First Combat
The division received its first taste of war on July 9, when, with the 27th Division, it was assigned to the organization and defense of the East Poperinghe Line, a third defensive position in the Dickebusch Lake and Scherpenberg Sectors. Full responsibility for the East Poperinghe trench system was assumed by the division on July 11.

FLANDERS
Affiliated with the British, the division reached the front lines for training on July 16, and remained until August 18. Actual training was carried on until August 9, the 59th Infantry Brigade was affiliated with the British 49th Division, the 60th Infantry Brigade with the British 33rd Division, while the Machine Gun and Infantry units served by battalions and other divisional troops by detachments.

After a brief return to the rear for further training, the division relieved the British 33rd Division in the front line of the Canal Sector from the vicinity of Elzenwalle to the railroad southeast of Transport Fme, on the nights of August 16 and 17. On August 18 the division assumed command, with the British Sixth Division to its right. On the next day the Canal Sector occupation was merged into the Ypres-Lys Operation.

YPRES-LYS
From August 19 until September 4 the division, less Artillery and 105th Ammunition Train, took part in the Ypres-Lys Operation. The 55th Field Artillery Brigade and the 105th Ammunition Train participated in the occupation of the Lucey Sector with the 89th Division, August 26-September 11. Rumors of a German withdrawal of troops was investigated on August 31 by combat patrols of the division. The next day, with the 60th Infantry Brigade leading, the division captured Moated Orange, Voormezeele, Lock No. 8, and Lankhof Fme, and occupied a line connecting these localities with the original front at Gunners' Lodge. The 27th Division served to the right, the British 14th Division to the left.

On the nights of September 3, September 4, and September 5, the division was relieved by the British 35th Division, and on September 4, the command passed. The division concentrated near Proven on September 5 and 6, and moved into the St. Pol Area, in the zone of the British First Army on September 7 for Training.

Meanwhile, on September 12-15, the 55th Field Artillery Brigade and the 105th Ammunition Train supported the 89th Division in the St. Mihiel Operation. On September 15, these units were detached from the 89th Division and ordered to the V Corps to support the 37th Division in the Avocourt Sector. The 37th, along with the two 30th Division units, occupied the Avocourt Sector on September 23-25.

THE SOMME OFFENSIVE
The 30th Division, less Artillery, and the 105th Ammunition Train participated in the Somme Offensive Operation September 22-October 1. On the nights of September 21, 22, 23 and 24, the division moved to the Tincourt-Boucly (British Fourth Army) Area, where the Second Corps was affiliated with the Australian First Division, east of Villeret and Hargicourt from 300 meters east of Buisson-Gaulaine Fme, through La Haute Bruyere, la Terrasse Trench, Bois des Tuyas, Boyeu du Chevreau, to Malakoff Fme. The 59th Infantry Brigade occupied the forward area. Command passed to the 30th Division on September 24.

The 55th Field Artillery Brigade and the 105th Ammunition Train, meanwhile, participated in the Meuse-Argonne Operation, supporting the 37th and 32nd Divisions from September 26 to October 8.

On September 26-27, the 30th Division attacked from a line of departure between 300 and 400 meters east of the line between La Haute Bruyere and Malakoff Fme, with the British 46th Division on the right, and the 27th Division on the left. On the night of September 27 and 28, the 60th Infantry Brigade relieved the 59th Infantry Brigade.

HINDENBURG LINE IS SMASHED
September 29, 1918, brought one of the most important victories of the World War 1, for on that date the 30th Division battered its way through the Hindenburg Line, one of the most formidable battle lines known to history.

Immediately after the penetration, the division crossed the canal and captured Bellicourt, then entered Nauroy. The Australian Fifth Division moved up to pass through the 30th, and both divisions advanced to establish a front from the intersection of Wattling Street road and canal, east and northeast to Bois du Cabaret, 800 meters northeast of the Boise de Malakoff. The next day the command passed to the Australian Fifth Division, but units of the 30th which were in line participated until noon.

During its advance of 20 miles, the division captured 98 officers, 3,750 enlisted men, 72 pieces of artillery, 26 trench mortars and 426 machine guns. It suffered 8,415 casualties.

On October I and 2 the division moved to the Heroecourt and Mesnil-Bruntel Areas, and on the Fifth, the II Corps prepared to relieve the Australian troops in the front line. Returning to the front, the 59th Infantry Brigade moved to Nauroy, the 60th Infantry Brigade and other units moved to the Tincourt-Boucly Area.

On the night of October 5 and 6 the 59th Infantry Brigade relieved the Australian Second Division from Monibrehain to Beaurevoir, and on the sixth, the 60th Infantry Brigade took position in support near Hargicourt and Bellicourt. The next day the 59th Infantry Brigade attacked to realign the front.

The division on October 8, assisted by tanks, the 59th Infantry Brigade and one battalion from the 60th Infantry Brigade, leading, attacked northeast, and captured Brancourt-le-Grand and Premont, and reached a line from the Fme de la Piete to the eastern outskirts of Premont, British Sixth Division served on the right, while British 25th Division was on the left. The 60th Infantry Brigade passed through the 59th on October 9, and captured Busigny and Becquigny. The next day the division front extended along the western outskirts of Vaux-Andigny, through La Haie-Menneresse, and St. Souplet, to St. Benin.

APPROACHING THE END
The 55th Field Artillery and the 105th Ammunition Train participated, between October 11 and November 11, in the occupation of the Troyon Sector, supporting the 79th and 33rd Divisions

On October 11, the division occupied Vaux-Andigny, La Haie-Menneresse, and reached the northwestern outskirts of St. Martin-Riviere, its front extending north along the west bank of the La Selle River to St. Benin. It was relieved during the night of October 11 and 12 by the 27th Division, and rested near Premont, Brancourt-le-Grand, and Monibrehain. Command passed on October 12.

The 30th Division returned to the line on the night of October 15 and 16, the 59th Infantry Brigade relieving the 54th Infantry Brigade (27th Division), in the right sector of the II Corps from Vaux-Andigny to one-half kilometer west of St. Martin-Riviere, British Sixth Division on the right, 27th Division on the left. On October 17 the division attacked northeast, crossing the La Selle River, captured Molain and established a line from three-quarters kilometer north of La Demi-Lieue to l'Arbre-de-Guise. The next day Ribeauville was occupied. The front extended from Rejet-de-Beaulieu to three-quarters kilometer southeast of la Jonquiere Fme, on October 19.

The 30th Division was relieved by the British First Division on the night of October 19 and 20, and moved, October 20-23 to the vicinity of Tincourt-Boucly and Roisel. The division moved to Querrieu Area on October 23, for rehabilitation and training.

30th Infantry Division Combat Narrative

"The division landed across Omaha Beach France on 10 Jun 44. The 120th Inf. captured Monmartin-en-Graignes the following day and then defended the Vire-Taute Canal line. The 117th Inf. attacked across the Vire and the 120th Inf. assaulted across the Vire-Taute Canal on 7 July 44, establishing a bridgehead at St Jean-de-Day which the 3rd Armd. Div. exploited. As the division advanced on St Lo it checked a German counterattack along the main Hauts-Vents Highway 11 July 44 and Pont Hebert fell after protracted fighting 14 July 44. Patrols reached the Periers-St Lo Road 18 July 44 and the division attacked across it 25 July 44 to drive beyond St Lo during Operation COBRA. The division took well defended Troisgots 31 July 44 and relieved the 1st Inf Div. near Mortain 6 Aug. 44. It was subjected to a strong German counterattack which ruptured its lines in the area on the following day during the battle for Avranches. The division went over to the offensive again 11 Aug. 44 and forced back German gains to Mortain.

The division then pushed east behind the 2nd Armd Div., taking Nonancourt 21 Aug. 44. It crossed into Belgium 2 Sep. 44, and advanced over the Meuse River at Vise and Liege 11 Sep. 44. The 120th Inf. occupied Lanaye Holland and captured the locks intact the same day, and on 14 Sep 44 the 117th and 119th Inf advanced into Maastricht. The 119th and 120th Inf. attacked toward the West Wall north of Aachen and the former reached positions commanding the Wurm River 18 Sep. 44. The division attacked across the river between Aachen and Geilenkirchen 2 Oct. 44 against strong German opposition, and the following day the 117th Inf. seized Uebach after house-to-house fighting as the 119th Inf. finally captured Rimburg Castle. The division was assisted by the 2nd Armd Div. as it continued slow progress in the West Wall, but was checked by a German counterattack on 9 Oct. 44 which isolated the 119th Inf. at North Wuerselen. The encirclement of Aachen was completed regardless on 16 Oct. 44 when the division made contact with the 1st Inf. Div."

Mortain
This small French village became the focus of a German counterattack on the evening of August 6, 1944. Operation L?ttich, as it was called, was ordered by Hitler with the intention of splitting the American forces between Hodges' First Army and Patton's newly formed Third Army. The Germans needed control of the vital road network around Mortain to allow a drive to Avranches on the coast. the Germans would later state that their failure to complete the separation of the American forces was a "turning point" in the battle of the western front. This failure was caused by the determined resistance of Old Hickory at Mortain.

Hitler personally ordered this attack contrary to the advice of his generals. It was opposed to such a degree that the commander of the116th Panzer Division refused to follow the order, delaying the attack. Nonetheless, at approximately 0100 hours 7 August the lead elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Division made contact with members of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division. In addition to the 2nd SS "Panzer Lehr" division, the 1st SS Panzer "Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler", 116th Panzer, and17th SS Panzergrenadier divisions also participated.

The disposition of Old Hickory's troops around Mortain was as follows. On the eastern side of the town stood a tall hill, elevation 314. Hill 314 had been recognized by the Americans as a vital defensive position early on and was held by the 2nd battalion, 120th Infantry. The 1st of the 120th was on the west of Mortain holding hill 285. Two platoons of the 120th's company F, a platoon of the 120th's antitank company, along with 3rd platoon of Company A, 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion had established what would prove to be a crucial roadblock at L'Abbaye Blanche where they could cover the road junctions north of Mortain. Meanwhile, the 117th Infantry was in place at St. Barthelmy, approximately two miles north of Mortain. The 119th Infantry was to the northwest near Le Mesnil-Adel?e.

The Germans made significant gains in the early hours of the attack, actually capturing the village of Mortain. However the Nazis failed to gain control of the crucial high ground around Mortain. Such was the disposition in the initial stages of the attack.

Although they held Mortain, they had not gained control of the roads they so desperately needed. The directed artillery fire from Hill 314 prevented this. The 120th held the hill and despite being completely cut off from resupply and relief these infantrymen withstood the repeated assaults of combined German artillery, armor and infantry assaults.

The most important function of the battalion's stand was the continuing ability to call accurate artillery fire from the massed guns of ten artillery battalions, 120 tubes in all. The drive around Hill 314 became an artillery duel relying on forward observers like Lt. Robert Weiss on the hill with the 120th. However, due to the inability to resupply the besieged troops, the F.O.'s were running out of battery power for their radios. Despite multiple attempts to fight through the German positions surrounding the hill no penetration could be made.

The situation became so desperate that artillery resupply (packing plasma, dressings, and medicine in artillery shells normally used to fire propaganda leaflets and firing them into the 120th's position) of medical supplies was attempted, with little success. Airdrops were also attempted. After struggling through amazing amounts of beauracracy at corps level, the divisional G-4 was able get some C-47 drops but most of the supplies ended up in German hands, and most importantly, no radio batteries made it through. Even the light artillery spotter Piper Cubs attempted to get through, but they were driven off by heavy German fire. Radio calls were limited to fire missions, and then only the briefest of information could be transmitted.

The plight of the 2/120th on 314 remained grave. They held out against more German attacks and most of the men were certain they would be overrun. Many veterans of the battle stated that the Germans could have walked right through them several times. It even progressed to the point that an SS officer presented a surrender ultimatum to Lt. Kerley, commanding Co. E. Kerley declined the offer, and at 2015 hours on the 9th the Germans attempted to make the doughboys pay for their insolence. The SS attacked yet again, yelling "surrender!" as they ran over the American foxholes. The resulting fight was so bitter that Kerley was forced to call in artillery on his own position to finally repulse the attack.

This situation continued until the troops on Hill 314 were finally relieved the morning of August 12th by elements of the 35th Infantry Division. The story of the battle is ripe with tales of heroism, sacrifice and determination by regular soldiers. However the drama at the individual level may be overshadowed by the theater level significance of the division's stand in Mortain.

The fact that the 30th division held out against such a major attack is amazing in itself. additionally it was important that the German forces were fixed at Mortain, allowing the air strikes, artillery barrages, and tank hunting infantry teams to exact a terrible toll on the strongest divisions the Germans had in the region. The German losses in this failed attack were remarkable.

Remarkable as well was the opportunity the attack gave the Allies. By leaving the 30th unrelieved at Mortain, General Bradley was able to fix the Germans on this bait and begin an encirclement of the entire German Army Group B. Via Ultra intercepts the Allied high command knew the Germans were not going to retreat from the battle with the 30th. Bradley then developed operation Totalize designed to circle from the south with Patton's troops to meet Montgomery's striking from the north to Falaise.

Although little recognized in popular history, the heroic stand of the 30th Infantry Division at Mortain made a tremendous contribution to the allied victory in France.