Leaked draft China-Solomon Islands security pact causes Pacific stir

[Boats]

Leaked draft China-Solomon Islands security pact causes Pacific stir
By: Moera Tuilaepa-Taylor, RNZ Pacific Mgr & APR Editor - 03-25-22
Re: https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03...-pacific-stir/

China buys the Solomon Islands - has been leade

A draft security cooperation agreement between China and Solomon Islands has been leaked on social media.

The unverified document includes seven articles, which discuss the scope of cooperation between both nations.

Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security senior lecturer Dr Anna Powles has seen the agreement on social media.

She told RNZ Pacific that the document is presented as a draft: “It doesn’t have any dates, nor is it signed.

“There are still questions around its authenticity but if it is authentic, it raises some serious questions and if it’s not authentic then it also provides some interesting insights into the way in which the geopolitical dynamic is playing out domestically in the Solomon Islands,” she said.

Dr Powles said that the draft document includes a request between the Solomon Islands government and China to send armed police personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to the Solomon Islands.

“Now that raises a lot of questions obviously, what is the distinction between police and armed police, and who are the other law enforcement and armed forces that are referred to in the agreement.

‘Maintaining social order’

“It also talks about what kind of tasks that a Chinese contingent would be involved in such as maintaining social order, it’s not clear what that means, it also talks about providing assistance on other tasks and it’s also unclear what those other tasks would be.”

Dr Powles points out that the agreement refers to protecting lives and property, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

In February, a team of Chinese police officers began working in Solomon Islands. This was two months after the Solomons government accepted Beijing’s offer to help restore law and order following anti-government riots in November 2021.

Dr Powles believes that if the draft agreement is authentic, then the deployment was a natural extension of the document.

The document also contains some concerning provisions which allow China to send ships to the Solomon’s “according to its needs”.

“The agreement states that China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands government make ship visits to the Solomons and carry out logistical replenishment and stopover and transition in the Solomons.”

She said that such provisions would need to be clarified as it was unclear what “China’s own needs” refer to.

Concerns over ‘strategic interests’

Are those strategic interests for instance? If so, that would raise a number of concerns. Particularly as to what would happen if China’s interests cut across the interests of the Solomon Islands or of its key regional partners such as Australia or Papua New Guinea.

“And it also suggests that logistical support would be provided for ship visits in the Solomon Islands and suggests that perhaps China could seek to establish a logistical supply base in Solomon Islands to support those ship visits.

The document does not specify what types of ships, but Dr Powles said “we could safely assume that they are referring to the People’s Liberation Army Naval (PLAN) ships.”

“In the Pacific, we have seen PLAN ship visits to the region. China has a strong interest in maritime issues and in the Pacific maritime domain. And so that probably is not surprising and there have been long-standing concerns and very public long-standing concerns about the potential for increased ship visits for China increasing its engagement in the Pacific maritime domain and potential implications that may have for a potential base to support those ship visits.”

Dr Powles also drew attention to one particular provision of the agreement, which raised alarm bells with respect to the control of information around security cooperation.

That provision stated that information between the Solomon Islands and China could only be released on mutual agreement by both parties.

“And that suggests that there would be the intent to control public information, to control media briefings, to control what access media has to information about security arrangements between the two countries.

“We can be legitimately concerned about lack of transparency about a degree around this agreement,” she said.

Solomon Islands switched allegiances from Taiwan to China in 2019.

Note: This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part II:
-
Saying China ‘bought’ a military base in the Solomons is simplistic and shows how little Australia understands power in the Pacific
By: Joanne Wallis and Czeslaw Tubilewicz of the University of Adelaide
Re: https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03...n-the-pacific/

The draft security agreement between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands.

In Australian debates, the term “influence” is often used to characterise the assumed consequences of China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific.

There’s an assumption China generates influence primarily from its economic statecraft. This includes its concessional loans, aid and investment by state-owned enterprises (which partly manifests in Beijing’s involvement of Pacific Islands in its Belt and Road Initiative).

* READ MORE: Leaked draft China-Solomon Islands security pact causes Pacific stir

* As Australia deploys troops and police, what now for Solomon Islands?

* China’s push into PNG has been surprisingly slow and ineffective. Why has Beijing found the going so tough?

On its face, the leaked draft seemingly proves Chinese spending “bought” enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government to consider this agreement. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.

NOTE: Senior Australian government ministers have expressed concern about a draft security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands

The Leaked Draft of Pact for China Naval Base Worries Australia.

The role of domestic politics
First, the draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics — not just geopolitics.

As explained by Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka after the November 2021 riots in Honiara, geopolitical considerations intersect with, and can be used to, advance longstanding domestic issues.

These include uneven and unequal development, frustrated decentralisation, and unresolved grievances arising from prior conflicts.

Power in the Pacific is complex. It is not just politicians in the national government who matter in domestic and foreign policy-making.

Take, for example, the activism of Malaita provincial Governor Derek Suidani, who pursued relations with Taiwan after Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2019. This highlights the important role sub-national actors can play in the both domestic and foreign policy arenas.

Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “passive dupes” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges — and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.

Australia’s current policy settings are not working
The second key issue is that Australia’s current policy settings are not working — if their success is measured by advancing Australia’s strategic interests.

Australia is by far the Pacific’s largest aid donor and has been on a spending spree under its “Pacific Step-up” initiative.

Australia spent billions leading the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as significant bilateral programMEs to the country. Yet Australia has not been able to head off Honiara considering the security agreement with China.

Perhaps Canberra has not sought to influence Solomon Islands on this matter. But given Australia’s longstanding anxieties about potentially hostile powers establishing a presence in the region, this is unlikely.

Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews has already commented in response to the leaked draft that:

THIS IS OUR NEIGHBOURHOOD AND WE ARE VERY CONCERNED OF ANY ACTIVITY THAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

The rumours (subsequently denied) that China was in talks to establish a military base in Vanuatu, and China’s attempt to lease Tulagi Island in Solomon Islands had already intensified Australia’s anxieties.

Such concerns partly motivated the government’s investment in the Pacific Step-up.

A closer look at the draft security agreement
The terms of the draft security agreement should make Australia anxious. It goes significantly beyond the bilateral security treaty between Solomon Islands and Australia.

Article 1 provides that Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands” in circumstances ranging from maintaining social order to unspecified “other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.

Even more concerningly for Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, Article 1 also provides that

RELEVANT FORCES OF CHINA CAN BE USED TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF CHINESE PERSONNEL AND MAJOR PROJECTS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS.

It remains unclear what authority the Solomon Islands government would maintain once it consents to Beijing’s deployment of “relevant forces” to protect Chinese nationals.

Article 4 is equally vague. It states specific details regarding Chinese missions, including “jurisdiction, privilege and immunity […] shall be negotiated separately”.

The agreement also raises questions about the transparency of agreements Beijing makes and their consequences for democracy in its partner states.

According to Article 5,

WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER PARTY, NEITHER PARTY SHALL DISCLOSE THE COOPERATION INFORMATION TO A THIRD PARTY.

This implies the Solomon Islands government is legally bound not to inform its own people and their democratically elected representatives about activities under the agreement without the Chinese approval.

The version circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.

Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan met yesterday with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and announced Australia will extend its assistance force until December 2023.

It will build a national radio network, construct a second patrol boat outpost, and provide SI$130 million (A$21.5 million) in budget support.

NOTE: A draft security cooperation agreement could allow China to deploy police and military personnel in Solomon Islands.

Playing whack-a-mole
While the timing was likely coincidental, it highlights an emerging dynamic in Australia’s Pacific policy: playing whack-a-mole by seeking to directly counter Chinese moves through economic statecraft.

Think of Telstra’s recent purchase of Digicel Pacific, headquartered in PNG — a move seen by some analysts as really an attempt to shut China out of the Pacific.

That China has been able to persuade Solomon Islands to consider an intrusive security agreement raises questions about our understanding of how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific.

If influence is taken to result in concrete behavioural changes (such as entering into a bilateral security agreement), and if Australia is going to “compete” with China on spending, you’d need to ask, for example: how much “influence” does an infrastructure project buy?

This understanding of power, however, is insufficient. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required.

Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups.

And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.

We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests.

The draft security agreement may come to nothing — but it should provide a wake-up call to Australia and its partners.

Old assumptions about how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific need urgent re-examination — as does our assumption that explicitly “competing” with China advances either our interests or those of the Pacific.The Conversation

About Dr Joanne Wallis: She is professor of international security and Dr Czeslaw Tubilewicz is senior lecturer at the University of Adelaide. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personal note: What's the old expression - Don't Fence Me In
-
China is pretty slick at manipulating agreements. To them they will soon
be able to manipulate the entire world order. Something to think about.
But it looks like they've secured more lands - fishing rights and plans
to build a military base in the area as well. When you've got the money
(and they do) they can manipulate others more than they realize.
-
Pretty slick operators they are - and they will continue doing this - until
they can conrol the entire world order.