The idea of a counter-stroke to cut off Paulus's Sixth German Army in Stalingrad was born as early as 12 September in Stalin's office. While Stalin himself remained convinced that the ultimate German objective was an advance up the Volga to Moscow, the fact was that Paulus was out on a limb with his flanks guarded by lesser-quality Roumanian formations, and the idea grew in attraction, especially since it would nip a German offensive northwards in the bud. Reserves were not available to carry out the counter-stroke at an early date, and Soviet attention was diverted by abortive attacks to relieve Leningrad. These began on 19 August and came to an end at the close of September. While they had not achieved their aim, they did forestall a major German assault on the city, one of Hitler's main plans for 1942, and kept German troops tied down who could have been better employed elsewhere. There was also the continued German pressure in the Caucasus and above all, at least in Stalin's eyes, on Stalingrad. The first priority was to prevent that city ailing into German hands. Nevertheless, Zhukov and Vasilievsky commenced planning. During the next month, Chuikov in Stalingrad desperately fought oft fierce German attacks. As he did so, the plan for Operation 'Uranus' began to take shape. It would consist of a deep double envelopment.

Operation 'Uranus'
From the north, Nikolai Vatutins South-West Front would attack the Third Roumanian Army and the drive on to Kalach. South of Stalingrad, Andrei Yeremenko?s Stalingrad Front would destroy VI Roumanian Corps and then meet Vatutin in the Kalach area. A further attack would be launched by Konstantin Rokossovsky?s Don Front and was designed to keep Pails pinned down. T movement of troops and other preparations c not go unnoticed by the Germans, but they we not certain what was about to unfold, even after, the end of October, a Russian propaganda campaign began to speak of large-scale operations against t Hitlerites'. At the end of October the start-date fixed as 9 November.

8 November 1942 Attack orders finally issued.
That night, however, the start-date was put be by one week because of delays in shifting troops and supplies.

11 November German attacks on Stalingrad renewed.
Chuikov?s sixty-second Army was soon in a desperate situation, but managed to cling on. In ? meantime it was decided that 'Uranus' should launched on the 19th.

19 November The South-Western and Don Fronts began their attack.
It was preceded by a short, sharp, but massive bombardment. The Romanians initially resisted strongly, and progress was slow.

20 November The Stalingrad Front attached.
Vatutin's attacks were now gaining momentum, by the end of this day he had penetrated up 25 miles.

21 November Paul?s HQ, now under threat moved to Nizhne-Chirskaye on the River Chir.
Next day Hitler ordered Paulus to move his east again to Gumrak, close to Stalingrad itself.

22 November Vatutin captured the vital bridge over the Don at Kalach.
It was the only intact bridge over the Don and on Sixth Army's main communications to the rear.

23 November The South-West and Stalingrad Fronts linked up.
Sixth and part of Fourth Panzer Armies, comprising 22 divisions and some 330,000 men, were trapped. The Roumanian Third Army had been destroyed and the Fourth badly battered. The task was to destroy the trapped German to but the Soviet forces were too weak to do immediately.

24 November Goering declared that he could keep Paulus supplied by air.
Paulus estimated that he required 750 tons day. The Luftwaffe, however, simply did not the number of transport aircraft needed to maintain this, and only one of the seven airstrips an Stalingrad had a night landing capability. Goering?s boast was therefore totally unrealistic. Nevertheless this decided Hitler that Paulus must remain where he was rather than break out to the west.

26 November Hitler ordered Sixth Army to stand fast.

27 November Army Group Don came into being.
Hitler appointed von Manstein to command it, and he was tasked with the relief of Paulus. He had one Luftwaffe, four Panzer and six infantry divisions, together with the remnants of a number of Roumanian formations. These forces were still concentrating, but von Manstein proposed to attack before they all arrived in order to achieve surprise and prevent a Soviet build-up. Rather than take the shortest route to Stalingrad, which ran initially along he River Don from its junction with the Chir, von Manstein chose the axis of the Kotelnikovo-Stalin-grad railway instead. His reasons were reported concentrations of Soviet troops astride the former and the problem of crossing the Don and the Chir. He decided to launch 'Winter Storm', as it was code-named, on 3 December.

Operation 'Winter Storm'
30 November Soviet attacks to clear the Germans from the lower Chir launched.
A weeks heavy fighting followed, during which von Manstein was forced to deploy formations earmarked for 'Winter Storm', which resulted in a postponement of that operation. The Soviets, however, failed to break through.

2 December Soviet attempt to split the German pocket at Stalingrad began.
I This was carried out by the Don and Stalingrad Fronts with the object of linking up at Gumrak. After five days' heavy fighting virtually no progress had been made, and the attacks were called off. Stalin ordered a new attack to be prepared. This, code-named 'Ring', was to be a two-phase operation: (1) to liquidate the south and west parts of the pocket; (2) a general assault against the remainder of the pocket. Once again the Don and Stalingrad Fronts were to carry it out, and it was to begin on 16 December.

12 December Von Manstein unleashed 'Winter Storm'.
The attack was carried out by Group Hoth (General Hermann Hoth). Initially progress was good, but fierce resistance by 5th Shock Army brought time for Russian troops from the Stalingrad area to be deployed in defensive positions along the River Myshkova.

16 December Soviet attack launched against Italian Eighth Army.
Code-named 'Little Saturn', this was aimed at cutting across von Manstein?s lines of communication and was carried out by element of the Voronezh and South-West Fronts. The Italians were quickly annihilated, and Tatsinskaya, the main German-held airfield for resupplying Stalingrad, was overrun.

19 December Hoot?s troops reached the Myshkova.
They were now within sixteen miles of Stalingrad. Since they could not break trough the Soviet defence line (although they continued trying until the 23rd), von Manstein proposed that Paulus break out and link up with Hoth. Paulus was only prepared to release some tanks unsupported by infantry, since he still had to hold on in Stalingrad. That day the Luftwaffe flew-in 250 tons to Paulus, which was a record and never again achieved, daily deliveries being only 90 tons or average.

24 December The Soviet counter-offensive broadened.
In the south the Stalingrad Front broke through the Fourth Roumanian Army and struck for the lower Don. Von Manstein, now threatened both from the north and from south, was forced to pull back Group Hoth.

28 December Hitler sanctioned a withdrawal by Army Groups Don and A to the line Konstantinovsk-Salsk-Armavir.
This put the army groups 125 miles away from Stalingrad and aggravated the resupply of Paulus still further. Even so, Hitler declared that he still intended to relieve the Sixth Army. Meanwhile the Russians could now prepare and execute the final reduction of the Stalingrad pocket.