Korean War

Throughout most of its history, Korea has been invaded, influenced, and fought over by its larger neighbors. Korea's closed-door policy, adopted to ward off foreign encroachment, earned it the name of "Hermit Kingdom." Japanese, Chinese, and Russian competition in Northeast Asia led to armed conflict, and Japan defeated its two competitors and established dominance in Korea, formally annexing it in 1910. Japan remained firmly in control until the end of World War II. Near the end of the war, the April 1945 Yalta Conference agreed to establish a four-power trusteeship for Korea. With the unexpected early surrender of Japan, the United States proposed-and the Soviet Union agreed-that Japanese troops surrender to US forces south of the 38th parallel and to Soviet forces north of that line.

In 1948 two different governments were inaugurated on the Korean Peninsula, fixing the South-North division of Korea. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was born south of the 38th parallel and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) north of it. North Korea, having obtained a massive amount of weapons from the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, launched guerrilla and other subversive operations against the South, preparing in haste to invade the South in a bid to communize the entire peninsula.

The communists built a formidable political and military structure in North Korea under the aegis of the Soviet command. They had created a regional Five-Province Administrative Bureau in October 1945, which was reorganized into the North Korean Provisional People's Committee in February 1946 and shed the "Provisional" component of its name twelve months later. The communists also expanded and consolidated their party's strength by merging all of the left-wing groups into the North Korean Workers' Party in August 1946. Beginning in 1946, the armed forces also were organized and reinforced. Between 1946 and 1949, large numbers of North Korean youths--at least 10,000--were taken to the Soviet Union for military training. A draft was instituted, and in 1949 two divisions--40,000 troops--of the former Korean Volunteer Army in China, who had trained under the Chinese communists, and had participated in the Chinese civil war (1945-49), returned to North Korea.

The US military government tried to put together a moderate coalition to provide itself with a broad base of political support.But the July 1947 assassination of a prominent leftist in the coalition and the decision of a coalition moderate to enter into unification talks with the north led to the demise of the coalition efforts.

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) was established. Syngman Rhee became the republic's first president. On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) was established in the north under Kim Il Sung. Guerrilla fighting in the south and clashes between southern and northern forces along the 38th parallel intensified during 1948-50. Although it continued to provide modest military aid to the south, the U.S. withdrew its occupation forces, leaving behind a 500-man Military Advisory Group by June 1949.

The communist South Korean Workers' Party led a partly indigenous guerrilla movement in the south after a major rebellion on Cheju Island in April 1948 that claimed tens of thousands of lives. South Korea's military and paramilitary forces were beset by mutinies and defections but eventually gained the upper hand. A communist-led revolt of army regiments in the southern part of the peninsula in October 1948, known as the Yosu-Sunch'on rebellion, consumed much of the army's attention and resources, and a massive purge in the aftermath of that revolt weakened the entire military establishment. In reaction to the Yosu-Sunch'on rebellion, a harsh national security law was passed in December 1949 that made communism a crime. However, the law was so comprehensive and vague that it could be used against any opposition group. Under the law, members of the South Korean Workers' Party were arrested and some 150,000 persons were barred from political activity.

North Korea put itself on a war footing in early 1949. Military officers were assigned to all high schools and higher institutions and all men and women aged 17 to 40 were given compulsory military training. Joint infantry, tank, and artillery field maneuvers were held by all major army units to test their ability to break through the 38th parallel.

North Korea's effort to win control of the south using guerrilla warfare forced South Korea's military leaders to concentrate on counterinsurgency operations. Fighting between South and North Korea began on 4 May 1949, in a battle probably started by the South. In the fall of 1949, North Korean guerrilla units attempted to gain control of remote areas and small towns in the mountainous areas of eastern and southern South Korea. It was estimated that as many as 5,000 guerrillas trained in North Korea were infiltrated into these areas by the winter of 1949. Two South Korean army divisions and one army brigade were quickly deployed to conduct sweep and destroy missions to eliminate the guerrillas. Counterinsurgency operations were initiated in South Cholla Province in October 1949. In some areas, South Korean villages were evacuated both to protect civilians and to assist counterinsurgency units in locating guerrilla bases. Guerrilla warfare continued until the end of 1949, coupled with skirmishing along the thirty-eighth parallel. By April 1950, less than 500 North Korean guerrillas remained in South Korea. Although the counterinsurgency program succeeded in ending the threat posed by the guerrillas, it had a deleterious effect on the army, necessitating reorganization and retraining for conventional war preparedness.

North Korea's conventional attack followed when it became clear that the insurgents would not triumph easily. At the beginning of 1950, more than 70 percent of North Korean troops were deployed in areas along the 38th parallel. By mid-1950 North Korean forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 troops, organized into ten infantry divisions, one tank division, and one air force division, with 210 fighter planes and 280 tanks. Soviet equipment, including automatic weapons of various types, T-34 tanks, and Yak fighter planes, had also been pouring into North Korea in early 1950. These forces were to fight the ill-equipped South Korean army of less than 100,000 men--an army lacking in tanks, heavy artillery, and combat airplanes, plus a coast guard of 4,000 men and a police force of 45,000 men.

Despite the heightening of Cold War tensions, the Truman Administration originally did not expect a major military conflict, and it drastically downsized American forces from 1945 to 1950. Military planners, for their part, assumed that the next war would be similar to the Second World War (except that nuclear weapons would be used earlier on). The North Koreans took encouragement from the US policy which left Korea outside the US "defense line" in Asia, discounting the probability of American counteraction.

On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave his famous Aleutians speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC. Acheson said that United States would adhere to the principle of non-interference with respect to the Chinese question and that the American defense line in the Pacific was one that connected Alaska, the Japanese archipelago, Okinawa, and the Philippines. He said the US Pacific "defense line" or "defensive perimeter" "runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes back to the Ryukyus.... We hold important positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and these we will continue to hold... The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands," he said. This -- Acheson tried to explain much later -- was no more than what the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Gen. Douglas McArthur held at the time, "that the U.S. line of defense starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska." But just because he did not include South Korea as part of his "defensive perimeter," it was said later on that such omission had served to give the communists "the green light" to try to overrun Korea.

Emboldened by the exclusion of South Korea from the American defense line in the Pacific zone in the so-called Acheson Declaration, Kim Il-sung decided to launch an outright invasion of the South. The 3,000 Soviet military advisors assigned to help train the North Korean forces were withdrawn as a smokescreen to cover the impending invasion. Information uncovered in 1992 confirmed that both the Soviet Union and China were aware and supportive of North Korea's invasion plans in 1949. Yu Song Cho, deputy chief of staff of the KPA at the time of the invasion, revealed that Soviet military advisers went so far as to rewrite his initial invasion order. Russian statements in 1992 revealed that Soviet air defense and fighter units totalling 26,000 men participated in the Korean War.

In the predawn hours of Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks and self-propelled guns, unleashed all-out attacks across the 38th parallel.

The only unforeseen event complicating North Korea's strategy was the swift decision by the United States to commit forces in support of South Korea. The time, place, and type of war that broke out in Korea came as a surprise to American policy makers and strategists. They were caught materially and intellectually unprepared. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea provides a look at the United States trying to handle the complexities of a strange kind of war, the first "limited war" the United States Army had ever fought. President Truman and his advisors had decided that to defeat the North Koreans would be too costly; instead, the United Nations forces would try to maintain the prewar border at the 38th parallel. The Truman Administration had great difficulty in calibrating political objectives, keeping strategy in line with policy, and isolating the adversary. The dispute between Truman and MacArthur highlighted the apparent disarray within American policy-making circles.

The United States, with other United Nations, came to the aid of South Korea. On June 26, 1950, Truman ordered the use of United States planes and naval vessels against North Korean forces, and on June 30 United States ground troops were dispatched. The United States, fearing that inaction in Korea would be interpreted as appeasement of communist aggression elsewhere in the world, was determined that South Korea should not be overwhelmed and asked the UN Security Council to intervene. When the Soviets made the mistake of walking out of an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, that body directed that the United Nations would send troops to South Korea.

The UN, in accord with its Charter, engaged in its first collective action by establishing the UN Command (UNC), under which 16 member nations sent troops and assistance to South Korea. At the request of the UN Security Council, the United States, contributor of the largest contingent, led this international effort. On August 29, 1950, the British Commonwealth's 27th Brigade arrived at Pusan to join the UNC, which until then included only ROK and U.S. forces. The 27th Brigade moved into the Naktong River line west of Taegu. Troop units from other countries of the UN followed in rapid succession; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. The Union of South Africa provided air units which fought along side the air forces of other member nations. Denmark, India, Norway, and Sweden provided medical units. Italy provided a hospital, even though it was not a UN member.

A 3-year "police action" resulted. The Korean War consisted of four distinct phases.

Initially, the Communist army advanced against increasing resistance as it forced the United Nations defenders into the Pusan perimeter in the most southeastern part of South Korea. The second phase began in 1950 when the North Koreans suffered a complete reversal of fortune when the UN forces landed at Inchon, far beyond the battle line; burst from the Pusan perimeter; shattered the North Korean Army; and pursued its remnants northward. The third phase began when China intervened in force in November 1950, surprising the scattered United Nations armies as they approached North Korea?s northern border and driving them back to the vicinity of the 38th parallel. Finally, the fourth phase was a stalemate, during which neither side would risk vast casualties in an attempt to gain a complete victory. Truce talks began in July 1951, but the fighting continued until July 1953, when the negotiations at last bore fruit and the conflict ended in a cease-fire agreement.

The events following the June 1950 invasion proved the superiority of North Korean military forces and the soundness of their overall invasion strategy. The North Koreans quickly crushed South Korean defenses at the 38th parallel. Spearheaded by tanks, the army of North Korea crossed the 38th parallel at several points on June 25 and plunged southward into the Republic of Korea. Caught unprepared, the South Korean army of Gen. Chae Byong Duk reeled back from the 200-mile border. South Korea's army was simply overwhelmed. The capital of Seoul fell in three days as the North Koreans under Gen. Chai Ung Chai bridged the Han River on June 30 and pressed forward down the length of the peninsula.

The speed of the North Korean drive and the unreadiness of American forces compelled MacArthur to trade space for time. Under the auspices of the United Nations, Gen. Douglas MacArthur flew in United States troops from Japan to aid the South Koreans. The first American ground forces (700 men from the 24th Infantry Division under Col. Charles Smith) took up positions at Osan, 30 miles south of Seoul, on July 5. Without effective antitank weapons, the combined American-South Korean forces could not halt the armored thrusts of the Russian-made T-34 tanks employed by the North Koreans. About 150 Americans were killed, wounded, or missing in the first Communist attack. By midafternoon, Task Force Smith was pushed into a disorganized retreat with the loss of all equipment save small arms.

As more United States units arrived by air and sea, Gen. William Dean of the 24th Division committed them in a series of delaying actions along the vital Seoul-Taejon-Pusan axis. But the retreat continued. Taejon fell on July 20. Dean himself was wounded and later captured. Meanwhile, on July 13 Gen. Walton Walker had assumed command of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, which soon included the 1st Cavalry and 25th Infantry (and later the 2nd Infantry) divisions, as well as marines.

On 26 July 1950, LT GEN Walton H. Walker issued an operational directive to his field commands to withdraw to prepared positions along the Naktong River, stabilize the front, and maintain a position from which they could transition to the offense. Units were to maintain contact with the enemy during the retrograde. Though Mac Arthur never alluded directly to Walker's withdrawal plans, he did convey the message that the Eighth Army was expendable -- there would be no "Korean Dunkirk" On 29, July, LT GEN Walker issued his controversial "stand or die" order outlining what be (and GEN MacArthur) expected. This ultimatum was disseminated to every soldier in the field with varying interpretations. Due to LT GEN Walker's ineptness at public relations, the news media picked up the story and promptly sensationalized his remarks. Many criticized the order because they thought it was impossible to execute. Walker and his Eighth Arm was running out of space to trade for time. Soon there would be no place to withdraw to except into the sea.

Despite the order, Eighth Army units were consistently forced back and, on 1 August, LT GEN Walker ordered his command to withdraw behind the Naktong River and establish a defensive posture oriented on terrain retention. Despite American dominance of the air and sea, the Eighth Army and South Korean units were pushed back to the Naktong River by August 5. Pohang, 63 miles northeast of Pusan, fell on August 11. By early August, South Korean forces were confined in the southeastern corner of the peninsula to a territory 140 kilometers long and 90 kilometers wide. Fifty miles short of the sea, a defensive perimeter (labeled by journalists as the "Pusan Perimeter") was formed. Apart from this "Pusan Perimeter" around the port of Pusan, the rest of the territory was completely in the hands of the North Korean army.

The Eighth Army dug in for a desperate defense in the perimeter around the key port of Pusan. The North Koreans, who had suffered an estimated 58,000 casualties in their drive southward, hammered at the perimeter defenses and managed to secure several bridgeheads across the Naktong, in the west. Taegu, 55 miles to the northwest, and Masan, 29 miles west, were seriously threatened. The front was now clearly defined and more or less static. Consequently, combat multipliers such as close air support and artillery could be employed more effectively while rail and road networks inroads against enemy tanks and mechanized artillery, gave American forces a feeling of security and the will to "stand or die".

At the Naktong, the North Korean Force made its supreme effort - and failed. By now the enemy's lengthened supply lines were under constant air attack, enemy naval opposition had been wiped out, and the blockade of the Korean coast had been clamped tight. During the next month and a half, fourteen North Korean divisions dissipated their strength in piecemeal attacks against the Pusan perimeter.

Walker made maximum use of his interior-line position to shift reserves to trouble spots. By the end of August all Communist penetration attempts had been checked or eliminated. At that time Walker commanded 91.500 Republic of Korea (ROK) troops, 87.000 Americans, and 1,500 British. In September the fighting at the edge of the perimeter showed a gradual diminishment of North Korean offensive power. Meanwhile in Japan, MacArthur organized an amphibious strike behind the Communist lines in the Seoul area.

General MacArthur recognized that the North Koreans were vulnerable to an amphibious envelopment. A landing at Inch'on, the Yellow Sea port just twenty-five miles west of Seoul would cut North Korean road and rail line supply routes. The Inch'on shore line is a low-lying coastal plain subject to very high tides. There are no beaches in the landing area-only wide mud flats at low tide and stone walls at high tide. Because of the mud flats, the landing force would have to use the harbor and wharfage facilities in the port area.

The assault on Inch'on on 15 September 1950 encountered light resistance and UN forces steadily pushed inland. This was a huge confidence builder for the forces and particularly MacArthur. In retrospect, it probably provided too much confidence, which contributed to future problems. The Inchon invasion cut the already overextended supply lines of the North Korean army. Communist soldiers fled up the peninsula, pursued by United Nations forces.

The breakout of the Pusan Perimeter was timed perfectly to coincide with the Inchon invasion. During the breakout of the Pusan Perimeter, ROK AND US forces would experience some of the most violent combat undertaken in the Korean War. The breakout of the Pusan Perimeter cost the Eighth Army alone over 4,000 casualties, including 750 killed in action. In fact, US casualties in the first two weeks of September were the heaviest of the war; likewise, ROK and UN counterparts paid equally in blood.

The course of the war changed abruptly, and within weeks much of North Korea was taken by United States and South Korean forces. By 25 September the NKPA, with their lines of communications severed and their escape routes imperiled, quickly capitulated or stampeded in panic towards the 38th parallel. There was a brief hesitation at the 38th parallel before the Allies crossed it, but on 9 October elements of the Eighth Army crossed the 38th parallel (after the ROK Army had already done so) and X Corps embarked at Inchon for sea movement to Wonsan.

On 19 October, the North Korean capital of Pyongyang was captured and by 28 October, ROK troops reached the Yalu River. In hopes of ending operations before the onset of winter, MacArthur on October 24 ordered an advance to the northern Korean border with China at the Yalu River. On 24 November, UN forces began the "end of the war" offensive which had as its objective the destruction of the North Korean regime and the unification of Korea. Victory seemed at hand, but within 24 hours the situation changed with devastating suddeness. When Kim's regime was nearly extinguished, the Soviet Union did very little to save it -- China picked up the pieces.

China, finding the UN Command occupation of North Korea unacceptable and its diplomatic efforts ignored, announced the formation of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in October 1950. The Chinese People's Liberation Army massed some 850,000 "volunteer troops" north of the Yalu River. The UN force's advance had continued despite warnings of a massive Chinese intervention by the huge Chinese force assembled across the Yalu in northern China. Mao Tse Tung feared that the Allies would not stop in Korea, but would continue across the Yalu River into China and attempt to overthrow communism in mainland China.

In late October and through the middle of November, MacArthur was still confident on his forces ability to conduct offensive operations. He felt the North Koreans were near defeat and that the chances of Chinese intervention were minimal. On 3 Nov, MacArthur?s Intel Chief believed Chinese intervention consisted of a small number of volunteers no more than 10,000. MacArthur felt he could not be stopped. As the days passed in November, it was obvious that the Chinese intervention was more than a small number of volunteers.

The Chinese loved to fight at night. This maximized their strengths (stamina, stealth, and large numbers) and minimized their weaknesses (susceptibility to air strikes, lack of transport, and nonexistent or limited artillery support. On signal (usually a flare, bugle, or pipe call), the first wave of attackers would surge forward in an effort to pin Americans to their position, while other columns attempted to find the weakest point in the line in order to turn a flank or gain a position in the rear.

During the night of 25 November 1950 strong attacks by more than 300,000 Chinese combat troops virtually destroyed the ROK II Corps and uncovered the central core of the 8th Army. By 26 November the 8th Army was in full retreat. This forced MacArthur to notify Washington "We face an entirely new war."

As the Chinese offensive gained momentum, American and other UN forces retreated. In the history of modern warfare only two nations have demonstrated their ability to leave a hostile shore with any semblance of order. At Dunkirk in 1940, the British faced with a choice, wisely elected to save their men and to forgo the hope of saving their equipment. At Hungnam in December 1950, the X Corps was able to withdraw its units intact with all equipment -- over 100,000 Soldiers, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of bulk cargo. The Navy used 109 ships (some twice) in transporting 192 shiploads. In addition, over 98,000 refugees were evacuated.

On 4 January 1951, the capital city of Seoul changed hands for the third time within a six month period. UN forces along the western front were forced to withdraw once again; however, the Chinese did not aggressively follow-up and contact with the enemy dropped off. While this sector of the front remained uneasily quiet after the capture of Seoul, the central and eastern fronts experienced a series of grim battles fought in sub-zero degree temperatures. Again, some ground was lost. By mid-January the military situation along the central and eastern fronts improved as enemy pressure gradually subsided. The primitive Chinese logistical system permitted offensive operations for no more than a week or two before a pause for replacements and new supplies. Exploiting this weakness, the US Eighth Army counter-attacked, recapturing Seoul by mid-March 1951, and by the first day of spring advancing to just below the 38th parallel.

MacArthur had the agreement of President Harry S Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take over the whole of North Korea. However, they did not agree to his suggestions of bombing China, including use of the atomic bomb. After MacArthur publicly advocated widening the war, President Truman recalled MacArthur on 11 April 1951 and named General Ridgway as successor. No significant change was made in the policy developed between President Truman's decision to intervene in June 1950 and the beginning of Armistice negotiations at Kaesong in July 1951.

During the war the Soviets sold China military equipment, including artillery and MIG fighter planes. The USSR also provided advisers and military hardware to the North Koreans, and Soviet pilots flew MiGs against US planes. However, Stalin was unwilling to become involved with the United States in a war over Korea, just as Truman was unwilling to become involved there in a war with the USSR.

By the end of May 1951, the battle lines were established where today's Demilitarized Zone exists -- northwestward from the Han River Estuary in the west, less than 30 miles from Seoul, to the north of the 38th Parallel on the east coast. The war had definitely entered a new phase. The fighting continued, but there would be no further large-unit ground operations involving dramatic advances and withdrawals up and down the length of the peninsula. Whereas maneuver and a fluid battlefield defined the initial phase of the Korean War, the remainder of the war was characterized by stalemate reminiscent of World War I trench warfare. Instead of a conflict that had as its purpose (for both opposing armies) the reunification of Korea, the war became a holding action. The issue of achieving a decisive military victory was no longer paramount and neither side had any desire to expand the scope of the conflict. As such, prospects of achieving a military armistice appeared promising.

With the appearance in late 1950 of the MiG-15 jet fighter the air war entered a new phase. It was apparent that the MiG-15 was superior to any aircraft then in the American inventory. The MiG pilots were also very good, being (for the most part) veteran Russian fliers. But a counter to the MiG-15 soon emered in the superb F-86A (and later, F-86E/F) Sabre. Many of the Sabre pilots were veterans of World War II and their expertise showed. Soon the Sabres and MiGs were mixing it up over northwest Korea, an area that became known as "MiG Alley." While the war turned into a stalemate on the ground, MiG Alley remained a hot spot throughout the war. For a time the B-29s continued bombing targets in northwest Korea by day, but when MiG-15s shot down five Superfortresses in a week in October 1951, the big bombers began attacking only at night. Air Force bombers kept Chinese airfields in North Korea out of action, while F-86 Sabres succeeded in downing so many MiG-15 jet fighters in "MiG Alley" that American forces further south were free of enemy air attack.

Armistice negotiations began at Kaesong in July 1951. But late in August 1951, after the truce negotiations had been suspended, the UN resumed the offensive in order to drive the enemy farther back from the Hwachon Reservoir (Seoul's source of water and electric power) and away from the Chorwon-Seoul railroad. Success in each of these enterprises would straighten, shorten and give greater security to the the UN front line, and inflict damage on the enemy. The UN put a major effort in the X Corps zone, using all five divisions in that corps to prosecute ridge-top and mountain actions. The US 1st Marine Division, with ROK marine units attached, opened a drive against the northern portion of the Punchbowl August 31.

Two days later the 2nd Division attacked northward against Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges in the vicinity of the Punchbowl's western edge and Taeu-san. Both assaults, delivered uphill by burdened, straining infantrymen, met with initial success. The 2nd Division, on Bloody and Heartbreak Ridges west of the Punchbowl, was engaged in the fiercest action since spring. The 2nd Division infantrymen crawled hand-over-hand up towering, knife-crested ridges to assault the hard-fighting enemy who would yield a ridge only in desperation, then strike back in vigorous counterattack. The same crest often changed hands several times each day.

Bloody Ridge consists of three hills 983, 940 and 773 and their connecting ridges. The maze of enemy trenches on the ridges made it appear to air observers that Bloody Ridge had been plowed. The trenches connected many bunkers which the enemy had built strong enough to withstand artillery fire and air strikes. The August 1951 fighting for Bloody Ridge took place while cease-fire negotiations droned on at the Kaesong armistice conferences. On Bloody Ridge infantrymen had to go forward with flame throwers and grenades after all supporting weapons had failed to dislodge the enemy. After weeks of combat, North Korean forces moved north to strengthen positions on the next prominent terrain feature in that area: Heartbreak Ridge.

In late September and early October 1951 a month-long battle focused on the complex structure of enemy defensive positions protecting the seven-mile-long hill mass that became known as Heartbreak Ridge. Responsibility for seizing this are had passed from Eighth Army to X Corps, to the 2d Infantry Division. North Korean soldiers in bunkers effectively slowed the American advance, throwing fragmentation and concussion grenades. Close infantry action is brutal, dirty, fear-inspiring work. The battle raged until 14 October, when the enemy seemed to be willing to reopen the truce talks and the last ridge was secured.

Fighting during the remainder of 1951 tapered off to patrol clashes, raids, and small battles for possession of outposts in no-man's-land. The front lines, except for periodic and bloody fights over particularly strategic terrain in what was called the "Hill War," stayed fairly constant. The war settled into a pattern oddly reminiscent of World War I. Both sides operated from heavily-fortified positions on the Korean mountainsides, sending out patrols, often at night, for reconnaissance and ambush. The Chinese mounted enough of their terrifying "human wave" attacks to vary the "routine." Action at the front continued as artillery duels, ambushes, and bitter contests for position, though these furious and costly small-scale battles left the lines substantially unchanged at the end of 1952.

In comparison to the naval forces engaged in World War II, Korea was a small war. At no time were more than four large carriers in action at the same time. Yet in the 3 years of war, Navy and Marine aircraft flew 276,000 combat sorties, dropped 177,000 tons of bombs and expended 272,000 rockets. This was within 7,000 sorties of their World War II totals in all theaters and bettered the bomb tonnage by 74,000 tons, and the number of rockets by 60,000.

The Korean Conflict was chaotic and difficult for American Artillery. Classical front lines disappeared. Artillery units often found themselves surrounded and artillerymen were called upon to fight side by side with the infantry. Artillery was used to perform rear guard actions. To make up for their lack of artillery, the Chinese made American battery positions their prime targets. Batteries had to fight off invaders in close combat and still fire their guns in support of the combat operations.

Three air interdiction operations, two named STRANGLE and another called SATURATE, tried to paralyze the enemy's transportation system upon which he relied for supplies. Weather and an inability to execute sustained night attacks thwarted these efforts. Much more successful was the campaign to employ air power to pressure the Chinese into accepting an Armistice satisfactory to the United States. This "air pressure" campaign was perhaps a key factor in finally ending the war. Attacks, in June 1952, on four hydroelectric generating complexes at Suiho, Chosin, Fusen, and Kyosen opened the campaign. These raids were spectacularly successful; North Korea experienced a nearly total loss of electric power for two weeks and never regained its former level of generating capacity before the end of the war. Manchuria, too, suffered the loss of a quarter of its supply of electricity. By the end of 1952, jet fighters had largely replaced the vulnerable F-51s for air-to-ground support. Even the older F-80 jet fighters sometimes proved too vulnerable.

In November 1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President on the campaign pledge to "go to Korea." Action at the front continued as a series of artillery duels, patrols, ambushes, raids, and bitter contests for outpost positions. Pork Chop Hill, situated in a no-man's land between the opposing forces, was the site of four separate engagements. It became famous in story and film just before the end of the war, in early July 1953, when the Chinese tried to dislodge elements of the 17th Infantry from the crest. Friendly forces withstood a series of assaults before withdrawing in the face of the enemy's disregard for casualties.

The truce talks remained stalemated and hostilities continued until an armistice was finally concluded on 27 July 1953. On that date at Panmunjom, the military commanders of the North Korean Army, the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the United Nations Command signed an armistice agreement. The war lasted three years and one month and devastated almost the entire Korean Peninsula. Neither the United States nor South Korea is a signatory of the armistice per se, though both adhere to it through the UNC. No comprehensive peace agreement has replaced the 1953 armistice pact; thus, a condition of belligerency still technically exists on the divided peninsula.

The war left indelible marks on the Korean Peninsula and the world surrounding it. The entire peninsula was reduced to rubble, and casualties on both sides were enormous [though as with most wars, subject to conflicting claims]. Combatant deaths alone included as many as 180,000 South Korean and United Nations troops. In June 2000 the US Department of Defense revised the the number of Americans killed in the conflict, from 54,246 to 36,940, to include 33,000 actual battlefield deaths. The higher figure -- widely cited for nearly half a century -- mistakenly included all 20,617 non-battlefield US military deaths that had occurred worldwide during the three-year conflict. Only to the more than dead in Korea. But only 3,275 nonbattlefield deaths, due to accident or disease, occurred in Korea. Estimates of the number of Communist soldiers killed range as high as 1,420,000 -- 520,000 North Koreans and 900,000 Chinese -- though these claims were surely inflated. Chinese sources report that only 110,000 Chinese soldiers were killed in action with another 35,000 dying of wounds and disease.

A political conference was held in Geneva in April 1954 to resolve the Korean question pursuant to the Armistice Agreement. But the meeting broke off in two months. The 38th parallel has simply been replaced by the truce line and Korea remains divided. The chances for peaceful unification had been remote even before 1950, but the war dashed all such hopes. Sizable numbers of South Koreans who either had been sympathetic or indifferent to communism before the war became avowed anticommunists afterwards. The war also intensified hostilities between the communist and noncommunist camps in the accelerating East-West arms race. Moreover, a large number of Chinese volunteer troops remained in North Korea until October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly important role in Korean affairs. Because tension on the Korean Peninsula remained high, the United States continued to station troops in South Korea, over the strenuous objections of North Korean leaders. The war also spurred Japan's industrial recovery and the United States' decision to rearm Japan.

Unlike after its previous wars, the United States did not fully and immediately demobilize. Production and spending continued at a relatively high level. In this respect, the Korean War was the most important event in the history of the Cold War, and, indeed, was a watershed in American military history. After this war, the United States embarked on the first long-term peacetime program of military and industrial preparedness. No longer would the country virtually disarm after a war; instead, it would promote the concept of readiness. No longer was the question whether or not to produce, but what to produce and how much.

Even after provoking the Korean War and wreaking fratricidal havoc on the nation, Pyongyang had not given up the policy of communizing the South by force of arms. The North has turned the whole country into a huge military barracks for use as the so-called "revolutionary base." After the division of the peninsula, North Korea used subversion and sabotage against South Korea as part of its effort to achieve reunification. North Korea was unsuccessful at developing a covert political infrastructure in South Korea or forging links with dissidents resident in South Korea, and after the early 1960s P'yongyang's efforts were unproductive.

Peacetime infiltration by North Korean agents was a fact of life in South Korea after the armistice in 1953. There were, however, clear shifts both in the number and method of infiltrations over the years and in their goals. Through the mid-1960s, P'yongyang sent agents primarily to gather intelligence and to try to build a covert political apparatus.

Starting in the fall of 1966, North Korea began pursuing a tougher, more aggressive policy toward South Korea and the US. Pyongyang deliberately heightened tensions along the DMZ, landed infiltration teams inside South Korea, and was more aggressive in shooting incidents involving South Korean fishing vessels and patrol boats. This policy was probably intended by the North Korean leadership primarily as a demonstration against US and ROK action in Vietnam.

Kim Il Sung embarked on a course of drastically increased conflict along lines proposed by Che Guevara. Based on the theory that the United States could not support more than one "Vietnam" at a time, he hoped to create a situation that would prevent the ROK from sending more troops to Vietnam. By 1967 a force of special agents, commandos, and guerrillas specialized for various locations in the ROK, averaging about 25,000 strong, was being trained and began operating into ROK. Action occurred throughout the country, at the DMZ and in mountainous regions in the Northeast and Southwest of ROK. The latter two were supported by sea infiltration, which constituted over 60 percent of the total. By late 1967 there had been vastly increased attempted penetrations, firefight incidents, and UNC casualties, all up about tenfold from 1966.

Kim Il-sung took advantage of US preoccupation with Vietnam by opening a "second Asian front". A total of 319 US and ROK soldiers were killed in action along the DMZ between 1966 and 1969. North Korean provocations against the South peaked in a period from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, when North Korea seemingly had a relative edge over the South in terms of military and economic strength. This dramatic shift to violent attempts to destabilize South Korea included commando raids along the DMZ that occasionally escalated into firefights involving artillery. These raids peaked in 1968, when more than 600 infiltrations were reported, including an unsuccessful attempt at a commando attack on the Blue House in Seoul. The Pueblo was captured at sea and its crew taken captive, South Korean trains were blown up, infiltration tunnels were discovered under the DMZ, North Korean artillery fired on a South Korean barracks, an American barracks was dynamited, North Korean commandos attacked the "Blue House" in Seoul to assassinate South Korea's President, and attacks on American and ROK troops along the DMZ became commonplace.

One of the worst episodes occurred in the early morning hours of 2 November 1966 while President Lyndon Johnson was staying at Walker Hill Resort near Seoul. North Korean troops charged out of the DMZ, lobbing grenades and firing submachine guns at close range at an American squad. The patrol fought back fiercely, but in vain. PFC Ernest D. Reynolds, who had been in Korea for only 17 days, was posthumously recommended for the Medal of Honor for his tenacity in the ensuing hand-to-hand fighting (it was not awarded). The patrol's only survivor was 17 year old PFC David L Bibee who pretended death while North Koreans yanked off his wrist watch.

On 21 January 1968, 31 commandos from the North Korean 124th Unit, a special forces unit, made a daring incursion across the truce line into Segomjong, Seoul, to raid the Blue House, the presidential residence, and kill key government officials. The commandos, all in South Korean military uniform, were armed with submachine guns and hand grenades. The South Korean military and police quickly launched a counteraction, capturing one of the commandos, Kim Shin-jo, and killing the other 28.

Less than 48 hours after the raid on the Blue House, North Korean forces seized the U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel USS Pueblo on January 23 and arrested its crew. The United States protested the incidents at the UN Security Council and met with North Korean representatives at the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom in an attempt to gain release of the ship and crew.

Other major acts of North Korean provocation included the infiltration of more than 100 armed guerrillas into the Ulchin and Samch'ok areas along the east coast in November 1968.

In 1969 more than 150 infiltrations were attempted, involving almost 400 agents. In 1970 and 1974, agents attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate President Park. In the 1974 attempt, during an August 15 ceremony marking National Liberation Day at the National Theater in Seoul, the assassin's shots missed President Park but killed Mrs. Park.

Subsequently, P'yongyang's infiltration efforts abated somewhat, and the emphasis shifted back to intelligence gathering and covert networks. From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, most North Korean infiltration was done by heavily armed reconnaissance teams, which increasingly were intercepted and neutralized by South Korean security forces. After shifting to infiltration by sea for a brief period in the 1980s, P'yongyang apparently discarded military reconnaissance in favor of inserting agents from third countries.

North Korea did not abandon violence, however, as was shown by the abortive 1982 attempt to recruit Canadian criminals to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan, the 1983 Rangoon assassination attempt that killed seventeen South Korean government officials and four Burmese dignitaries, and the 1987 destruction of a Korean Air airliner with 115 people on board. In the airliner bombing, North Korea broke from its pattern of targeting South Korean government officials, in particular the president, and targeted ordinary citizens.

Other North Korean provocations included the axe-murders of two American officers at P'anmunjom in August 1976, the intrusion of a North Korean submarine near Kangnung in September 1996, and another such intrusion in June 1998.

In addition, North Korea has dug invasion tunnels across the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone in violation of the Armistice Agreement. One of the tunnels was detected by the South Korean troops in January 1974 and three others later. It is believed that North Korea has dug dozens of invasion tunnels in the buffer zone.

Technically, the peninsula remains in a state of war restrained by an armistice. The subject of replacing the armistice with a formal peace agreement was mentioned in the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation between North Korea and South Korea, but remained unresolved by the end of the century.