Curiouser and Curiouser

[thedrifter]

William S. Lind: Curiouser and Curiouser

If there is one thing that all Washington should be able to agree on, it is that the United States does not want to fight another war in Korea. The bloodbath would be horrific, the financial cost would be ruinous, and the effects of such a war on the stability of northeast Asia would be unpredictable. Plus, we might not win.

Yet when President Bush was asked during his recent Asian trip about North Korea's request for a non-aggression pact with the United States, he replied, "We will not have a treaty, if that's what you're asking. That's off the table."

For heaven's sake, why?

North Korea has offered to give up its nuclear weapons program for such a treaty. Speaking with Thailand's prime minister, Mr. Bush later said, "We have no intention of invading North Korea." If that is true, then what is the Administration's objection to a formal non-aggression pact? At the very least, offering North Korea such a pact would put the onus on them if they chose to continue their nuclear program instead. And if they did in fact give up their nukes in return for a treaty, we would walk away with a very good deal.

Here we see the underlying problem with the Bush administration's foreign policy. On the surface, its actions often do not make sense. There is no obvious, clear, or even rational explanation for positions the administration takes. Naturally, that leads people at home and abroad to ask what is really going on. What is the Bush team up to? What is their hidden agenda? What are their real intentions and plans?

The Iraq war is exhibit A. Since Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction and was not working with non-state, Fourth Generation forces (aka "terrorists"), what are the real reasons America attacked Iraq? For oil? For Israel? For world dominion? Everyone speculates, because the official answers don't make sense.

Now the same speculation is underway about American intentions in Korea. Does America perhaps plan to attack North Korea's nuclear facilities? Does it think a war in Korea would injure China, which elements in Washington see as a probable future enemy? Do Pentagon advocates of the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" believe they could win an easy victory over North Korea, thereby justifying even more money for high-tech weapons? What are the unstated, real reasons behind Mr. Bush's refusal to consider a non-aggression pact?

It appears that North Korea may save the Bush administration from itself in this case. Secretary of State Colin Powell has indicated that the U.S. might offer a written guarantee of some sort that it will not attack North Korea, a guarantee that would be backed by China, Japan and Russia as well. After first rejecting this offer, the North Korea now appears willing to reconsider. This is wise from their perspective, because a guarantee involving the other regional powers would put more, not fewer, constraints on Washington than would a bilateral treaty. If America signed, then attacked North Korea anyway under the administration's preventative war doctrine, it would have serious problems with China, Russia and Japan. It is all too easy to imagine Mr. Rumsfeld, at a news conference following an American strike on North Korea, referring to a non-aggression pact as a mere "scrap of paper."

But the underlying problem remains. So long as Washington's actions do not make sense in terms of its stated policies and intentions, people will keep wondering what the real game is. Curiouser and curiouser, as Alice would say. One is tempted to revise a bon mot from that worst of years, 1914: in Pyongyang, the situation is serious but not hopeless; in Washington, it is hopeless but not serious.

? 2003 William S. Lind.


Sempers,

Roger

[SuperScout]

While we may be truly curious about who William Lind is, or what his agenda is, we do have a clear picture of what this administration has presented, and how it expects the North Korean regime to respond. And we can certainly agree emphatically and expressly that we do not want to go to war with the North Koreans, for all the reasons as stated, irrespective of the curious crystal-ball prognosis of Mr. Lind.

Recall if you will, that several months ago, as we were in the midst of the run-up to invading Iraq, the NK dictator was making much noise and motion, much like the spoiled little brat seeking attention from the the busy teacher. Not to minimize the seriousness of nuclear weapons, assuming that the NK do indeed possess some, this administration chose to generally ignore the temper tantrum while concentrating on the task of more immediacy. Simultaneously, the back-channels of diplomacy were being worked with the Red Chinese, a truly astute move, as the Chinese have much more to fear from a hostile Korea, and much more to gain by a calmed Korea. Other nations, we have since learned, were also involved in the dance, which has produced a markedly lessened tension and level of chest-thumping by the NK.

This administration has obviously reviewed history, and seen the patent futility of treaties with Communist regimes, particularly those of the more belligerent nature. The previous administrtion had signed a deal with the NK, and before the ink was dry, abrogations by the NK began. A treaty, as Mr. Lind might learn someday, elevates the parties to a certain stature in the court of world opinion, and this elevation is something that would not work to our advantage; by continuing to implicitly acknowlege the NK as the 4th world country they truly are, we can act from a position of being pro-active, making the NK all the more predictable.

Mr. Lind is also rather a rosy-lens looker when he claims that SH was not working with terrorists, when this fact has been established by overwhelming evidence. He apparently never read of the pronouncements by Germany, France, Russia, and our former leaders that Iraq did indeed have WMD. What we have done is to underestimate SH's ability to hide all this stuff with such charm an skill.

It really does make sense, if one bothers to read with a discerning eye, to reason with a broader perspective, and to eschew the limitations wrought by liberal paranoia.


By more thoroughly understanding the NK, and by not acting unilaterally, the