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David
Thu January 16, 2003 12:31am
C-26 Metroliner


Description: The C-26 is operated exclusively by the Air and Army National Guard and was first delivered in 1989. They have quick change passenger, medevac, or cargo interiors. The C-26A is the civilian equivalent of the Fairchild Metro III with the C-26B being equivalent to the Fairchild Metro 23. The C-26B(CD) [Counter Drug] and the UC-26 are National Guard Bureau aircraft used to support the Air National Guard in drug control operations. The UC-26C is a derivative of the Fairchild Merlin IVC. The C-26B provides time-sensitive movement of personnel and cargo, as well as limited medical evacuation. The UC-26C provides support to counter drug (CD) operations. Additionally, up to ten ANG C-26Bs are being modified to carry specialized electronic equipment used to support CD operations.


The C-26 aircraft, manufactured by Fairchild Aircraft Incorporated, is a high performance, fixed wing, pressurized, twin engine turboprop that has accomodations for a pilot and a co-pilot and 19 passengers and/or cargo or a combination of both. It is powered by two Garrett TPE331-12URH engines, rated at 1100 shaft horsepower (820 kw) takeoff power and 1000 shaft horsepower (746 kw) maximum continuous power and equipped with 106 inch (269 cm) diameter McCauly full feathering, reversible, constant speed four bladed propellers.


The aircraft represents an on-call, rapid response, modern air transport for high priority resupply and movement of key personnel to remote, unserviced or feeder sites. Specifically, the aircraft is used to deliver repair parts, equipment, technical teams, crash and accident investigation teams. In its role, such functions as range clearance, Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC), administrative movement of personnel, transportation connections and courier flights are accomplished.


The C-26 Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) Follow-On Acquisition effort in 1997 focused on providing full CLS for 32 Air National Guard (ANG) and Army National Guard (ARNG) C-26B aircraft and 1 ANG UC-26C aircraft. The C-26 Program Office used acquisition streamlining initiatives to remove all Military Standards & Specifications (MIL STDs/SPECs) from the RFP. The RFP Support Office was employed to support the C-26 program. The team also reduced government-mandated Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) from 22 to 4, and substituted a performance-based Statement of Objectives (SOO) for a Statement of Work (SOW). The requirement was designed to conform to Federal Aviation Administration certifications and standards, creating a high level of interest and competition within the commercial industry. These efforts resulted in program cost avoidance of approximately $33.4M.


On 23 January 1998 the US Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center Reconnaissance Systems Program Office (ASC/RAKBL) awarded a $5,489,211 contract to Versatron Corp. for a replacement Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) System for the Air National Guard C-26B Aircraft. The system is a third generation detector technology, non developmental item consisting of eleven installed and fully integrated systems and two complete spares. The FLIR system includes a Thermal Imaging System (TIS), color TV and Laser Range Finder all co-located in a single gimbal turret, plus any separate associated electronic units. The turret fits in the existing pod and weighs less than 145 pounds. The total system including the turret, electronic units and cabling weighs less than 285 pounds. The turret rotates a full 360 degree in azimuth field of regard and elevation coverage above 0 degree level elevation and beyond -90 degrees (NADIR). The FLIR is able to receive azimuth and elevation cue commands. The Modulation Transfer Function (MTF) and Noise Equivalent Temperature Difference (NETD) combined must result in a Minimum Resolvable Temperature Difference (MRTD) that provides thermal sensitivity and spatial resolution to detect and recognize a .5m x 2m man size target from other thermal sources or the background at 30,000 feet slant range under clear visibility weather conditions.





General Characteristics, C-26 Metroliner



Builder:
Fairchild Aircraft Corporation





Power Plant:
Two Garrett TPE331-11U-612G engines





Thrust:
1,100 horspower each shaft





Length:
42.17 feet





Height:
16.83 feet





Wingspan:
46.25 feet





Maximum Takeoff Weight:
16,500 pounds









Maximum Speed:
248 knots





Service Ceiling:
25,000 feet





Range:
2,040 nautical miles





Crew:
Two pilots, maximum of 19 passengers





Cargo Capacity:
Rear compartment: 850 pounds
Nose compartment: 800 pounds





Date Deployed:
1989
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David
Wed February 12, 2003 9:39pm
NATO Medal with Ribbon

NATO MEDAL


1. Description: A bronze medal, 1 3/8 inches in diameter, bearing on the obverse the NATO emblem (a four pointed star emitting a ray from each point superimposed on an annulet) enclosed in base by a wreath of olive. The reverse side has a band inscribed "NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION" at top and "ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L?ATLANTIQUE NORD" at the bottom. In the center is a sprig of olive between the inscription "IN SERVICE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM" above and "AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX ET DE LA LIBERTE" below.


2. Ribbon: The ribbon is 1 3/8 inches wide and consists of the following stripes: 5/32 inch Yale Blue 67176; 1/8 inch White 67101; 13/16 inch Yale Blue; 1/8 inch White; and 5/32 inch Yale Blue.


3. Criteria: Authorized by the Secretary General of NATO for specific NATO operations. In accordance with Executive Order 11446, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may approve acceptance for operations and authorize the wear by US Service members who meet the criteria specified by the Secretary General of NATO. The acceptance of the NATO Medal has been approved for US Military personnel who serve under NATO Command or operational control in direct support of NATO operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, or as designated by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), from 1 July 1992 through a future date to be determined.


4. Components: The NATO Medal presentation set, received from a NATO representative, normally includes the regular size medal and ribbon bar. It may include a clasp denoting the specific operation for which the award was made. US Service members are authorized to retain the ribbon clasp if presented; however, the wearing of a ribbon clasp with the NATO Medal or service ribbon is not authorized. A miniature NATO Medal is available from commercial sources.


5. General Information:


a. To recognize subsequent awards (if approved by the Secretary of Defense) for service in a different NATO operation, US Service members will affix a bronze service star to the NATO Medal suspension ribbon and service ribbon.


b. The NATO Medal will normally be presented by the SACEUR Headquarters exercising operational command or control over US military units or individuals prior to their departure from service with NATO.


c. The NATO Medal shall have the same precedence as the UN Medal, but shall rank immediately below the UN Medal when the wearer has been awarded both decorations.
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David
Wed February 12, 2003 9:40pm
Prisoner of War Medal wit

PRISONER OF WAR MEDAL


1. Description: On a bronze medal, 1 3/8 inches in diameter, an eagle with wings opened surrounded by a circle of barbed wire and bayonet points. The reverse has the inscription "AWARDED TO" around the top and "FOR HONORABLE SERVICE WHILE A PRISONER OF WAR" across the center in three lines with a space between the two inscriptions for engraving the name of the recipient. The shield of the Coat of Arms of the United States is centered on the lower part of the reverse side with the inscription "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" around the bottom of the medal.


2. Ribbon: The ribbon is 1 3/8 inches wide and consists of the following stripes: 1/16 inch Old Glory Red 67156; 3/32 inch White 67101; 1/16 inch Old Glory Blue 67178; 1/8 inch White; center 11/16 inch Black 67138; 1/8 inch White; 1/16 inch Old Glory Blue; 3/32 inch White; and 1/16 inch Old Glory Red.


3. Criteria:


a. The Prisoner of War Medal is issued only to those U.S. military personnel who were taken prisoner and held captive after 5 April 1917;


(1) While engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States;


(2) While engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or


(3) While serving with friendly forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing force in which the United States is not a belligerent party.


b. Civilians who have been credited with military service which included the period of captivity are also eligible for the medal.


c. Hostages of terrorists and persons detained by governments with which the United States is not engaged actively in armed conflict are not eligible for the medal.


4. Components: The following are components of the Prisoner of War Medal:


a. Medal (regular size): MIL-M-3946/53. NSN 8455-01-251-2096 for set which includes regular size medal and ribbon bar.


b. Medal (miniature size): MIL-DTL-3943/241. Available commercially.


c. Ribbon: MIL-DTL-11589/319. Available commercially.


d. Lapel Button: MIL-DTL-11484/152. Available commercially.


5. Background: a. Public Law 99-145, Department of Defense Authorization Act, dated 8 November 1985, amended Chapter 57 of Title 10, USC, 1128, to require under certain circumstances the issuance of a Prisoner of War Medal to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Armed Forces of the United States, was taken prisoner and held captive after 5 April 1917.


b. As a result of the above law, DOD solicited designs from all sources, and on 29 November 1985, designated The Institute of Heraldry (TIOH) as the Executive Agency for designing and procuring the medal. Over 300 designs were received and referred to a committee, comprised of representatives of the Armed Services, for advising the Secretary of Defense on a selection.


c. The design selected was created by Mr. Jay C. Morris of The Institute of Heraldry. The symbolism of the design is as follows: The eagle, a symbol of the United States and the American spirit, though surrounded by barbed wire and bayonet points, stands with pride and dignity, continually on the alert for the opportunity to seize hold of beloved freedom, thus symbolizing the hope that upholds the spirit of the prisoner of war. The ribbon colors red, white, and blue are symbolic of our National colors while determination to survive in or to escape from a hostile environment.


d. Order of precedence and wear policy for medals awarded to Army personnel is contained in AR 670-1. Policy for awards, approving authority and supply of medals is contained in AR 600-8-22.
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David
Fri March 21, 2003 6:17am
High-power microwave (HPM

High-power microwave (HPM) sources have been under investigation for several years as potential weapons for a variety of combat, sabotage, and terrorist applications. Due to classification restrictions, details of this work are relatively unknown outside the military community and its contractors. A key point to recognize is the insidious nature of HPM. Due to the gigahertz-band frequencies (4 to 20 GHz) involved, HPM has the capability to penetrate not only radio front-ends, but also the most minute shielding penetrations throughout the equipment. At sufficiently high levels, as discussed, the potential exists for significant damage to devices and circuits. For these reasons, HPM should be of interest to the broad spectrum of EMC practitioners.


Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and High Powered Microwave (HMP) Weapons offer a significant capability against electronic equipment susceptible to damage by transient power surges. This weapon generates a very short, intense energy pulse producing a transient surge of thousands of volts that kills semiconductor devices. The conventional EMP and HMP weapons can disable non-shielded electronic devices including practically any modern electronic device within the effective range of the weapon.


The effectiveness of an EMP device is determined by the power generated and the characteristic of the pulse. The shorter pulse wave forms, such as microwaves, are far more effective against electronic equipment and more difficult to harden against. Current efforts focus on converting the energy from an explosive munitions to supply the electromagnetic pulse. This method produces significant levels of directionally focused electromagnetic energy.


Future advances may provide the compactness needed to weaponize the capability in a bomb or missile warhead. Currently, the radius of the weapon is not as great as nuclear EMP effects. Open literature sources indicate that effective radii of “hundreds of meters or more” are possible. EMP and HPM devices can disable a large variety of military or infrastructure equipment over a relatively broad area. This can be useful for dispersed targets.


A difficulty is determining the appropriate level of energy to achieve the desired effects. This will require detailed knowledge of the target equipment and the environment (walls, buildings). The obvious counter-measure is the shielding or hardening of electronic equipment. Currently, only critical military equipment is hardened e.g., strategic command and control systems. Hardening of existing equipment is difficult and adds significant weight and expense. As a result, a large variety of commercial and military equipment will be susceptible to this type of attack.


The US Navy reportedly used a new class of highly secret, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse warheads during the opening hours of the Persian Gulf War to disrupt and destroy Iraqi electronics systems. The warheads converted the energy of a conventional explosion into a pulse of radio energy. The effect of the microwave attacks on Iraqi air defense and headquarters was difficult to determine because the effects of the HPM blasts were obscured by continuous jamming, the use of stealthy F-117 aircraft, and the destruction of Iraq's electrical grid. The warheads used during the Gulf War were experimental warheads, not standard weapons deployed with fielded forces.


Col. William G. Heckathorn, commander of the Phillips Research Site and the deputy director of the Directed Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory, was presented the Legion of Merit medal during special retirement ceremonies in May 1998. In a citation accompanying the medal, Col. Heckathorn was praised for having provided superior vision, leadership, and direct guidance that resulted in the first high-power microwave weapon prototypes delivered to the warfighter. The citation noted that "Col. Heckathorn united all directed energy development within Army, Navy and Air Force, which resulted in an efficient, focused, warfighter-oriented tri-service research program." In December of 1994 he came to Kirtland to become the director of the Advanced Weapons and Survivability Directorate at the Phillips Laboratory. Last year he became the commander of the Phillips Laboratory while still acting as the director of the Advanced Weapons and Survivability Directorate.


As with a conventional munition, a microwave munition is a "single shot" munition that has a similar blast and fragmentation radius. However, while the explosion produces a blast, the primary mission is to generate the energy that powers the microwave device. Thus, for a microwave munition, the primary kill mechanism is the microwave energy, which greatly increases the radius and the footprint by, in some cases, several orders of magnitude. For example, a 2000-pound microwave munition will have a minimum radius of approximately 200 meters, or footprint of approximately 126,000 square meters.


Studies have examined the incorporation of a high power microwave weapon into the weapons bay of a conceptual uninhabited combat aerial vehicle. The CONOPS, electromagnetic compatibility and hardening (to avoid a self-kill), power requirements and potential power supplies, and antenna characteristics have been analyzed. Extensive simulations of potential antennas have been performed. The simulations examined the influence of the aircraft structure on the antenna patterns and the levels of leakage through apertures in the weapons bay. Other investigations examined issues concerning the electromagnetic shielding effectiveness of composite aircraft structures.


Collateral damage from E-bombs is dependent on the size and design of the specific bomb. An E-bomb that utilizes explosive power to obtain its damaging microwaves will result in typical blast and shrapnel damage. Ideally, an E-Bomb would be designed to minimize and dissipate most of the mechanical collateral damage. Human exposure to microwave radiation is hazardous within several meters of the epicenter. However, there is a relatively low risk of bodily damage at further distances.


Any non-military electronics within range of the E-bomb that have not been protected have a high probability of being damaged or destroyed. The best way to defend against E-bomb attack is to destroy the platform or delivery vehicle in which the E-bomb resides. Another method of protection is to keep all essential electronics within an electrically conductive enclosure, called a Faraday cage. This prevents the damaging electromagentic field from interacting with vital equipment. The problem with Faraday cages is that most vital equipment needs to be in contact with the outside world. This contact point can allow the electromagentic field to enter the cage, which ultimately renders the enclosure useless. There are ways to protect against these Faraday cage flaws, but the fact remains that this is a dangerous weakpoint. In most circumstances E-bombs are categorized as 'non-lethal weapons' because of the minimal collateral damage they create. The E-bomb's 'non-lethal' categorization gives military commanders more politically-friendly options to choose from.
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David
Fri March 21, 2003 6:41am
Arrow TMD

Israel began work on a potential theater missile defense (TMD) system in 1986, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States. While the threat posed by ballistic missiles has been a concern for Israel since the mid-1980s, Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during the Gulf War underscored the danger posed by the buildup of missile technology in the region. Given the lack of available Israeli resources for TMD development, the United States agreed to co-fund and co-develop an indigenously-produced Israeli TMD system. In 1988, the US and Israel began what was to evolve into a three-phase program to develop the ARROW series of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs).


Arrow II is intended to satisfy the Israeli requirement for an interceptor for defense of military assets and population centers and will support US technology base requirements for new advanced anti-tactical ballistic missile technologies that could be incorporated into the US theater missile defense systems. The Arrow missile, a joint international project with Israel, is a long-range interceptor that offers the United States technology infusion, including lethality data; development of optical window technology applicable to both THAAD and Navy Area Defense programs; data from stage separation at high velocities and dynamic pressures; and, interoperability development that will allow synergistic operations of Arrow with US TMD systems, if required in future contingencies.


The Citron Tree battle management center, built by Tadiran, guides the Arrow 2 interceptor, developed by Israel Aircraft Industries' MLM Division. The entire anti-tactical ballistic missile project is called Homa.


The Arrow 2 system can detect and track incoming missiles as far way as 500 km and can intercept missiles 50-90 km away [some sources suggest the engagement range is 16 to 48km]. The Arrow 2 uses a terminally-guided interceptor warhead to destroy an incoming missile from its launch at an altitude of 10 to 40km at nine times the speed of sound. Since the missile does not need to directly hit the target--detonation within 40-50 meters is sufficient to disable an incoming warhead. The command and control system is designed to respond to as many as 14 simultaneous intercepts.


Comprised of three phases, this intiative began with the Arrow Experiments project (Phase I) that developed the preprototype Arrow I interceptor. Arrow I provided the basis for an informed GOI engineering and manufacturing decision for an ATBM defense capability.


The Phase II ARROW Continuation Experiments (ACES) Program was a continuation of Phase I, and consisted of critical lethality tests using the Arrow I interceptor with the Arrow II warhead and the design, development and test of the Arrow II interceptor. The first phase of ACES, completed in the third quarter FY 94, featured critical lethality tests using the Arrow I interceptor with the Arrow II warhead. Since program initiation in 1988, Israel successfully improved the performance of its pre-prototype Arrow I interceptor to the point that it achieved a successful intercept and target destruction in June 1994. The ACES resulted in a successful missile target intercept by a single stage ARROW-1 interceptor. The second phase of ACES consisted of the design, development and test of the Arrow II interceptor, which achieved two successful intercepts of simulated SCUD missiles on August 20, 1996 and March 11, 1997. The ACES Program ended in FY 1997, upon the completion of ARROW intercept tests.


The third phase is the Arrow Deployability Project (ADP), which began in FY96, aimed at integrating the entire ARROW Weapon System (AWS) with a planned User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) capability. Continuing through 2001, the ADP will be the cornerstone for US/Israeli BMD cooperation. The Arrow Deployability Program involves a total commitment of $500 million over five years, with $300 million contributed by Israel and $200 million from the United States. This will allow for the integration of the jointly developed Arrow interceptor with the Israeli developed fire control radar, launch control center and battle management center. This project will pursue the research and development of technologies associated with the deployment of the Arrow Weapon System (AWS) and will permit the GOI to make a decision regarding deployment of this system without financial participation by the US beyond the R&D stage. This effort will include system-level flight tests of the US-Israeli cooperatively developed Arrow II interceptor supported by the Israeli-developed fire control radar and fire control center.


After US planning activities in FY 94/95, the Arrow Deployability Project (ADP) pursued the research and development of technologies associated with the deployment of the Arrow Weapon System and to permit the Government of Israel to make a decision on its own initiative regarding deployment of this system without financial participation by the US beyond the R&D stage. This effort included three system-level flight tests of the Arrow II interceptor and launcher supported by the Israeli-developed fire control radar and battle management control center. Studies will be done to define interfaces required for Arrow Weapon System interoperability with US TMD systems, lethality, kill assessment and producibility.


Prior to obligation of funds to execute ADP R&D efforts, the President must certify to the Congress that a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) exists with Israel for these projects, that each project provides benefits to the US, that the Arrow missile has completed a successful intercept, and that the Government of Israel continues to adhere to export controls pursuant to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Subsequent US-Israeli cooperative R&D on other ballistic missile defense concepts would occur in the future.


Although there is a general policy of denial for Category I missile programs as defined in the the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, an exception has been made for the Arrow theater missile defense program. In the Arrow program, the challenge the United States faces is to transfer capabilities to defend against missile attacks without releasing technologies for manufacturing missiles.


In a test in September 1998 the Arrow 2 simulated an intercept against a point in space 97 seconds after being fired from the Palmachim military base south of Tel Aviv. The first integrated intercept flight test was successfully conducted in Israel on 01 November 1999. The Green Pine radar detected a Scud-class ballistic target and the Citron Tree battle management center commanded the launch of the Arrow II interceptor and communicated with it in-flight to successfully destroy the incoming missile.


On 27 August 2001, Israel successfully tested the Arrow-2 anti-missile missile in the ninth test of the anti-ballistic missile system. The target was a missile, called the Black Sparrow, which was dropped from an IAF F-15 fighter jet at high altitude. The Arrow-2 Green Pine radar detected the missile, and the Citron fire-control center launched the Arrow-2 interceptor. The target was intercepted about 100 kilometers from the coastline, the highest and farthest that the Arrow-2 had been tested to date.


An interface has been developed and delivered in Israel for AWS interoperability with US TMD systems based on a common JTIDS/Link-16 communications architecture and message protocol. The BMDO-developed Theater Missile Defense System Exerciser (TMDSE) will conduct interactive simulation exercises to test, assess, and validate the JTIDS-based interoperability between the AWS and US TMD systems. Once the TMDSE experiments are completed in FY01, the AWS will be certified as fully interoperable with any deployed US TMD systems.


Israel planned to defend itself against short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks with two Arrow 2 batteries located at only two strategic sites. According to its original 1986 schedule, the Arrow system was supposed to enter operational service in 1995. By 2000 Israel was reported to have deployed several batteries of Arrow-2 anti-missile missiles. According to some [probably erroneous] reports, these were along the Israeli- Lebanese borders.


The first Arrow Weapon System (AWS) battery was deployed in Israel in early 2000. The first battery of the Arrow missiles is deployed in the center of the country, with the newly developed missile defense system entering operation on 12 March 2000. According to some reports, the first Arrow battery was operational at the Palmachim base [some reports suggest that the first battery was in the southern Negev desert at the Dimona nuclear facility].


Israel is built a second state-of-the-art anti-missile battery in the center of the country to fend off missile attacks. A second battery is to be placed at Ein Shemer east of Hadera, but was delayed by strong opposition from residents who claim its radar would be hazardous to their health. The new battery, about six miles from the central town of Hadera, was officially "for training purposes" as of mid-2002, but the sources said it already had operational capability. By late 2002 Israel was trying to make the second battery operational before any American attack on Iraq. The Arrow missile launchers from the second battery could be linked to the Green Pine radar of the Palmachim battery to improve its effectiveness.


Israel had originally planned to deploy two Arrow 2 batteries but has since sought and won promises of funding for a third battery. The US Congress approved the funding of $81.6 million toward the cost of a third batteries. Each battery reportedly costs about $170m.


The joint US-Israeli project, which includes missiles, interceptor launcher batteries, the Green Pine radar and the Citron Tree fire-control system, cost $1.3 billion to develop. The final bill is expected to be double the billion dollars spent so far. This cost could be reduced if the Arrow 2 is sold to other countries which have expressed interest - such as Great Britain, Turkey, Japan and reportedly India.


The Green Pine radar used by the Arrow 2 was sold to India with US approval, and was deployed in India in 2001. In early 2002 American officials sought to stop Israel from selling the Arrow 2 interceptor missile to India, arguing that the sale would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime. Although the Arrow 2 interceptor could possibly achieve a range of 300 km, it is designed for intercepts at shorter ranges, and it is unclear whether it could carry a 500-kg payload to the 300-km range specified in the MTCR.


2ar2.jpg

David
Fri March 21, 2003 6:41am
Arrow TMD

Israel began work on a potential theater missile defense (TMD) system in 1986, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States. While the threat posed by ballistic missiles has been a concern for Israel since the mid-1980s, Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during the Gulf War underscored the danger posed by the buildup of missile technology in the region. Given the lack of available Israeli resources for TMD development, the United States agreed to co-fund and co-develop an indigenously-produced Israeli TMD system. In 1988, the US and Israel began what was to evolve into a three-phase program to develop the ARROW series of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs).


Arrow II is intended to satisfy the Israeli requirement for an interceptor for defense of military assets and population centers and will support US technology base requirements for new advanced anti-tactical ballistic missile technologies that could be incorporated into the US theater missile defense systems. The Arrow missile, a joint international project with Israel, is a long-range interceptor that offers the United States technology infusion, including lethality data; development of optical window technology applicable to both THAAD and Navy Area Defense programs; data from stage separation at high velocities and dynamic pressures; and, interoperability development that will allow synergistic operations of Arrow with US TMD systems, if required in future contingencies.


The Citron Tree battle management center, built by Tadiran, guides the Arrow 2 interceptor, developed by Israel Aircraft Industries' MLM Division. The entire anti-tactical ballistic missile project is called Homa.


The Arrow 2 system can detect and track incoming missiles as far way as 500 km and can intercept missiles 50-90 km away [some sources suggest the engagement range is 16 to 48km]. The Arrow 2 uses a terminally-guided interceptor warhead to destroy an incoming missile from its launch at an altitude of 10 to 40km at nine times the speed of sound. Since the missile does not need to directly hit the target--detonation within 40-50 meters is sufficient to disable an incoming warhead. The command and control system is designed to respond to as many as 14 simultaneous intercepts.


Comprised of three phases, this intiative began with the Arrow Experiments project (Phase I) that developed the preprototype Arrow I interceptor. Arrow I provided the basis for an informed GOI engineering and manufacturing decision for an ATBM defense capability.


The Phase II ARROW Continuation Experiments (ACES) Program was a continuation of Phase I, and consisted of critical lethality tests using the Arrow I interceptor with the Arrow II warhead and the design, development and test of the Arrow II interceptor. The first phase of ACES, completed in the third quarter FY 94, featured critical lethality tests using the Arrow I interceptor with the Arrow II warhead. Since program initiation in 1988, Israel successfully improved the performance of its pre-prototype Arrow I interceptor to the point that it achieved a successful intercept and target destruction in June 1994. The ACES resulted in a successful missile target intercept by a single stage ARROW-1 interceptor. The second phase of ACES consisted of the design, development and test of the Arrow II interceptor, which achieved two successful intercepts of simulated SCUD missiles on August 20, 1996 and March 11, 1997. The ACES Program ended in FY 1997, upon the completion of ARROW intercept tests.


The third phase is the Arrow Deployability Project (ADP), which began in FY96, aimed at integrating the entire ARROW Weapon System (AWS) with a planned User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) capability. Continuing through 2001, the ADP will be the cornerstone for US/Israeli BMD cooperation. The Arrow Deployability Program involves a total commitment of $500 million over five years, with $300 million contributed by Israel and $200 million from the United States. This will allow for the integration of the jointly developed Arrow interceptor with the Israeli developed fire control radar, launch control center and battle management center. This project will pursue the research and development of technologies associated with the deployment of the Arrow Weapon System (AWS) and will permit the GOI to make a decision regarding deployment of this system without financial participation by the US beyond the R&D stage. This effort will include system-level flight tests of the US-Israeli cooperatively developed Arrow II interceptor supported by the Israeli-developed fire control radar and fire control center.


After US planning activities in FY 94/95, the Arrow Deployability Project (ADP) pursued the research and development of technologies associated with the deployment of the Arrow Weapon System and to permit the Government of Israel to make a decision on its own initiative regarding deployment of this system without financial participation by the US beyond the R&D stage. This effort included three system-level flight tests of the Arrow II interceptor and launcher supported by the Israeli-developed fire control radar and battle management control center. Studies will be done to define interfaces required for Arrow Weapon System interoperability with US TMD systems, lethality, kill assessment and producibility.


Prior to obligation of funds to execute ADP R&D efforts, the President must certify to the Congress that a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) exists with Israel for these projects, that each project provides benefits to the US, that the Arrow missile has completed a successful intercept, and that the Government of Israel continues to adhere to export controls pursuant to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Subsequent US-Israeli cooperative R&D on other ballistic missile defense concepts would occur in the future.


Although there is a general policy of denial for Category I missile programs as defined in the the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, an exception has been made for the Arrow theater missile defense program. In the Arrow program, the challenge the United States faces is to transfer capabilities to defend against missile attacks without releasing technologies for manufacturing missiles.


In a test in September 1998 the Arrow 2 simulated an intercept against a point in space 97 seconds after being fired from the Palmachim military base south of Tel Aviv. The first integrated intercept flight test was successfully conducted in Israel on 01 November 1999. The Green Pine radar detected a Scud-class ballistic target and the Citron Tree battle management center commanded the launch of the Arrow II interceptor and communicated with it in-flight to successfully destroy the incoming missile.


On 27 August 2001, Israel successfully tested the Arrow-2 anti-missile missile in the ninth test of the anti-ballistic missile system. The target was a missile, called the Black Sparrow, which was dropped from an IAF F-15 fighter jet at high altitude. The Arrow-2 Green Pine radar detected the missile, and the Citron fire-control center launched the Arrow-2 interceptor. The target was intercepted about 100 kilometers from the coastline, the highest and farthest that the Arrow-2 had been tested to date.


An interface has been developed and delivered in Israel for AWS interoperability with US TMD systems based on a common JTIDS/Link-16 communications architecture and message protocol. The BMDO-developed Theater Missile Defense System Exerciser (TMDSE) will conduct interactive simulation exercises to test, assess, and validate the JTIDS-based interoperability between the AWS and US TMD systems. Once the TMDSE experiments are completed in FY01, the AWS will be certified as fully interoperable with any deployed US TMD systems.


Israel planned to defend itself against short- and medium-range ballistic missile attacks with two Arrow 2 batteries located at only two strategic sites. According to its original 1986 schedule, the Arrow system was supposed to enter operational service in 1995. By 2000 Israel was reported to have deployed several batteries of Arrow-2 anti-missile missiles. According to some [probably erroneous] reports, these were along the Israeli- Lebanese borders.


The first Arrow Weapon System (AWS) battery was deployed in Israel in early 2000. The first battery of the Arrow missiles is deployed in the center of the country, with the newly developed missile defense system entering operation on 12 March 2000. According to some reports, the first Arrow battery was operational at the Palmachim base [some reports suggest that the first battery was in the southern Negev desert at the Dimona nuclear facility].


Israel is built a second state-of-the-art anti-missile battery in the center of the country to fend off missile attacks. A second battery is to be placed at Ein Shemer east of Hadera, but was delayed by strong opposition from residents who claim its radar would be hazardous to their health. The new battery, about six miles from the central town of Hadera, was officially "for training purposes" as of mid-2002, but the sources said it already had operational capability. By late 2002 Israel was trying to make the second battery operational before any American attack on Iraq. The Arrow missile launchers from the second battery could be linked to the Green Pine radar of the Palmachim battery to improve its effectiveness.


Israel had originally planned to deploy two Arrow 2 batteries but has since sought and won promises of funding for a third battery. The US Congress approved the funding of $81.6 million toward the cost of a third batteries. Each battery reportedly costs about $170m.


The joint US-Israeli project, which includes missiles, interceptor launcher batteries, the Green Pine radar and the Citron Tree fire-control system, cost $1.3 billion to develop. The final bill is expected to be double the billion dollars spent so far. This cost could be reduced if the Arrow 2 is sold to other countries which have expressed interest - such as Great Britain, Turkey, Japan and reportedly India.


The Green Pine radar used by the Arrow 2 was sold to India with US approval, and was deployed in India in 2001. In early 2002 American officials sought to stop Israel from selling the Arrow 2 interceptor missile to India, arguing that the sale would violate the Missile Technology Control Regime. Although the Arrow 2 interceptor could possibly achieve a range of 300 km, it is designed for intercepts at shorter ranges, and it is unclear whether it could carry a 500-kg payload to the 300-km range specified in the MTCR.


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David
Thu March 27, 2003 8:06am
Kuwaiti security sources

Kuwaiti security sources said on March 19, 2003 that U.S.-led forces had moved into the Kuwaiti side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the Iraq-Kuwait border, apparently in preparation for an invasion of Iraq. A U.S. military spokesman denied it. Tens of thousands of U.S. and British troops are in the desert in northern Kuwait preparing to attack. President George W. Bush has said his forces will invade if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein does not flee by early Thursday.
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David
Thu March 27, 2003 9:08am
Confirmed military action

Wednesday, March 26, 2003: Elements of the 7th Cavalry Regiment face Medina armoured Republican Guard divisions outside Karbala as they push for Baghdad.


Wednesday, March 26, 2003: Elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force headed to Al Kut to push into Baghdad along the Tigris and hit the Republican Guard's southern forces.


Wednesday, March 26, 2003: Battle continues near Nasiriyah. Marines capture Iraqi military hospital along with weapons, ammunition, chemical suits and gas masks.


Wednesday, March 26, 2003: US troops secure Talil Air base in southern Iraq.


Wednesday, March 26, 2003: US-led war planes bombed targets in the northern part of the country including Mosul, Kirkuk and Tikrit.


Tuesday, March 25, 2003: American Marines are engaged in a heavy battle east of Najaf for control of the Euphrates valley region and river crossings.


Tuesday, March 25, 2003: Coalition forces confirm that 43 soilders have been killed in the campaign to date.


Tuesday, March 25, 2003: British troops have amassed outside the southern Iraqi city of Basra in preparation for an urban assualt on the city that previously was not a military target.


Tuesday, March 25, 2003: Coalition forces bomb two Iraqi bunkers in northern Iraq destroying one.


Tuesday, March 25, 2003: A friendly fire exchange results in the death of 2 British soliders.


Monday, March 24, 2003: A US Apache helicopter is downed in fighting ouside Karbala. The 2 US pilots have been captured by Iraqi forces and shown on Iraqi TV and al Jazeerah.


Monday, March 24, 2003: US Apache helicopters attacked Armored Republican guard positions between Karbala and Al Hillah, meeting with stiff resistence.


Monday, March 24, 2003: 70 US Special Forces troops are said to be working with Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq to destroy Ansar al-Islam strong holds in the moutainous border region between Iran and Iraq. Ansar al-Islam is beleived to have ties to al Qaeda and is blamed for a suicide bombing in northern Iraq this past weekend that killed and independent journalist.


Monday, March 24, 2003: US coalition forces report that cruise missles have been launched again Ansar al-Islam position in northern Iraq.


Monday, March 24, 2003: More than 200 special forces are said to be operating in northern Iraq and more continue to arrive on regular coalition flights through Turkish airspace.


Monday, March 24, 2003: A heavy battle still rages in the southern Iraqi town of Basra that has led coalition forces to draw back from the city. Fierce fighting to control the city, which the coalition said was siezed Friday, continues.


Monday, March 24, 2003: A bus carrying 36 civilians was bombed accidently by coalition forces as it tried to cross a bride in northwest Iraq. 5 Syrian nationals were killed and many injured, all were trying to escape fighting by fleeing to Syria.


Sunday, March 23, 2003: An unmanned, remote-controlled Predator drone destroyed an antiaircraft artillery gun in southern Iraq on Saturday. It was the first Predator strike of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition defense officials said. The MQ-1 Predator dropped one Hellfire II missile on the mobile antiaircraft artillery piece outside Amarah at 1:25 p.m. (5:25 a.m. Saturday EST), near the Iranian border, according to the Combined Forces Air Component Command. about 90 miles south of Baghdad.


Sunday, March 23, 2003: The U.S. military has secured a facility in southern Iraq that Pentagon officials said might have been used to produce chemical weapons. The officials cautioned that it wasn't clear what materials were at the facility in Najaf, about 90 miles south of Baghdad.


Sunday, March 23, 2003: US Army 11th Helicopter attack force engages the elite 2nd Armored Brigade of the Republican Guard outside Karbala, meeting stiff resistence and a hail of anti-aircraft fire described by one pilot as a 'wall of fire.'


Sunday, March 23, 2003: US Army support team is ambushed and captured by Iraqi forces after straying from forces in the Nasiriyah area. As many as 4 were US soilders killed in the ambush and up to 6 captured. Captured troops and those killed have been shown on Iraqi television and al Jazera.


Sunday, March 23, 2003: Heavy fighting in Nasiriyah has resulted in the death of at least 4 American troops.


Sunday, March 23, 2003: Late reports from US are saying that a RAF plane was accidently shot down by a Patriot missile in a friendly fire incident. Details as to the pilot's condition and the circumstances of the friendly fire incident are not yet available.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: In a Kurdish region of northern Iraq, a freelance cameraman working for the Australian Broadcasting Corp., Paul Moran, 39, died when a taxicab exploded at a checkpoint in Sayed Sadiq, the network said. Three Kurdish fighters also died, and an ABC correspondent was wounded, it said. Security officials of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan blamed the blast on a suicide bomber from an Islamic extremist group, Ansar al-Islam, which U.S. officials believe has links to al Qaeda.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: Two British helicopters collided in the Persian Gulf during the support operations killing all 7 troops on board; 1 American and 6 British, bringing the casulties to 21 - 7 Americans and 14 British.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: As many as 1,500 Turkish troops are reported to be poised to cross the border into Kurdish controlled northern Iraq creating some tensions between the US and Turkey. Turkey claims that the troops have been sent to the border region near Iraq to aid in any humanitarian efforts and also to monitor the Kurdish situation as the war progresses.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: The city of Al Basrah in southern Iraq was encircled by allied forces who opted not to enter the city. After engaging minimal resistence on the outskirts of the city coalition forces passed by the without claiming continuing to Baghdad.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: The H2 and H3 air fields, beleived to be site of Scud launchers in western Iraq, have been taken by coalition forces who clain tentative control of both installations.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: Kurdish forces and CNN sources confirm that the city of Kirkuk has been the target of aerial bombardment for the third night of the campaign.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: The northern city of Mosul is reported to have come under heavy bombardment for the third night in a row.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: Though coalition forces claimed tentative control over Umm Qasr -- over 24 hours ago, allied forces continue to come under fire from pockets of resistence.


Friday, March 21, 2003: The port city of Umm Qasr -- Iraq's only outlet to the Gulf - has fallen to allied forces. The old port was taken by British troops; U.S. Marines seized the new port.


Friday, March 21, 2003: The port city of Umm Qasr -- Iraq's only outlet to the Gulf - has fallen to allied forces. The old port was taken by British troops; U.S. Marines seized the new port.



Friday, March 21, 2003: Retreating Iraqi troops are confirmed to set 9 oil wells a blaze outside the southern city of Al Basrah.


Friday, March 21, 2003: U.S.-led forces strike the northern city of Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city.


Friday, March 21, 2003: Intense bombing of Kirkuk resumes for the second night. Anti-aircraft fire is visible over the city.


Friday, March 21, 2003: A second Marine from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was killed during the fight for Umm Qasr.


Friday, March 21, 2003: A US Marine has been killed in the line of fire, details are not yet available.


Friday, March 21, 2003 : Coalition forces bombed the Iraqi-controlled northern city of Mosul just before 4:30 a.m. Friday (8:30 pm Thursday EST).


Friday, March 21, 2003: Kurdish fighters in the Mosul region confirm that an air field outside of Mosul was bombed by US forces.


Friday, March 21, 2003 : British troops moved into the Al Faw Peninsula of southern Iraq. The Al Faw Peninsula runs from the Iraqi city of Basra to the Persian Gulf and is home to a significant portion of Iraq's oil industry.



Friday, March 21, 2003 : Iraqi television early Friday said targets hit by coalition forces included a military site in the southern city of Basra, near the Kuwaiti border, and another target in Akashat, a town about 300 miles west of Baghdad near the Syrian border. Iraqi television reported four Iraqi soldiers were killed.



Friday, March 21, 2003: Several thousand US airborne troops are expected to land in northern Iraq with the objective of capturing the strategically important city of Kirkuk and securing oil fields. The US had wanted to station about 60,000 troops in Turkey with the aim of carrying out a full scale ground invasion - but the plan has been blocked by the Turkish Government.


Friday, March 21, 2003 : American troops with about 250 main battle tanks are pushing into south-western Iraq with the aim of moving swiftly north towards Baghdad. US Marines and around 25,000 UK ground troops and armour are expected to cross into southern Iraq in a second offensive, analysts say. Royal Marines from the UK's 3 Commando Brigade are expected to occupy the strategically important southern city of Basra.


Friday, March 21, 2003: Iraq fired a ballistic missile targeting US and British forces as they crossed the Kuwait/Iraq border.


BAGHDAD:


Wednesday, March 26, 2003: During the continued bombing campaign of Baghdad, US Pentagon officials confirm that ordinance hit in heavily civilian marketplace in northern Baghdad.



Tuesday, March 25, 2003: Coalition forces flew over 3,000 missions in the last 24 hours and heavily bombed Baghdad. Iraqi television stations were targeted and destroyed in what an American commander described as 'decapitating the Iraqi leadership's ability to communicate'. However, Iraqi television was broadcasting only hours later.



Monday, March 24, 2003: Baghdad and outlying areas are being bombing in a effort to 'soften' Republican Guard positions around the city. The coalition hopes to keep the Republican guard from retreating to Baghdad and engage them outside the city proper. Saddam International Airport and military airstrip outside Baghada have also been hit by cruise missles.



Sunday, March 23, 2003: Baghdad continues to be the target of night bombing and air raids. Iraq has set oil filled trench dug around the city on fire to hinder the coalition's bombing campaign. A US Defense spokesman regarded this tactic as "useless and ineffective" against percision weapons technology.


Saturday, March 22, 2003: Baghdad is pounded with over 1,000 cruise missiles and pecision weapons for the third night of the campaign in Iraq. Iraq claims that over 200 civilians have been injured in the attacks.



Friday, March 21, 2003: Air raid sirens sound at 9:00 pm Baghdad local time (12:00 pm EST), for a half hour the city waits as anti-aircraft streaks the night sky. At approximately 9:25 pm Bagdad local time, heavy percision bombing begins in various parts of Baghdad. City areas are pounded for several hours.


Friday, March 21, 2003: U.S. officials said approximately 20 cruise missiles were launched in the most recent attacks from U.S. Navy ships and submarines in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf and - for the first time - from two British submarines. Two of the three main buildings in the Tigris complex of ministerial office have been completely destroyed and left unusable after being struck by percision bombs. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's palace and government offices along with Special Republican Guard strongholds were among targets hit during this second day of bombing in Baghdad.


Thursday, March 20, 2003 : An intense U.S. and coalition bombing attack rocked the Iraqi capital with a succession of explosions and fires that destroyed at least two buildings -- including the government facility containing the offices of Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz.



KUWAIT:
Monday, March 24, 2003: Iraq has launched 6 additional ballistic missles on Kuwait. 4 were intercepted by Patriot missiles and the remaining two were said to have hit in southern Iraq.



Monday, March 24, 2003: A Patriot missile intercepted an Iraqi missile fired toward Kuwait about 1 a.m. Monday [5 p.m. Sunday EST], a Kuwaiti army spokesman said. The missile was intercepted north of Kuwait City and came down away from any residential area, Col. Youssef Al-Mulla told CNN. The resulting explosion could be heard as a muffled, distant boom in the Kuwaiti capital.



Saturday, March 22, 2003: Iraq is reported to have fired another ballistic missile into Northern Kuwait. Coalition forces say the missile was shot down by a Patriot missile.



Saturday, March 22, 2003: A US soilder of the 101st Airborne based in northern Kuwait is being held for a grenade attack in Camp Pennsylvania that killed 1 American troop and wounded at least 12 others. Early reports say that it was an act of defiance and sabatoge by an American troop who recently converted to Islam and disagrees with coalition actions in Iraq.



Friday, March 21, 2003: Iraq retaliates against invasion forces by firing up to 7 missiles into northern Kuwait.


Friday, March 21, 2003 : U.S. Marine CH-46 helicopter crashed in northern Kuwait early Friday morning, killing all 16 people on board - 12 British military personnel and four American crew members, Pentagon officials said.



Thursday, March 20, 2003: Iraq responded to the attack by firing at least four missiles into northern Kuwait, two of which U.S. Patriot missiles intercepted, U.S. military officials said. U.S. forces sounded numerous alerts in the hours after the strikes, sending troops at several bases scrambling for chemical protection gear and running for bunkers. Air raid sirens also sounded in Kuwait City.



IRAN:


Saturday, March 22, 2003: Washington has confirmed that they are in tense diplomatic talks with Iran who claims that as many as three cruise missiles misfired and landed inside Iran. Reports remain unconfirmed and Washington says it is investigating the situation.



TURKEY:


Sunday, March 23, 2003: Two U.S. cruise missiles fell in unpopulated areas of Turkey on Monday, the Pentagon said. No one was hurt.



Saturday, March 22, 2003: Turkish and U.S. military authorities investigated an undetonated missile that appeared to have fallen into a remote village in southeastern Turkey. No one was hurt by the missile, which witnesses said left a crater 13 feet [4 meters] wide and 3.3 feet [1 meter] deep. The missile fell in Ozveren, 430 miles [688 kilometers] northwest of the border with Iraq, at about 5:30 p.m. [9:30 a.m. EST], as planes were seen flying overhead, witnesses said.



Saturday, March 22, 2003: Turkey grants the use of its airspace for US military and coalition over flights.
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David
Fri April 18, 2003 11:33am
Staff members at a Baghda

Friday, April 11, 2003, Staff members at a Baghdad hospital treat a man who hospital sources say was hurt in a rocket attack by U.S. forces on April 11. The International Committee of the Red Cross said some small Baghdad hospitals had closed and some big hospitals were inaccessible.
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David
Tue June 14, 2005 2:14pm
ANALYSIS OF SUSPECTED SOU

ANALYSIS OF SUSPECTED SOURCES OF DIARRHEA PATHOGENS 24 OCT

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