Tet 1968

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At the beginning of Tet, the 2nd NVA Division Headquarters and its three subordinate regiments, the 3rd, 1st and 21st, left their normal base areas in the Que Son mountains to participate in attacks both to the south of LZ Baldy and The Hoi An-Da Nang area to the north. Local force VC units also coordinated in these attacks. To help relieve pressure on the Da Nang/Hoi An sphere by both interdicting and spoiling actions, the 1/35 launched operations in this area on February 3, 1968.
Establishing a new LZ, Cacti at BT 059479, the battalion was operating a few miles southwest of Hoi An in an AO originally bounded on the east by Highway 1, on the west by an abandoned railroad, on the south by Road 535 and on the north by the Song Thu Bon river. The terrain was flat and densely to sparsely vegetated and populated. The U.S. Marines had previously frequently operated in the area.
(This section is based on recollections by C, 1/35 commander David R. Collins as expressed in "Anatomy of a Battle" as well as letters from, and phone discussions with, William W. Taylor Jr. who was the 1/35 battalion commander.)
The events leading up to the 9th are too numerous to mention but included many small actions and repeated encounters with evading NVA. Numerous fortified villages were found with expertly concealed bunkers and fighting positions that obviously had been hastily evacuated. Numerous caches of supplies were also uncovered, again underscoring the likelihood that massive artillery and napalm strikes had caused the NVA to disengage and move north across the Song Thu Bon.
Colonel Taylor thus sought an extension of the northern boundary of the AO. A request that had to be coordinated all the way to III Marine Amphibious Force headquarters before it was finally approved. Colonel Taylor, learning that the Marines had never successfully operated north of the Song Thu Bon and also that reliable intelligence placed the HQ for the 21st NVA Regiment just north of the river, was determined to exercise due caution. He thus directed that the river crossing be carried out under cover of darkness.
This was accomplished shortly before daybreak on Feb 7 with Bravo securing the crossing. One platoon of Bravo had crossed when a sharp firefight broke out with a squad of stay-behind NVA resulting in three enemy dead and no American casualties. Bravo consolidated, moved out, and was quickly followed across by Alpha and Charlie companies. The plan was for all three companies to veer eastward and then north. Once achieving those positions, they were all to jump off due west in rapid movement to gain contact and have enough elements available to maneuver and exploit any contact while still daylight.
Major contact failed to develop on the 7th with the exception of Bravo who experienced intense combat with several NVA sniper teams resulting in several American casualties including five dead. In addition, a medevac supporting B Company took a bullet through the engine and crashed in Bravo?s perimeter.
At 0830 on February 8, an armored cavalry platoon of five APCs linked up with Bravo to give the battalion additional fire power. The 8th passed with again no major contact but many encounters with enemy snipers during methodical searches and burning of deserted villages that showed recent enemy activity.
On the night of February 8, Captain Collins recalls meeting with his platoon leaders to survey the maps and plan the next day?s activity. Every village in the area but one had been searched. That last one, about 1500 meters to the north, would require movement through a broad field of dry rice paddies and chest-high elephant grass and would be the next day?s target. Charlie Company experienced the NVA psyops program shortly after dark when from about 150 meters away, male voices in a non-Vietnamese accent, were heard to repeat, "Americans go back, go back home."
The next morning Charlie waited for Bravo to move a bit closer for mutual support since the APCs were slowing Bravo?s progress. Alpha Company was located about 1500 meters south. While waiting, Charlie received mail, C-rations, and ammunition resupply. At 0930, with Bravo making good progress, Charlie Company moved out. Captain Collins, not wanting to cross all the open area to the north, directed the 2nd and 4th platoons to move 500 meters northeast to a tree line. They were to wait there while the rest of the company linked up and then they would all move through the trees and light undergrowth to the objective. The company command group moved behind the 2nd platoon with the lead platoon on the right flank.
As the lead element approached the tree line, sniper rounds cracked from the north into the CP group. Captain Collins ordered the 2nd and 4th platoons into the tree line intending to maneuver them toward the fire while deploying the other two platoons as a fixing force. Captain Collins states the movement was rapid and looked good when a heavy mortar barrage, followed by intense enemy machine gun fire, suddenly hit the left flank. Turning in the direction of that fire, Charlie Company then beheld a strange site according to Captain Collins. About 250 to 300 NVA were standing in rows, covered with grass from the shoulders up. They were about 30 meters away. Some of them waved and yelled "Hello GI!"
Colonel Taylor was at LZ Cacti when the fighting started, in the middle of a visit from 3rd Brigade CO. Colonel George E. Wear. Hearing the radio traffic that indicated Charlie in major contact, Colonel Taylor yelled down to his CP to get him a chopper. However, Colonel Wear told him to take his and so he did. Later another chopper was obtained and Colonel Taylor alternated using them all day long; switching while the other was being refueled and stopping only long enough for a bio-breaks and something to drink.
By this time Captain Collins had deployed his company in a backward L-shape, which gave each platoon good fields of fire. He recalls his right flank as being in good shape. However, the left flank, with much less natural cover, was suffering the brunt of the enemy assault. Enemy small arms, machine guns, mortars, and 840 rockets were causing numerous casualties. With a platoon leader already dead, two NCOs took charge of the left flank, organizing the defenses and setting-up a central location for the wounded.
Two soldiers, spotting a large enemy group squatting in the grass on their left, ran to the point and killed 16 NVA. Captain Collins states that the actions by some of the NVA were bewildering. Some of the enemy stood straight up and covered their faces with their hands or turned their heads, waiting to be shot. Others began crawling toward the Americans across a dry rice paddy and were killed with very few even firing their AK47s. Some of Co. C?s troops were yelling profanities and laughing at the enemy as they fired.
By this time Colonel Taylor was becoming increasingly concerned about C Company?s predicament and had started Bravo Company, under Captain Don Reh, toward the beleaguered unit. Colonel Taylor?s original idea was to bring Bravo into the village from the right so as to relieve the pressure on C Company. Bravo however soon ran into stiff resistance itself with enemy Recoilless and B40s starting to find the accompanying APCs. Colonel Taylor recalls one poignant radio exchange with Captain Reh when, after hearing of one failed attempt to break through, he simply told him, "Well, you are just going to have to try again." (And keep trying they did, For an excellent coverage of Bravo?s actions, read the attached article by Captain Reh.)

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attack from the North west, just below rt 9.