Korea
The environment in Korea presents several unique challenges for the protection of American service members, civilians and family members. While the force protection posture continues to improve, United States Forces Korea has 95 installations across the peninsula, many quite small and remote. These 95 installations have been organized into 12 ?enclaves? for more centralized planning, execution, and coordination of resources and to provide a clear chain of command responsibility.

Most American troops will be moved out of Seoul by the end of 2007, and all of the US 2nd Infantry Division that's currently patrolling the region north of Seoul will be moved south of Seoul by 2008. Existing military facilities at Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys, both located south of Seoul, are being expanded and upgraded to accept the redeployed forces.

South Korea is located in northeastern Asia and is officially known as the Republic of Korea. It occupies the southern portion of the Korean Peninsula, it is bounded on the north by North Korea; on the east by the Sea of Japan; on the southeast and south by the Korea Strait, which separates it from Japan; and on the west by the Yellow Sea. It has a total area of 98,484 sq km (38,025 sq mi), including numerous off-lying islands in the south and west, the largest of which is Cheju (area, 1829 sq km/706 sq mi). The state of South Korea was established in 1948 following the post-World War II partitioning of the peninsula between the occupying forces of the U.S. (in the south) and the USSR (in the north). North Korean armed forces invaded South Korea in June, 1950 resulting in massive destruction to the nation.

The Republic of Korea has the most heavily defended border in the world. Though the probability of conflict remains low, the potential of hostilities occurring on the Korean peninsula is greater than in many other parts of the world.

The Korean War never ended. In its place is a fragile armistice. On the 15th of every month the Korean government holds civil defense drills. At 1400 hours the air raid sirens are sounded and everyone in South Korea must get off the streets and into the nearest building. As soon as you hear the sirens, go inside, whether you are walking, riding a bicycle, or driving a military or civilian vehicle. About 20 minutes later, the "all clear" is sounded and everyone can resume their outside activities. Comply with the regulation! If the 15th falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the civil defense drill is held on the nearest weekday.

At the outbreak of the Korean War the U.S. did not have any airbases established in Korea. After some quick reconnaissance missions, the U.S. Air Force identified several airfields they would have to use. Because the names of these fields were so confusing i.e. Pyonggang and Pyongyang, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) decided to assign an alphanumeric designation to them. It started chronologically, the first field used, Pusan West would be K-1, Taegu K-2, etc. However the chronological system faltered and a policy of designating K-bases seemed non-existent. This may explain why some fields were designated but not used and other fields were used but not identified. The most glaring example of this is the airfield of Hagaru-ri just south of the Chosin reservoir. Although major airlift operations were conducted here, as described in William M. Leary?s Anything, Anywhere, Anytime Combat Cargo in the Korean War, the FEAF did not designate it a number. It is also important to note those operations originating from K-bases did not make up the entire air effort. Augmenting these activities were multiple role aircraft launched form aircraft carriers, cargo aircraft and heavy bombers from Japan, and helicopters from the A bases located on the peninsula.

The road network throughout the Republic of Korea is not to the same standard as the network in the U.S. and most of Europe. It is often inadequate to support U.S. Army traffic. Added to this is the industrial revolution currently ongoing in South Korea which has seen an explosion in the number of cars and trucks now in country. The industrial revolution has also seen a large-scale expansion of urbanized areas that further contribute to traffic congestion. Although road construction appears to be taking place everywhere, it is not keeping pace with the influx of new vehicles. Along with increased traffic congestion, a particular concern to military planners is the number of underclass bridges in country that will not support U.S. Army tracked and wheeled vehicles. Many bridges that originally supported heavy traffic are now old and show signs of stress, making them difficult to classify. At the same time, the U.S. Army is upgrading tanks to the newer M1A1-HA and introducing the new HET (M1070 Tractor/M1000 Semitrailer). A combined weight of the HET transporting the improved M1 weighs out at Military Load Class 95, far above what most bridges in country will support. For this reason, movement plans often include down-loading tracks at underclass bridges. This can significantly increase convoy movement times. It also adds additional risk factors to the unit's movement. A thorough risk assessment must be performed for all convoy movements. Movement routes must be thoroughly checked prior to convoy movement. This includes inspecting movement routes to identify the best times of day (usually night) for movement, and This includes inspecting movement routes to identify the best times of day (usually night) for movement, and checking all bridges for adequate load classification. Rock drop structures are common and of varied sizes throughout the 2ID area of operations. Many of these structures are too narrow to allow two-way traffic when moving outsized vehicles such as the M1 Tank. In addition, some outsized vehicles will not fit through certain rock drops even if restricted to one-way traffic. On some routes there is a double set of rock drops.

US Forces in Korea are currently scattered across 41 troop installations, and an additional 54 small camps and support sites. The living and working conditions on these camps are the worst in DOD, and the investment required to bring them all up to standard would be enormous. Rapid growth and urbanization in Korea over the last several decades has created an even greater demand for available land and increased encroachments and pressures on areas used by US forces. Many of the smaller US camps and training areas originally in isolated locations are now in the center of large urban areas. This causes friction with local residents and often limits the ability to train effectively.

The Land Partnership Plan is a joint US and ROK solution to these problems. The Defense Ministry and the USKF signed the LPP in March 2002, under which the USFK will reduce the number of its bases from 41 to 23 and return to South Korea roughly 50 percent of the land it currently uses, equivalent to some 135 million square meters, by 2011.

Some Koreans share a view of the universe which may seem somewhat conspiratorial to Americans. Korea has been kicked or pushed around during much of the past century by the Japanese, the Communists and their own military. Many Koreans think the U.S. is nearly omnipotent, especially with the demise of the former Soviet Union. When the KCIA director assassinated President Park Chung Hee in 1979, some Koreans assumed the U.S. was behind it or at least knew about it in advance. When Roh, Tae Woo (1988-1993) won the 1987 presidential election, they thought the U.S. arranged it; had Kim, Dae Jung (elected ROK President on 18 DEC 97) been elected at the time, they would have assumed it was because the U.S. had supported him. That's why some Koreans cannot imagine that the U.S. Army was not somehow involved with ROK Army 's participation during the 1980 Kwangju incident. Others suspect the U.S. is preparing to withdraw from Korea and is holding secret talks with North Korea unbeknownst to Seoul. That's why so many thought the dispatch of Patriot missiles to USFK was motivated by a desire to sell them to the ROK.

The United States is committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and agreed in the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to help the Republic of Korea defend itself from external aggression. In support of this commitment, the United States currently maintains about 37,000 service personnel in South Korea, including the Army's Second Infantry Division and several Air Force tactical squadrons. To coordinate operations between these units and the 650,000-strong South Korean Armed Forces, a Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established in 1978. The CFC is headed by General John Tilelli, who also serves as commander in chief of the 16-member-nation UN Command (UNC) and the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK).

Several aspects of the security relationship are changing as the United States moves from a leading to a supporting role in the defense of the Republic of Korea. South Korea has agreed to pay a larger portion of USFK's stationing costs and to promote changes in the CFC command structure. On December 1, 1994, peacetime operational control authority over all South Korean military units, then still under U.S. operational control, was transferred to the ROK Armed Forces.

Throughout the postwar period, tensions have continued between the Korean governments, although the late 1980s and early 1990s saw some efforts to promote North-South dialogue and better relations. The United States believes that the question of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula is, first and foremost, a matter for the Korean people themselves to decide. The United States is prepared to assist in this process if the two sides desire.

In April 1996, President Clinton and ROK President Kim Young Sam announced a proposal for four-party talks (the U.S., ROK, DPRK, and China) with the goal of establishing a permanent peace mechanism to replace the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement. The opening plenary session of the talks was held in December 1997 in Geneva.

A complex trend of events since mid-1999 has generated public attention on US forces in Korea and its role in the ROK. With the June 2000 historic presidential summit between South and North Korea and significant warming of relations between both nations since then, many South Koreans no longer see North Korea as a major threat. Other strains between the US and the ROK include: the fall-1999 revelation of potential American soldier participation in Korean War massacres (e.g. No Gun Ri); environmental impact issues (e.g., July 2000 Yongsan illegal formaldehyde disposal issue); Korean encroachment onto US training lands and resulting dangers (e.g., Kooni range); the "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Korean War," which serves as an occasion for the release of long pent-up criticism about the US government?s historic role on the Korean peninsula; and our Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the US and ROK government, which protects the rights of individual soldiers and USFK. SOFA has evolved over the years from an irritant into what top ROK government officials concede is a major public issue.

During 2001, the U.S. and the ROK successfully negotiated several important alliance issues. The Special Measures Agreement (SMA), once completed, will significantly increase contributions to the maintenance of U.S. troops on the Peninsula. Under the SMA, the ROK will cover 50 percent of the non-personnel stationing costs for U.S. forces by 2004. The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) has also reached a tentative agreement with the ROK government on a Land Partnership Plan (LPP) that will consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 26 while enhancing training and combined warfighting capability. Commander USFK and the ROK Ministry of National Defense have agreed to review the 1990 agreement to relocate Yongsan Army Garrison, the home of USFK, from its location in downtown Seoul.

The U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement is an international agreement designed to serve the mutual interests of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea to regulate all matters related to the presence of U.S. armed forces involved in defending the ROK from external aggression. It protects the basic human rights of U.S. citizens subject to its provisions. The SOFA defines the legal rights and obligations of Servicemembers while serving in Korea and provides facilities and land for military use. The Agreement also ensures a supportive environment for the US military forces, essential to ensuring a basic quality of life. In effect, the SOFA covers everything concerning USFK military and civilian personnel and their dependents ? from their entry into, until their exit from the ROK.

The SOFA sets forth each nation?s responsibilities with respect to many subjects, including facilities and areas used by U.S. forces, entry and exit of U.S. personnel, customs, taxation, criminal jurisdiction, claims procedures, health and sanitation, use of utilities and USFK?s employment of Korean citizens.

The SOFA applies to members of the U.S. armed forces, civilian employees, invited contractors, technical representatives and their dependents. Civilian and military personnel of the U.S. Embassy and JUSMAG-K enjoy privileges under the SOFA, but are covered by separate agreements with the ROK government.

SOFA-status personnel are obliged to respect the laws of the ROK and abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement and, in particular, from any political activity. In some cases the SOFA supersedes or abridges Korean law. For example, active-duty military personnel are exempt from passport and visa requirements and SOFA-status personnel are exempt from Korean taxes on wages and salaries paid by the U.S. government.

For SOFA-status personnel entering Korea on a passport, the Korean visa should be category "A-3" and authorize "multiple entry." Passport holders must also have "SOFA Verification" stamped next to the visa. Application for "A-3" and multiple-entry visa classification and SOFA verification are made free-of charge on request at any ROK Immigration Office. Contact the local Army Community Service (ACS), Military or Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) for information and necessary paperwork.

The SOFA also fully acknowledges the ROK government?s right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over USFK personnel accused of violating Korean laws. Accused military personnel remain in U.S. custody until all judicial proceedings are completed, including appeals. Civilians may be placed into ROK custody if the charges are serious and their presence for trial cannot be guaranteed.

SOFA-status personnel are encouraged to carry a "SOFA Card" at all times. The card (USFK FL 1EK) includes instructions in case you are involved with Korean law enforcement officials and need assistance. A statement of SOFA status and emergency telephone numbers are written in Korean and English. SOFA cards are available through unit orderly rooms and civilian personnel offices.

In late March 2002 it was reported that Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, commander of US Forces in Korea, had announed that the US planned to shut about half of its military bases in South Korea over the coming decade, without reducing the number of troops from the current 37,000. About a third of American troops will move, consolidating all American forces at 23 facilities. The $2.5 billion move is intended to return land to South Koreans and to increase the efficiency of American troops. One significant part of the plan is the improvement in the living conditions for US troops. Poor housing conditions have been a notorious part of service in Korea. South Korea agreed to pay $1.12 billion of the $2.5 billion price of the project. When the 10-year project is complete, 25 percent of US troops in South Korea will be able to bring their families with them, versus the the current level of 10 percent. This would still be less than the 75 percent level of troops with families in Japan, Germany and other US bases overseas.

In April 2002 South Korea agreed to contribute about $463 million to US Forces Korea (USFK) for upkeep for the year. During the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Washington in mid-November 2001, Korea agreed to increase its budget for USFK by 10.4 percent for the year 2002, from $444 million to $490 million. Due to an increase in the proportion of Korea's payment denominated in won, the actual contribution by Korea was reduced to $463 million. The Korean payments for South Korean nationals hired by USFK accounts for almost half of Korea's share.

In late 2002 and early 2003 reports began to surface indicating that the United States would propose the shifting of US forces from Seoul to locations further south.

A senior ranking U.S. military official said on 25 April 2003 that most of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) will be moved to Osan-Pyeongtaek area in the long term, heightening the possibility that the headquarters of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command (UNC), currently in Yongsan Garrison, will be moved to the area. ? There is a long-term vision that has most of the U.S. forces located in the Osan/Pyeongtaek area,? said Maj. Gen. James Soligan, Deputy Chief of Staff UNC/USFK to reporters after giving a speech before 250 American Korean War veterans in Seoul. ?There are clearly discussions going on, but no decisions have been made. That?s a long-term objective.? According to Soligan, the USFK hopes to realign and consolidate its bases, currently scattered throughout the peninsula, into two major ?hubs? _ one in the Osan-Pyeongtaek area, home of the Osan Air Base, and the other in the Daegu-Busan area, which includes Camp Hialeah. It was the first time the USFK indicated a major reshuffle of military base positions. Changes in the existing Land Partnership Plan (LPP) South Korea and the U.S. signed in 2001 to consolidate U.S. military bases are inevitable as a result.

On 03 June 2003, General Leon J. LaPorte the head of US Forces Korea, announced in a forum at the Korean National Assembly that roughly 6,000 of the total 7,000 troops would be relocated. US and Republic of Korea officials agreed to a plan to realign American forces stationed in "The Land of the Morning Calm." In June 4-5 meetings held in the South Korean capital city of Seoul, according to a joint U.S.-South Korean statement, it was decided the operation would consist of two phases. During Phase 1 US forces at installations north of the Han River would consolidate in the Camp Casey (Tongduchon) and Camp Red Cloud (Uijongbu) areas. Both bases are north of Seoul and the Han, but well south of the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea. The 14,000-strong US Army 2nd Infantry Division, which provides troops to bases near the DMZ, is headquartered at Camp Red Cloud. During Phase 2 US forces north of the Han River would move to key hubs south of the Han River. US and Korean officials agreed to continue rotational US military training north of the Han even after Phase 2 is completed.

On 17 November 2003 the United States and South Korea agreed in principle to move most American forces south from the demilitarized zone along the border with North Korea. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in the country's capital for the annual Security Consultative Meeting between defense officials from the two countries. Officials agreed to relocate American forces in the north of the country ? primarily the Army's 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey ? in two phases. First, they will be consolidated into a smaller footprint. Then they will be moved to the southern part of the country. Eventually, officials explained, US forces in Korea will be centered on two main "hubs" in the south.