The fleet of the British Navy had been designed to contest a huge, decisive battle, with the enemy. After the outbreak of the First World War, attempts were made to draw the smaller German Navy into the North Sea for a major battle. Admiral Hugo von Pohl, the commander of the German High Seas Fleet, resisted these temptations, but in February 1916, he was replaced by the much more aggressive, Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer.

In May 1916 Scheer decided that he would take on the might of the British Navy. As a bait, Scheer ordered Admiral Franz von Hipper and 40 ships to begin a sweep along the Danish coast. When he heard the news, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who was at Rosyth, gave instructions for the Grand Fleet to put to sea.

With the absence of reconnaissance aircraft, both Jellicoe and Scheer sent out scouting cruisers to locate the position of the enemy. The two sets of scouting cruisers made contact and after a brief gunfire exchange, returned to guide their fleets to battle.

Meanwhile, Admiral Sir David Beatty, and 52 ships had left Scarpa Flow in the Orkneys and were on the way to join Admiral Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet. At 15.45, Beatty came into contact with Admiral Franz von Hipper and his 40 ships. The two fleets opened fire at a range of 15 kilometres. The hazy visibility created problems for both sides but the position of the sun gave a significant advantage to the German captains.

After receiving five hits from the German battlecruiser, Von Der Tann, the British battlecruiser, Indefatigable, sunk at 16.03 after a magazine explosion. More than 1,000 sailors on the Indefatigable were killed as a result of the blast. At 16.25 Queen Mary also exploded and went down in only 90 seconds. Two destroyers on both sides were also sunk during this period.

The situation of Beatty's ships became more difficult with the arrival of Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer and the German High Seas Fleet. Sir John Jellicoe, aboard Iron Duke, and the rest of the Grand Fleet, were 20km northwest of Sir David Beatty when the initial battle started. Jellicoe's battlecruiser squadrons headed quickly towards Beatty's fleet but she before they arrived, Invincible became the third of Britain's battleships to explode after a German shell penetrated a turret at 18.33.

The Grand Fleet opened fire immediately it arrived. Scheer, recognizing his dangerous position, ordered his ships to turn north. Jellicoe, fearing that Scheer was trying to lead the Grand Fleet into a submarine trap or minefield, ordered his ships not to follow. Instead he headed southeast and then south, hoping to intercept Scheer's homeward journey. At 19.10 the two fleets made contact again. Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer ordered Admiral Hipper's battleships to charge the Grand Fleet, while ordering the rest of his ships to turn away from the fighting. After 20 minutes of firing, Admiral Hipper also headed home.

Again, unwilling to follow the same route as the German ships, Sir John Jellicoe headed south-west and managed to intercept Hipper at 20.15. Lutzow was sunk and Seydlitz and Derfflinger were badly damaged before the British decided once again not to follow the retreating German ships.

Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer and the German Navy immediately claimed victory based on the number of ships destroyed. Whereas the British Navy lost 3 battlecruisers, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers (6,100 casualties); the German Navy lost 1 battleship, 1 battlecruiser, 4 light cruisers and 3 destroyers (2,550 casualties).

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was criticised for being over-cautious, but he argued that it was vitally important to protect the size of his Grand Fleet. Whereas Jellicoe was able to inform the British government on 2nd June that the Grand Fleet was ready for further action, the German High Seas Fleet had to be reconstructed and was never in the position to risk another major North Sea confrontation. Jellicoe was therefore able to claim that his tactics were justified by the battle's long-term effects.