Perceiving that the key to a successful investment of Knoxville lay in controlling the heights south of the city, Longstreet ordered part of Hood's Division to cross the Holston River [now the Tennessee River] and move on the Federal positions at Forts Higley, Dickerson, and Stanley. This move was intended to allow the Confederate artillery to dominate the Federal lines west and north of the city by firing from the higher ground south of the river. In addition, should the Federals be driven from their hilltop fortresses, a quick assault across the pontoon bridge might breach the Federal lines from the rear and make their positions in Knoxville untenable.

The Texas Brigade of General Jerome Robertson and the Alabama Brigade of General E. McIver Law, along with Captain William Parker's Virginia Battery, crossed the Holston on flatboats two and a half miles below the city between 21 and 23 November 1863. The Confederates quickly established themselves on Cherokee Heights, driving the advanced Federal pickets back to their main skirmish line. Both sides entrenched in the woods and commenced a heavy sniper fire.

The Federal works south of the river were manned by part of the 23rd Army Corps. Colonel Daniel Cameron's Brigade occupied the advanced skirmish line along the western slope of Armstrong's Hill, which rises along the river between Cherokee Heights and Fort Higley. Between Armstrong's Hill and Cherokee Heights was an open field of about ten acres bordered by a rail fence running along the edge of the woods at the slope of Armstrong's Hill and turning to enclose a lane running across the southern edge of the field to the foot of Cherokee Heights. A small log cabin stood below the slope just north of the lane. Most of the field was sheltered from the river by a thicket some sixty yards wide. Cameron's pickets were posted in the woods behind the fence line at the foot of Armstrong's Hill.

Cameron's Brigade was a mixture of veteran troops and regiments of little over one year's service, who had seen no action other than skirmishes with bushwhackers. Cameron had placed his veterans, the 24th Kentucky and 65th Illinois, in the line of works along Armstrong's Hill, holding the relatively untried 103rd Ohio in reserve. Sniper and harassing artillery fire had been heavy throughout the morning of 25 November, and the 103rd Ohio was ordered to reinforce the Federal picket line.

Separating Armstrong's Hill from Fort Higley to the east is a deep ravine. A short saddle joins the southern edge of Armstrong's Hill to the Fort Higley ridge line. At about noon on 25 November the 103rd Ohio crossed this saddle and filed up the slope to the crest of Armstrong's Hill. The men stacked arms while officers went forward to the picket line to choose positions for their companies. Suddenly, a barrage of Confederate artillery opened from Cherokee Heights, and the Federals were stunned to see a Confederate battle line, colors waving and bayonets gleaming, emerge from the woods and march resolutely across the field toward their lines. General Micah Jenkins, commanding Hood's Division, assaulted with Robertson's Texans on the left near the river and Law's Alabamians on the right. The Texans quickly crossed the 220 yards of open ground in their front, only to be staggered by a close-range volley from veterans of the 24th Kentucky and 65th Illinois. On they came, up a short slope to a rail fence bordering the wood line. There they were halted by heavy fire from entrenched Federals.

To the south, Law's Brigade enjoyed initial success. The Alabamians had less open ground to cross, and the Federal skirmish line was not heavily manned in their front. They surged up the hillside and into the woods, clashing with the 103rd Ohio at the top of the hill. Lack of officers and battle experience produced initial confusion among the green Ohioans, who nevertheless put up a spirited defense. However, Law's men, who must surely have been reminded of another fight for a wooded hilltop much like this one not quite five months before in Pennsylvania, pressed forward, pushing the Ohioans off the crest toward the deep ravine at their backs. Grimly the Ohioans hung on until a private seized the initiative and shouted, "Forward! Charge bayonets!" With a cheer, the 103rd Ohio charged and drove the Confederates back down the hill to the fence line.

In the meantime, the right of Cameron's Brigade had launched its own charge, driving Robertson's Brigade back across the field to the foot of Cherokee Heights. Now unsupported, Law's Brigade also fell back slowly, leaving pockets of resistance along the rail fence bordering the lane and setting up a strong point in the log cabin. The 24th Kentucky followed the Texans across the field and attempted to scale Cherokee Heights, but Parker depressed his guns and raked the Federals with shell and canister. The field changed hands several times as one side or the other gained the advantage. Some of Robertson's Texans worked their way into the thicket bordering the river where, along with their comrades in the log cabin and along the rail fence, they kept up a hot crossfire on the Federals.

Finally, about dusk, Cameron's men, with support from Wolford's mounted command, pushed the Confederates out of the thicket and log house and back to their lines on Cherokee Heights. Still determined to take Cherokee Heights, the 24th Kentucky scaled the hillside nearly up to Parker's guns, but their comrades did not follow so they fell back. Both sides re-occupied and consolidated their positions of the morning, settling into the familiar routine of sniper fire for the remainder of the siege.

The action at Armstrong's Hill has largely been forgotten. You cannot find Armstrong's Hill mentioned anywhere in the Official Records and only in a handful of regimentals. However, this was a savage two-hour battle with important results for the siege of Knoxville and surprising parallels to the assault on Little Round Top at Gettysburg. The numbers in both actions were roughly equal, and the Confederate participants were the same in both. The terrain is markedly similar on both fields, although the slope of Little Round Top is certainly rockier. The Confederates mounted a spirited assault in both instances, only to be driven back. Here the similarities end; Little Round Top has been the subject of story, poetry, and canvas for 125 years, while Armstrong's Hill has been relegated to obscurity.

It deserves better. The Federal defense denied Longstreet the use of the best high ground across the river for his artillery, and two veteran Confederate brigades were kept out of the assault on Fort Sanders. Who knows what might have been the result had Hood's veterans joined in the charge on the ditch in that frigid morning of 29 November? Cameron's men, including the no-longer-green 103rd Ohio, were justified in the pride with which they described their actions at Knoxville in post-war memoirs. To be sure, they would fight in bigger battles, but they would never forget Armstrong's Hill as one of their finest hours.