30,000, with nary an apology.

. . . I am not bemoaning the loss of money since that operation is one-tenth of the amount our family has spent in our 23 years of involvement. But I do believe that this Committee has a responsibility to investigate and, where necessary, prosecute these incredible liars. . . .

The fraudulent sideshows also sidetracks U.S. investigators away from serious leads and force them to chase phantoms:

Sen. McCain: "How much of the effort that your organization is engaged in has been -- how much of your assets have had to be diverted to tracking down the bogus pictures and the hoaxers?

Mr. Sheetz: At times, Senator, I would tell you that that process has literally precluded us from doing anything else. Because the political pressure has been so intense and the high interest among the people in the Government, this committee, the American public, to know what is the truth on those cases. . . It's an opportunity-cost argument. Essentially, what you're doing is dropping the work that would probably have more payoff to chase after things that ultimately turn out to be useless exercises.

Discussion

The committee wishes to commend the families and advocacy groups for their strong leadership and perseverance over the years. They have moved the issue in a positive manner in spite of incredible obstacles. The most difficult obstacles were the intransigence of the Communist governments and the lack of focus and attention by the U.S. Government at many points during the last 40 years.

At the Committee's first round of hearings, in November 1991, all witnesses -- families, activists, and government officials -- agreed that, ." . . one of the most important things that could come out of the early days of these hearings is a new structure, and a new relationship process with the families." Assistant Secretary Carl Ford explained:

. . . we didn't lose our credibility with you, with the families, with the American people overnight and we're not going to gain that credibility back overnight. . . . The only thing that is going to persuade people is our actions and our results, and to prove over time that we are serious, that we do mean what we say, and that despite occasional setbacks, despite occasional human errors, we're going to demonstrate over the next months and weeks, years, that we can do it better than we have done it in the past. That's our only commitment, to try. And if there are problems that this committee uncovers, we'll try to fix them.

In addition to other steps noted above, two actions taken on behalf of POW/MIA families during the last year have been significant:

To answer families need for an ombudsman that both DIA and casualty officers would respond to, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney created a top-level liaison office at the Pentagon in January 1992. The job of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs is to spearhead POW/MIA policy-making and to try to get answers when casualty officers cannot.

POW/MIA documents were ordered declassified in July 1992 by President Bush, at the unanimous request of the Senate. This step was taken in conjunction with the establishment of a central "library" that families can turn to for consolidated information about their case and others, in accordance with an amendment sponsored by Sen. McCain and enacted in November, 1991. (See Chapter 5, Declassification).

The most substantive response to families' concerns, however, has been field operations that have put American troops on the ground in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to search for answers. For most of the past 20 years, U.S. investigators shuttled back and forth from Bangkok to Hanoi whenever they could get permission from Vietnam. Then, a month before the Committee was formed, a temporary U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi was permitted to open; that became permanent in November, 1992.

Increased Vietnamese cooperation, won by Presidential Emissary Gen. John Vessey (USA, Ret.), Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, and three Senate delegations to Southeast Asia, widened U.S. investigators' access, letting them go to places where Americans were reported seen alive after the war, talk to prison guards and others who may know what happened to missing Americans, and examine archives and top-secret files that hold promises of more answers.

For many POW/MIA families, however, 20 years' experience dealing with the Government makes it difficult to accept these new promises. Answers about their kin's fate are still necessary -- but they are not sufficient to explain the intervening 20 years of U.S. Government run-around and worse -- and the lack of concern by Communist governments for basic human dignity.

The Committee's review of past family experiences reflects an array of problems in dealing with our government that never should have happened. With proper organization, planning, sensitivity and openness, the Committee believes these problems can be avoided in the future.

Recommendations

The Government has wavered repeatedly in its efforts to account for missing servicemen. Their families never have.

POW/MIA families want action, not more promises. The best that the U.S. Government can do for them is to do its best for their missing kin. The Committee believes the following steps must be taken to assure families that the Government is doing its best, and not simply assigning a priority that is merely words.

Accordingly, the Committee recommends:

Those actually working on POW/MIA accounting in the field in Southeast Asia should be made available, when schedules permit, to meet with families in the United States.

Military service casualty offices should be headed by civilians who are not subject to the kind of routine duty rotations experienced by military personnel. Individuals in these sensitive positions must have experience and a base of institutional memory if they are to deal effectively and knowledgeably with family members.

The resumed publication of a regular newsletter containing POW/MIA related information would be a useful means of sharing new developments with the families.

Guidelines should be established immediately for the creation of a central computerized data base within the Executive branch with information on all unaccounted for U.S. personnel from past military conflicts, to include World War II, Korea, the Cold War and Vietnam. All relevant casualty and intelligence data, in addition to any recently obtained information potentially correlating to a specific case should be made readily available to family members and researchers through the central data base. On-line access to the central data base should be made available through an easily accessible modem system.

Procedures also should be developed to ensure that requests for information contained in the data base can be processed easily so that family members receive prompt, printed responses when necessary. Additionally, procedures should be established by the Department of Defense and the Department of State to ensure that the data base is updated regularly. The Committee further recommends that the Secretary of Defense authorize the DOD family liaison officer to work with the service casualty officers to develop a data base program which meets the needs of families and researchers who need to use the system.

Family members of Vietnam era POW/MIAs who would like to travel to Southeast Asia for direct discussions with appropriate U.S. and foreign government officials should be encouraged and helped to do so.

Arrow · #3 05-20-2003, 06:33 PM

Senate Select Committee Testimony & Depositions

Memos of John F. McCreary
April 27, 1992

Memorandum for:
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

From:John F. McCreary

Subject:Legal Misconduct and Possible Malpractice in the Select Committee

1. As a member of the Virginia State Bar, I am obliged by Disciplinary Rule DR-1-103(a) to report knowledge of misconduct by an attorney "to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violations." Under Rule IV, Paragraph 13, of the Rules for the integration of the Virginia State Bar, this obligation follows me as a member of the Bar, regardless of the location of my employment, for as long as I remain a member of the Virginia State Bar. Therefore, I am obliged, as a matter of law and under pain of discipline by the Virginia State Bar, to report to you my knowledge of misconduct and possible prima facie malpractice by attorneys on the Select Committee in ordering the destruction of Staff documents containing Staff intelligence findings on 9 April 1992 and in statements in meetings on 15 and 16 April to justify the destruction.

2. The attached Memoranda For the Record, one by myself and another by Mr. Jon D. Holstine, describe the relevant facts, which I summarize herein:

a. On 9 April 1992, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, in response to a protest by other members of the Select Committee, told the Select Committee members that "all copies" would be destroyed. This statement was made in the presence of the undersigned and of the Staff Chief Counsel who offered no protest.

b. Later on 9 April 1992, the Staff Director, Frances Zwenig, an attorney, repeated and insured the execution of Senator Kerry's order for the destruction of the Staff intelligence briefing text. I personally delivered to Mr. Barry Valentine, the Security Manager for SRB-78, the original printed version of the intelligence briefing text. I also verified that the original was destroyed by shredding in the Office of Senate Security on 10 April 1992, along with 14 copies.

c. On 15 April 1992, the Staff Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha of Massachusetts, when advised by members if the Staff about their concerns over the possible criminal consequences of destroying documents, minimized the significance of the act of destruction; ridiculed the Staff members for expressing their concerns; and replied, in response to questions about the potential consequences, "Who's the injured party," and "How are they going to find out because its classified." Mr. Codinha repeatedly defended the destruction of the documents and gave no assurances or indications that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.

d. On 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, Senator John Kerry, stated that he gave the order to destroy "extraneous copies of the documents" and that no one objected. Moreover, he stated that the issue was "moot" because the original remained in the Office of Senate Security "all along."

e. I subsequently learned that the Staff Director had deposited a copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security at 1307 on 16 April.

3. The foregoing facts establish potentially a prima facie violation of criminal law and a pattern of violations of legal ethics by attorneys in acts of commission and omission.

a. It is hornbook law that an attorney may not direct the commission of a crime. In this incident two attorneys, one by his own admission, ordered the destruction of documents, which could be violation of criminal law.

b. Neither the Staff Chief Counsel nor any member of the Select Committee made a protest or uttered words of caution against the destruction of documents, by admission of the Chairman, Senator Kerry. The Chief Counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the Staff about the legality of its actions, and, in fact, had earlier issued the general prohibition to the Staff against document destruction.

c. The Chief Counsel's statements during the 15 April meeting to discuss the document destruction showed no regard for the legality of the action and displayed to the Staff only a concern about getting caught. By his words and actions, he presented to the Staff investigators an interpretation of the confidentiality and security rules that the rules of the Select Committee may be used to cover-up potentially unethical or illegal activity.

d. The Staff Director's action in placing an unaccounted for copy of the intelligence briefing text in the Office of Senate Security on 16 April constitutes an act to cover-up the destruction. Throughout the 16 April meeting, all three attorneys persisted in stating that the document had been on file since 9 April. This is simply not true.

4. I believe that the foregoing facts establish a pattern of grave legal misconduct - possibly including orders to commit a crime, followed by acts to justify and then to cover-up that crime. Even absent criminal liability, the behavioral pattern of the attorneys involved plays fast and loose with the Canons of Legal Ethics and establishes that one or more of the attorneys on the Select Committee are unfit to practice law. I am obliged to recommend that this report be filed with the appropriate disciplinary authorities of the State Bars in which these attorneys are members.

(Signed)
John F. McCreary, Esquire

October 30, 1992

Memorandum for the Record

From: John F. McCreary
Subject: Obstruction of the Investigation

1. I am concerned that recent lines of investigation have been seriously compromised by leaks of sensitive information by the Committee Staff Director to the Department of Defense. Leaks to the Department of Defense or other agencies of the Executive Branch of my Memoranda for the Record are interfering with follow-up discussions with useful witnesses. Moreover, they are endangering the lives and livelihood of two witnesses.

Leak of Information on Jan Sejna

2. Irrespective of leaks outside the government, Bill LeGro, attended a meeting of the US-Russia Joint Commission group in Washington on 28 October 1992 at the Department of State. The discussion featured information provided by Sejna. LeGro stated that Ambassador Malcolm Toon called for his dismissal. DIA personnel defended Sejna as to his expertise on Central Europe, but not as to his information on other areas, particularly POW related.

4. On 30 October 1992, I learned from Bill LeGro that he was directed to read a letter from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Select Committee that discredits Sejna's information. The letter reportedly indicates that Sejna's information has been checked and not been confirmed by his former government. At the time this letter was received, the Staff had decided to take Sejna's deposition but had not yet scheduled a deposition of Sejna. In addition, my MFR was written from memory, and did not do justice to all that Sejna stated, either in detail or in context. As of this writing, we do not know what Sejna knows or will say under oath, yet his testimony has already been written off. This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.

Suspected Leak of Information on Le Quang Khai

5. The second issue of suspected misconduct concerns witness Le Quang Khai. Although Le made a public statement concerning POWs on 12 September 1992, no agency of the US government contacted him concerning his POW information. He told me on 26 October that some men who represented themselves as FBI agents contacted him to attempts to recruit him to return to Vietnam as a US intelligence agent for six months. After which his request for asylum would be favorably considered.

6. On 30 October, Mr. Robert Egan of Hackensack, New Jersey, who is a close friend of Mr. Le and the intermediary whereby the Committee Staff met Mr. Le, informed McCreary and LeGro that the FBI had again contacted Mr. Le. A person representing himself as an FBI person called on 30 October to set up a meeting with Le to discuss Le's working as an intelligence agent for the FBI's POW/MIA office.

7. So far informal checks indicate there is no such office. Secondly, this contact occurred three days after my return from taking Le's deposition in Hackensack on 26 October. I observed a copy of the MFR with apparent routing designators written in the top margin on the desk of Frances Zwenig on 28 October.

8. The contact with Le two days after preparation of my MFR, despite the passage of a month since his public declarations, is highly suspicious and more than coincidental. The circumstances of both contacts in which persons identifying themselves as FBI without showing credentials or other evidence of authenticity or authority and also making a pitch to recruit Le are also highly suspicious.

9. An internal Department of Defense Memorandum identifies Frances Zwenig as the conduit to the Department of Defense for the acquisition of sensitive and restricted information from this Committee. Based on the above sequences of events, I must conclude that Frances Zwenig continues to leak all of my papers to the Defense Department. Her flagrant disregard of the rules of the Senate and her oath of office are now jeopardizing the livelihood, if not the safety, of Senate witnesses. In addition, the Department of Defense's continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstruction of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.

(Signed)
John F. McCreary

May 3, 1992

Memorandum for:
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

From:John F. McCreary

Subject:
Possible Violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, by the Select Committee and Possible Ethical Misconduct by Staff Attorneys.

1. Continuing analysis of relevant laws and further review of the events between 8 April and 16 April 1992 connected with the destruction of the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text strongly indicate that the order to destroy all copies of that briefing text on 9 April and the actual destruction of copies of the briefing texts plus the purging of computer files might constitute violations of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, which imposes criminal penalties for unlawful document destruction. Even absent a finding of criminal misconduct, statements, actions, and failures to act by the senior Staff attorneys following the 9 April briefing might constitute serious breaches of ethical standards of conduct for attorneys, in addition to violations of Senate and Select Committee rules. The potential consequences of these possible misdeeds are such that they should be brought to the attention of all members of the Select Committee, plus all Designees and Staff members who were present at the 9 April briefing.

2. The relevant section of Title 18, U.S.C., states in pertinent part: Section 2071. Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally (a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 795)

3. The facts as the undersigned and others present at the briefing recall them are presented in the attached Memorandum for the Record. A summary of those facts - and others that have been established since that Memorandum was written - follows.

a. On 8 April 1992, the Investigators' Intelligence Briefing Text was presented to Senior Staff members and Designees for whom copies were available prior to beginning the briefing. Objections to the text by the Designees prompted the Staff Director to order all persons present to leave their copies of the briefing text in Room SRB078. Subsequent events indicated that two copies had been removed without authorization.

b. On 9 April 1992, at the beginning of the meeting of the Select Committee and prior to the scheduled investigators' briefing, Senator McCain produced a copy of the intelligence briefing text, with whose contents he strongly disagreed. He charged that the briefing text had already been leaked to a POW/MIA activist, but was reassured by the Chairman that such was not the case. He replied that he was certain it would be leaked. Whereupon, the Chairman assured Senator McCain that there would be no leaks because all copies would be gathered and destroyed, and he gave orders to that effect. No senior staff member or attorney present cautioned against a possible violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, or of Senate or Select Committee Rules.

c. Following the briefing on 9 April, the Staff Director, Ms. Frances Zwenig, restated to the intelligence investigators the order to destroy the intelligence briefing text and took measures to ensure execution of the destruction order. (See paragraph 3 of the attachment.) During one telephone conversation with the undersigned, she stated that she was "acting under orders."

d. The undersigned also was instructed to delete all computer files, which Mr. Barry Valentine witnessed on 9 April.

e. In a meeting on 15 April 1992, the Staff's Chief Counsel, J. William Codinha, was advised by intelligence investigators of their concerns about the possibility that they had committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing text. Mr. Codinha minimized the significance of the documents and of their destruction. He admonished the investigators for "making a mountain out of a molehill."

f. When investigators repeated their concern that the order to destroy the documents might lead to criminal charges, Mr. Codinha replied "Who's the injured party." He was told, "The 2,494 families of the unaccounted for US Servicemen, among others." Mr. Codinha then said, "Who's gonna tell them. It's classified." At that point the meeting erupted. The undersigned stated that the measure of merit was the law and what's right, not avoidance of getting caught. To which Mr. Codinha made no reply. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Codinha give any indication that any copies of the intelligence briefing text existed.

g. Investigators, thereupon, repeatedly requested actions by the Committee to clear them of any wrongdoing, such as provision of legal counsel. Mr. codinha admitted that he was not familiar with the law and promised to look into it. He invited a memorandum from the investigators stating what they wanted. Given Mr. Codinha's statements and reactions to the possibility of criminal liability, the investigators concluded they must request appointment of an independent counsel. A memorandum making such a request and signed by all six intelligence investigators was delivered to Mr. Codinha on 16 April.

h. At 2130 on 16 April, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee, convened a meeting with the intelligence investigators, who told him personally of their concern that they might have committed a crime by participating in the destruction of the briefing texts at the order of the Staff Director. Senator Kerry stated that he gave the order to destroy the documents, not the Staff Director, and that none of the Senators present at the meeting had objected. He also stated that the issue of document destruction was "moot" because the original briefing text had been deposited with the Office of Senate Security "all along." Both the Staff Director and the Chief Counsel supported this assertion by the Chairman.

i. Senator Kerry's remarks prompted follow-up investigations (See paragraphs 4 through 9 of the attachment) and inquiries that established that a copy of the text was not deposited in the Office of Senate Security until the afternoon of 16 April. The Staff Director has admitted that on the afternoon of 16 April, after receiving a copy of a memorandum from Senator Bob Smith to Senator Kerry in which Senator Smith outlined his concerns about the destruction of documents, she obtained a copy of the intelligence briefing text from the office of Senator McCain and took it to the Office of Senate Security. Office of Senate Security personnel confirmed that the Staff Director gave them an envelope, marked "Eyes Only," to be placed in her personal file. The Staff Director has admitted that the envelope contained the copy of the intelligence briefing text that she obtained from the office of Senator McCain.

3. The facts of the destruction of the intelligence briefing text would seem to fall inside the prescriptions of the Statute, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2071, so as to justify their referral for investigation to a competent law enforcement authority. The applicability of that Statute was debated in United States v. Poindexter, D.D.C. 1989, 725 F. Supp. 13, in connection with the Iran Contra investigation. The District Court ruled, inter alia, that the National Security Council is a public office within the meaning of the Statute and, thus, that its records and documents fell within the protection of the Statute. In light of that ruling, the Statute would seem to apply to this Senate Select Committee and its Staff. The continued existence of a "bootleg" copy of the intelligence briefing text - i.e., a copy that is not one of those made by the investigators for the purpose of briefing the Select Committee - would seem to be irrelevant to the issues of intent to destroy and willfulness; as well as to the issue of responsibility for the order to destroy all copies of the briefing text, for the attempt to carry out that order, and for the destruction that actually was accomplished in execution of that order.

4. As for the issue of misconduct by Staff attorneys, all member of the Bar swear to uphold the law. That oath may be violated by acts of omission and commission. Even without a violation of the Federal criminal statute, the actions and failures to act by senior Staff attorneys in the sequence of events connected with the destruction of the briefing text might constitute violations of ethical standards for members of the Bar and of both Senate and Select Committee rules. The statements, actions and failures to act during and after the meeting on 15 April, when the investigators gave notice of their concern about possible criminal liability for document destruction, would seem to reflect disregard for the law and for the rules of the United States Senate.

(Signed)
John F. McCreary

Arrow · #4 05-20-2003, 06:46 PM

Senate Select Committee Testimony & Depositions

KGB/GRU Information on U.S. POW-MIAs - S E N S I T I V E -

MEMORANDUM

For: Senator John F. Kerry, Chairman
Senator Bob C. Smith, Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

From: Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. (initialed here)

Date: July 20, 1992

Subject: KGB/GRU Information on U.S. POW/MIAs

Like you, I am appalled at the negligent manner in which our government has sought the return of American POW/MIAs.

helvetica,arialI am writing this memo to bring my knowledge on this subject to your attention and to express my interest in assisting you in your efforts 1) to determine the fate of American POW/MIAs and 2) to obtain their release or the return of their remains.

Based on newspaper accounts, it appears to me that you have encountered difficulties in obtaining support and information from the KGB and GRU. I have in mind recent statements by Col. - Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov that Vietnam will be a difficult case because much of the information "has not reached the archives," by Yevgeny Primakov, that the KGB has "found no new information that missing Americans from the Vietnam conflict were held in Russia," and from reports that Russian intelligence agencies are resisting efforts to uncover files on U.S. POW/MIAs.

I have been in the defense and national security business for over twenty-five years. From 1975 to 1990 I was heavily involved in the analysis of Soviet operations and strategy. Based on this work, I believe there is a considerable information in the KGB and GRU on the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs from the Korean and Vietnam' Wars and other situations. I also believe there are approaches other than "searching the archives" that may be much more effective.

To explain my beliefs and to indicate why my experience may be particularly relevant to your efforts, I would like to share with you selected portions of my notes on my debriefings of a particularly important Soviet bloc defector, Jan Sejna.
- S E N S I T I V E -Mr. Sejna is now an American citizen. When he defected in 1968, Gen. - Maj. Sejna held a variety of top-level positions Czechoslovakia that brought him into first-hand contact with Soviet intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity. Among the positions he held were chief of staff to the Minister of Defense and secretary of the Defense Council, which was the highest decision - making body in areas of defense, intelligence, counter-intelligence, and foreign policy in the communist system.

That is, Sejna was a member of the decision-making hierarchy, in daily contact with top-level communist officials from around the world, and privy to military and intelligence plans and operations. His reports have been assessed within U.S. intelligence, operating under instructions from the Soviet Union, constructed a hospital in North Korea. Ostansibly, the hospital was built to treat casualties of the war. In reality, it was an intelligence research facility in which Czechoslovak, Soviet, and North Korean doctors would experiment on U.S. and, to a lesser extent South Korean, prisoners of war.

Czechoslovak military intelligence operations in North Korea came under the direction of Soviet military intelligence. The Czechoslovak official who was in charge of their portion of the operations in North Korea was Colonel Rudolf Bubka of the Military Intelligence Administration (Zpravdajska sprava or Zs) of the Czechoslovak General Staff. Colone Bubka was in North Korea under diplomatic cover. The hospital was under his authority. The Czechoslovak official immediately in charge of the hospital was Colone Professor Dr. Dufek, who was a heart specialist. Sejna learned about the hospital directly from Col. Bubka, from various official reports on the experiments, and from briefings to the Defense Council by experts such as Dr. Dufek and Dr. Plzak, a neurologist who was also a member of the medical team at the experimental hospital in North Korea, and from other top-level officials in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The experiments were justified by the Soviet officials as preparations for the next war. The Soviet objective was to determine the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. servicemen so that the Soviets could better asses the ability of U.S. soldiers to survive and operate in the rigorous conditions of all-out global war. Special experiments were devised and run to test the psychological and physiological endurance limits of U.S. servicemen. The fate of some U.S. POWs is inextricably tied to these experiments. This is one of several reasons why the KGB and GRU are less than enthusiastic in their efforts to uncover the fate of U.S. POWs. The experiments likely would surface in the process.

Additionally, the U.S. POWs were used as guinea pigs to test a variety of chemical and biological warfare agents and drugs that were being developed for military and intelligence use. One of the series of experiments conducted on U.S. POWs was to test the effectiveness of different mind-control drugs. As it turned out, the most effective drugs were those that had been developed at the Czechoslovak Air Force Scientific Center. Many of us can still recall the radio broadcasts and filmed newsreels that were shown at the movies in the mid 1950's in which the propaganda statements of U.S. servicemen denouncing America were aired. It was the Czechoslovak mind control drugs that caused the captured U.S. servicemen to renounce America, speak of the benefits of the communist system, and subsequently refuse to return to the United States following the cease fires. I understand our defense establishment lists such people as defectors and traitors. This may be a most unjust approach to a very complex problem.

To investigate bio-chemical aspects of U.S. servicemen, which was also part of the Soviet search for vulnerabilities, autopsies were performed on dead servicemen whose bodies were taken by the North Koreans and on those POWs who did not survive the various experiments at the intelligence medical facility. To further show the coupling of seemingly disparate intelligence operations to the POW issue, it was because of these autopsies on U.S. POW/MIAs that the Soviets, Khrushchev in particular, first seized on the idea of waging war on American youth with narcotics.

The idea of using narcotics as weapons, as different from their use as intelligence tools, was a major thrust of communist China's foreign policy adopted in 1949. The Korean War was the first war in which the Chinese would push narcotics as a way to undermine the effectiveness of the opposition's military forces. This strategy would later be employed with greatly enhanced effectiveness against the French, and later the Americans, in Vietnam.
- S E N S I T I V E -During the Korean War Soviet KGB intelligence was especially interested in the Chinese narcotics operation and followed it with great care. One of their findings was the existence of a surprisingly high incidence of use of hard narcotics, such as herion, cocaine, and the synthetic hiropon, among U.S. servicemen when contrasted with similar use by South Korean servicemen, a factor of two greater.

It was a consequence of the autopsies that this information came to take on strategic importance. During the autopsies, the Soviet and Czech doctors discovered that an unusually high percentage of the young U.S. servicemen had cardiovascular damage -- "mini heart attacks" was how the Soviet doctors described the damage -- a much higher percentage than among South Koreans. While several possible contributing factors were identified, such as diet, the doctors recognized the correlation between the incidence of heart damage and use of hard drugs and concluded that the drugs were probably a major cause.

When Khrushchev learned about this finding, he immediately recognized the potential of narcotics as a strategic weapon and commissioned a study to determine the potential effectiveness of narcotics trafficking as a strategic weapon for use against the West, the United States in particular. This was the origin of what would become by 1962 one of the most important Soviet-bloc intelligence operations undertaken to undermine our society, military effectiveness, and economic stability. Their primary initial targets were our youth, which are the backbone of any nation's military strength, and our colleges, because that was where our future leaders were to be found. A thorough investigation of the fate of U.S. POWs ultimately should also lead American intelligence to the sources of the narcotics plague that has grown exponentially since roughly 1969, when the Soviet trafficking strategy went operational.

What happened to the unaccounted for American POWs in the Korean War? Most are probably dead. But, some of the roughly 8,000 still unaccounted for might be alive. Were any of the American POW guinea pigs likely to have been returned? When I put this question to Sejna, his response was emphatic. "NO WAY! " he exclaimed, adding that Czechoslovak intelligence also built a crematorium in North Korea to help dispose of the remains of U.S. servicemen following the autopsies -- the ultimate fate of a majority of the American POW guinea pigs.
- S E N S I T I V E -Obtaining information about the fate of POWs from the Vietnam War will be even more difficult than from the Korean War because many POWs are coupled to extremely sensitive programs. Before his fall from power in September 1964, Sejna explained, Khrushchev, Khrushchev put the wheels in motion to continue in North Vietnam the experiments that were begun in North Korea during the Korean War. The experiments had been considered extremely profitable and there were many new drugs, chemical and biological agents and possible counteracting vaccines developed in the intervening years that needed to be tested.

Accordingly, arrangements were negotiated with the North Vietnamese and medical experiments using American POWs as buinea pigs were continued. Doctors from East European countries besides Czechoslovakia were involved. Most of the experiments on U.S. POWs were conducted in military hospitals in North Korea. But, the most sensitive experiments were conducted in KGB and GRU facilities back in the Soviet Union. This is why the movement of U.S. POWs to Russia and their interment in prisons and psychiatric "clinics" as revealed by Mr.Yeltsin takes on added significance.

It is highly unlikely that information on these activities will ever find its way into the Russian archives. Being research operations, the activities directly relate to special capabilities that are in being today and to covert operations over the past twenty years of the highest sensitivity.

For openers, the POW experiments are coupled with efforts to develop new generations of military chemical and biological warfare agents, efforts that, according to Sejna were more sensitive and more highly classified than nuclear weapons programs. They are also coupled to the development of chemical agents and drugs for intelligence applications and their nature likely will raise serious questions about a wide variety of assassination activities, including several undertaken against a variety of the highest-level national and international leaders.

They are coupled to the development of a wide variety of ming-control drugs. One that was described by Sejna was a follow-on to the drug used to reverse the values of selected U.S. POWs during the Korean War and cause them to disown America as described earlier. The new drug tested in the mid-1960's was covertly administered through food. It was operationally used as early as 1967 to turn influential anti-Soviet individuals in various countries into neutral and even pro-Soviet supporters.

That is, the telltale trail of U.S. POWs impinges on these, and other, extremely sensitive Soviet intelligence operations and capabilities that are still highly valued today. It goes without saying that neither the KGB nor the GRU are likely to find and volunteer such information on their own initiative!

I am convinced that the above is only a fraction of the information that is close at hand respecting the fate of U.S. POW/MIAs. The above information is just bits and pieces I collected in the process to conduct careful debriefings on the POW/MIA issue -- but would welcome the opportunity to do so. There is no doubt in my mind that considerably more information could be extracted from further debriefings, and that among the items of greatest interest would be the names of other officials and participants from various former communist countries who would also have detailed memories based on first-hand knowledge. Once identified, these people could be contacted and the process repeated. The result would be a mass of detail that would be most difficult to refute and which then could be used as the basis for specific discussions with President Yeltsin to obtain his assistance in a much more direct attack on the KGB and GRU bureaucracies than merely looking for needles in the archive haystacks.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the above in detail with you and address any questions you may have. An over view of my background is attached for your information. My phone number is (XXX) XXX-XXXX.

Finally, I would like to caution your staff not to take any precipitous action based on the above without careful deliberation. That is, there are a number of important operational nuances that I did not discuss above because of their sensitivity.

Arrow · #5 05-20-2003, 06:50 PM

more to come...

Jerry D · #6 05-20-2003, 09:05 PM

As Artie Johnson said on Laugh In "Verry Interesting" thanks for the posting of this information

makes a person think!

Arrow · #7 05-21-2003, 05:27 PM

Thanks for reading Jerry and taking the time to stop and think.

Senate Select Committee Testimony & Depositions

Testimony of Albro Lundy III
Submitted On Behalf of His Father Major Albro L. Lundy Jr.
November 7, 1991

This is an overview to establish a baseline for initial investigation by the committee. This is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis, as the Lundy family is still conducting investigation. As further factual evidence surfaces, the Lundy family will submit the details for the Senate to investigate.

In March of 1970 at the age of 37, Major Albro L. Lundy, Jr. said goodbye to his parents, wife and six children to answer his country's call. In the face of extreme controversy about a conflict half a world away, he unquestioningly went off to fight for freedom against an enemy known as communism. He is first and foremost, a patriot. Major Lundy is a fighter pilot but his military record shows far more. Prior to his assignment to Southeast Asia, he had taught German Luftwaffe pilots how to fly America's best planes. Upon return from his tour in Vietnam, he was to be assigned as the military attache to an Eastern European embassy (he went down just twelve days before his rotation home.) Major Lundy had also served at Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) where he had designed weapons systems and operations. This assignment came after he had completed his master's degree in Human Factors.

In addition to his family, his love was flying and he was very skilled at it. During the first eight months of his tour in Southeast Asia, Major Lundy was awarded the Silver Star, two Distinguished Flying Crosses, the Air Force Air Medal and six Air Force Commendation Medals, (Fourth through Ninth Oak Leaf Clusters.)

Facts of Loss Incident

On Christmas Eve 1970, Major Lundy was flying a med-evac search and rescue mission in North Central Laos over the Ban Ban Valley. Although two other A1E fighter groups had refused this mission, Major Lundy volunteered. Three Air American helicopters, two Raven forward air controllers, and Air America C-7A and another A1E were flying on that mission. Major Lundy reported having a rough engine and that he needed to leave the airplane. Subsequent intelligence analysis indicated that his engine was hit by groundfire, as the area was heavily defended by both North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao ground troops.

Major Lundy announced that he was leaving the airplane and the observers watched an apparently normal chute deployment. One observer reported seeing someone in the chute initially, while other observers reported that no one was in the parachute as it neared the ground. Ground rescue teams were unable to reach the parachute site as the area was very hostile and casualties were taken.

Major Lundy was declared MIA, survivability rated as Category 1 (indicating out of aircraft at time of crash--Attachment 1). Two days later Major Lundy was declared KIA/BNR. There is no clear explanation given as to why he was declared KIA. Although combat forces try to make the best determinations they can in the face of uncertainty, this does not mean their judgments are infallible. For instance, Ernie Brace, who had been declared dead by the U.S. Government, returned alive in 1973 during Operation Homecoming I.

Immediately following Major Lundy's "death", and for twenty years thereafter, the Lundy family was given but a fraction of the above information. For instance, both the telegram and official condolence letter from the Commander of the 56th Special Operations Wing, Col. E.J. Walsh, specifically indicated that Major Lundy did not leave the aircraft and that "he died instantly as a result of the aircraft crash." (Attachment 2) Yet, one witness states that he saw Major Lundy in his parachute and the government to this day lists his survivability category as 1, meaning that he was out of the airplane. Additionally, the family was told that a parachute deployed from the plane, yet no adequate explanation has ever been given as to how his parachute could deploy if he went down and was incinerated in the plane. Finally, from whom, when, and where did any of this information come from? The family was not given an information to answer these questions or verify the facts.

Family Response

Major Lundy's family accepted the KIA/BNR designation despite the mysteries surrounding the crash. The Lundy family went on with their life. Johanna Lundy went to law school, became an attorney and raised six children on her own. Major Lundy's loss was so traumatic to the family that they completely avoided the POW/MIA cause even while the war was ongoing. The Lundy family accepted the death of Major Lundy so firmly that when Scott Barnes met some of the family at church in the summer of 1981 and said he had information that Major Lundy was still alive, the family said they were not interested in his information because Major Lundy was dead. Barnes approached the family because he saw Albro Lundy III's name in a visitor's book and recognized the unique name.

Scott Barnes reported on Major Lundy in his book BOHICA on page 42. THE LUNDY FAMILY FORMALLY REQUESTS THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO SUBPOENA THE CIA FILES ON MAJOR LUNDY THAT ARE REFERRED TO IN BOHICA AND TO SUBPOENA COL. PAUL MATHER, to question him about Major Lundy and all other POWs. (Attachment 3)

Major Lundy's eldest son, Albro III, had always wanted to speak to the wingman who watched his father go down and in 1985 he submitted a FOIA Request for his father's file and the names of the witnesses to his crash. The Air Force responded by sending Major Lundy's personnel and medical files but sent a letter stating that there were "no witnesses to Major Lundy's incident." Albro Lundy III accepted this letter as the truth and did no further follow-up. Despite this letter, when the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo was leaked to the media, the government immediately said that there were four witnesses to the "death" of Major Lundy. (Attachment 4)

WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT LIE TO THE FAMILY WHEN THEY KNEW THERE WERE WITNESSES AND AT LEAST ONE WITNESS STATEMENT? The government has lost all credibility in the family's eyes--they now want to see all the original documents for themselves. And so they should. There is no legitimate reason to classify these documents.

First Live Reporting of Major Lundy

In the spring of 1991, the government sent Johanna Lundy a transcription of letter purportedly written for Major Lundy. The government classified them as "dog tag reports" of an obviously fraudulent nature although the report contained correct information not found on a dog tag. Johanna's response was to toss them in the trash and mention them to her family in passing. This is another example of how firmly the family believed that Major Lundy was dead.

Albro III ordered his own set of documents and while examining them found a mention of thumbprints buried in the bottom of the transcription. It was difficult for him to understand why this wasn't mentioned in any of the government's analysis. Certainly this could prove or disprove the correct nature of the report and whether or not Major Lundy did survive. Albro called his Air Force Liaison officer, William Frampton, about the case. His first question was, "Have you run the fingerprints yet?" Frampton replied that THEY DO NOT CHECK FINGERPRINTS UNLESS THE NEXT OF KIN REQUESTS IT. Lundy III was stunned. At this point it had been five months since the original documents were received. This is the "Highest National Priority" and the government does not even try to match fingerprints of a possible POW? The Pentagon leaves "no stone unturned" in their search for POWs and does not try to verify fingerprints? Lundy also noted that they also did not call the Next of Kin and ask if they wanted them checked or mention them in their reporting. In some cases the NOK may not even know that fingerprints exist to try matching.

Missing Fingerprints

Lundy's amazement at the cavalier attitude towards the fingerprints turned to shock when it was discovered that his father's fingerprints were missing from the file and no match could be attempted. In addition to knowing that his father had been fingerprinted as least 5 times, Lundy III possessed a letter from his father's file saying "Attached is Major Lundy's fingerprint card." (Attachment 5) His father's prints did not just fall out of the file if they were attached to this letter. Someone had to take them out on purpose.

Enter: the Famous Photograph

In late April, Judge Hamilton Gayden called Albro III and suggested he contact Gladys Fleckenstein, the mother of Lt. Comdr. Larry Stevens, because she might have a photo of Major Lundy. Gladys had had the photograph in her possession for almost six months and had never been able to identify the third man in the photo. The names of Stevens and Robertson were on the back of the photo Shelby Robertson Quast had obtained.

Gladys had previously been aware of the Lundy family name from a letter sent to her by Chuck Trowbridge of the DIA in February 1991 stating that Major Lundy was supposedly held with Robertson and Stevens (Attachment 6). Gladys requested the Lundy family address, however, the government would not release this information. The fact that private individuals had to bring these families together is not so incredible when compared to the fact that the government possessed a three-man photograph with an unidentified third man and independent corroborating evidence that these three men were being held together and never once contacted the Lundy family to possibly identify the third man. This blatant government malfeasance directly contradicts the stated POW policy of being the "nation's highest priority."

Upon receiving a copy of the photograph from Gladys's source, an American humanitarian worker who received the photo at Site 2, Thailand, Albro immediately submitted it to a preliminary photo analysis that showed the photo had not been tampered with, except for the label applied as the sign. Albro who wanted to protect his family, especially his mother, did not mention the photo or his investigations.

Second eye-witness account

On June 27, Lundy was called by the Air Force Liaison with a second-hand live sighting of his father, still reportedly held with Robertson and Stevens, that was received in January 1991 by DIA. AS OF SEPTEMBER, 1991, THE DIA HAS NOT INVESTIGATED THIS LIVE SIGHTING. This was confirmed by Bob Sheetz, Chuck Trowbridge and Warren Grey in a meeting with Lundy and Shelby Quast September 1991. In fact, when the question was raised at this meeting specifically about these men, none of these individuals, supposedly fully briefed on the case, even recalled the existence of a second live sighting report. DIA had the report 5 MONTHS before giving it to the family and has STILL NOT FOLLOWED UP A LIVE SIGHTING NOW NINE MONTHS OLD of this highly visible case. If the families had been given the names of the sources and supposed locations, instead of having this information classified, the men might be home right now.

Photo Identification

Albro finally told his mother about the existence of the photo in early July, just prior to flying to Washington for the National League of Families conference. Johanna demanded to see the photo before hearing any corroborating evidence, and she identified the photo within minutes. "That is a picture of my husband," Johanna Lundy has said to the world. Nothing but an actual photograph of her husband would convince her that he survived. It took the weight of this picture, along with other evidence, as well as the government's dishonesty and malfeasance to cause her to question the government's initial declaration of this death. "Why would they lie if they don't need to?" she states. This photo is also unanimously identified by all Major Lundy's relatives and friends.

This photograph has also been analyzed and the identity of Major Lundy has been confirmed by photographic and computer photo analysts. These analyses will be submitted separately upon request of the committee. Particularly with Major Lundy there is an UNMISTAKABLE CORRELATION of Major Lundy's features in his young photos to his aged image in the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo.

Pentagon Treatment of Photo

Albro Lundy III has made four trips from California to the Pentagon to see the file on his father and has been denied access each time. The first time occurred during the League of Families conference where the Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy families all met together for the first time. When all three families questioned Pentagon officials during the League of Family Conference July 11-14, they all said they had never seen the photo before. Because of the families' definite identifications of the men in the photo, Carl Ford and Ken Quinn made plans to give the photo to the Vietnamese and request repatriation of the men.

On July 15 the photo was given to the Vietnamese and surrounding governments.

On July 16th the photo was leaked to the press--not by the families.

On July 17th, the Pentagon held a press conference saying the photo could not be proved authentic and "unnamed Pentagon sources" said the photo was a hoax.

Before Ken Quinn could even get to the bargaining table on July 25th, the real OFFICIAL government policy was made quite clear to the Vietnamese: THE POWS ARE ALL DEAD.

The Pentagon undermined Ken Quinn's trip to Hanoi to discuss the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo by releasing to CBS News a seven-page analysis discrediting the letters and therefore, by association, the photo, even though the two had never before been connected, on the eve of this meeting. This analysis, containing a plethora of errors and misinformation too numerous to cite here, was handed to nation-wide news media before it was released to the three families involved. Carl Ford had promised the families prior to this that nothing would be released to the news media without it first being given to all three families involved. When questioned by Albro III about this breach of his promise, not to mention policy, Ford responded, "I guess my work is not worth much, is it?" Absolutely not, says the Lundy family.

One of the most tragic results of this breach was the fact that Johanna Lundy was told by reporters over the phone that the analysis indicated that remains of her husband and his identification card had been found. The fact that the government would even have printed this information when it knew that Major Lundy flew sanitized, (meaning that he flew without any identification on his person because he was flying in the secret war in Laos), and that the official government line to Mrs. Lundy until this moment had been that he was incinerated in his plane, is nothing less than brutal and blatant dishonesty. The government has yet to make a retraction nor provide the Lundy family with any of the evidence they purport supports this lie.

The government has had this photo in its possession since June 1990 according to DOD News Briefing on August 6, 1991. A FOIA submitted in September requesting all copies of the photo and photo analyses done on it has still not been responded to by General Soyster. The families were told by Bob Sheetz that the photo was not sent to the FBI for analysis until July 1991. WHY DID IT TAKE THE DIA ONE YEAR TO EVEN SUBMIT THIS PHOTO FOR ANALYSIS? WHY DOES DOD CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON ANY POTENTIAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE EXCEPT FOR THE IDENTITIES OF THE MEN? WHY DOES THE ONLY PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS (FROM SANDIA) RELEASED TO THE FAMILIES DWELL ON THE ERRONEOUS IDENTIFICATION OF THE PHOTO AS CIRCA WWII INSTEAD OF SPECIFICALLY FOCUSING ON THE SPECIFIC IDENTITIES OF THE THREE MEN? In fact, an identity analysis was not even requested of Sandia.

Concerning other Pentagon allegations about this photo, the Robertson/Lundy/Stevens photo has never been found in Soviet magazine nor has it been proven to be a "fake" or a "hoax". The Pentagon's official response to the families is that the families' identifications indicate that theses men are who we say they are and the Pentagon is seriously investigating it. Yet, in actuality, they are doing nothing to bring these men home and, in fact, are discrediting the evidence that shows they are alive.

Questions Requiring Answers

Why would our government risk their credibility with the Vietnamese by giving them a photo they had done no analysis on?

If the government truly had evidence showing questions about the photo, why did the DIA not share this information with the families when they made numerous trips to the Pentagon requesting all information on the photograph? Or did the DOD just start slandering the photo for their own purposes after it became public?

If two other families have actually identified the middle man in this photo, why haven't they come forward to shed light on this photo and to help bring their man home?

Why hasn't the DOD forwarded the Lundy family's request to these two families that they come forward or contact the Lundy family privately? Did the DOD just create this story as a way to debunk the most readily identifiable image of the three men?

How could a parachute deploy without a person in it?

Who were all the people who saw Major Lundy's incident? Where are the witness statements of the Durax pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement?

Why was Major Lundy rated survivability Category 1 and still declared KIA without further proof of his death?

Certainty of prisoners in Laos

The United States lost 586 servicemen, missing in action, in Laos during the Vietnam War. In February of 1973, the communist Pathet Lao, through their spokesman Soth Petrosky, claimed to hold dozens of our men as prisoners of war and demanded that the U.S. negotiate for their release. Within two months, President Nixon fell from power because of Watergate and never negotiated with the Pathet Lao. The Vietnamese, as recently as July 1991, through their U.N. Ambassador, told Johanna Lundy that the Vietnamese did not negotiate with the United States regarding POW's held in Laos and that the U.S. must negotiate directly with the Path Lao. To this day, not one living American POW has returned from Laos. "You do not understand...there is a greater destiny for our foreign policy in Asia and the POWs are expendable in pursuit of that policy..." said Harriet Isom, Charge'd d' Affairs, United States Embassy, Vientiane, Laos, 1990.

Summary

In the Lundy case, the family has been deliberately lied to. Major Lundy's file tampered with, all evidence including the live-sightings and fingerprints have not been pursued and the photo has been erroneously slandered by the government. The Lundy family feels the government has shown a complete lack of good faith in trying earnestly to follow up all possible leads on the possibility of Major Lundy's captivity. They have in fact deliberately obfuscated the truth, prolonging the captivity of Major Lundy as well as all the other live POWs. It's time to stop the ludicrous charade that has been perpetrated by the Department of Defense. We pray that the Senate Select Committee can reveal the truth and finally bring our loved ones home.

Formal Information Request

The Lundy family formally requests the Senate Select Committee to obtain and provide to the Lundy family the following information which we know exists:

All classified information on Major Lundy.

CIA Radio Intercepts on prisoners captured in Laos from 1970 until today.

All photo analysis done since receipt of the photo in June 1990 which should include DIA and FBI photo analysis.

All reports of photo and sources.

Latent prints of Major Lundy known to be held at the FBI.

Any and all Henry Fingerprint Classification Cards on Maj. Lundy.

Witness statements of all Air American pilots referred to in Park Bunker's witness statement.

All CIA files on Major Lundy, particularly the one referred to in BOHICA.

Subpoena of Col. Paul Mather to discuss post-1973 reports of major Lundy.

Arrow · #8 05-21-2003, 05:32 PM

DOD Response to The 3 Man Picture

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

International
Security Affairs

DoD Response to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy Testimony

The following allegations were raised by the family members regarding DoD investigative efforts on behalf of the purported Robertson, Stevens, and Lundy photographs. DoD Responses follow.

(Ms.Fleckenstein): As of September 16th, I received the information from the Defense Department that the picture had been analyzed by Dr.Charney, who I just told you that they didn't accept that, and that they would analyze it their selves. And I waited up until now. I've called and called trying to get the annalysis to me, which I did not get, and didn't know about it until I arrived here yesterday morning and it was handed to me by Major Giddens.

The Department of Defense sent the photograph purported to depict Commander Stevens to Sandia National Laboratory on 13 September 1991. When Sandia completed its analysis the report was reviewed at DIA and then forwarded it to the Assistance Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) in order to respond to direct family requests made to Carl Ford's Military Assistant. The report was obtained on late 5 November and was provided to Mrs. Fleckenstein personally by Major Gittins rather than forwarding it through the Navy Casualty Assistance Office. This accomodation was made in order to minimize the delay to Lieutenant Commander Steven's family in light of their participation in the Committee Hearings.

(Ms.Shelby Quast): And I guess I'm asking for some help. We have said this so many times, yet I continue to hear that it [the three man photo] has been in a magazine. It's simply people don't want to hear that. And I would like to, for the record, set it straight. It has never been found to be a fake or a hoax, or ever found to be in a magazine.

The Department of Defense has never stated that the three man photo is a hoax or fake. The facts surrounding the photograph of the three individuals identified by family members as Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy are as follows:

1) The photograph first surfaced during August 1990 in Thailand along with a report which was not correlated to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy. The photograph was received along with a second photograph that was later located in an Eastern-bloc magazine in Phonom Penh and which depicted a Soviet special forces military officer. The report that accompanied the first passing of the photo was that the two photos depicted four Americans from the same prison in Vietnam and that the three were friends and the fourth was separate from the other three, so two photos were taken.

2) There are no first hand live sighting reports of the three individuals that correlate to Robertson, Stevens and Lundy. In every case, the reports are hearsay, second or third hand reports. The first report, does not have any name association to Robertson, Stevens or Lundy.

3) Flyers widely circulated in Southeast Asia by Red McDaniel's American Defense Institute provide basic biographical data on Colonel Robertson and Lieutenant Commander Stevens. Information contained within the flyer forms the basis for information associated with later iterations of the photograph. Associated reporting that goes beyond the basic biographical data is quite obviously wrong---almost humorously so.

4) The photograph has been altered. The placard that the men appear to be holding was added to the photograph after it was taken and printed, and a photo made of the alteration. The placard reflects basic data that appears on several other photographs, also reported by the sources of those photos to depict American POWs. The writing on the placard is by the same hand as the writing on a number of other alterations to photos purported to depict American POWs and later located in Soviet magazines.

5) The men in the photo appear to be holding rifles in the photograph. U.S. Government photo analysts have identified the butt of a rifle on the left side of the photo and the rifles are apparent under the placard.

6) A tape recording received with the photograph by one source and identified as the voice of Colonel Robertson by the source was rejected as a fraud by the Robertson family.

7) Captain Buchanan, Colonel Robertson's WSO stated that he did not know whether Colonel Robertson got out of the aircraft. He did not see Colonel Robertson subsequent to ejecting from the aircraft.

8) Congressman Peterson testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affiars, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, that he was interrogated by the Vietnamese about Colonel Robertson with Colonel Robertson's dogtag and idenfitication card. He also stated that the Vietnamese captors told him that Colonel Robertson had died and it was his (Peterson's) opinion that Robertson had died either in the crash or shortly thereafter.

(Ms.Quast) (Page 332): The third part I just wanted to touch upon quickly to address the access to information. I have been promised at a very high policy lever access to my father's file, but denied access by those people that have testified before this committee when I went to see the file. I'm asking what is the policy and who runs the show for POW policy.

Ms. Quast has met on several occasions with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl W. Ford, Jr. On one occasion in Mr.Ford's office on August 22 at 1:20PM, Ms.Quast requested to see the entire DIA file on her father. Mr.Ford did not promise Ms.Quast that she could see the file. He stated that he would look into the matter because the file may contain sensitive classified information.

When Ms.Quast returned to see Mr.Ford, she reiterated her request to see the entire file. She was again told that the file contained classified information and she would not be provided access to the file. Mr.Ford assured Ms. Quast that his staff would compare the DIA file with the Casualty Assistance Officer's file maintained by the Air Force to ensure that she was in possession of all of the unclassified information on her father. Lieutenant Thomas Doughty, of Mr.Ford's staff, reviewed the DIA file and the Air Force file with Mr. George Atkinson, USAF Missing Persons Office, on 5 November 1991 and determined that Ms.Quast had been provided all but one document from the DIA file. This information was communicated personally by Lieutenant Doughty and Mr.George Atkinson to Ms. Quast during one of the recesses to the hearings.

There is no anticipated change to policy to provide access to classified material to the families. The Department of Defense will continue to provide the families with all information regarding their unaccounted for loved ones. Where classified information is involved, sensitive sources and methods will be sanitized from the document prior to delivery to the families.

(Senator Smith): So I am going to put all officials in control of these [fingerprints] on notice that I intend to know why, in the case of all of the live sighting reports, and all of the individuals involved in those reports, why we do not have fingerprints in the service jackets of those individuals. And if you do not know why, you better start looking because I want to know why.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the sole USG agency with the responsibility for maintaining fingerprints of American citizens. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records on servicemen. None of the services are required by law or regulation to maintain fingerprints in the service records of their individual servicemen. The national fingerprint database within the FBI maintains all service fingerprint records as well as the fingerprints of civilians who may be fingerprited and their prints retained by the Government.

Congressman Solarz, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affiars, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, requested an explanation of why the fingerprints of Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant Commander Stevens, and Major Lundy all are missing from the FBI database. At the Department of Defense request, FBI Director William Sessions provided the possible explanation for this state of affairs. Director Sessions' response is provided in pertinent part:

Since the FBI is the repository for fingerprints for military personnel, DoD requested the prints for these individuals, in addition to the third person linked to the photograph, Lieutenant Commander Larry J.Stevens. A search of FBI fingerprint files did not disclose a record for these three individuals. There are many reasons why we may not currently have those fingerprints and an explanation for the record may be beneficial.

The most logical reason for the absence of these prints may be the policy for purging files. In the case of military prints, if DoD reports an individual killed-in-action (KIA) or otherwise deceased, the print is placed in a special file for seven years and then destroyed unless there is additional information furnished by the military. In testimony, Mr.Ford advised that the DoD had listed Major Albro L. Lundy, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Stevens as KIA based on eye witnesses' accounts of each incident. Relevant herein is a list of 2,483 names furnished to the FBI by DoD in 1984. They were identified by DoD as being "Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia." A search of our fingerprints files identified prints for 912 individuals from that list. The prints for the three individuals linked to the photograph were NOT among those with prints in file. All existing prints from that list are being maintained and are not subject to being purged.

Another explanation is that we never received fingerprint of those in question. But, it would perhaps be more than coincidental that the prints for three individuals linked to a single photograph would have been submitted. This is particularly true given the policy of fingerprinting all military personnel. Unfortunately, due to the volume of civil prints alone, approximately 35 million individuals and 90 million cards, records of receipted are not maintained. In most instances, the only means to determine if there is a print on file is to check the index. The absence of an individual from the index only indicates the FBI does not currently have a file. This would not necessarily mean that the FBI never had a file. It could have been previously purged from the system, but, in most instances, there would be no record of the purge.

Fingerprints are frequently not capable of classification/retention due to their illegibility based on the quality of the inked prints that are submitted. When this occurs, the prints are sent back to the contributor with a request to obtain a ligible fingerprint card for resubmission. It is not unusual to not receive a follow-up set of prints. As above, there would be no record if this occured. As a point of reference, in the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 1991, the FBI Identification Division rejected over 790,000 fingerprints cards for this reason. Although historical figures are not available for the Vietnam War era, rejection rates for prints submitted by the military in the early 1980s were about 15 percent. Anecdotal information from the Vietnam War era indicates rejection rates may have been as high as 25 to 30 percent.

It should be noted that the Department of Defense requested in 1984, well before this photo surfaced, a list of POW/MIAs for whom the FBI had fingerprints on file. At that time, Robertson, Stevens and Lundy's fingerprints were not within the FBI database. We can provide no further explanation for this phenomenon beyond that provided by the Director of the FBI, however, there is no conspiracy, cover-up or otherwise mysterious circumstances surrounding the loss of these files as has been suggested by some individuals at these hearings.

The fingerprints record of Captain Donald G. Carr another individual with a high profile POW/MIA photograph case, IS on file with the FBI and available for comparison if that individual is located.

(Mr.Albro Lundy) (Page 345): I have asked one photoanalysis that we've done to be passed around to the Senators. It's a simple photo overlay. Its done on acetate, and if you take a look at it--you just lift the acetate up-one of the photos is my father as a younger man and then the other photo is the copy of the photo drawn out. You see that it matches perfectly. All the features are the same, the head analysis, something that could have been done very easily, I think by the Government immediately, but has never been done, or at least has never been provided to us.

The simple analysis described by Mr.Lundy was provided to Government photo analysis experts at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI experts reaction was the the "analysis" had no basis in science, was not acceptalbe methodology in any professional association that they were aware of, and would not be accepted for admission as evidence in any court in the United States on the issue of identification by photograph. Despite its simplicity, the method decribed in the testimony is patently unreliable.

Mr.Lundy (Page 347): So I wrote a FOIA....So if you can not read it, but the part that is highlighted says specifically, this is all the information in the file, there were no witnesses to this incident.

Mr.Lundy's FOIA request in 1985 was directed to the USAF. Their records had no indication that there were any witnesses to the incident in which Major Lundy was lost. The sole witness statement was located in a file in JCRC during a records search conducted pursuant to his 1991 FOIA request to JCRC. This report was provided to Mr.Lundy immediately by the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs when its existence became known.

(Mr.Lundy) [in response to the statement "Apparently some other families claim (the individual in the three person photo) is theirs] (Page 354): And none of the families that the DIA has talked about have come forward, have called and said, let me help you here, this is my son or this is my brother. Would it not be relief to me? ... I asked Chuck Gittins, I said please Chuck, contact those people. Please write them and tell them to contact me. I need to know, I need to know. I don't know if Chuch has done it or not, but they have not contacted me.

In a September meeting in PDASD Ford's office with PDASD Ford, Shelby Quast and Major Gittins, Mr.Ford explained to Mr.Lundy the fact that two other families had come forward to claim the pictured individual as their unaccounted for loved one. He also explained that the individuals claimed by the other families also bore a striking resemblance to the individual in the three-person photo. Mr.Ford reiterated that these families did not want to be thrust in the limelight and requested that the DoD not share their identities Mr.Ford told Mr.Lundy that he intended to honor that request.

While Major Gittins was escorting Mr.Lundy out of the Pentagon after the meeting with Mr.Ford, Mr.Lundy stated in passing that he would like to speak to the two other families. Major Gittins reiterated Mr.Ford's explanation and stated that DoD would respect the request of the families. Mr.Lundy never requested "really like to talk to the other families." Major Gittins surmises that the actual question was not asked so that it would not appear that Mr. Lundy was trying to get around the decision of PDASD Ford, but rather that Major Gittins would do so on his own initiative.

Arrow · #9 05-21-2003, 06:34 PM

Senate Select Committee Testimony & Depositions

Statement by the Honorable Duane P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense

Statement by the Honorable Duane P. Andrews Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) before the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs United States Senate October 15, 1992

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. While I am pleased to support your hearing which is examining markings on buildings and terrain in Southeast Asia that may relate to American POW/MIAs and to have this opportunity to set the record straight on a lot of incorrect information that is in circulation, I have great apprehension in discussing in an open hearing topics that relate to the capabilities and practices of our Nation's Intelligence activities. I believe that it is a poor security practice to "talk around" classified operations iniformation that was recently widely disclosed in the TV and print media. It seems that we and officials that have served before us have been indicted in the court of public opinion for ignoring signs that Americans were left behind based on an inaccurate bill of particulars that was drawn up using incomplete, selectively leaked intelligence.

I understand the frustration with classification expressed by many in the general public and in particular by the families and Veteran's organizations that are so concerned with the POW/MIA issue. They appear to believe that we are unnecessarily keeping this intelligence material behind a veil of secrecy - that as it relates to events from decades ago it therefore no longer required classified protection. This is not the case. Much of what we have discussed in closed meetings is based on current intelligence sources and methods. This is not, as some have charged, an attempt to hide a perceived government failure to liberate our POWs. Rather, it is the fulfillment of our obligation to protect those intelligence means and methods vital to our global responsibilities in the defense of the Nation.

Notwithstanding his reservations about public discussion of intelligence matters, Secretary Cheney has authorized me to present an unclassified statement describing certain of our intelligence activities and other related activities that were understaken in response to certain symbols that have been purported to indicate the possible presence of American prisoners of war in Vietnam and Laos. These symbols have been referred to in the press as the USA and K, the 1973 or 1573 TH, the Morse Code K, the 52 or B52, the "arrow and P, and what were believed to be a series of escape and evasion identity numbers that were seen by Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency, or JSSA, personnel on some photographs of Laos.

To the extent that I can in an open session, and to the best of my knowledge based on what I have pulled from the reports of actions that were undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency and by the JSSA, I will review our current understanding of these symbols. Following my statement Mr. William Gadoury of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting will present his statement concerning certain activities related to the search for Americans and the USA symbol. Colonel Bob Bonn, Commander of the JSSA, Mr. Bob Dussault, Colonel Bonn's deputy, and Mr. Al Erickson, a SERE instructor and evasion and escape expert, and Mr. Sheetz, Mr. Santora, and Mr. Knapper from the Defense Intelligence Agency are present. These individuals are prepared to independently confirm the accuracy of what I relate.

However, I must caution that in open session we will be unable to present the full range of information available to us on these matters -- information that we have previously presented to the Select Committee in closed meetings. Any questions that require getting into classified information in order to provide a complete answer will have to be answered in a closed hearing. Please do not take this as an indication that we are not willing to answer your questions fully. We have willingly made all of our documents available to the Select Committee and we will willingly answer all of your questions. We just have to do so in a responsible manner when dealing with sensitive intelligence or escape and evasion matters. If we divulge the tradecraft used in either area it may cost American lives in future conflicts.

Before I review the specific symbols of interest I would like to make a few comments concerning imagery. I believe that a short general description of this topic will help you understand the complexity of the issue and the technical photographs we probably think of the snapshots we get back from the drug store or the one hour film processor or the portraits we have taken on special occasions. When we talk of imagery we are talking about quite a different thing. Although some of our imagery is produced by light directly falling on a wide strip of film, most is produced by very high technology processes involving devices which transform the varying light signals into digital signals. These digital signals can be read out on very high resolution workstations -- a kind of film negative. Such imagery can be made up of a single view of the area or it can be made up of two images taken slightly apart in time or from two slightly different angles. This allows us to view the image as if it were in three dimensions.

We examine such film on a light table under very powerful optics. In effect we put it under a microscope. Interpreting the information contained in a film positive or negative is not a skill you can pick up quickly. I was an imagery analyst in my earlier years in the Air Force. It took me six months of basic schooling and another six months of on-the-job training before I was considered qualified to sign my name to an imagery interpretation report. Today, we send our analysts to an additional three months of advanced schooling after they have had this basic qualification training. When viewing an image it is often easy to "see" things in nature that appear to be man-made but which on closer examination are shadows and foliage.

When an intelligence analyst has a question about an area or a specific point target he submits an imagery request. This request is given an appropriate priority and will be imaged. This image does not go directly to the intelligence analyst that requested that it be taken. Rather, a skilled imagery interpreter examines the image and prepares an imagery interpretation report. This written report, and occasionally a print or photograph of the target, is forwarded to the analyst. Some times when an imagery interpreter examines an image he or she will see something that was not mentioned in the original analyst's request. An example is the USA seen by a CIA imagery interpreter who was examining imagery of Laos for another purpose. In such a case the imagery interpretation report is forwarded to the analytic section responsible for the unexpected sighting.

I also should address why we are showing line drawings of the symbols we are here today to discuss. A fair question is "You are very open about what these symbols are or appear to be so why not show photographs of them?" The reason is straightforward. If a camera scientist can get his hands on an image he canb determine many characteries of the camera that took the picture. Its location, its focal length, the camera's stability, its sensitivity to the varying intensity of light, and a host of other technical parameters. We do not want the scientists of other countries to obtain such knowledge of our technical capabilities. Such knowledge would help them hide things from us that we need to see to support our military forces and for national security.

Now I will turn to the symbols that have been the subject of so much discussion. I will review each of the images of interest in turn. I believe this will support our conclusion that of all the millions of square kilometers of territory in Southeast Asia that we have examined over the years we really only have two unexplained sets of symbols which were clearly intended to communicate something to an observer from above.

The first symbol of interest is a 1973 TH. This symbol was imaged on May 20, 1973 and again on July 10, 1973 on the Plain of Jars in Laos. The Plain of Jars was a hotly contested area during the war in Indochina. Lao General Vang Pao and his Hmong soldiers fought valiantly for control of this vital area which contains within its borders the key lines of communication for central Laos. Control of the Plain of Jars shifted back and forth between Royal Lao Army and Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces during the war.

The imagery, now unclassified, which contains this set of symbols was obtained using an unmanned airborne reconnaissance system. It has been interpreted as either a 1573 or 1973 and either TA or TH. None of the four possible combinations of these symbols correlate to a classic distress symbol or to the escape and evasion symbols that our crews were trained to use. Another explanation is that the four numbers resemble a personal authenticator number but we have been unable to correlate them with any individual. Although it is not what we would expect to be used by an unaccounted for U.S. military person, the symbols remains of interest to the Defense Department because they have not been explained.

Possible explanations for the appearance of these symbols are many, though none seem particularly convincing. For instance, the U.S. Government provided aid to General Vang Pao through CIA-operated Air America assets. Some Air America crews were downed in action. One such U.S. Aviator, Emmet Kay, went down on May 7, 1973 approximately 8 kilometers from the area where this symbol was either tramped, cut, cleared or etched into the elephant grass. (Emmet Kay returned to the U.S. in September 1974.) Some have surmised the Emmet Kay's Hmong crew might have made the symbol during the few hours they were free before capture. The leader of the Hmong was a Major Thao. We can speculate that he may have been trying to signal their location by abbreviating his name. We may never know the answer to this as Major Thao died in captivity.

Others have surmised that the symbol could have been placed on the ground by a group of Thai personnel that were also captured during this period by the Pathet Lao. TH, of course, is the two character U.S. country code for Thailand. We know that these three Thai individuals were held in captivity with Emmet Kay and his Hmong crew members. Many attempts have been made over the years to follow this lead. Only recently, a new lead has surfaced indicating that one of the Hmong may now be available for interview in Thailand. If we are successful in our attempt to interview this individual we may learn more. But at this point, we have no way of knowing if the symbol was or was not made by either the Thai individuals or the Hmong.

Another, and less likely, theory for the symbol relates to the downing of an AC-130 gunship in December 1972, some 300 miles away in southern Laos just across the Lao/Thai border. While only two crew members were known to have survived, one of the crew members that stayed with the plane down to its impact on the jungle floor was Captain Thomas Hart. Captain Hart is the only downed aviator whose initials and loss circumstances could possible correlate with the initials TH. While Captain Hart's remains were recovered in 1985 by the JCRC, even if Captain Hart had survived, it is unlikely that he would have chosen to evade for over 300 miles through some of the roughest territory in Laos. He would more likely have gone a relatively short distance due West toward Thailand and freedom.

All we know for sure at this point in time in 1992 is that the symbol remains unexplained despite having been analyzed in depth on at least four separate occasions: by the Pacific Command in 1973: by the JCRC and DIA in 1976: by DIA in 1986/87: and by the DIA, CIA and JSSA in 1992. Neither the DIA, JSSA, or the JTF-FA have been able to make a correlation to any individual. While positive results may have been hoped for in 1973-75, it is not likely that 19 years later we will be able to pick up the trail in Laos. In short, the origin and meaning of this symbol is unexplained and probably will remain so.

I will now turn to the USA & possible K symbols. This symbol was imaged on January 22, 1988 in a narrow rice paddy Valley in Northeast Laos near Sam Neua, Laos. This imagery was taken for a project unrelated to POW/MIAs and was not looked at by an imagery analyst until early December 1988. While the actual imagery remains classified, the line drawing we have with us today is unclassified. As you can see, the letters USA are clearly distinguishable, and each letter is estimated to be more than twice the height of a normal sized man. On the imagery, below the USA letters some additional markings can be seen. Some have speculated that these markins are in the pattern of the number 34 or even the letter K, or perhaps even a so-called walking K distress symbol. This symbol was only imaged once. By the time it was discovered in December 1988 by the Central Intelligence Agency and immediately brought to DIA's attention, it was no longer observable on the ground.

Once this symbol was made known to DIA, investigative steps were promptly taken. The full range of follow-up steps taken by the U.S. Government have been briefed to the Committee in a closed meeting. What I can say here in open session is that all appropriate means of information collection, including the full range of intelligence assets avialable to the U.S. Government have been brought to bear to no avail. Like the prior symbol discussed that appeared on the Plain of Jars in 1973, this USA symbol remains unexplained.

There is still disagreement as to whether or not the markings and shadings seen below the USA letters are in actuality some type of evader symbol. It is clear to DIA and CIA imagery analysts that the USA letters were constructed by scraping away the rice stubble from a harvested rice paddy in dry season. One likely explanation for what appears to some as a 34 or possible K is the dumping of extractred rice stubble in several piles at random. Clearly, the supposed K is not in any fashion comparable to the USA letters -- not in size, not in means of construction, not in spatial orientation, and certainly not in clarity. When this image was further examined through the application of sophisticated computer-enhanced analysis, including the use of so-called false color analysis to differentiate between grey scales, this alleged K symbol appears even more likely to be the mounding of rice stubble and thus even less convincing as a possible K.

So what do we have here? No one, not DIA, not CIA and not JSSA, can correlate the USA and possible K symbols with an unaccounted for individual. While the Lao government has admitted that prior to 1973 prisoners were kept in Pathet Lao headquarters caves located in the Sam Neua area, prisoners were not known to be held there after the war ended. These caves have been visited many times in recent years by Americans and other Westerners, and it was clear by the late 1980's that the caves are no longer in use. Other facilities that would likely be used for hiding American POWs are not known to exist anywhere else in Sam Neua.

I acknowledge that there have been isolated reports of POWs being held in some areas of Laos, including Sam Neua. But after giving these reports, most of which come from refugee sources, a full and complete evaluation, the Department has been unable to develop convincing evidence that U.S. POWs are being held in Sam Neua today, nor do we have any evidence they were being held there in 1988.

Mr. Bill Gadoury, an investigator who covers Laos for the Joint Task Force - Full Accounting, has an interesting story to tell that may relate to the USA symbol. As I indicated earlier, Bill will tell this story at the conclusion of my statement.

Where we are now with regard to the USA symbol can be summarized as follows: 1). The USA and possible K remains unexplained, despite having tasked every means of information collection available through the intelligence Community. Many collection capabilities have been exercised multiple times to no avail. 2). No correlation to a known unaccounted-for individual can be made by DIA, JSSA, or the JTF-FA. And 3). Until an unexpected lead develops, there is little more that can be done other than continuing to monitor the situation. We have discussed in our closed meeting how we are accomplishing this monitoring.

I will now address the possible K symbol in Morse Code on the roof of a building. This possible symbol was seen on July 30, 1975 when DIA and CIA imagery analysts noticed several light spots on the roof of one building within a known prison compound in Vietnam Northeast of Haiphong. The photography remains classified, so DIA has prepared line drawings for our discussions in open session.

Noticing a distinct color difference -- some roof sections were much brighter than the remainder of the roof on one barracks type building -- CIA imagery analysts attempted to discern a possible pattern. They made a tenuous call that the pattern could be a dash - dot - dash in Morse code, which could be the letter K or the letters N and T. Although this was an admittedly tenuous imagery analytic call, an intenst all-source analysis was mounted by DIA.

What they learned can be summarized at the unclassified level as follows. First, the prison compound was formerly a French detention facility, used later during the Vietnam war years as a provincial jail. We know that it was used to house captured South Vietnamese commando infiltrators, several of whom were ultimately interviewed after emigrating from Vietnam after the war. These former inmates stated that no U.S. prisoners were even known to be incarcerated there during wartime.

Other sources provided postwar information. This prison, known to us now as the Dong Vai Reeducation Camp, was used from late 1975 to late 1978 by the North to house former Army of Vietnam (ARVN) officers and other South Vietnamese officials who underwent "reeducation" to prepare them for "proper functioning" in the new socialist/communist unified Vietnam. Thus, from late 1975 Dong Vai became part of a much larger reeducation camp system in Vietnam that has been described to us in great detail by many of the thousands of South Vietnamese refugees that have been interviewed by DIA's investigative personnel. Taken as a whole, the body of reporting from Dong Vai paints a consistent picture -- this camp was used for reeducation and not for housing U.S. prisoners.

A closer look at the photography of July 30, 1975 reveals some very interesting details. The front gate is wide open and no special security measures are apparent. The roofs of a number of buildings inside and just outside the compound are off, indicating probably rehabilitation of the jail facility, no doubt preparing it for its subsequent use as a reeducation camp.

Fusing all this information, we see a very consistent picture. First, after the fall of Saigon, Dong Vai was renovated and subsequently used as part of the reeducation camp system. Second, the replacement of roof tiles accounts for the color difference seen on July 30, 1975. In fact, the photography shows that one section of the roof of the building in question is open, indicating that tile replacement was still in progress. Further, photography of the compound taken in January 1975 before this reconstruction process started failed to show any roof tile color variations. And photography of December 1975 after the roof reconstruction was complete, shows weathering of the sections replaced in July; no color variations are observable.

The Dong Vai reeducation camp had a rather short lifetime. By late 1978, most of the reeducates had either been released or were moved to other re-education camps further south. For Vietnam and China, the late 1970's were punctuated by recurring security threats and border crises. We can speculate that because this facility was so far north, the Vietnamese decided to close it for security reasons, or perhaps it was no longer needed as part of the reeducation camp system. What is known through recent photography is that the camp is no longer in use, many of the buildings have been torn down and much of the former prison/camp area has reverted to agriculture.

In short, the fused, all-source analytic view of DIA and CIA is that Dong Vai was not a facility that housed American prisoners; that roof reconstruction accounted for the roof tile color differences seen only on July 30, 1975; and, that it highly unlikely that symbols were consciously placed on the roof structure as a signal. JSSA fully agrees with this assessment. We consider this possible symbol closed and are no longer pursuing it.

I will now address the 52 or B52 symbol. Based upon source reporting in 1979 and 1980 that American prisoners might be held in a detention facility in southern Laos, imagery analysts began to review the area for the presence of a detention facility. In doing so, the numbers 52, believed to be a possible symbol were observed five times between December 1980 and March 1981 in a facility located in the area southeast of the city of Nhommarath, Laos. The photography, which remains classified, shows a possible 52 in an agricultural area within the camp. The possible symbol was first observed on December 4, 1980, with subsequent observations on December 30, 1980, January 2, 1981, February 6, 1981 and March 8, 1981. Slight changes in the structure of the symbol were noted from sighting to sighting and as late as March 8, 1981, the symbol was still in place, however, the top portion of the 5 could no longer be seen.

The symbol was located within a row crop area between the walls of an inner compound and the perimeter fence. Although imagery analysts have arrived at different conclusions as to whether there was actually a 52 symbol or not. Because of the variations in the size and structure of the possible numbers from observation to observation there was strong suspicion that what the imagery analysts were reporting as possible 52, might be nothing more than shadowing within the row crop area. During continued analysis of the possible numbers, some imagery analysts reported that there might even be a "B" associated with the symbol, however, the possible B appeared to be another instance of shadowing within the area under observation.

The source reporting which was the basis for requesting the imagery analysis came to DIA from the CIA which stated that the reporting should be read with caution since there was some question as to the reliability of the sources involved. As noted earlier, the facility in question was located near the Lao city of Nhommarath, which is situated in Khammouane Province; the city of Nhommarath is within 50 kilometers of the Mekong River and the border of Thailand. The proximity of this facility to Thailand raised doubts that the Lao Communists would actually hold American prisoners in an area so close to Thailand.

In 1980 and 1981 there was not a large number of sources as yet available who had visited the area or been within the facility near Nhommarath. Nevertheless, photographs of the interior of the facility in question were turned over to U.S. Government representatives. The photographs, taken in early 1981, indicated that Western prisoners were not present within the facility. The exact measures undertaken by the U.S. Government to inspect the facility and to determine whether American prisoners were being held or not remains classified. In addition, the body of reporting from human sources who had detailed knowledge of the interior and purpose of the facility does not support the notion that American prisoners had ever been held within the facility.

There was not then and there has never been proof that American prisoners were held in the facility near Nhommarath. As a matter of fact, continued analysis since 1980, photographs of this facility and human sources support our best judegement that Americans were not held in the facility. The facility is now known to have been a reeducation camp used by the Communist government that took power in 1975 to educate former Royal Lao Army officers and certain officials from the Royal Lao government. This camp has been described to us in detail by former inmates that have been interviewed outside of Laos. There is even more reason to believe now that what was interpreted as a possible 52 symbol was nothing more than the irregular furrows of many individual garden plots.

I will now turn to the symbols referred to as an arrow and a "p." In mid-1992, during a routine review and analysts of central Laos, analysts discovered a possible symbols which included a large arrow and the possible letter "p." These symbols were on the ground in December 1987. Further review of these possible symbols revealed that although one symbol has the overall shape of an arrow, the stem does not join the arrow head. The stem of the arrow may be up to 100' in length. The possible "p" symbol appears to be nothing more than a scarred area on the ground with vegetation, perhaps a bush or two, growing in the center.

There is no evidence that this possible symbol has any association with Americans, whether living freely or in captivity. Explanations for the possible arrow include natural limestone outcroppings or logs. An imagery search was conducted in both directions of the axis of the possible arrow with negative results. When imaged this area was undergoing the slash and burn process associated with clearing jungle for agricultural use. When next imaged this area was under cultivation. While we are attempting to identify refugees in Thailand who came from the area where the symbol was observed, we have little hope of gaining further information on these five year old possible symbols.

This gets us to the bottom line of the various symbols which we believe were intended by their makers to be detected from above. To date, we have two unexplained sets of symbols. One was imaged in 1973 and one was imaged in 1988. A full range of follow up actions were undertaken. None of these symbols can be tied to a U.S. POW but neither can we absolutely disprove that "possibility."

I would now like to turn to some apparent evader symbols that have been cited as recent evidence of POWs in Laos. These supposed symbols were seen by members of the JSSA on a poor quality positive print of an image. For context, the JSSA is a 65 person organizatino located in three states and headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. As commander, Colonel Bonn reports to the Air Force Director of Operations. The Air Force and JSSA are executive agents for the Department of Defense for two major areas: Joint operational evasion and escape matters, and Code of Conduct and SERE training. They have a third, more recent charter as an executive agent for the purpose of drafting, in coordination with the Services and other DoD agencies, a Department of Defense Directive on POW/MIA matters. The latter project is in progress.

Under the JSSA E? charter, they are responsible for working E? operational matters with command planners and operators to ensure tactics, procedures, equipment, and training are adequate and consistent with JCS policy. The JSSA also acts as executive agent for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel with respect to Code of Conduct and SERE training. To accomplish this they have a special training unit with 19 people responsible for providing advanced instruction and exercises for selected high risk-of-capture personnel from all the military services. This unit trains these personnel in Code of Conduct, SERE, and hostage survival courses, both in residence and using mobile training teams.

The JSSA has also been charged by DoD to conduct periodic inspections of five SERE certified training schools operated by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; to research and analyze prisoner of war and actual SERE experiences for lessons learned to improve training; and to maintain a Code of Conduct-related research library.

That then, in a nutshell, is the JSSA. The JSSA does not have an never has had MIA accountability as a functional responsibility. They are not cognizant of all-source intelligence related to MIAs and have never been tasked by anyone to conduct a comprehensive review of reports of downed, missing, or captured personnel in Southeast Asia. However, in 1978 the JSSA did do a survey of Operation Homecoming POW debriefs and compiled a data base of all references to sightings of non-returnees. The only POW analytical role the JSSA now performs is to review POW and peacetime hostage debriefs for lessons we can apply to the training programs we oversee.

The JSSA has never been asked to review DIA's MIA efforts. The JSSA is not an inspector general and has no one qualified in intelligence analysis or photographic interpretation to perform such a function.

Aside from the project to draft a DoD Directive, the JSSA's current involement in POW/MIA matters was solely due to requests by the Select Committee that they review poor quality, poor resolution copies of photography for evaluation with respect to evasion and escape techniques of ground signal communication. This they did with some degree of discomfort at being asked to be photographic interpreters, a technical skill they do not possess and which was called to the Committee's attention by the DoD POW/MIA Central Documentation Office -- this is the organization that I established to declassify POW/MIA documents and to support the Select Committee.

On June 22, the Chief Counsel of the Select Committee requested that the JSSA evaluate the photograph containing the USA symbol discussed earlier. The letter of request asked the JSSA to provide an independent evaluation of the symbol's probably origins, meaning, and if they are consistent with accepted SERE training and procedures. The JSSA was also asked to evaluate a photograph of a second larger area some distance to the southwest.

In forwarding the JSSA's response on July 10, the Director of the DoD Central Documentation Office cautioned Mr.Codhina, Chief Counsel of the Select Committee, that the JSSA does not maintain a capability to perform imagery analysis and that imagery was only one source used in the intelligence process and that to fully comprehend the significance of a photo, information from multiple sources must be considered and examined by analysts from an appropriate intelligence organization.

I regret that I was not personally aware of the Committee's request to the JSSA and our response in July. I believe we could have avoided the resulting misunderstandings if we had been aware that the JSSA was attempting in good faith to perform a function that was well outside their area of expertise. Basically, the JSSA personnel viewed a very poor quality print with a magnifying glass and saw a lot of numbers and letters. They then matched these symbols against their authenticator lists of missing airmen. Where these matches occurred they indicated that these might be possible "evader" symbols. I do not want to get more specific on these symbols as much of the escape and evasion tradescraft is classified and may well be used again. I am concerned that all of the media attention to these symbols has probably compromised any attempts by any possible surviving American POWs to use the symbols that were taught to them in Southeast Asia.

Viewing a poor quality print with a magnifying glass is just now how imagery exploitation should be done. This ignores the basic principles of imagery interpretation which considers the pattern, shape, size, shadow, surroundings, tone and texture of each artifact. When the JSSA personnel viewed the original quality imagery of the printed photograph on a light table using high resolution optics the nature of all the supposed evader symbols became clear. They were simply vegetation, shadows or artifacts of the photographic production process. Some possible symbols were even in the tops of 200 foot tall trees, an unlikely place for an evading POW to leave a signal. When shown photographs of other locations including Africa and Utah, the JSSA personnel also "saw" the same kinds of symbols -- symbols which again disappeared on the light table. Each and every apparent evader symbol was reviewed by JSSA on the light table and none were found to be real. Now I don't want to give the impression they were imagining things. Often when you look at a photographic print you can see numbers and letters in the shadows. That is why we do not normally interpret such prints for intelligence purposes and that is why it takes a long time to train imagery interpreters; it is easy to be misled. In this case it is unfortunate that untrained personnel were used to support an unwarranted conclusiong concerning evader symbols in Laos.

Mr. Chairman that concludes my statement. I respectfully request that Mr. Gadoury of the Joint Task Force Full-Accounting present his statement before we entertain questions. I make this request as I believe his statement is relevant to the questions that may remain concerning the USA and possible K symbols.

Arrow · #10 05-21-2003, 06:44 PM

Senate Select Committee Testimony & Depositions

Testimony of Monika Jenson-Stevenson
November 7, 1991

It's a great honor to appear before this distinguished group of Senators. I know that many of the Senators on this Committee have worked long and hard to finally bring to justice, an issue that has so strongly affected our country and has for so long been neglected.

I came here at my own expense today because I and my husband have spent the last six years of our lives researching and writing a book about the subject you will address. The conclusions we drew were ones that I would have thought inconceivable 10 years ago. I am here because the response to the book has made it overwhelmingly clear that the many people that concern themselves with this issue need desperately to have, just one segment of the U.S. Government champion their right to know the truth about what happened to American soldiers who were taken prisoner in a war that everyone wanted to forget about as soon as it was over.

This issue, as we see it, is about trust between citizens and their government on the most important contract, when soldiers risk their lives for a country and the country promises certain protections in return. Sadly, in my view, that trust has been badly abused by the government agencies who have controlled the Prisoners of War issue.

When I began this story for a Sixty Minutes program, I was an experienced reporter. I was not naive. I felt that almost nothing would shock me. But I was shocked to find that my government, which I believed had a common objective with the families of the missing and veterans, was deliberately lying and putting an incomprehensible resistance to the people they were most obligated by moral, legal and Constitutional mandates to protect. We found, my husband and I, in the writing of the book, that the Interagency Group which controls this issue, not only lied with impunity, they did so with full conviction that they had a moral right to do so. We wanted to find out why but the best answer we ever got was that it was necessary for reasons of National Security. Whatever that meant in this context, it did not include the American soldiers who were caught by a vicious enemy and War situations that embarrass this country.

The soldiers lost in Laos, for example, were protected by no National Security umbrella. They were simply designated nonexistent. The official government position has always been that there is no credible evidence of prisoners left behind in Laos or anywhere else in Southeast Asia with the best will, that can only be described as a blatant lie, yet it is policy. We came across large amounts of credible evidence, evidence collected by the most expensive and the best technology in the world, as well as that reported by competent and loyal human agents, many of whom were our former allies and risked their lives, their limbs and also lost prisoners in that conflict. Evidence that was described on my "60 Minutes" segment by General Tighe, the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as a miracle. Now if the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in all those critical years knew that is was a miracle, we believe that the Interagency Group controlling the Prisoners of War also knew it. Yet almost all of the evidence, a lot of it has been inexcusably retired, left to disintegrate and be destroyed. That is a fact that will make this Committee's job very, very difficult.

Another devastating lie is that if men are still alive, they are there by choice. My husband knows something about that. He saw French prisoners long after the French Indo-China War was over and filed a report with the Canadian Government. The Vietnamese displayed these prisoners to my husband as converted Communists, but it was clear that they were prisoners and that they were under extreme duress, like Bobby Garwood in Vietnam, abandoned by their country. They had no way of telling the truth about their real position without forfeiting their lives. We believe the Prisoners of War Control Group knows that about Bobby Garwood and the other American prisoners that they have reports on.

Another lie is that the Vietnamese have never offered to return prisoners. We too have talked to the Vietnamese, my husband more extensively than I, and we have talked with people who were direct witnesses to meetings where the Vietnamese made a direct offer of prisoners for money. One was made to the Woodcock Commission in the late 70's.

The truth is that lies have become U.S. Government policy on prisoners. That's a policy more generally known a plausible deniability. I'd like to give you just one very graphic example of what happens to credible intelligence and what happens to our institutions.

One of our sources is a retired CIA man of high rank who personally saw prisoners in Laos in the early 80's. He reported this to the appropriate agencies and he knew which ones they were. The negative response spurred him to look into the policy. What he found was a deliberate organized attempt by some Intelligence officials to disinform and harass the families of the missing who were most vocal in their disaffection of government policies. He brought very specific charges to the Justice Department. When we tried to find out what happened to those charges, they had disappeared. All that the Investigator could find was self-serving documents that cleared the DIA of all wrong doing. The Investigator then asked the Justice Department for the full file. The official said he would have to take this up with another government department and later, the official withheld the complete file because of a third agency's objection. Is this what American Justice has sunk to, that a third agency, without identifying itself, can interfere with critical matters effecting the lives of Prisoners of War that are brought before the Department of Justice?

I know that many of the readers of our book find this unacceptable. We hope, and they hope that you will not only address this problem but you won't allow this investigation to become made ineffective by the same kinds of abuse, abuse of secrecy and that you will rectify this kind of activity.

I've been asked to bring up one more matter by the people who have been working quietly and diligently on the issue of live prisoners. They are concerned that perhaps this Committee will address itself too much to the issue of remains and not live prisoners. They recognize that you have a full years investigation ahead before you can issue any definite statements about prisoners but, they are urging that you issue now, a public statement which says:

"If there are American alive in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia who were taken prisoner during the Vietnam War or because of activities growing out of that War, the Select Committee will welcome them home."

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